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ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of corruption in the context of civil wars is of increasing interest in schol-
arly literature. Colombia exhibits a particular case in which right-wing paramilitaries from
the United Self-Defence of Colombia, strongly supported in drug tra*cking activities, col-
luded with local politicians and captured the subnational state in many a region, under a
phenomenon known as “parapolitics” or the politics of paramilitaries. Unlike the latest gen-
eration of armed conflicts in which warlords have sought to deconstruct the state, Colom-
bian paramilitaries levered their strategic interests within the existing institutional framework,
backed by local political elites and authorities, and pivoted on patron-client ties. In the context
of these alliances, paramilitaries provided politicians with a violent muscle meant to protect
electoral processes and maximize votes. In return, politicians protected paramilitary activ-
ities and represented the Self- Defence warlords in Congress in order to feed their political,
judicial and economic domains.
By elucidating the nature of “parapolitics” and by addressing the question of why (condi-
tions), how (mechanisms) and to what purpose (ultimate goal) did the phenomenon emerge
in Colombia, I examine in subnational comparative perspective the cases of Sucre and Norte
de Santander departments. By building causal paths in historical perspective I substantiate
parapolitics in the selected cases as well as variations in the processes and outcomes thereof.
Although the cases do not represent the whole universe of “parapolitics”, causal paths help
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INTRODUCT ION
In 2002, at the pinnacle of its military power, the right-wing paramilitary organizationUnited Self-Defence of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), an irregu-
lar warring actor involved since the mid-1990s in fighting the left-wing oriented guerrillas of
the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
bia – FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN),
engaged with the first Uribe administration (2002–2006) in a rocky process of peace talks and
demobilization. In late 2006, over 34,000 AUC’s combatants demobilized. The peace process
with paramilitaries was successful in terms of the dismantling of a massive military structure
responsible for hundreds of thousands of killings and over a million displaced civilians, and
of the relative distension of the internal conflict in many a region. Nevertheless, the process
revealed that beneath the violence and humanitarian crisis unleashed by paramilitaries lay a
large-scale phenomenon of collusion of AUC warlords with politicians and of AUC’s state
capture at the national and subnational levels. Paramilitaries had made alliances with a sig-
nificant share of elected and appointed politicians between 1998 and 2007, diverted hundreds
of millions of dollars from public co(ers, and penetrated the judiciary and security agencies.
This phenomenon, known as “parapolitics” – a term meant for designating the collusion of
paramilitaries and politicians – established an elite of ultra-violent warlords, intimately linked
to drug tra*c and deeply entrenched in local and national power networks. Likewise it led
politics, and many elected politicians and appointed o*cials to the road of criminality.
By the time theAutodefensas demobilized, the organization no longer required the massive
military apparatus it had built throughout a decade as the organization had by then robust
political connections in various regions and at the highest levels, its members had amassed
extraordinary personal wealth and even tried to participate directly in local politics. The po-
litical, economic and violent capital built by paramilitaries not only served the Autodefensas
legitimation process inmany a subnational setting but also – andmost importantly – provided
the muscle for influencing the congressional sphere. Allied Congress members voted the so-
called Justice and Peace Law, which provided the AUC’s demobilization framework. This
legal framework not only provided a safe-conduct to legality with high levels of impunity and
the protection of theAutodefensas’wealth and assets; the demobilization process constituted
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a promising avenue for paramilitaries to pursue political power. In this vein, the AUC consti-
tuted a threat beyond the sphere of public security and jeopardized to a significant extent the
country’s institutional stability.
However, at that point the relationship between crime and politics in Colombia was not
new anymore – it can be traced back to the early 1980s with the emergence of the Medellín
drug cartel. Since then there had been several attempts at capturing the state and influencing
politics in a long coevolving thread of criminalized politics and politicized crime. Francisco
Gutiérrez analyses the pursuit of power by criminals in his extraordinary work on Colombian
political parties (2007) and accounts for three main stages of the phenomenon. The first one
took place in the early 1980s when infamous drug baron Pablo Escobar joined the Congress
as Representative for a short termwith the support of some of the most powerful barons from
the Liberal party in order to advance the Medellín cartel’s agenda against extradition1. Soon
after he was expelled from Congress2, Escobar continued its enterprise against extradition
from the underground, where he engaged in a terrorist and magnicidal war against the state.
Escobar’s e(orts in fighting extradition proved fruitless as extradition was enacted in the 1991
constitutional reform, two years before he was shot dead by Colombian security forces. The
second stage took place in the early 1990s, when the Cali cartel chose a di(erent strategy,
namely that of infiltrating politics in a top-down fashion by massively financing the presiden-
tial campaign of Liberal candidate Ernesto Samper. Despite the magnitude of the scandal
and the consequent U.S. pressure against his administration3, Samper was elected in 1994 and
remained in o*ce until the end of his mandate, in 1998. This time the aim of the infiltration
was the protection of the cartel members and their illegal and legal activities from the very
top of the state. Nonetheless, Gutiérrez explains that the failure of this top-down infiltration
occurred not only because of the over-exposure the most visible area of the Liberal party but
also because it was unsuccessful in reaching the subnational circuits which constitute the nat-
ural niches for building electoral capital (2007). Under a great deal of pressure from the U.S.,
the Colombian government extradited the whole Cali cartel’s leadership in 1995.
1Although the bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. was signed in 1979, it only became a constitutional
norm in 1991. Before that the treaty was in a legal and political limbo (presidential discretion and alleged uncon-
stitutionality). In this context drug barons put maximum pressure through terrorism and magnicide in order to
ban the extradition of Colombian nationals.
2In 1982, and before being publicly known as a criminal, Pablo Escobar was alternate Representative for
the Liberal party. He sought to use his political position to overturn the extradition treaty with the U.S. By 1984,
Escobar was one of themost wanted criminals in the world and therefore his parliamentary immunity was revoked.
From that point he went into hiding until his killing in 1993.
3TheU.S. State Department decertifiedColombia’s performance in the anti-narcotics e(orts in 1996 and 1997,
a matter that had pervasive political consequences for the Samper’s administration.
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It was only in the late 1990s, when the internal armed conflictwas entrenchedwith drug traf-
ficking, that the politics-crime connection reached its most important level of sophistication
and therefore of success under parapolitics. But where did these paramilitary groups come
from? How did they entrench with organized crime in the context of the Colombian internal
conflict? Paramilitary groups emerged in Colombia as private illegal security structures cre-
ated by drug barons of the likes of Pablo Escobar and Gonzalo Rodríguez in the early 1980s,
aimed at protecting illicit drug trade and enforcing contracts. The rural rich, politicians and
militaries in turn instrumented these groups at the subnational level in what Gutiérrez and
Barón (2006) call the “guild-party-militia trinity” intended to protect the electoral processes of
traditional politicians against competitors, enforcing rural private property against landless
peasants’ occupation, and providing counterinsurgent dirty-work of eliminating guerrillas’
civilian support. This phase of first generation of paramilitaries lasted until the early 1990s.
During that decade these structures were responsible for an unprecedented wave of political
violence against politicians who opposed drug tra*ckers, Left-wing militants, and human
rights activists among others.
Between 1990 and 1994 paramilitary groups experienced a temporary decline due to Pablo
Escobar’s death and the dismantling of theMedellín cartel. During that time, FARC and ELN
guerrillas dramatically expanded throughout the national territory and were systematically
threatening society as well as the country’s economic and productive infrastructure. There
was a general perception that the state was incapable of defeating guerrillas and that in many
regions it had simply surrendered. It was in this context where the escalation of guerrilla
warfare produced the stabilization of private security through the creation of the second gen-
eration of paramilitary groups. Instead of seeking a public response to violence, the “guild-
party-militia trinity” involved in financing private armies and legal security structures. The
latter is the case of the so-calledConvivir, poorly regulated rural private security cooperatives
authorized by the government in the mid 1990s4, which became the nursery of the AUC.
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia surfaced in northern Colombia, in the Urabá re-
gion in Antioquia department in 1996, and were created by Carlos Castaño who, along with
his brothers Fidel and Vicente, had commanded a regional paramilitary structure that had
served the Medellín Cartel during the 1980s in Antioquia. This structure, which experienced
4According to AUC commander Salvatore Mancuso (Martínez, 2004), Convivir were not only the reserve
source of paramilitaries; the project was strongly articulated to the creation of the AUC. A total of 414 Convivir
were created between 1995 and 1996. In 1997 the Constitutional Court declared the unenforceability of the decrees
that authorized the creation of these private security cooperatives. After that, many Convivir managers and
members went clandestine and joined the AUC.
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a brief decline in the early 1990s, rearmed in 1994 under the label of Peasant Self-Defence
of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU – Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá) and acted
in concomitance with the local Convivir structure. Between 1994 and 1996 the ACCU en-
gaged in a bloody war against FARC in the Urabá region and in only two years the organiza-
tion had fully subdued guerrillas and committed massive human rights abuses. The ACCU
model proved so e*cient that the Castaño “house” succeeded in gathering eightAutodefensas
groups from all over the country such as the Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare (ACC),
and Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio (ACMM), and other 34 paramilitary
structures from other regions, in order to create the AUC in 1997. The organization had a
national scope and was vertically articulated around its counter-insurgent discourse, which
made it the third actor in Colombia’s protracted internal conflict. However, the AUC was
also horizontally integrated via warlords’ private agendas and interests mostly linked to drug
tra*c. The AUC had a supreme commander, Carlos Castaño, and a general sta( formed
by other prominent warlords such as Salvatore Mancuso, “Ernesto Báez”, “Jorge 40, “Pablo
Sevillano” and “Diego Vecino”; however, it was a confederate body and warlords had a great
deal of autonomy in their regions. The transformation from scattered private armies to an
organized warring actor with political pretensions represented what Cubides (2005) refers as
to the finding of the public objective of counterinsurgency to fulfil private goals.
The Autodefensas rapidly expanded throughout the Colombian territory in order to con-
front guerrillas, capture the rents from illegal and legal economies traditionally controlled by
FARC and ELN, and secure drug tra*cking corridors. The AUC was most successful in cen-
tral and northernColombiawheremany territorieswere rapidly transformed into “subversion-
free” areas, thanks to the open support of local establishments, the public force and drug traf-
fickers. Nonetheless, the expansion towards the southern regions was not as fruitful insofar
as historically, FARC was in control of these areas and dismantling its political, economic,
military and social infrastructure proved extremely di*cult.
In the context of the crossed vertical-horizontal agendas of warlords, the geographic expan-
sion or the process of what Ramírez (2005) calls “private territorialization” of the AUC were
not only defined by a counter-insurgent strategy, but followed mainly to subnational political,
military and economic interests. These interests and their interactions significantly varied
throughout the territory. In some regions, AUC structures were financed and supported by
local establishments – politicians in need of protection of electoral enterprises and rural rich
seeking personal protection against guerrillas – as it was the case of the Caribbean coast de-
partments. In other regions these structures were directly supported by sectors of the national
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armed forces looking for counter-insurgent “dirty work”, and drug tra*ckers in need of pro-
tection of coca crops, as it was the case of northeastern Colombia. Other type of dynamics
could be observed in departments such as Valle del Cauca5, Arauca and Casanare where local
drug barons bought AUC franchises and established local armies that protected coca crops,
drug tra*cking corridors and export points. Nonetheless it is noteworthy that the Autode-
fensas did not exclusively expand “on demand”: warlords also had their own agendas which
comprised increasing their participation in the illegal drugs production and trade as well as
taking over the local state by controlling electoral enterprises, appointments to key o*ces and
public budgets.
The Autodefensas operated during two main stages. During the first stage (1998–2001)
paramilitaries created what Oslender (2008) calls “geographies of terror” by focusing on the
support of military and police forces in terror campaigns against civilians considered as the
alleged social bases of guerrillas.6 It is calculated that the death toll of the paramilitary o(en-
sive was of over 150,000 civilians killed inmassacres and selective assassinations7 and over one
million displaced people. Warlords also amassed great wealth during this stage by increasing
their participation in the illicit drugs market via alliances with existing organized crime syn-
dicates or via the dispute of territories with FARC. To a significant extent the alliances with
drug cartels were successful8 andmany drug tra*ckers bought AUC franchises. However, the
dispute with FARC was costly and bloody, and not always successful. On the other hand, by
forcibly dispossessing peasants from their land and generating a “counter-agrarian reform”
(Echandía, 2006; Reyes; 1997), AUC warlords emerged as a new class of rural landowners.9
5According to Fernando Cubides (2005) and Restrepo and Llano (2005), the paramilitary expansion in the
Norte del Valle region was articulated by the emergence of the region’s drug cartel soon after the Cali cartel
was dismantled in the early 1990s. The incursion of the AUC through the Calima Bloc mainly responded to the
needs of providing security to the expansion of the Norte del Valle cartel’s infrastructure (processing laboratories,
clandestine runways and embankment points) towards peripheral areas controlled by FARC. In this manner, the
Calima Bloc reinforced the structures of drug tra*cking in the region andthe mafia apparatus was regionally
positioned through the military power of the AUC.
6There are very few cases of direct guerrillas-paramilitary confrontation; theAUC’s strategy clearly privileged
attacking civilians (peasants, union workers, human rights activists, and members of the Left).
7Paramilitary terror included a strong ingredient of “ritual” violence, a “legacy” from La Violencia times:
dismemberment with chain saws, stoning, use of poisonous snakes, sexual aggression on dead bodies, etc.
8SalvatoreMancuso, one of the AUC top commanders, confessed allying with and protecting renowned drug-
tra*ckers of the like of Hernando Gómez Bustamante, alias “Rasguño” from the Norte del Valle Cartel; Fabio
Ochoa Vasco, alias “Kiko Chiquito” from Medellín, José Antonio Herrera Hernández (“Toño Cacao”), Jorge
Luis Hernández Villazón (’Boliche’) and José Israel Guzmán (“El Arquitecto”) (VerdadAbierta, 2009)
9According to the NGO Codhes, since 1990 the AUC snatched through violence, intimidation and money
laundering almost 4.7 million hectares from peasant families who owned small farmstead, causing a humanitar-
ian crisis of more than 2.5 million internally displaced people. According to the United Nations Drug Control
Programme – UNDCP – the estimated value of warlords’ land has an estimated value of US$2.4 billion.
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AUC’s second stage (2001–2006) was that of parapolitics: warlords established innumer-
able alliances with politicians and paved the road for their reincorporation into civilian life.
The legal/illegal interaction of parapolitics, as the ultimate stage of the politics-crime alliance,
built what Carroll (1972) refers as to “disintegrative power”, a relatively di(use yet e(ective
capacity to erode and even bring to collapse the existing social, political and economic insti-
tutions via violence and corruption.
research questions: a conceptual approach to parapolitics
This thesis aims at shedding a light on parapolitics by contributing to the understanding of
the nature of the phenomenon; the factors that explain the clique and coevolution of paramil-
itarism and politics in contemporary Colombia; the mechanisms used, and the ultimate pur-
pose thereof.
From a sociological perspective, the emergency of drug tra*ckers in Colombia implied
the rise of a “criminal social class”, which, like any other emergent class, has sought social
recognition, economic predominance and political power. Literature has largely overlooked
the value of political representation in the context of political-criminal connections. The rela-
tionships between crime and politics have been mostly depicted at the basic level of exchange,
or what DellaPorta and Vanucci (1999) refer as to “transactional corruption”: criminals de-
mand privileges and special treatment from the police and courts whereas politicians ask for
votes, money, and, in some cases, the elimination of their competitors. Indeed, immunity and
impunity constitute the most valuable assets for criminals. Nonetheless, the incorporation
of the “political market” into the “criminal market” is far more complex than its contrac-
tual sphere. The fact that parapolitics significantly transformed many subnational settings
in terms of politics, economic accumulation and social integration demands an examination
that beyond its transactional domain connects to the basic political and economic subnational
processes that facilitated parapolitics.
I address three main research questions I consider central for understanding parapolitics
beyond its transactional sphere.
The first question relates to the nature of the phenomenon: what is parapolitics? Parapoli-
tics is a category created by Colombian journalists, and beyond factual description it does not
provide conceptual and analytical keys for explaining the hijacking of the public sphere via the
alliances between politicians and paramilitaries. Nevertheless, if filled in with such keys, the
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term may constitute a helpful concept to encompass the complex nature of the phenomenon
and capture all possible permutations of historical interactions and the building of consensus
between AUC warlords and politicians that shaped specific processes in many a region.
The second question is about the nature of the AUC: what and who were paramilitaries
in Colombia? This seemingly simple question is fundamental for determining the complex
nature of this actor who beyond its criminal and anti-subversive spheres was capable of trans-
forming political, economic and social landscapes. Answering this question allows determin-
ing the degree of autonomy of the AUC from the state apparatus and its connection with
distinct forms of power and accumulation among others
The third question: why, how and to what purpose did parapolitics take place? The why
is related to the conditions that facilitated parapolitics in Colombia, that is the factors at
play beyond the phenomenon’s transactional sphere; the how relates to the strategies and
mechanisms of parapolitics; and the purpose refers to the ultimate goals of warlords and
politicians in the context of such arrangements.
parapolitics and available literature
Parapolitics has been widely discussed in Colombia amidst a strongly politicized debate and
an unprecedented judicial o(ensive against hundreds of elected and appointed politicians of
all levels, military, police and secret service o*cers, legal entrepreneurs and even multina-
tional firms involved with the AUC. Mass media, NGOs, and some think tanks have been
active in tackling the topic. Nevertheless, the academic debate has been comparatively poor,
which is quite surprising given not only the extraordinarily amount of judicial and journalis-
tic evidence generated over the last decade, but also the prolific production of literature on
the internal conflict by the Colombian academy – to the extent to which many scholars have
been classified into a species of discipline called “violentology”.
Regarding the first research question, that of establishing the nature of parapolitics, the
available literature can be organized along three strands. The first one is that of parapolitics
as a contract, in the works ofMauricio Romero (2004, 2005) and León Valencia (2007). These
authors portray parapolitics as an event in which local elites and paramilitaries interacted in
the framework of converging interests and consequently – and almost naturally – formed
alliances in order to rebel against the influence of the central state, namely against peace
e(orts undertaken by successive administrations.
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The second approach interprets parapolitics at the relational level. Acemoglu, Robinson,
and Santos (2009) tackle parapolitics as a symbiotic relationship between politicians and
paramilitaries that took place in peripheral Colombia. Using a quantitative approach, the
authors establish that elected Congress members in 2002 and 2006 rewarded the violent pro-
tection of elections by theAutodefensaswith a lenient legislative framework that benefited its
demobilization. The third line explores an institutional approach. Barrera and Nieto (2010)
o(er the idea of parapolitics as an institutional arrangement and a type of social relation, as
well as a two-way transaction of assets and favours.
The nature of paramilitaries in Colombia has been widely discussed. Besides being mostly
descriptive and imbued with a predominant rural view, knowledge on Colombian paramili-
tarism has also been importantly fragmented along ideological and disciplinary boundaries
and is, as a result, unsystematic, producing a long-standing gap between empirical evidence
and the lag of a rather scarce scholarly production. This gap is centrally related to the mul-
tifaceted and complex nature of the actor, the political and subnational dimensions, and the
ways in which they articulate diverse and even opposite interests (state and organized crime
syndicates).
The wide spectrum of classifications starts with the view of paramilitarism as a counterin-
surgent strategy, a species of Contras or of state irregulars that unleashed a dirty war regime
since the 1980s (Uprimny and Vargas, 1990; Medina Gallego, 1990). Others have classified
paramilitaries as organized groups parallel to the state but this parallel nature does not nec-
essarily imply any kind of syndication (Rangel, 2005). In this line Fernando Cubides (1998)
rejects the concept of “self-defence groups”, used by authors like Melo (1990) and Ramírez
(2005) insofar they were not created as a means of legitimate defence but as a private o(en-
sive instrument of drug tra*ckers, politicians, rural rich and the likes. Ramirez even rejects
using the “paramilitary” as a category at doing so suggests organic links to the state and ob-
scures the complex social alliances behind the phenomenon. Some scholars have adventured
in alternative approaches that instead of using the above mentioned denominations they ac-
count for concepts such as Vilma Franco’s multi-dimensional concept that entails a “coun-
terinsurgent complex” and “corporate mercenarism” (2002), the already mentioned “guild-
party-militia” trinity of Gutiérrez and Barón (2006); mafia organizations (Duncan, 2007), vi-
olent entrepreneurs (Romero, 2004; 2005), and elitist formations (Bolivar, 2005). There is also
the eclectic view of the 2003Human Development Report for Colombia, according to which
the AUC were simultaneously a political project, a military apparatus, an actor in regional
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social conflicts, rent-seekers, a way of life, a territorial power, a degraded violent actor, and a
trap against human development (INDH, 2003).
Regarding the why, that is the conditions that made parapolitics possible, Valencia (2007)
and Romero (2004, 2005) concur in that the successive – and fruitless – peace talks undertaken
by several administrations with guerrillas since 1984 have triggered a series of “mutinies” of
local elites who have used or allied with paramilitary groups in order to close subnational
boundaries against guerrillas as potential political competitors in eventual demobilization
processes. Following Edward Gibson’s concept of subnational authoritarianisms (2005), the
authors valuably base their analyses upon the confrontational nature of territorial politics vis-
à-vis the democratizing trends at the national level. In this vein, the confluence of criminal
and political interests under the contractual frame of parapolitics constitutes the ultimate
expression of the local resistance against the centre, specifically triggered by the peace talks
with FARC under the Pastrana administration (1998–2002).
The main contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2009) is that their analysis deviates from nor-
mative prescriptions and acknowledges that in the absence of the monopoly of coercion, state
formation has been possible in peripheral Colombia, although in a di(erent manner from that
of modern Colombia, as a result of the interaction of state and non-state actors (guerrilla and
paramilitaries). The analysis also states that the weakness of the state in these territories is
not only related to the high costs and barriers to accessing the periphery for state. This weak-
ness can be also explained by the fact that in many cases the incentives delivered by non-state
actors to state agents provide greater benefits than accessing the periphery for the pacifica-
tion, modernization and democratization thereof. In other words, instead of assuming the
high costs of bringing the state back into peripheral Colombia, state agents promote the ac-
commodation of armed groups with whom they share relatively similar preferences in order
to maximize votes.
The institutional approach of Barrera and Nieto (2010) acknowledges that the alliances of
AUC warlords and politicians were conditioned by specific contexts at the subnational level.
Despite the promising avenue of this work – it provides a series of elements to be taken into
account for building a conceptual framework that takes parapolitics to the institutional realm
– it does not actually construct it.
There are other works that do not exactly account for parapolitics but tackle paramili-
tary formation and evolution in Colombia. These works are based upon structural expla-
nations and historical analyses, and generally establish sophisticated causal paths to under-
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stand paramilitary formation, consolidation and evolution overtime. Romero (2004, 2005)
and Gutiérrez and Barón (2006) rely on the explanatory power of the AUC’s process of ter-
ritorial expansion. As the organization progressed throughout the geography it entrenched
in the subnational life and deeply transformed the political, economic and social landscapes.
In alliance with subnational elites, the AUC participated in the closure of boundaries of au-
thoritarian subnational regimes. Instead of referring to the concept of territorial expansion
Gonzalez et al., (2002) grant centrality to “geographies or war”, a category that goes one
step ahead and provides are more nuanced account more of the transformation of territories
under the influence of the AUC. In a similar vein, Ramírez (2005) refers to “private territo-
ries”. This category is also attractive in the sense that beyond the alteration of the territory
there is an appropriation thereof. All authors acknowledge the importance of alliances with
local bureaucracies, political bosses and rural rich in the strategies of territorial expansion or
appropriation, or of creation of geographies of war. They also agree with slight variations
on the type of political regime paramilitaries supported and reproduced. Alejandro Reyes
(1994; 1998) contends that paramilitary territorial expansion is the outcome of a process of
“agrarian counter-reform” undertaken through land accumulation.
Another important set of literature provides a sophisticated view on the subject of paramil-
itary formation related to the politicization of the AUC in the subnational space and its in-
teraction with distinct forms of accumulation. Authors like Pizarro (2004), Richani (1997,
2007), Cubides (2005), and Duncan (2007) provide a useful examination of the ways in which
the functional alliances between local elites, state actors, organized crime and paramilitaries
worked and reproduced at the subnational level, and are key to understanding parapolitics.
These authors spatially approach the alliances in the context of specific geographies of war,
which allows for subnational variations according to the particular ways in which the logics of
politics and of market interact. These authors argue that the interests of AUCwarlords and of
politicians at the local level and the interaction between politics and rent seeking were so di-
verse, that it is very di*cult to establish a general single hierarchy of interests. In some regions
the subordination to rent seeking seems evident but in others the paramilitary articulations
to distinct political projects is a predominant pattern.
A lens used for explaining the how, that is the mechanisms of parapolitics, is that of the
capture of the state, with the works of Garay et al. (2008, 2010) and López (2010). This
set of literature undertakes a conceptual e(ort to expand the reach of traditional literature
on state capture that focuses on forms of large-scale corruption, with individuals, groups or
firms as principal agents involved in influencing law, regulations and/or policy making pro-
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cesses (Hellman, 1998; Hellman et al., 2000; Omelyanchuk, 2001). Garay et al. go beyond
the transactional sphere of state capture and explore the notion of reconfiguring the state, a
process in which illegal armed actors play as central agents. The authors propose a model to
understand and predict complex scenarios of what they call the “co-opted reconfiguration of
the state”, which consists of the quest to systematically modify the political regime and in-
fluence the creation, modification, interpretation and application of rules and public policies
in order to obtain personal benefits in a sustainable fashion. In this model, violence plays a
central role.
The Nuevo Arco Iris Foundation’s research, led by Claudia López (2010), based upon the
idea of the co-opted reconfiguration of the state, goes beyond Garay et al. by systematically
approaching the subnational arena. The research o(ers detailed accounts –mainly descriptive
– of parapolitics in every Colombian department where the phenomenon took place. All cases
were thoroughly substantiated relying on field research and media archives and the research
o(ers an impressive wealth of empirical data. Under a di(erent scope, Losada (2006) focuses
on the general mechanism of electoral capture and through the analysis of the 2002 elections,
he identifies a series of types of politico-electoral strategies adopted by paramilitaries, a mech-
anism that permits accounting for subnational variations in parapolitics.
Gustavo Duncan (2007) provides an innovative view on the how from a perspective of po-
litical economy. According to Duncan, the AUC progressively mutated from countryside war-
lords to urban mafia networks. The urban infiltration of the AUC is significantly explained
by the weaknesses of the state and the changes in the state structure as a consequence of de-
mocratization and globalization. In this line of argument the author also contributes to an
important extent to the realm of the why. The infiltration process, strongly substantiated
upon empirical evidence, is analysed on four levels: the control of urban criminal activities,
urban poor sectors, poorly regulatedmarkets, and the seizure of public institutions. Although
for Duncan politics was the predominant goal of warlords, the market rationale complexly
intertwined with the former.
Finally, in the area where there seems to be the strongest consensus is regarding the purpose
of parapolitics, that is using the state – via the alliances made with politicians, o*cials, se-
curity agencies and the judiciary – with the aim of re-entering to civilian life with laundered
criminal records and assets, as well as political power and connections. For politicians, the
alliances served the purpose of reproducing power and winning elections. There are nonethe-
less di(erent emphases, from the more radical ones of Claudia López (2010; 2009) for whom
parapolitics was about the “re-foundation of the nation”, the “co-opted reconfiguration of the
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state” (Garay et al., 2008), to the progression from the countryside to urban centres (Duncan,
2007).
filling the gaps
Following the most promising avenues of enquiry suggested by this literature, I conducted
empirical research in subnational comparative perspective – explained below in theMethod
section – to try to answer the research questions addressed above. To a significant extent, the
existing academic literature has given rise to the same research questions I have addressed
yet none has fully solved or answered them. Researchers involved in this line of enquiry have
made very important contributions to explaining parapolitics, as seen above. It is important
to acknowledge that all reviewed literature, under di(erent perspectives, o(er plausible expla-
nations on the phenomenon, account for key conceptual dimensions and provide relevant em-
pirical support. The accounts provide valuable – yet scattered – conceptual keys for a stronger
conceptual and analytical approach: the tensions between national and subnational politics;
state building as a result of the interaction of state and non-state actors in peripheral regions;
state capture as a means to reconfigure the state; and the convergence of geographies of war
and local political economies. Likewise, the literature o(ers an impressive amount of data
on the subject. Yet, on the whole, the phenomenon remains under-examined and demands
not only further empirical analysis but also a stronger and more comprehensive theoretical
approach, and this research has suggested something of a solution for this puzzle.
There are two main shortcomings in the reviewed literature that in my perspective consti-
tute the central analytical pillars for a better understanding of the nature and reach of para-
politics, which require elaboration and that this research aims at solving. The first one is the
need of moving beyond transactional or contractual sphere of parapolitics. The idea of para-
politics as institutional arrangements and social relations provided by Barrera and Nieto is
extremely appealing insofar as it extends the assessment of parapolitics beyond the transac-
tions of assets and favours.. Unfortunately, the authors did not develop this line of enquiry
any further.
Second, and in spite of the vast empirical available evidence that accounts for the strong
variations within the universe of parapolitics, the literature fails in tackling the territorial
and temporary dissimilarities of parapolitics. López’ account of state capture at the subna-
tional level constitutes an impressive e(ort of bringing the whole universe of local parapoli-
25
filling the gaps
tics processes into a single line of research and provides valuable information on the subject.
Nonetheless, the mainly descriptive nature of the regional studies precludes the possibility of
undertaking at more conceptual and analytical levels any systematic substantiation of the sim-
ilarities/variations found. The outcome is uncritical in the sense it tends to homogenize the
spatial and temporal dimensions of parapolitics, providing only a single explanatory frame-
work, that of parapolitics as a conspiracy for taking over the state. Losada goes a step ahead
and accounts for di(erences by establishing di(erent ideal-type repertoires of alliances be-
tween warlords and politicians in the context of electoral processes. Although his account
fails in using these types within a wider analytical scope of subnational political economy, it
constitutes one of the few valuable e(orts to account for parapolitics as a subnational phe-
nomenon and on the heterogeneous nature thereof. My research showed that indeed parapol-
itics did not occur in the same way and at the same time across the Colombian geography,
a fact that supports the idea that the phenomenon was mainly built in a bottom-up fashion,
regionally, with some top-down concurrent trends, but was not a homogenous occurrence.
Regarding the first question on the nature of parapolitics, I propose understanding the
phenomenon as a subnational process of political economy, that is the political and economic
regimes that emerged at the level of subnational governance, where warlords and politicians
(and other key actors such as organized criminal structures and legal entrepreneurs) concurred
in the interaction of distinct forms of political power, economic accumulation, war economies
and collective violence.
In the following, I outline the threemain characteristics of parapolitics. The first one relates
to its directional nature, a point mostly overlooked in the literature. Parapolitics was mainly
built in a bottom-up fashion – with some state capture trends built in the opposite direction –
and therefore exhibits significant spatial and temporal variations. Space, understood as a site
in which conflicting power relations between di(erent levels of government and actors take
place, matters insofar as it accounts for territorial politics (Tarrow, 1978) or political topogra-
phies (Boone, 2003) as key concepts for understanding the organization of politics across
territories and the political processes that take place along territorial lines of conflict. Para-
politics took place subnationally as warlords and politicians interacted in the basic context of
local institution making and therefore the phenomenon was embedded in specific economic,
political and social contexts. Parapolitics o(ers varied repertoires that account for di(erent
permutations of political power, economic accumulation and war economies.
In terms of its temporal dimension, although the phenomenon took place in a specific
time frame (late 1990s – mid-2000s), it did not occur simultaneously and in the same fashion
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throughout the whole Colombian territory, which suggests it was not a phenomenon centrally
organized and orchestrated as many accounts claim. The temporal variations are linked with
spatial di(erences.
The second feature is the impossibility of decoupling collective violence from parapolitics.
Not only did violence become the main instrument for the building and supporting of these
processes of political economy. Violence strongly varied from one case to the other in terms of
its forms, intensities and purposes, and according to the lights shed by this research, violence
responded to the specific goals of parapolitics in each territory. In other words, the blending
of distinct subnational political and economic trajectories with varied patterns of collective
violence generated di(erent repertoires of parapolitics
The third feature is that these particular processes of political economy were not built out-
side the existing institutional framework but within the prevailing arrangements, producing
significant distortions outside framework by enabling transactions across boundaries (legal-
illegal; national-subnational; public-private; urban-rural) in order to maximize benefits (po-
litical, economic and social). The process was not aimed at overthrowing the state. This is not
a minor observation insofar as parapolitics did not generate a deconstructive type of power
such as those experienced in collapsed or failed states in which warlords build frameworks
of rule outside formal state institutions, based on personal ties in which patronage works
as a means of political control and convert organizational resources and goals into private,
non-collective benefits (Reno, 2000; (Zellman, 2007; Giustozzi (2005)
Regarding the second question, the nature of the AUC: Although my research aim was not
determining the nature of the AUC, and as such I did not work in this direction, the research
– specifically the interviews with AUC warlords – confirmed the accuracy of some interpreta-
tions found in the revised literature. I was able establish that the AUC was an autonomous
actor from the state, and that despite its counterinsurgent aims – which aligned the Autode-
fensas informally with sectors of the military and police – the AUC acted independently of
the objectives of the state and was a much more complex actor, being simultaneously adver-
sary, allied, parasite and predator of the state. Another finding, also supported in the existing
literature, is that the AUC was a confederation of warlords, mostly involved in drug tra*ck-
ing activities, who managed to act according to their private agendas whilst responding to the
organizational discourse. The AUC’s collective counter-insurgent discourse (master cleavage)




Another characteristic found is thatAUCwarlordswere boundary crossers, followingAhram
and King’s account on Burmese warlordism (2011). The authors’ starting point – the iden-
tification of warlordism with the realm of political economy – is the same as mine and this
regard warlords move beyond the criminal domain and interconnect the spheres of politics,
economy and culture and even make them interact. Although warlords – like gangsters –
are violent entrepreneurs, racketeers and economic producers, they conceptually di(er in the
sense that they master the manipulation and crossing of boundaries, that is conducting vi-
olent and non-violent transactions of legal and illegal commodities and of political goods,
across political, economic, and cultural lines. They are arbitrageurs. The concept of arbi-
trage can be applied beyond physical resources. AUC warlords not only sought out gradients
between di(erent market spheres (licit-illicit) but also of state authority; they constantly ma-
nipulated and crossed boundaries in order to deliver political goods (votes) by exploiting an
anti-subversive discourse at the subnational level, appealing to politicians, rural rich, and the
like. In the same vein, they were granted enough legitimacy to act within and outside the ex-
isting institutional framework and conducting all sorts of transactions across the legal-illegal
boundaries. Therefore, Duncan’s account on AUC as amafia organization noted above (2007)
is problematic and misleading insofar as it miscasts the political dimension and its complex
interaction with the economic rationale.
On the question of the why, the accounts revised above place great importance on the
weight of structural factors as triggers of paramilitary formation and parapolitics: the ten-
sion between centre and periphery, the interaction of state and non-state actors that shapes
distinct types of state formation of which parapolitics constitutes a phase thereof, and the
changes in the opportunity structure introduced by democratizing and liberalizing reforms,
among others. These are all of great value but these approaches are partial. Each one of the
abovementioned on its own does not seem to have enough explanatory power.
As stated above, although parapolitics pervaded most of the Colombian territory, there
were on the one hand substantial di(erences in the ways in which the phenomenon occurred
subnationally, and on the other hand, there were parapolitics-free territories. I therefore claim
that there was a series of conditions that a) facilitated/precluded parapolitics, and b) shaped
distinct forms thereof. In this vein, and in order to strengthen the explanatory power of the
research, I approached thewhy by incorporating a series of key variables to the analysis (state
formation processes, democratization, collective violence and crime, forms of accumulation,
and transformation of political parties), and for each of the selected cases – two subnational
units – I interacted them in historical perspective. These interactions permitted tracing causal
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paths that allowed systematizing the explanation of the specific forms and outcomes of para-
politics in the cases as well as substantiating the spatial and temporal di(erences found. These
key variables are discussed in the next chapter.
Regarding the how, I deal with three mechanisms used in the context of parapolitics. The
first one is that of state capture. The existing literature has incorporated state capture as a
way of explaining parapolitics. Such is the case of the “co-opted reconfiguration of the state”
by Garay et al. (2008) whose study remains at the conceptual level and does not provide any
empirical key for understanding the complexity of the concept. There is also the aforemen-
tioned study conducted by López on subnational cases of parapolitics, which under the state
capture prism constitutes an invaluable contribution to the empirical wing of parapolitics
studies. Nevertheless, I found that state capture on its own does not account for parapoli-
tics, and has not enough explanatory power insofar as it constitutes a form of transactional
corruption despite its levels of sophistication and therefore cannot account for more com-
plex interactions such as those I explain in my research. I assumed then state capture as a
mechanism of parapolitics, and as such it proved helpful for capturing the transactions and
contracting of the alliances between warlords and politicians.
The second mechanism I discuss is that of electoral strategies based upon Losada’s ideal
types of warlords’ electoral strategies that go from strong preferences vis-à-vis politics to indif-
ference. I resort to these types as mechanisms that permit locating warlords’ personal agendas
and consequently understanding the forms and outcomes of parapolitics in the selected cases.
I thoroughly discuss these strategies in Chapter 2.
The third mechanism incorporated in the analysis is that of violence. Violence did not only
constitute a counterinsurgent tool for paramilitaries and its military allies. It mainly had a
sense of social control for the establishment of authoritarian political regimes, securing mar-
kets of illegal commodities, and accumulation of wealth. Regarding the capture of the state,
it served the purpose of shielding parapolitics inasmuch as it provided access to information,
o*ce, financial resources, impunity and immunity to warlords and politicians. State capture
involved two critical spheres: that of protection, which entailed the collusion with military
and police members of all rankings, and the infiltration of the judiciary. The Autodefensas
supported the military in neutralizing FARC and ELN guerrillas and their alleged civilian sup-
port, often under tripartite arrangements with politicians, in the context of which paramili-
taries committed hundreds of thousands of crimes. AUCmembers also provided information
to local attorneys for the prosecution of alleged guerrilla members. In exchange, authorities
guaranteed impunity and immunity from investigation and prosecution. The second sphere
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is the capture of key institutions from where warlords could control and/or participate from
subnational governance, predate local public finances mainly via the diversion of contracts,
and influencing decision-making processes at the national executive and legislative levels.
Although not considered a mechanism, the urban/rural divide introduced by Duncan in his
analysis of warlords’ progression from the rural to urban areas is very useful for organizing
and di(erentiating the ways in which paramilitaries operated in either setting. This approach
is very enlightening in the sense it permits classifying warlords’ di(erentiated mechanisms
(labour-intensive and military-like strategies in the countryside and the network mafia-type
model in urban centres). These di(erentiatedmechanisms significantly played in shaping para-
politics, as discussed later.
Finally, regarding the purpose, for many analysts parapolitics was the outcome of identical
goals and interests of both warlords and politicians: taking over the state in order to legal-
ize the Autodefensas’ criminal status through a lenient demobilization framework and create
subnational authoritarian regimes based on illegal economies. However, this argument is
accurate, the process was much more complex. The drivers of parapolitics were not homoge-
nous because the interests and goals of politicians and warlords did not always coincide. On
the one hand, there was a confederation of warlords deeply connected to the narcotics produc-
tion and trade, in control of a massive military muscle, with varied interests that went from
the protection of accumulation strategies to political participation and representation. On
the other hand, there were local politicians that demanded point alliances with paramilitaries
for the violent control of electoral results, but there also were less instrumental engagements
that entailed the foundation and reproduction of authoritarian and criminal political regimes
at the subnational level. The confluence of all these criminal and political spheres created
di(erent types of systems of mutual protection and support.
Consequently, the concurrence of actors involved in parapolitics created repertoires that
went from political consociational arrangements of the type of Gibson’s subnational author-
itarianisms or local power structures that meddled with violence (2005), as it was identified
in one of my cases (Sucre department) to engagements closer to the corporate-holding type
for taking over economic transactions of all types (Norte de Santander department). It is nev-
ertheless important to point out that there were hardly dichotomies of the kind exposed by
Collier (2002) of greed or politics: the logic of markets and of politics were deeply intertwined





I am using a qualitative approach in this research and through subnational comparative anal-
ysis I examine two geographic units for the purpose of the thesis: the cases of Sucre and
Norte de Santander departments, where parapolitics took place but exhibit strong variations
in terms of the nature and reach of the processes. These di(erences are explained by the dispar-
ities in the interaction of the five analytical features mentioned above in historical perspective.
Consequently, political landscapes, forms of accumulation, geographies of war, and systems
collective violence were distinctively shaped in each case.
Although comparing countries would have been an interesting research road, the hetero-
geneous nature of the Colombian case would have been completely diluted by the needs of
generalization in the comparative exercise. As noted above, no single account on parapolitics
has yet explored subnational cleavages and has explained di(erences and similarities based
upon empirical evidence. By tending to generalize as a single and homogeneous phenomenon
with single-faced explanations, all approaches su(er the consequences and limitations of Sny-
der’s mean-spirited analysis (2001) and Hurst’s “part-to-whole mapping” (2005), distort the
phenomenon’s actual complexities I found during my research. Ignoring the subnational di-
mension miscasts the variables at play in parapolitics as well as their di(erentiated nature and
interaction, and the relationship and tensions between centre and periphery, which explains
my choice of research along subnational lines and handling the spatially uneven nature of the
research object. I found that this type of analysis provides more accurate coding frameworks,
avoiding Rokkan’s miscoding of the national case – “whole nation bias” (Rokkan, 1970) – as
well as for mischaracterizations of contexts. As Gibson states (2005) (Gibson, 2004), disag-
gregating countries along territorial lines is useful for exploring how constituent parts of a
political system interact in large heterogeneous countries as it is the case of Colombia.
Regarding the number of cases, I initially aimed at exploring more subnational units. Nev-
ertheless, as I established the need of understanding the processes of political economy in
historical perspective I found such richness in the analytical possibilities and in the collection
of evidence that I limited my research e(orts to a small-N of two subnational comparative
units. This research o(ers a vision that is panoramic and yet has an important sense of detail.
Despite the clear trade-o( that arises between the ability to gain control over the subnational
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units and the ability to generalize, I believe an e(ort of middle-level of generalization, that is
generalizing findings to similar types of regions within the country, is worth the risk and by
and large fulfils my research expectations.
Case selection
The project explores and compares the cases of two subnational units: Sucre andNorte de San-
tander departments. The selection mainly responded to the promising strong di(erences to
be found in the analysis. Paraphrasing Charles Tilly when referring to theory building (1995),
I found that a good comparison systematically seeks for di(erences and not for similitudes.
The comparison is framed within two analytical resources. First, the main historic mile-
stones that determined the relevant variations in terms of state formation, configuration of
political power, forms of accumulation, integration to markets, and paths of the internal con-
flict. Second, developing the hypothesis that these factors explain the paramilitary vision of
politics and markets, the spatial dimension of the conflict, and the social capital that the AUC
was capable to connect with or build. How this model of governance was based upon power-
ful coalitions of legal and illegal interests, successfully combined a private o(er of coercion,
the capture of the public sphere, the alignment of interests from diverse sectors of subnational
elites, the combination of a vertical and authoritarianmodel, and the vigorous social mobility
of warlords via drug tra*cking and irregular warfare.
The historical and empirical evidence reveals strong variations between both subnational
units. When I was preparing my research plan I projected the variations in terms of successful
and unsuccessful projects of state capture by AUC warlords. When I started research, and
mostly during fieldwork, I found a completely di(erent pattern of di(erences, whichmade the
analysis more complex and enriching. In Sucre I found a large-scale phenomenon of alliances
between politicians and warlords and of state capture with clear political projections to the
national sphere, which was made possible by subnational closed political boundaries, pre-
modern forms of accumulation and weak pre-existing forms of organized crime and criminal
activities, narrow political competition and a very strong atomization of political parties, and
vertical integration of society to the state.
In contrast, I found in Norte de Santander a case of medium-scale collusion and a more
restricted scope of state capture with clear economic rationale and little or no political pro-
jections at all (Norte de Santander). This mainly conformed to more opened political bound-
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aries; a more horizontally integrated society to the state; modern forms of accumulation and
strong pre-existing criminal structures and activities; and a stronger political competition and
less atomization of political parties.
Causal paths
This type of research faces Lijphart’s problem of too many variables – not enough cases for
causal inference (1971). In comparative case studies, causal complexity demands for variables
to be seen as the components of specific configurations, rather than as independent (Ragin,
2000). It allows dismissing the possibilities of examining cases as wholes based on thick de-
scription – a feature ofN=1.
A feasible way of reaching a balance between parsimony and complexity rests in mapping
set-theoretic relationships of variables – or relational analysis Aus (2005) – which permits
building causal paths for parapolitics. Although this is not aimed at building ideal-typical
cases of parapolitics, causal paths helps building explanatory frameworks that may be gener-
alizable to a larger universe of similar cases.
However, causal paths cannot be understood as mechanisms. The explanatory power of
causal paths depends upon in-depth historical and empirical illustrations of how recurrent
processes or pathways are linked to outcomes and context-specific conditions (Mayntz, 2004).
I resort to the five analytical keys and put them inmotion and interaction in historical and spa-
tial perspective: state formation and evolution of the internal conflict; the weakness/strength
of the subnational state; the changes in the opportunity structure of the state in the context
of democratizing and modernizing reforms; the endogenous connection of drug tra*c with
the internal conflict; and the fragmentation and de-institutionalization of political parties.
Both cases display the same type of outcome – parapolitics – yet they significantly di(er in
their respective causal configuration. Each case has a di(erent process of state and party for-
mation, democratization and modernization, thus di(erent positions along the weak-strong




Data and field research
Besides using qualitative tests against data collected from an extensive set of academic work,
I analysed a large mass media database I have been collecting since 2005 of international, na-
tional and local press and magazines, and twelve extensive judicial files of parapolitics cases
illustrated in this research. In the second semester of 2009 I undertook fieldwork in Bogotá,
Sucre and Norte de Santander, where I made sixteen in situ semi-structured interviews with
AUC warlords, victims, national and local o*cials, presidential candidates, academics, and
members of civil society organizations. It is noteworthy that the collection of reliable and
systematic data in the context of this thesis by the time I did my research in Colombia was
di*cult insofar as any enquiry on parapolitics was and continues to be a risky task. This sit-
uation not only entailed a significant threat for me but mainly for interviewed people, which
explains why I could not make more interviews and why I protect the identity of some of my
sources. Interviews with AUC warlords were particularly challenging insofar as by then the
Ministry of Justice had banned interviewing imprisoned criminals. I also had to opportunity
to attend five Justice and Peace public hearings, a transitional justice space coordinated subna-
tionally by the Attorney General’s O*ce with the participation of demobilized paramilitaries
and victims, in which the former confess committed crimes.
Structure of the thesis
Besides the current introduction and the concluding section, this thesis has seven chapters,
of which the first addresses a series of analytical keys that in historical perspective account
for parapolitics. The second chapter discusses the ways in which parapolitics was built in
Colombia, and identifies the trends and outcomes thereof. The third chapter relates to the
benefits of parapolitics and the post-AUC era. The following four chapters constitute the
body of cases and comparative analysis. Each case is covered in two chapters: one provides
the historical background and the other substantiates the process of parapolitics.
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ELUC IDAT ING THE ROADS TO PARAPOL IT IC S : THE
ANALYT ICAL KEYS
In terms of theory, this research faces the challenge of identifying the elements that explainparapolitics as a series of subnational processes of political economy and set them within
their historical and spatial context. For that purpose, I have identified five analytical features
that in historical interaction permit identifying the causal paths of parapolitics and explain
to a significant extent its heterogeneity throughout the territory: the di(erentiated process of
state formation and evolution of the internal conflict in Colombia; the relative weakness of
the Colombian state; the changes in the opportunity structure of the state in the context of
democratizing and modernizing reforms; the endogenous connection of drug tra*c with the
internal armed conflict; and the fragmentation, de-institutionalization and criminalization of
the major political parties. These features, their interaction at the subnational level, and their
concomitance at the local and national levels have shaped distinct political landscapes, forms
of accumulation, geographies of war, and systems of collective violence.
Subnational spaces that have been successfully modernized and democratized, experienced
the rise and success of independent political movements, exhibited moderate to intermediate
influx of drug tra*c and marginal e(ects of the internal conflict – circumscribed to slums
– were parapolitics-free territories. Nevertheless there was the capture of rents from poorly
regulated activities by theAutodefensas, such as wholesale food markets. This was the case in
Bogotá: elections and public co(ers were shielded against the AUC. InMedellín – Colombia’s
second city – there was no parapolitics. All these variables could be checked in the same line
of those in Bogotá with slight variations, excepting for the e(ects of paramilitary collective
violence and organized crime, which in Medellín were devastating. Other settings with a
better integration into state and markets but parochial politics and lesser levels of democracy
exhibited intermediate levels of parapolitics and heavy organized crime. That was the case of
Norte de Santander. Finally, a region like the Colombian Caribbean, with the lowest levels of
state formation, modernization and democratization, an ultra violent internal conflict, and
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pre-modern political activity did not exhibit levels of organized crime such as the latter and
the former, but had the highest number of cases of parapolitics.
subnational cleavages in the state formation process and the evolution
of the internal conflict
Explaining the subnational variations of parapolitics implies contextualising the phenomenon
in a wider framework of the historical and spatial configuration of the Colombian state and
the evolution of the internal conflict. According to Tilly (1992), institutionalization processes
aremore e(ectivewhen the state is capable of exerting a direct formof domination throughout
the territory, that is, when the state monopolizes coercion, justice and taxation, and a mod-
ern bureaucracy predominates. However, the Colombian process of state formation is better
explained under Elias’s argument of state building as a heterogeneous and gradual process of
territorial and social integration in which local powers increasingly link with the central state
bureaucracy (1998). Consequently Colombian dynamics of state formation exhibit strong dif-
ferences from one region to the other in the performance of state institutions and apparatuses,
as well as in the forms of social cohesion, economic organization, integration to the domestic
and global markets, and relations between state and political regime. So do the dynamics of
the internal armed conflict. The country’s large territory and extremely complex geography1
have resulted in a spatially dispersed population as well as in fragmented markets and poli-
tics (Melo and Bejarano, 1989; Deas and Gaitán, 1995). Consequently, the nation has had a
precarious identity, marked by deep regional and party divisions (Palacios, 1995). In addition,
successive and protracted civil wars throughout Colombia’s republican life2 as well as the
persistence of illegal armies and organized crime bear witness to the fact that neither central
nor subnational authorities have managed to exercise a monopoly over coercion, fulfil basic
regulatory functions and mobilize the population.
The influence of the state has reached regions and localities in di(erent ways and to di(er-
ent degrees, as well as at di(erent times. The democratic and modernizing dimensions have
evolved at di(erent speeds and sometimes in opposite directions. In words of Bejarano and
1According to the Inter-American Development Bank’s Index of Geographical Fragmentation (IGF), Colom-
bia is the third most complex country in terms of geography out of 155 countries assessed.
2In the almost two hundred years of Colombian republican life, countless civil wars have taken place. Before
the current conflict erupted in he 1960s, the “War of the Thousand Days” (1899–1902) and “La Violencia” (1948–
1960), triggered both by the ferocious struggle between traditional political parties – liberal and conservative – are
remembered as the bloodiest conflicts that ever took place in the country.
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Pizarro (2002), the Colombian fragmented territory has been “selectively” modernized and
democratized: on the one hand there are central regions where the state dominates in a direct
fashion and performs through a relatively modern bureaucracy, an impersonal justice appa-
ratus and military forces that seek to monopolize coercion. The political spectrum is usually
wide and therefore political power is dispersed. In these cases, subnational boundaries are
permeable to national rule and influence (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; (Gibson, 2005) and local
politics reinforce the democratizing trend. On the other hand, there are peripheral areas –
which constitute the largest share of the territory – in which the state exerts an indirect form
of rule because it has not been able to overcome fragmentation. In such settings, the action
of the state has been systematically intermediated by subnational political elites and warring
actors, and a strong social vertical integration via clientelistic ties prevail. Local establish-
ments have locked subnational boundaries in order to maintain regressive types of status quo.
In these peripheral areas the political spectrum is very narrow thus political power is highly
concentrated.
Traditional political parties – Liberal and Conservative – have constituted confederations
of large and semi-institutionalized clientelist networks that never managed to promote terri-
torial unity but have instead fostered fragmentation, further deepening the centre-periphery
cleavages. The creation of parties in Colombia has hardly corresponded to what Panebianco
(1988) refers as to territorial penetration, that is, a political centre that controls, stimulates
and leads parties’ expansion to peripheral areas, and creates regional and local groups. Given
the high levels of territorial fragmentation the model of penetration was permanently chal-
lenged in peripheral Colombia by one of territorial di"usion, that is, when political parties
are generated in a more spontaneous fashion at the subnational level. In this line, local elites
created groups that progressively linked with the national level. This tension in the formation
of political parties created semi-institutionalized structures that reflected the lack of internal
coherence in the dominant coalitions and displayed high levels of factionalism.
The situation of highly fragmented states with weak regulatory powers, as it is the case of
Colombia, is reflective of the fact that they have not been able to overcome the competition
of strong local actors in mobilizing human and material resources, as well as in allocating
dominant values and norms. Joel Migdal’s account explains Colombia’s specific situation
well: social control is granted to thosewho are able to deliver key components for the strategies
of survival of individuals in fragmented societies, and generates compliance, participation
and legitimation. The organization that succeeds in this task – seldom the case of the state –
has a comparative advantage and can apply to society a repertoire of sanctions, rewards and
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symbols aimed at imposing parochial and discriminatory rules and norms (Migdal, 2002),
di(erent from the state’s universalistic and democratizing ones. Power is thus at the heart of
social control and accordingly, society is marked by a fundamental conflict over legitimacy
and authority which stems from the resistance of local strongmen (chiefs, landlords, bosses,
clan leaders, kinships and warlords) to the influence of the state. This is what Gibson (2005)
calls “subnational authoritarianism”.
Nevertheless, Migdal warns that despite the fact that the state systematically fails to es-
tablish itself as the predominant power actor, it constitutes by and large the most prominent
organization. It has the options of either exerting violence to weaken its competitors – an
extremely costly strategy insofar as it entails not only displacing strong individuals but also
whole patterns of fragmented social control – or accommodating with competitors at di(er-
ent levels of society, creating “triangles of accommodators” (Migdal, 2002) in which local
strongmen and politicians rely on state resources and patronage in order to maintain and re-
produce clienteles and where state leadership involves in implicit accommodation with the
former.3 This accommodation creates a phenomenon “regime juxtaposition” (Gibson, 2005)
in which two competing levels of rule with jurisdiction over the same territory operate to a
great extent under di(erent types of norms and practices. In this vein, centre and periphery
constitute a spatial system of authority (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983) in which both spheres are
interdependent as none can do without the other: each is required for maintaining political
order, delivering votes and allocating resources.
The correlate of fragmentation and the consequent dissimilarities in state formation is the
spatial and temporal di(erentiation of collective violence. There are “geographies of violence”
(Gonzalez et al., 2002) as there are political topographies, and the latter significantly shape
the specific patterns and dynamics of the former. The empirical evidence shows that the in-
ternal conflict has not a(ected the Colombian territory homogeneously and with the same
intensity. The armed confrontation between the state, guerrillas and paramilitaries has taken
place di(erently throughout the space, following specific subnational economic, social and
political dynamics. The territorial unevenness of violence constitutes a partial outcome of a
series of geographic and demographic conditions, but these do not necessarily determine the
choice of actors for violence. According to Gonzalez et al. the temporal and spatial variations
3Chubb (1982) o(ers a similar perspective based on the case of politics in Palermo under the Christian Demo-
cratic Party rule. “White collar” middle class (bureaucrats), a weak entrepreneurial class, mafia and urban poor
interact in a complex web of private appropriation of the public in the context of the boom of the construc-
tion industry from the 1950s. All interactions between actors generate systems of reciprocal obligations in a
self-perpetuating process.
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of the internal conflict are neither related to a unique polarization of clearly defined actors
nor to a specific axis of dispute. The internal conflict is diversely embedded in each region
and as such, it evolves around distinct dynamics, opportunities and incentives that may not
relate to what Kalyvas (2003) calls the “master cleavage” of civil wars. Nonetheless, such dy-
namics may occasionally intertwine and mutually reinforce (Vásquez, 2001). In other words,
a myriad of conflicts are contained under a master umbrella of the internal conflict.4 Time
wise „ although the internal conflict has taken place in a specific time frame (from the early
1960s to the present), some territories have been linked to the conflict’s dynamics over the last
fifty years whereas others became entangled in conflict only ten years ago.
the relative weakness of the state
It is indisputable that illegal warring actors have enormously contributed to the weakening
the state in Colombia by dissolving the monopolies of coercion and justice, undermining
civil society spaces and facilitating the business of the drug tra*cking. But unlike the latest
generation of civil wars or so-called “new wars” that bring states to failure and collapse in a
rapid fashion, the protracted Colombian internal conflict reflects Daniel Pécaut’s paradox of
“order and violence” (1987), in that despite its entrenchment, the conflict has not represented
the dissolution of a rather stable political and economic order.
Although assessments of state weakness across developing countries vary from each other
and many still remain inadequate, most of them coincide in that Colombia is a weak state
in spite of being a mostly modern nation with a long formal democratic tradition and a well-
performing economy (Rotberg, 2004; CGD, 2004; DFID, 2005). Despite being a relatively
well-governed polity, crime and conflict have constituted critical dimensions that have over-
shadowed the political, economic and social welfare indicators, and have therefore negatively
a(ected the country’s overall democratic scores. However, state weakness is not a consistent
feature in Colombia in the sense that it displays subnational di(erences. Following Bejarano
and Pizarro’s argument on the selective nature of the country’s modernization and democrati-
zation processes (2002), the static nature of the state weakness concept hinders the possibility
of explaining the actual dimension of the Colombian situation.
4This is not an exclusive feature of the Colombian internal conflict. Kriger (1992) interestingly illustrates this
situation in the case of Zimbabwe, in which many conflicts were waged under the umbrella of the liberation war.
Kalyvas (2003) uses impressive amounts of empirical evidence to refer to this phenomenon as to the “ontology of
war”: although wars can most of the times be explained by a single cause, wars trigger a myriad of conflicts. In
this sense the “purpose” of violence di(ers from the “production” of violence.
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Scott Mainwaring (1999) identified changes in the levels of democracy in Colombia and ar-
gues that the country has oscillated between authoritarian, semi-democratic and democratic
governments since the 1930s.5 The last semi-democratic stage started in the 1990s when the
unprecedented expansion and intensification of the internal conflict progressively weakened
the state, bringing it to the verge of collapse. Unlike the case of other semi-democratic peri-
ods, the causes of this decline were not endogenous to the political regime or the party system
but were intimately related to the connection of drug tra*cking and the conflict with politics,
society and the economy in the country.
Despite the fact that on the whole the Colombian state and society have been historically
reactive to organized crime and violence, from the late 1970s, the consensus amongst elites vis-
à-vis these phenomena has experienced a process of disintegration. Leal andDávila (1990) and
Gutiérrez (2007) agree that whereas some actors privileged the rule of law and democratizing
mechanisms, others favoured de-institutionalized ways of confronting the conflict through
paramilitary groups and guerrillas, dirty war dynamics, the influx of drugs money in political
campaigns and the influence of criminals in subnational and national politics. The latter
triumphed in peripheral Colombia. It is noteworthy that this fracture in the consensus has
not meant that criminals have incontestably dominated Colombian society. It has been more
the case of alliances of criminals and politicians taking place in spheres where the actors were
able to elude criminal, political or social sanctions. This is very much the case of parapolitics.
Archer (1995) argues that the wearing down of the state along with the chronic weak-
ness thereof brought Colombia to a situation of “partial collapse” and of besiegement of
the democracy. Although the concept of partial collapse seems rather radical and imprecise,
Bejarano and Pizarro’s argument that explains the paradox of a country that has made ex-
traordinary advances in some of its democratic dimensions but has experienced dramatic set-
backs in others (2002), is useful for precising the reach of this concept. This partial collapse
occurred in peripheral areas where the historically weak state could not overcome the com-
petition of predatory subnational elites, paramilitaries and guerrillas who emerged as rival
“proto-states” or as aspiring state-makers, and further contracted. This has not happen in
“modern” Colombia.
5Colombia has had semi-democratic governments between 1936–1949; 1958–1964; 1990–1997; an authoritar-
ian rule between 1949–1957, and only a democratic period between 1974–1990. The semi-democratic nature of the
1936–49 and 1958–64 is related to the extremely narrow space for political participation and in this fashion, the
limits emerge from within the political system. The authoritarian period mainly relates to the ultra-conservative
and repressive Conservative rule of elected president Laureano Gómez (1950–1953) and the only dictatorship that
has taken place in the country from General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla followed by a temporary Military Junta (1953–
1958).
40
the changes in the opportunity structure of the state
An aspect that demands for precision is the fact that the state in the late 1990s only e(ec-
tively controlled two-thirds of its territory did not imply that guerrillas and paramilitaries
totally controlled the rest of Colombia, as often incorrectly reported. Although warring ac-
tors have created zones of influence in a great share of the national territory, these areas are
under permanent dispute and therefore it is di*cult to draw a clear line that separates the
spaces these groups have claimed as their own. Unlike the cases of Afghanistan or the DRC,
the Colombian conflict has not stemmed from or caused a case of “institutional multiplic-
ity” (Beall et al., 2004), that is, the existence or creation of rival or competing institutional or
rule systems beyond the formal existing framework. Even in the case of guerrillas, who have
sought to overthrow the regime since the 1960s, insurgents have not been actually capable of
creating competing regimes. Within the same institutional framework, three competing lev-
els of rule with jurisdiction over the same territory coexist and compete for legitimacy: the
state’s modern and democratic institutions, and two opposed authoritarian projects of guer-
rillas and paramilitaries vastly fed by drug tra*c. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that
overall the state has remained legitimate and comparatively stronger.
Another dimension of the partial breakdown of the Colombian state relates to the uneven
performance of the state apparatus. Some sectors have indeed exhibited a quantum of coher-
ence and e*ciency, but crucial sectors such as themilitary, the police and the judiciary became
almost totally ine(ective in this context given the inability to enforce a coercive and normative
order. Fortunately, these state’s muscles started to build up again since the 2000s.
the changes in the opportunity structure of the state
Since the 1980s, successive Colombian administrations have engaged in democratizing and
liberalizing processes that have involved the quest for a peaceful termination of the internal
conflict, the opening of a traditionally narrow political system, the granting of larger auton-
omy to territorial entities, and the enlarging of the country’s competitiveness in a globalized
economy.
The relationship between decentralization and violence in Colombia di(ers from the ex-
periences of other countries in situations of conflict. In many a conflictive setting decentral-
ization has constituted the means to redress the role that centralist patterns of governance
may have played in fuelling violence in the past and expanding governing opportunities at the
subnational level for those who previously waged war. In Afghanistan, the 2004 Loya Jirga
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constitutional reform denied provinces the right to elect governors in an attempt at limiting
the influence of regional warlords but introduced an upper chamber to ensure the represen-
tation of provincial interests in the central government. The Sudanese People’s Liberation
Movement was granted significant autonomy in 2005 to put an end to decades of conflict. In
the Iraqi case the distribution of authority over natural resources and fiscal revenues along
with the question of Kurdish autonomy in the North, dominated politics during the constitu-
tional process. Decentralization was likewise a central post-conflict issue in Angola, Bosnia,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Sri Lanka. In Colombia, reforms were enacted by a
weak state in the midst of the conflict. They did not bring the conflict to an end but instead
exacerbated it, making the aim of “pacifying through reforms” unviable (Bächler, 2004).
Reforms have indeed facilitated peace processes and the demobilization of illegal armed
groups6 in Colombia but at the same time they have made other warring actors resilient or
made them even stronger. Reforms have widened the political spectrum but have also un-
leashed a systematic violent campaign against new political forces. Reforms have granted
larger autonomy to territorial entities but have equally made themmore vulnerable to corrup-
tion from machine politics and empowered guerrillas and paramilitary groups. Reforms have
indeedmade the economymore competitive but have equally hyper-criminalized the economic
sphere via the illegal drug trade. The tendency towards greater levels of democratization and
a more liberalized economy ended up having a negative impact on other fundamental dimen-
sions such as those of governance and human rights.
Mauricio Romero (2005) provides a series of keys for understanding the unexpected ef-
fects of these reforms. By discussing paramilitary formation in Colombia since the 1980s,
he identifies three mechanisms that were triggered by the implementation of peace processes,
decentralization and political participation policies. The first mechanism is the polarization
between subnational elites and the central government in the context of the 1980s and 1990s
peace talks with guerrillas insofar as they constituted a possibility of redefining local power
structures through the potential electoral participation of demobilized insurgent members.
The risks of political imbalance in favour of guerrillas in peripheries in which drug barons
were becoming an emergent power actor is the key to understand the emergency of a first
generation of paramilitary groups (1980–1994) as a relevant political instrument, in Gutiér-
6During the Barco administration (1986–1990) some of the main Colombian guerrillas were demobilized: the
Popular Liberation Army (EPL-Ejército Popular de Liberación), 19th of April Movement (M-19), the indigenous
guerrillaQuintín Lame, and the Labour Revolutionary Party (PRT – Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores).
During the Samper administration (1994–1998) the CRS – Corriente de Renovación Socialista) was demobilized.
It is noteworthy that since 1984 there have been several fruitless peace talks with FARC and ELN.
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rez and Barón’s abovementioned “guild-militia-party” trinity (2006). Most of the violence
committed by paramilitaries during the 1980s and early 1990s against the Left revealed the
instrumental nature of these organizations in the counter-insurgent and electoral objectives
of regressive subnational coalitions, a trend that deeply opposed that of the national govern-
ment. The second mechanism is that of competition for territorial control of guerrillas and
the emergent power of the paramilitary (pre-AUC structures), a matter that dramatically in-
creased the intensity of collective violence in the country. The third mechanism relates to
fragmentation within the state organization (civilian-military, executive-judiciary-legislative
and centre-periphery) that unleashed a ferocious rivalry between those who defended the ren-
ovation of the political system and those who sought to preserve the status quo of traditional
politics at any cost.
Widening the political spectrum
The popular election of mayors7 was the central component of an integrated package of fiscal
and administrative municipal reforms enacted in 1986. It largely sought to put an end to the
traditional rigid two-party system in which Liberals and Conservatives were the only political
forces at play. In this perspective, the reform encouraged long-excluded sectors of society –
mainly the Left and ethnic groups – to run for mayoralties, municipal councils, departmental
assemblies, and Congress (Pinzón, 1989). The 1991 constitutional reform enacted further
mechanisms for overcoming political exclusion and increasing participation in public a(airs.8
However, guerrilla ex-combatants’ attempts at getting elected, and members of ethnic groups
and religious minorities have proved rather unsuccessful. Since reforms were enacted, non-
traditional parties have not surpassed 25% of the lists competing for municipal elections.9
Excepting large urban centres, where independents have experienced an extraordinary rise,
machine politics and collective violence have dramatically curtailed political participation.
Political violence has played a central role in weakening the reach of this reform. The case
of the Patriotic Union Party (UP – Unión Patriótica) is illustrative. The party was created in
1985 in the context of the first – and unfruitful – peace talks that took place in Colombia
with FARC guerrillas under the Betancur administration (1982–1986). The UP, a promising
7Before the reforms, departmental Governors, who in turn were appointed by the President, appointed May-
ors. The first popular election of Governors took place in 1992.
8The 1991 constitutional reform substituted the representative democratic model by a participatory model.
9Source: National Registry O*ce.
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political alternative to traditional parties – in 1986, the UP won 5% of the votes to Congress,
and in 1988, the first popular election of mayors, the party won 16 mayoralties – su(ered
from being seen as FARC’s political arm. Between 1986 and 1988 paramilitary groups in
alliance with local establishments and members of the Colombian army assassinated 30% of
UP candidates, including presidential candidate Jaime Pardo. In 2008, the UP dossier at the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights accounted for over 5,000 assassinated and forcibly
disappeared militants, leading the organization to the verge of disappearance.10 Since the UP
experience, every single peace talk attempt with guerrillas has triggered similar dynamics.
But the other side of this phenomenon has been the direct or indirect use of this democ-
ratizing channel by criminals for participating in local power, either by supporting specific
traditional candidates or running directly for o*ce. This will be thoroughly discussed below.
The resistance of subnational establishments to the widening of the political spectrum has cre-
ated a vicious circle in which the contracting of private violence hinders participation, and the
systematic political obstruction increases the disengagement of alternative and independent
groups from public life.
Increasing local autonomy
Another key reform was the enactment of the Basic Statute of Municipal Administration,
which granted larger autonomy to Mayoralties and Town Councils in the provision of educa-
tion and health services, and provided mechanisms for the participation of the community in
local matters. In terms of fiscal decentralization, the law empowered municipalities not only
in terms of redefining the framework for the generation of local revenues but also by defining
the transfer of value-added tax revenues from the central government. These reforms signif-
icantly contributed to filling the depleted departmental and municipal co(ers. Nevertheless,
after over a century of a hyper-centralized control over public finances, local entities became
autonomous almost overnight, with the overwhelming absence of control mechanisms and
technical skills for dealing with public contracting and fiscal norms. This situation generated
a complete financial, fiscal and administrative debacle.
10In 2002 the National Electoral Council removed the legal status to the UP, based upon the legal disposition
that indicates that those political organizations that cannot obtain through their candidates at least 50,000 votes,
reach or maintain their representation in Congress loose automatically their legal status. Nevertheless, in July
2013, a high court granted the party legal status again, arguing that the loss of representation was the outcome
of systematic violence against its members.
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Although corruption has been a historical characteristic, the poorly designed reformsmade
subnational finances even more vulnerable to corrupt practices. In the absence of accountabil-
ity mechanisms and in the context of increased electoral competition via popular elections,
politicians systematically appropriated public funds not only for enlarging their personal
wealth but also for campaign financing as the costs of campaigns dramatically increased with
popular elections.
For many analysts (Cubides, 2005; Duncan, 2007; Pizarro, 2004), the extraordinary terri-
torial expansion of irregular warring actors and the escalation of collective violence in 1980s’
Colombia were strongly related to these reforms. Besides the dramatic increase of corrup-
tion by local administrations and the reproduction of political machines, decentralization fed
armed versions of clientelism or “armed clientelism” (Peñate, 1999) under which local bud-
gets became significant spoils of war, mostly in regions that benefited from royalties from the
mining and energy industries. In this framework, guerrillas and paramilitaries systematically
manipulated electoral processes, controlled appointments as well as public contracts in many
regions. Armed clientelism has taken place to a large extent as a consequence of the tension
between political, fiscal and administrative decentralization and the increasing central grip on
the management of public security and the administration of justice.
In the context of reforms, guerrillas and paramilitaries had di(erent positions vis-à-vis the
state. The latter – both in their early instrumental stage and in the AUC era – were status quo
keepers and used their muscle to exert violent clientelist practices in a symbiotic mode with
the local establishment in the regions under their control. The case of guerrillas is di(erent.
Reforms facilitated a successful transition from the Cold-War era fight for land reform to the
current andmuch less ideological fight for territory. Decentralizationmade the takeover of the
national state via the revolutionary route a decreasingly important goal for guerrillas insofar
as all power was no longer centralized and consequently controlling subnational governments
became more strategic. FARC and ELN have developed an ambiguous relationship with local
administrations: although they hardly belonged to any subnational ruling coalition – contrary
to paramilitary groups – they have had enough violent muscle to control elections and predate
public finances inmany regions. At times they have impeded elections11 and at times they have
supported them, involving elected and appointed o*cials in networks in charge of diverting
public finances. Despite seeking to subvert the status quo, guerrillas ended up accommodating
to and taking advantage of the changes in the opportunity structures of the local state and the
11The Colombian Municipalities’ Federation reported nine cases in which not a single candidate ran for may-
oralties or town councils in 2003 local elections in guerrillas’ controlled. Likewise the Federation reported that
during the same year 160mayors had to govern from exile due to FARC and ELN threats.
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market and entered an interminable stage of “parasitism” (Pizarro, 2006). The protractedness
of the “subnational revolutionary road”, the involvementwith drug tra*c, and the progressive
disengagement from the masses are all factors that have even further enhanced the rebels’
pragmatism over ideology.
Economic liberalization
In the early 1990s Colombia introduced structural adjustments in the economy, facilitating
the entrance of foreign capital, dismantling custom duties, privatizing state-owned firms, and
opening markets. As a consequence the country experienced monetary revaluation, higher
interest rates, and the elimination of some financial controls. However, despite Colombia’s
good economic performance12, the country lacked the regulatory and control capacity for un-
dertaking the complex agenda of liberal reforms. The new wave of competition generated by
the flood of foreign goods in the Colombianmarket completely transformed the traditional re-
lationship between production and demand. As a result many industries could not cope with
competition and entire productive sectors disappeared. The privatization of state-owned as-
sets did not make up for the increasing public deficit. Private investment mainly concentrated
in the construction and services sectors, less vulnerable to foreign competition. The increase
of imports was not financedwithmore exports, as it was expected, but with credit and foreign
investment, which ended up being unsustainable in the long run.
Neoliberal policies had two main e(ects that favoured the intensification of the internal
conflict: First, the enlargement of the informal sector, one of the largest in Latin America13,
of which drug tra*c related activities had a large share as a source of informal jobs that
absorbed the unemployment generated by the partial or full collapse of some sectors, partic-
ularly that of agriculture (Martin Masso, 2008; Lee, 1998). Although the largest bulk of this
informal labour force was engaged in the agricultural end of illicit drugs, it acquired increas-
ing importance in urban centres via micro-tra*cking and money laundering. The informal
nature of this market also expanded to other illegal activities such as arms tra*cking, vehi-
12During the 1980s almost all Latin American economies experienced recession as well as extreme cash
flow and external financing di*culties, which led many countries to devaluation and structural adjustment pro-
grammes. Colombia was notwithstanding one of the few exceptions in the regional crisis: the country did not
have serious liquidity problems and had an acceptable access to credit. This performance allowed themaintenance
of good levels of reserves and of currency stability. Between 1981 and 1990 the GDP’s accumulated growth was of
43.6 per cent whereas the region’s was of 12.4%.
13According to the World Bank, the informal sector represented 39%of the GDP in the late 1990s.
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cle theft, smuggling, and prostitution, and has connected to poorly regulated cash-intensive
sectors such as gambling and food wholesale markets.
The second e(ect was related to capital flows associated with drug tra*cking activities. Im-
ports and the dismantling of custom duties facilitated the flows of illicit money. It is notewor-
thy that the argument about drug trade being the central driver of the Colombian economy
is a myth (Rocha, 2000 and Steiner, 1998)14.
Nonetheless, there have been no restrictions for criminal investment in the rural sector. The
state’s incapacity to enforce rural property rights and the deficient register tools of property
transactions not only facilitated the massive investment in rural estates as a way of laundering
money; it also generatedmassive waves of forcible displacements in many a region under what
Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession”. It has been calculated that the AUC is
responsible for over 70%of the forcible internal displaced peasants in Colombia (about 5mil-
lion) from which they grabbed over 4 million hectares of land (CNRR, 2010). Violent expro-
priation and fraudulent titling, mainly done to secure corridors for the drug trade and export
points, transformed the structure of land in some regions, and in others it reversed the small
successes achieved in the state e(orts for democratizing the access to rural land.15 Disposses-
sion also transformed the rural economy at the expense of the agrarian sector’s productivity.
This violent agrarian counter-reform contributed to the strengthening of a rentier-based po-
litical economy in rural areas based on land speculation, extensive cattle ranching, and cash
crops geared to international markets such as coca and palm oil.
14Although the drug tra*cking income represented in its peak – mid-1980s – over 30%of the GDP when laun-
dered money flooded the market, the phenomenon only lasted a couple of years and its actual size in the economy
remained relatively small. The laundering of illegal capital in Colombia has faced a roof provided by the closure
and concentration of industrial and financial property in a few entrepreneurial clusters. The construction sector
was largely una(ected insofar as it has been regulated by an institutional financial scheme subject to information
requirements. Consequently, illegal money has been decreasingly repatriated and has instead remained abroad
circulating in consumer countries or the o(shore banking sector.
15In many regions, rural land property has been a traditionally contentious issue because of the high levels of
concentration thereof. Successive agrarian reforms attempts have proved a complete failure not only because of
the high political pressure against the reforms but also because of collective violence. UNDP’s latest report on
Colombia estimated a Gini coe*cient for rural land concentration of 0.875, on of the highest in the world. The
World Bank has qualified Brazil’s coe*cient of 0.8 as dramatic. In Colombia, a new landed elite of drug tra*ckers
and paramilitaries, traditional landowners and cattle ranchers, speculators, and more recently multinational min-
ing corporations predominantly control land. Together, these groups have contributed to a precipitous decline in
the land used for food production. Currently, from a total of 21.5 million hectares suitable for food production
only 4.9 million hectares are cultivated; that is only 22.7% of the total. This constitutes a paradox insofar as
Colombia is one of few countries in the world, which along with Brazil, have available land for expanding the
agricultural frontier (UNDP, 2011).
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the endogenous connection of drug traffic with the internal armed con-
flict
Colombia’s organized crime syndicates transformed from the great drug cartels of Medellín
and Cali in the 1980s and early 1990s into multiple small structures. After the dismantling
of large cartels, Colombian groups lost the grip over cocaine distribution as Mexican and
European organizations progressively entered the market. However as Bolivia and Peru were
experiencing a dramatic decline of coca cultivations in the early 1990s and Colombia was
experiencing the abovementioned crisis of the agricultural sector that massively drew impov-
erished peasants into the coca economy, the competitiveness of Colombia in the narcotics
trade started to stem from the agro-industrial and processing phases of coca leaf. Since the
second half of the 1990s the country became the largest coca and cocaine producer in the
world (UNODC, 2005). This phenomenon generated large waves of colonization character-
ized by chaotic patterns of settlement as well as an unmitigated environmental deterioration.
Coca crops first expanded in peripheral areas of open internal frontier, mainly in the Ama-
zonian basin in southern Colombia, but progressively moved towards more central areas of
traditional agricultural frontier, like the co(ee growing areas, the Caribbean region and the
north-eastern zones.
The increasing strength of Colombia in the production stage of coca generated an endoge-
nous connection with the internal armed conflict. Mastering coca leaf production implied an
aggressive expansion of coca crops, mostly in areas of extremely complex geography, which
demanded a great deal of security, protection and regulation. It was in this context in which
FARC and AUC, with their massive armies and the know-how of operating in di*cult geogra-
phies, joined the world of drug tra*cking. In the absence of formal authority, guerrillas and
paramilitaries supplanted the state in these peripheral regions and were therefore capable of
protecting crops from competitors and eradication activities, securing the plantation’s expan-
sion, controlling the massive labour force involved, and regulating the coca paste market. No
other actor was capable of guaranteeing the largest coca economy in the world. According
to UNODC (2008) coca crops grew in Colombia from 39,800 hectares in 1994 to approxi-
mately 160,000 in the mid-2000s, out of which over 520 metric tonnes of cocaine were pro-
duced. Along with the expansion of illicit crops, violence dramatically increased: FARC and
AUC engaged in a ferocious expansive campaign throughout the territory and themutual con-
frontation resulted in an enormous death toll of civilians and an unprecedented humanitarian
crisis.
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By specializing in the production phase, guerrillas and paramilitaries found an extraordi-
nary financial source in the drugs trade for funding their respective war e(orts in moments of
military decline. However, the paths to that specialization were di(erent. FARC’s relation to
illicit drugs has beenmainly instrumental insofar as they have constituted ameans for funding
the “revolutionary road”. The case of paramilitarism is di(erent. As seen, its origin and evo-
lutionwas criminal; not rebel. Many authors consider that the survival and impressive growth
of FARC during the 1990s would not have been possible without the cocaine trade (Echandía,
1999, (Cubides, 2005; Gutiérrez, 2008), 2003). Without drug tra*cking paramilitaries would
have never emerged in the country.
By the 2000s both paramilitaries and guerrillas not only fully controlled the production
phase but also were also progressively involved in cocaine tra*cking.
the fragmentation, de-institutionalization and criminalization of ma-
jor political parties
According to DellaPorta and Vanucci (1999) in their analysis on Italian politics, corruption
spreads in periods of political parties’ transformation, when a political class with strong ide-
ological convictions is substituted by individuals viewing politics as just another “business”,
and characterized by very low moral costs for illegal activities. This is also the case of Colom-
bia.
The fragmentation of Colombian traditional parties started taking place in the late 1950s
in the context of the National Front (Frente Nacional), a consociational agreement between
the Liberal and Conservative parties aimed at coping with the demands of development, over-
coming the mid-twentieth century civil war known as La Violencia, and making a democratic
transition in the aftermath of General Rojas Pinilla and the JuntaMilitar dictatorships (1953–
1957). This pact shifted the weight of competition within parties and empowered regional op-
erators in detriment of the centre (Leal & Dávila, 1990), a matter that significantly explains
the decay of traditional caciques and the rise ofmachine politics. TheNational Front favoured
the conformation of narrow regional public spaces and exclusive political cultures; identities
built outside the Liberal-Conservative sphere were qualified as extremist or marginal.
Clientelism experienced a significant transformation under the National Front: the classic
dyadic patron-client relationship .declined and machine politics emerged. This new form of
clientelism did not stem from the competition between parties insofar as theNational Front ar-
49
fragmentation, de-institutionalization and criminalization
rangement provided pre-established o*ce quotas to parties, but from intra-party competition
(internal factions competing for quotas). In this context, parties experienced an atomization
process through factions organized around “houses”, that is, personalistic groups led by Lib-
eral and Conservative ex-Presidents. Fragmentation, stronger along the Liberal lines, was the
outcome of a strategy of survival of houses: in order to endure amidst competition, houses’
owners increasingly empowered their subnational operators. According to Leal and Dávila
(1990) the competition ended up not only weakening the Liberal party’s cohesion at the top
but further de-institutionalizing it at the subnational level where politicians in a more or less
autonomous fashion were centred in feeding their clienteles and collecting votes.
According to Gutiérrez (2007) a second stage of atomization occurred in the late 1990s
during the loss of hegemony or “defrosting” of traditional parties, intimately linked to the
criminalization of the Liberal party with the aforementioned infiltration of the 1994 presiden-
tial campaign by the Cali Cartel’s money in and the systematic failure of attempts at a peace
process with FARC and ELN. This phase of atomization occurred under the Pastrana admin-
istration (1998–2002) in the context of peace talks with FARC that were brought to an end
under political and public opinion turmoil.16 The central trigger of this fragmentation phase
was paramilitarism. The Liberal candidate for the 2010 presidential elections Rafael Pardo
interprets the situation:
“during Pastrana’s administration the AUC sought to become a third actor in
the peace talks with FARC, just like in Northern Ireland with the “trinity” of
Royalists, IRA and the government [...] The eventual participation of paramili-
taries in a tripartite peace process would open FARC and the AUC the possibility
of political participation. Similar to the case of Arena in El Salvador, the AUC
leadership saw the Liberal party as its political platform, because since the 1980s
paramilitaries had a strong influence in regions of Liberal hegemony [...] This
16President Pastrana agreed on creating the so-called “distension zone”which consisted in clearing from armed
forces and the judiciary an area of 42,000 km2 (the size of Switzerland) comprising 5municipalities located in the
south-western provinces of Meta and Caquetá. The distension zone generated strong negative reactions from di-
verse sectors in the country (armed forces, liberal politicians, and mass media, among others) with the argument
that the extremely generous governmental concessions were undermining the national sovereignty. Opposition to
the process increased as the distension zone, created in areas of FARC traditional dominion, was used by guerrillas
to hide kidnapped people and intensify coca crops and cocaine processing. This was one of the main issues that
made Pastrana bringing the process to an end. It is to note that all prior peace attempts with FARC have systemati-
cally failed, not only because of FARC’s strong negotiating position but also because of the strong civilian-military
and partisan divisions. Between 1982 and 1984Conservative President Betancur compromised in a cease-fire, truce
and peace process with FARC guerrillas with little success. Between 1991 and 1992 a second attempt by Gaviria’s
Liberal administration (1990–1994) of peace talks with FARC, and a third one by President Samper (1994–1998)
also failed.
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situation created a strong internal fragmentation: a minority from the Liberal
national leadership considered that the peace process could not involve the AUC
as a third actor insofar as they were “thoroughbred” criminals and could not be
granted political status. This position frustrated the paramilitary project of de-
mobilizing and using the Liberal party as a platform; yet there was an ambiguous
situation insofar as in many liberal regions paramilitaries were widely accepted
and supported. The emergency ofUribista parties [president AlvaroUribe’s coali-
tion] is to a significant extent the consequence of this internal fracture. As these
Uribista parties emerged the AUC found a platform and a shelter therein” (Pardo,
2009).
The legitimacy crisis broke the internal cohesion of parties and brought a loss of control
over labels. This situation had two consequences. The first one was the emergency of what
Gutiérrez (2007) refers as to “transitionals”, that is members and factions – mostly Liberal –
that emigrated from o*cial lines towards a myriad of new personalized17 electoral microen-
terprises (Pizarro, 2004) with unclear programmatic purposes but clearly located towards the
right in the political spectrum. It is in this context that Alvaro Uribe, a former Liberal Party
militant with a strong anti-subversive profile, was elected President in 2002 and re-elected in
2006, supported by a strong coalition of right-wing oriented transitional movements, the so-
called Uribista parties. The Uribista coalition, as it will be analysed, had the largest number
of politicians prosecuted and convicted for parapolitics. The second consequence was the
rise of “independents” in large urban centres such as Bogotá and Medellín with impressive
electoral strength and proven clean records of governing. It is also noteworthy that in this con-
text the Left managed for the first time to become a significant electoral force after successive
historical failures by winning Bogotá’s Mayoralty three times in a row.
A reform in the electoral law in 2003 sought to counteract the atomization process. The
reform provided for the establishment of a 2% threshold (in order to win a seat in the legisla-
ture a list had to have at least 2% of the vote at the national level); a change in the electoral
quota18; the prohibition for parties to represent more than one list per electoral circumscrip-
tion; and the introduction of the “preferential vote”, a mechanism for electors to chose their
preferred candidate from a list. Even though the number of lists fell dramatically, political par-
17Under the competing lists system only the candidate heading the list was elected.
18The formula used to assign seats was switched from the Hare quotient formula to the d’Hondt “highest
average” rule.
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ties remained considerably atomized with further defections, and personal politics continued
unabated via preferential voting.
The atomization process also implied a significant increase in the costs of campaigns, a
matter that made them progressively more vulnerable to criminal seizure. Despite the intro-
duction of control mechanisms over campaign financing, the matter still remains unresolved.
The state has significantly increased the funding of parties and campaigns in order to coun-
teract the infiltration of illegal money, but private contributions continue to be a shadow area.
Presidential campaigns have an overall limit (80% state resources and 20% private contribu-
tions) and individual private contributions have a 2% limit. Unlike presidential campaigns,
congressional campaigns only have an overall limit but the law has not yet established a limit
for private contributions. In this case the latter’s limit is the candidate’s overall limit, making
the infiltration of illicit money harder to detect insofar as the frontmen system has become
increasingly sophisticated in Colombia. This has considerably contributed to the collusion
between politicians and criminals.
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THE ENG INEER ING OF PARAPOL IT IC S
In their analysis of Italian politics, DellaPorta and Pizzorno (1996) argue that the party sys-tem in Italy transformed from a system of participation to one of protection through the
influx of the mafia in politics. As discussed, the Colombian party system seems to have fol-
lowed the same path of progressive penetration of criminals into the political sphere. However,
it is important to make some qualifications regarding the case of Colombia. First, despite the
overwhelming number of parties entering the protection system of the AUC, not all parties
were part of it. By the same token, not all politicians from protected parties colluded with
paramilitaries and not all the alliances with criminals were identical in nature. Second, except
for the cases of parties directly created by the AUC, there is no evidence of party capture from
the top, as was the case of the infiltration of the Liberal party in the mid-1990s. It is possible
to claim that parapolitics was not a national political-criminal conspiracy orchestrated from
the top, but a phenomenon built in a bottom-up fashion from the local to the national. Third,
although the interest of AUCwarlords in allying with politicians was undisputable, as already
discussed, paramilitaries were not always interested in politics, that is, seeking representation
in decision-making spaces or directly participating in elections.
The Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) and the Attorney General’s O*ce (AGO) have been
actively investigating the system of protection since the mid-2000s. So far, 165 congress mem-
bers and 470 local o*cials elected and appointed between 2002 and 2007 have been prose-
cuted and/or convicted for linkages with paramilitary groups. According to López and Sevil-
lano (2009) these figures indicate that the AUC surpassed the previous infiltration capacity
of Pablo Escobar; in 1982, by the time he had become a Congress member his group’s vote
did not exceed one per cent of the total congressional vote. When the Cali Cartel massively
infiltrated the Liberal campaign in 1994, Congress members involved in the scandal did not
exceed 12% of the total vote. The incremental success of criminals over time indicates not
only the refinement of collusion but also reveals the advantages of allying with politicians
in a bottom-up fashion. Unlike previous processes in which infiltration mostly occurred in
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the opposite direction, this time 25 departments out of 32 experienced the phenomenon of
parapolitics, with varying levels of intention and intensity.
In this chapter I deal in particular with the “engineering” of parapolitics, that is the modali-
ties under which politicians andwarlords colluded and the types of variations each of arrange-
ments found throughout the country. By examining the available evidence and data, I explain
paramilitaries’ di(erent strategies and preferences vis-à-vis politics and economic accumula-
tion – and the combinations thereof, as well as those of politicians involved. I also analyse the
di(erent levels of geographical, partisan and individual involvement in parapolitics. Likewise
I analyse the trends in the investigation and prosecution of parapoliticians and paramilitaries,
and the response of the Executive and its congressional coalition. Finally I examine the bal-
ance of the benefits obtained by paramilitaries, the re-emergence of paramilitary structures,
and the survival of parapoliticians.
preferences, opportunities and possibilities of warlords in the framework
of parapolitics
Although on the whole the AUC had a clear collective political goal in the context of the
demobilization process, not all AUC commanders showed the same interest in politics, and
as discussed before, this is related to the fact that not all of them had identical incentives
and interests. The diverse economic interests and military concerns of warlords determined
their proximity or distance vis-à-vis political power. In order to understand the paramilitary
meddling in politics a great deal of attention is required to avoid generalizations insofar as the
interference in local governance and economic activities varied from one region to the other.
In his analysis of the 2002 electoral process, Rodrigo Losada (2006) identified three types of
politico-electoral strategies adopted by paramilitaries: hegemonic, predominance within re-
stricted competition, and apparent electoral indi(erence. Losada’s categories are ideal-types,
and although his account fails in using themwithin awider analytical scope of subnational po-
litical economy, it constitutes, as mentioned above, one of the few valuable e(orts to account
for the heterogeneous nature of parapolitics.
The hegemonic strategy was undertaken in areas and by warlords with the highest pref-
erence for politics. The strategy was aimed at narrowing the scope of political groups or
candidates – to the extent of having at times single candidates – through violence, electoral
fraud, and buying of votes. Although Losada only analyses the case of theMagdalena depart-
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ment in the Caribbean region, the empirical evidence demonstrates that all other departments
in that area also fit the hegemonic model: Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar, Atlántico, Cesar and La
Guajira (Map 1). The Urabá region in Antioquia, which is the part that integrates that depart-
ment to the Caribbean region, can also be included as part of this group1. The concentration
of the hegemonic model in the Caribbean geography and the fact that all these departments,
excepting for Antioquia, were under the jurisdiction of the AUC’s Northern Bloc (Bloque
Norte), suggest that the AUC, besides seeking to create a drug tra*cking corridor along the
Caribbean coastal line, also pursued the building of a political cluster.
All Caribbean departments have been traditional Liberal strongholds, and have been histor-
ically characterized by subnational authoritarian rule, vertical social integration via a strong
clientelist exchange, poor integration into markets (excepting for some capital cities such as
Cartagena and Barranquilla) and rentier economies based upon latifundia. The paramilitary
campaign of territorial expansion was particularly aggressive in the Caribbean region2, which
had various consequences. On the side of the war balance, guerrillas were dramatically and
rapidly weakened, a matter that, unlike in other regions, did not demand a colossal military
e(ort, mainly because of a series of geographic factors that determined its limited embedment
in these territories. Regarding the economic sphere, although paramilitaries in the Caribbean
area strengthened their control over drug tra*cking activities and expanded their accumula-
tion means via local public budgets, extortion rackets, and the violent dispossession of unse-
cured peasant land, the Caribbean territories were the AUC’s main targets for accumulation.
The evidence demonstrates that in these departments the main asset for warlords was politics,
a matter that significantly explains why the paramilitary influx in local politics generated the
most striking cases of power coalitions of politicians and AUC warlords with the support of
rural rich and permissive social environments. In this context, the Liberal party experienced
a significant loss of electoral weight and representation whilst the Uribista coalition parties
were strengthened under the direction of former Liberal barons.
1It is to note that the Antioquia department is large enough to exhibit strong sub-departmental variations
in every possible sense. This also applies to paramilitary presence. Seven AUC structures operated in the depart-
ment, under di(erent commanderships and with diverse dynamics and agendas: two structures in Urabá region
(Bananero and Elmer Cárdenas blocs), which is the area integrated to the Caribbean region; one structure in the
Bajo Cauca region (Mineros bloc); two structures in Medellin Metropolitan Area (Metro and Cacique Nutibara
blocs); one structure in theMagdalena river valley (Autodefensas del MagdalenaMedio); and one structure in the
east and north eastern areas (Héroes de Granada bloc).
2According to the Observatory for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, between 1998 and
2001massacres increased by 140% in Antioquia, Sucre, Magdalena, Cesar and La Guajira departments.
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In this model, warlords supported a wider spectrum of candidates and were relatively tolerant vis-à-
vis competitors as long as they all delivered within the framework of their interests. As in the 
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departments as cases of the predominance model (Map 1). Unlike the former model, these 
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geographically deconcentrated group might result from the fact that these territories provided the 
AUC extraordinary accumulation opportunities via both legal and illegal economic activities. All 
these departments not only have been largely integrated to domestic and international markets via 
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Mapped by the author.
The second model identified by Losada is that of predominance within restricted compe-
tition, a typology identified in territories where political power did not seem to be on top of
AUC’s agenda. In this model, warlords supported a wider spectrum of candidates and were
relatively tolerant vis-à-vis competitors as long as y all d livered wit in the f amework of
their interests. As in the hegemonic model, Leftist candidates were considered ideologically
unacceptable and were systematically excluded and obstructed. Although Losada does not
subs antiate thi model, he includesNorte de Santander –NDS, Santand r, A auca, Casanare,
Meta, Caldas, Tolima and Valle departments as cases of the predominance model (Map 1).
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Unlike the former model, these departments are scattered throughout the Colombian geogra-
phy. However, the logic of this geographically deconcentrated groupmight result from the fact
that these territories provided the AUC extraordinary accumulation opportunities via both
legal and illegal economic activities. All these departments not only have been largely inte-
grated to domestic and international markets via trade (NDS), oil exploitation (Santander,
Arauca and Casanare) and agroindustry (Santander, Meta, Caldas, Tolima and Valle), but
have also been of importance in the context of the coca/cocaine economies (Meta, Arauca,
NDS and Valle). The AUC connections with all these lines of business have been thoroughly
substantiated in a study by Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris on the matter (CNAI, 2011). It is
therefore not surprising that there were fewer politicians compromised with the AUC in these
departments as well as fewer cases of threats over elections or fraud, if compared to the de-
partments of the hegemonic model. It is noteworthy that all these departments exhibit wider
ranges of political actors in permanent competition, a feature that could have made political
alliances more complex and di*cult to establish than in the Caribbean region where politics
have beenmore compact and far less competitive. On thewar balance side, the AUC could not
overcome the competition of guerrillas over control of the territory and resources3, a matter
that suggest that the magnitude of the AUC’s military e(ort in these cases also made politics
secondary on the agenda.
For the third model, that of apparent electoral indi!erence, Losada only uses the Risaralda
department in order to illustrate this type. I add Quindío, Cundinamarca and Boyacá insofar
as the existing evidence suggests similar trends not only in the arrangements of parapolitics
but also vis-à-vis other characteristics. In terms of warfare, this central area has been the least
exposed to guerrillas influence. Despite the existence of several municipalities with strong
paramilitary presence, and some collusive arrangements with politicians, the AUC proved
rather indi(erent to politics in Risaralda as well as in the other I point above. The linkages
with politicians were far from being systematic, and there is no evidence of electoral violence,
voter intimidation or fraud, and competition for votes tended mainly to run under the typi-
cal restrictions imposed by machine politics rather than by paramilitary pressure. Although
traditional forms of politics prevail in these departments, there are no traces of authoritarian
types of local rule as those found in the Caribbean region, which to a large degree can be
explained by the integration to markets – mainly via the co(ee industry, the deconcentration
3In the case of Arauca, the AUC sought to capture the extraordinary rents derived from the oil industry.
However, as Arauca has been a guerrillas’ stronghold over the last 30 years, the connections of political elites with
ELN and FARC over the “distribution” of oil royalties have proved dominant.
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of rural property – small to medium landholdings, and because of the poor connection to the
drug tra*cking circuit.
There are however many other departments that neither fit any of Losada’s types nor are
they included in Losada’s analysis: excepting for Chocó, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño, Putu-
mayo, Huila, Guaviare, Amazonas, Vichada, Vaupés and Guainía departments are clustered
in the southwestern and southeastern parts of the country (Map 1). In these departments
very few cases of collusion between politicians and paramilitaries – or no cases at all – have
been registered. The fact that all these peripheral departments have been traditional FARC
strongholds, with the largest coca/cocaine economies in the country also fully controlled by
FARC, explains why paramilitary consolidation was extremely di*cult in these areas. Given
the AUC’s incapacity of challenging guerrillas for the control of illicit economies, other fac-
tors explain the little or sporadic presence of paramilitary groups: low population density,
poor legal economies, little electoral activity, meagre political elites, and marginal represen-
tation of these departments in Congress. Although these departments exhibit forms of local
rule controlled by machine politics from traditional politicians and FARC, and there are a few
cases of collusion between politicians and AUC warlords, overall the balance has been more
favourable to guerrillas.
As stated before, Bogotá andMedellín, Colombia’s largest cities, and to a lesser extent Cali,
were areas out of the reach of parapolitics. In Bogotá, the Capital Bloc (Bloque Capital) con-
trolled Corabastos, the largest wholesale food market in the country, had protection rackets
and made social cleansing in slums. In Medellín there were two paramilitary structures: the
Metro Bloc (Bloque Metro) perhaps the only anti-subversive thoroughbred group in charge
of eliminating guerrillas’ urban militia members in the Comunas (slums), and the Nutibara
Bloc (Bloque Nutibara) in charge of collecting drug tra*cking debts. An internal war elimi-
nated former structure and the latter monopolized the AUC operation. In these cases politics
proved extremely di*cult to permeate, mainly because mayoralties were in hands of indepen-
dents and the spectrum of parties in town councils was too wide to capture. To date there
are no signs of alliances with politicians. Collusion mostly took place in the realm of security
agencies and the judiciary, and meant to protect illicit economic activities.
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the arrangements of parapolitics
As noted before, the complexity of the AUC to a significant extent stems from the fact that
the political rationale of warlords meddled with the market rationale. All AUC commanders
were drug tra*ckers but at the same time had political interests too. The important feature
here is that each warlord or groups thereof had a leading rationale that overrode the other
and to a large extent one became the instrument of the other. The judicial and media sub-
stantiation of parapolitics, as well as the field findings of this research reveal two main types
of arrangements pursued by the AUC -political predominance and economic predominance.
These arrangements also encompass Losada’s typologies. As the author exclusively explores
the electoral behaviour of warlords and does not analyse their economic rationale, it is possi-
ble to locate his hegemonic type closer to arrangements with political predominance and the
other three close to those with economic predominance.
Disregarding warlords’ rationales, preferences and electoral models, these alliances always
entailed on the side of politicians the maximization of votes, o*ce and seats in Congress.
The only variation on the side of politicians was that in some cases they aimed at building
regressive political projects in coalition with the AUC whereas in others political projects did
not involve warlords; only point alliances mediated by violence for electoral purposes.
Arrangements with political predominance
Foundational pacts and co-governance alliances
These partnerships were exclusively concentrated in the Caribbean region – Losada’s hege-
monic cluster, with the largest number of collusion cases, as discussed below. They represent
the most sophisticated and complex parapolitical alliances, undoubtedly driven by strategic
political rationales of both politicians and paramilitaries. In these cases, warlords and politi-
cians sought to build authoritarian political regimes based upon the AUC’s ultra-violent mus-
cle.
Sealing the alliances: the foundational pacts
The “Burma Plan” (Plan Birmania) was the name of a strategy launched in 2001 by the AUC,
aimed at consolidating in the short term the paramilitary unity through the drug trade, and in
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the mid and long run the control of political power at the subnational and national levels.4 In
the context of the Plan, and as 2002 presidential elections approached, many commanders an-
ticipated the triumph of candidate Alvaro Uribe and along with it the possibility of engaging
in a cease-fire and demobilization process (Interview, Ramón*, 2009). In 2001 AUC com-
manders called a National Self-Defence Conference during which they chose Uribe as their
candidate insofar as “Uribe reflected the Autodefensas’ way of thinking” (Ramón*, 2009) .5
But supporting the presidential candidate of their preference was not su*cient for making
the cease-fire and demobilization process become reality. Major reforms had to be made and
di(erent sectors had to be consulted. In this vein, securing strong congressional representa-
tion became a central goal. Although almost the entire AUC command agreed on the needs
of securing a legal safe passage for the reincorporation to civilian life6, not all warlords par-
ticipated in the political process required for that purpose.
Warlords with the strongest political drive promoted explicit regional alliances with politi-
cians and compromised them in supporting the AUC’s political project. Former Senator
Miguel de la Espriella confirmed that in 2001 he and various politicians from Sucre, Cór-
doba, Bolívar and Magdalena, signed the so-called “Ralito Agreement”, a subnational po-
litical foundational pact for “re-establishing the country”. Years after, Salvatore Mancuso
revealed a copy of the document, which contained the signatures of four Senators, eight Rep-
resentatives, one departmental deputy, six mayors and ex-mayors, one town councillor, five
appointed o*cials, two cattle-ranchers, and a journalist from the Caribbean departments.
The warlord also stated “all those who signed the Ralito Agreement did it voluntarily. They
all went there [Santafé de Ralito county] to support the peace process we were promoting [...]
but they also knew that for that purpose they needed to survive the next elections” (Mancuso,
2008). Between 2001 and 2002, subsequent agreements with identical purposes took place in
the Caribbean region: Chivolo (Magdalena), Pivijay (Cesar), and Urabá (Antioquia). Along
with those, commanders “Ramón Isaza” and “Ernesto Baez” created an association of 120
mayors in Antioquia called Amipaz.
The fact that these alliances formed in the Caribbean region, and not somewhere else, is not
fortuitous. Paramilitaries found fertile conditions in these departments for their criminal and
undemocratic project. As it will be discussed in the case of Sucre, the Caribbean territory has
4The Burma Plan was named after Myanmar’s political process of a dictatorship based on illegal economies
(El Espectador, 2007).
5Although Salvatore Mancuso revealed that the AUC contacted people from Uribe’s campaign in order to
finance the candidate, nothing has been proved in this respect (VerdadAbierta, 2009a).
6It is noteworthy that some paramilitary commanders did not agree with the demobilization process, the
same ones whose structures never demobilized.
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been historically characterized by the building of subnational authoritarian enclaves oppos-
ing the centre’s democratizing trends and reforms, with extremely narrow political spectra,
widespread corruption, vertical forms of social integration mediated by clientelist ties, and
precarious forms of accumulationmainly based upon rents on latifundia. These foundational
pacts occurred in the intersection of the trajectory of political economy and the Burma Pact
principles. To a significant extent the crossing of these worlds was made possible because the
most prominent Caribbean AUC warlords belonged to the regressive rural landed elites, and
many of them came from families of that traditionally had been involved in politics.
The mainstream accounts have interpreted Ralito’s “re-establishment of the country” as a
subnational conspiracy against the centre. Interestingly, Rafael Pardo takes this pact’s genesis
back to the late 1990s during the failed peace talks of the Pastrana administration with FARC.
Pardo argues that the potential entrance of FARC in the political arena in the early 2000s con-
stituted the main trigger of such agreements: “Ralito was not necessarily a conspiracy; it was
more of a reaction against the possibility of a constitutional assembly in the framework of an
eventual demobilization of FARC. It was a defensive mechanism; a common front inherent
to political machines and clientelism in some regions” (Interview, Pardo, 2009). Whether the
conspiracy theory was true, and notwithstanding the fact that the peace process with FARC
was frustrated, the existing evidence demonstrates that although these Caribbean founda-
tional pacts did not exactly “re-establish the country”, they constituted the frameworks under
which a series of consociational arrangements of paramilitaries and politicians were created.
Through such arrangements the regressive subnational status quo was armoured against any
type of threats against the long-standing rule of dominant political “houses” and/or the land-
holding structure in rural areas. The AUC protected through violence and fraud the electoral
interests of political barons who maximized votes as never before and reproduced their power
in Congress. In exchange, the AUC was given room to co-govern, imposing local candidacies
and appointments to local o*ce and corporations with the aim of capturing the budgets and
state functions.
By the same token, paramilitaries made alliances with public security agencies, the military
and the judiciary for counter-insurgent tasks and the protection of drug tra*cking activities.
In this context, the AUC did the “dirty work” of massacring and displacing hundreds of thou-
sands of civilians in order to weaken the alleged social support of guerrillas and deteriorating
the latter’s capacity of controlling territories. In many cases the AUC infiltrated judicial of-
fices in order to guarantee immunity from investigation and prosecution.
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Figure 1: Ralito agreement text and signatures’ facsimile7
CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENT
Fellow citizens,
The people of Colombia, invoking God’s protection, claim the unity of the nation, security,
peaceful coexistence, justice, equality, knowledge, freedom and peace for all its inhabitants.
For this purpose we have been bestowed with the inalienable task of re-founding the
motherland and signing a new social contract.
Along with all the people gathered here today, we assume the compromise of guaranteeing
the state’s ends: defending national independence, maintaining territorial integrity, and
securing peaceful coexistence and the validity of a just order.
Building this new Colombia, in a space in which every person has the right to private
property as well as duties regarding the community, is our challenge.
Every Colombian has the duty of contributing to peace in order to obey the constitutional
mandate. This task is not the prerogative of a few but the obligation of us all.
All the undersigned will create working commissions of which the results will be presented
in our next meeting in October.
Santafé de Ralito, July 21st 2001
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This type of alliances paved the path throughwhich the AUC amassed extraordinarywealth
and obtained strong political representation in Congress for the demobilization process, as
discussed below. Politicians whose electoral victories were secured via paramilitary violence
and fraud were the ones who voted the disastrous demobilization legal framework that served
AUC warlords interest.
Controlling the vote: supporting traditional politicians and creating AUC’s own
Some of the new parties that emerged as the outcome of fragmentation and atomization dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 were created at the subnational level in the Caribbean during the time
of parapolitics. This was the case of MORAL Party, created for the 2002 elections, which
was transformed into Democratic Colombia for the 2006 elections, and of the Popular United
Movement andCivic Popular Convergence (both directly created by theAUCwithAUC-made
politicians). The core constituencies of the Popular Integration Movement were located in
Atlántico, Magdalena, Cesar and Guajira. The electoral success of these parties was the out-
come of the violent and fraudulent influence of the AUC.
Electoral fraud was one of the main strategies used by the criminal coalition in many
Caribbean departments. The case of the 2002 congressional elections in Magdalena is par-
ticularly striking. According to a key witness in a judicial investigation8, Representative José
Gamarra and AUC commander “Jorge 40” orchestrated the scam. Twenty-one municipal-
ities were distributed into three “electoral districts”: the southern district was awarded to
candidates Luis Eduardo Vives (Senate) and Alfonso Campos (House of Representatives); the
central district was assigned to candidates Dieb Maloof and José Gamarra; and the western
district was given to Salomón Saade and Jorge Caballero. Once districts were drawn up, fraud
was triggered: “the electoral fraud was of gigantic proportions. For that purpose we designed
this special software which based on the electoral census allowed manipulating each vote: the
software included all names of potential voters, their national identification numbers as well
as the assigned polling stations in eachmunicipality. Gamarra financed the operation and paid
USD 3,000 for each departmental data base” (AGO-PI, 2006). AUC’s Northern Bloc men put
pressure on the Local Register Authority’s heads in each of the targeted municipalities, made
7Translated by the author. Besides the signatures of AUC warlords’ Salvatore Mancuso (signing here as “San-
tander Losada”), Adolfo Paz, Jorge 40 andDiegoVecino, those of JoseMaria Lopez and Salvador Arana, Córdoba
and Sucre departments’ governors are also included in the facsimile. The original document contains the signa-
tures of all the assistants.
8Rafael García was the former IT director of the National Secret Service. He was convicted for facilitating
Magdalena’s electoral fraud and corruption in public contracts.
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them assign electoral juries, and instructed them how to guarantee votes for Jorge 40’s chosen
candidates. Subsequently, vote totals were electronically manipulated. The electoral results
confirmed the strategy’s success: Luis Eduardo Vives obtained 89% of his total national vot-
ing inMagdalena; Salomon Saade, 86%and DiebMaloof 59%. Their partners for the House
of Representatives all had votes of over 75% in the same municipalities. Electoral abstention,
void votes and blank ballot papers were extremely low in Magdalena for these elections, far
below the national average. Notably, all politicians elected under this fraudulent strategy have
been sentenced for colluding with “Jorge 40”. The same strategy of districts was used in Ce-
sar in support of the Alvaro Araújo, Miguel Durán, Mauricio Pimiento and Jorge Ramírez;
and in Bolívar to favour William Montes.
There was also electoral fraud during the same year’s presidential elections. By using the
samemechanisms, the AUC sought to guarantee Uribe’s victory inMagdalena: “that explains
why in the only Caribbean department inwhich President Uribe won the elections was inMag-
dalena; the department produced over 300,000 votes for him” (AGO-PI, 2006). Uribe’s top
campaign sta( in Magdalena who later became high ranking o*cials during his administra-
tions were heavily involved in the fraud: the then departmental campaign manager, Jorge
Noguera, who was later appointed as the Director of the National Secret Service and involved
the institution in one of the worst cases of paramilitary infiltration; the former director and
deputy director of the National Anti-Narcotics Agency, and the former Presidential Council-
lor for Youth Programmes.
Terrorizing the populationwas themain ingredient for securing votes and tookmany forms
such as directly threatening political competitors and assassinating them in case they did not
withdraw or gathering people and forcing them to vote for specific candidates under threats
of massacres, as reported in Sucre. Terror was also used to keep people away from the polls so
ballot stu*ng and other forms of manipulation of vote totals could occur, as was reported in
Cesar. Other strategies involved collecting people’s national ID cards – necessary for voting
– and using them to collect the ballots and filling them in for voters, as reported in Bolívar;
retaining people’s IDs and counterfeiting ballots those that could not vote because they had no
identification to do so (Magdalena and Córdoba); and replacing ballots that favoured other
candidates di(erent from AUC’s supported candidates (Sucre, Bolívar and Magdalena).
Under these co-governance alliances the AUC not only delivered in order to secure the elec-
toral success of well-established local politicians. Paramilitaries also created their own politi-
cians, though with less success. The best-known cases are those of Representatives Eleonora
Pineda, Rocío Arias andMuriel Benito who with none or little political backgrounds became
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electoral phenomena in 2002. Pineda, from Córdoba, who in 2000 was elected as Tierralta’s
municipality town councillor with 748 votes, won a seat at the House of Representatives with
82,082 votes in 2002. In the same year Benito, from Sucre, won a seat with 44,365 votes and
Arias, from Antioquia, won another one with 23,877 votes. The last two congresswomen had
no prior political experience. These politicians were the product of electoral fraud and armed
pressure. These cases were perhaps the first to attract the attention of the authorities. Accord-
ing to an interviewed warlord, “Eleonora [Pineda] was a monster created by us; just as Rocío
Arias and Muriel Benito. We never used this strategy again” (Interview, Ramón*, 2009).
In all these Caribbean cases, once supported politicians were elected, AUC warlords co-
governed departments and municipalities. They interfered greatly in determining candidates
for mayoralties and governors’ o*ces, appointments to key subnational o*ces, mainly those
in control of the largest budget share. Likewise they influenced local contracting, divert-
ing millions of dollars from public co(ers. Paramilitaries and politicians had the long-term
project of building undemocratic and criminal subnational states in the Caribbean region. In
some places, as in Sucre, warlords even prepared their own candidates, who would run in the
2007 and 2008 electoral arena, after the AUC’s demobilization.
Point alliances for electoral purposes
The alliances for co-governance and representation in Congress were not the only arrange-
ments that took place between politicians and paramilitaries. There were also point electoral
alliances, limited in scope and time, which entailed an instrumental exchange of votes, public
budgets and contracts.
Caldas and Tolima are examples of this type of arrangements. Both departments exhibit
patterns of traditional politics, clientelism and corruption, but the political spectrum was
wider that that of Caribbean departments. These territories have been strongly linked to
markets via agricultural exports. According to the judicial investigations, the principal aim of
the AUCwas the capture of available rents in these territories while maximizing votes was that
of politicians. There were no political projects involved. Other departments like Risaralda
could fit this typology; nevertheless investigations against politicians were inconclusive.9
9Former Senator Habib Merheg was linked to AUC warlord “Macaco”, one of the biggest drug tra*ckers
the AUC had. According to witnesses Merheg gave “Macaco” USD 200,000 in order to “protect” his campaign.
However the linkages between Merheg and Macaco were never proven (La Silla Vacía, 2010).
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In Caldas, warlord “Ernesto Báez” used a similar strategy to that of Magdalena and Cesar
and in 2003 created two “electoral districts” in northern Caldas, one for Enrique Emilio and
the other for Dixon Tapasco, son of traditional Liberal baron Ferney Tapasco and elected in
Congress in 2006. The instrumental alliance also included an AUC’s frontman in Tapasco’s
lists (VerdadAbierta, 2010). The Autodefensas secured the victories of Emilio and Tapasco’s
candidates to mayoralties and town councils in the “electoral districts”. It was established
“Ernesto Báez” got a strong grip of that region’s public budgets. This political platform se-
cured a seat in Congress for Tapasco, who was convicted to seven years of imprisonment for
colluding with the AUC (SCJ-26584, 2011).
In Tolima, former Senate President Luis Gómez was convicted in 2007 to nine years of
imprisonment under charges of illegal campaign financing by AUC’s local commander “El
Socio” for his 2002 election (SCJ-32792, 2011). El Guamo, Valle de San Juan, San Luis and
Purificación electedmayors, all Gómez’smen, were also supported by theAUCwhich in return
obtained 10%of public contracts. Former Representative Javier Devia was convicted to seven
years of imprisonment. It was established that Devia’s 2006 campaign was “protected” by
AUC’s Tolima Bloc (SCJ-33015, 2011).
Arrangements with economic predominance
In the cases that fit in this category, AUC warlords’ economic rationale overrode politics, and
this is mainly explained by three factors. The first one is that the territories o(ered extraor-
dinary accumulation possibilities via illegal and legal activities, as it was the case of NDS
and Valle departments. Second, some warlords were originally drug tra*ckers who bought
AUC franchises in order to join the demobilization process and legalize wealth and criminal
activities. This is the case of Miguel Arroyave (“Arcángel”) who paid 5 million USD for be-
coming the AUC commander of Meta, Cundinamarca, Boyacá and Casanare departments,
as well as of Bogotá’s Capital Bloc; the Mejía Múnera brothers (“Los Mellizos”) who for 2
million USD created the Arauca Victors Bloc; Francisco Zuluaga (“Gordo Lindo”) who com-
manded the Pacific Bloc, Carlos Jiménez ( “Macaco”) of Central Bolívar Bloc, and Ramiro
Vanoy (“Cuco”) ofMiners Bloc, for similar amounts. Third, in almost all cases in which the
economic rationale led the parapolitical arrangements, warlords were not native of the areas
in which they operated. Most of them came from Antioquia and Córdoba departments –
cradles of the AUC, a feature that explains to some extent the lack of political drive given
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their disconnection with these “occupied” territories. By contrast, all the Caribbean region’s
warlords were native of those departments and most of them belonged to the local elites.
Although it is extremely di*cult to calculate the wealth of AUC commanders, it must have
been of extraordinary proportions given the fact that all warlords had ties with drug traf-
ficking, used sophisticated money laundering mechanisms, had access to public budgets and
contracts (it is estimated that the AUC had shares of between 10% and 50% of budgets in
the departments where they controlled mayoralties and governors o*ces), and controlled ex-
tensive protection rackets. Many of them expanded the economic webs towards other illegal
activities (contraband, prostitution, human tra*c, fuel and vehicle theft) and poorly regulated
legal ones (lotteries, wholesale food markets, private security firms, construction, bureaus de
change). Others also accumulated wealth via the violent dispossession of peasants’ land. The
strength of armies that added up to 34,000 armed personnel guaranteed the success of the
AUC’s participation in this impressive spectrum of activities. Although maintaining such a
large army must have been very costly for the AUC, it is highly probable that the total income
exceeded by far the cost of the war e(ort.
In territories where economic interests came first, paramilitaries required multiple arrange-
ments in order to protect their accumulation activities. Warlords successfully infiltrated pub-
lic security agencies, colluded with policemen and militaries, and allied with people from
the judiciary. In this way they guaranteed impunity and immunity from investigation and
prosecution. But politicians were also central to the protection system, mostly elected local
o*cials (mayors and governors). In these contexts, all these key agents constituted nodes in
the criminal networks of paramilitaries.
In all cases of parapolitics in the context of economic arrangements, politicians acted as
maximizers of votes and were funded with AUC money. In exchange they provided paramil-
itaries access to public budgets and contracts and protected their economic activities. There
have been no signs of the building of political projects. The relationship was merely instru-
mental.
Drug tra%c and money laundering
Politics became a mechanism for money laundering via campaign financing and those politi-
cians who received funding became partners in crime. But the relationship between drug
tra*c and politics was not exhausted in this exchange. As discussed, drug tra*c constituted
the economic backbone of the AUC and therefore it required a great deal of protection not
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only from law enforcement and judicial agents but also from politicians. The cases of NDS,
Arauca andValle help understanding this type of exchange: paramilitaries supported elections
through campaign funding and elimination of opponents, and in exchange winners protected
and even participated in AUC’s illegal activities.
In Valle department AUC’s Calima Bloc financed Dilian Francisca Toro’s campaign with
USD 170,000, and mid-ranking AUC men were in charge of making people vote for her (El
Espectador, 2008). She won a seat in the Senate in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006, when she
became Senate’s President (El Espectador, 2010). Since 2012, Toro is being investigated for
the laundering of USD 2.7million from a well-known drug baron in Valle, which she and her
husband used to buy a rural property in northern Valle (Kienyke, 2012).
In Arauca, drug tra*ckers “Los Mellizos” who became AUC commanders via franchise
funded Julio Acosta’s campaign to theGovernor’sO*cewithUSD 220,000 (CaracolNoticias,
2010). Acosta also used the AUC for eliminating o*cials from the department’s Registrar
O*ce who knew about the electoral fraud committed during his campaign. Los Mellizos’
wealth was estimated in USD 800million (Semana, 2001), a great deal of which was amassed
during their short time in the AUC. Governor Acosta’s support to “Los Mellizos” between
2003 and 2007was crucial for the cocaine tra*cking to Europe via Venezuela andWest Africa.
InNDS, formerCúcuta’sMayorRamiro Suárezwas a crucial ally of commander “El Iguano”.
The warlord funded his campaign and during his time in o*ce (2003–2007) Suárez protected
the complex web of both illegal and legal businesses of paramilitaries in the department that
ranged from drug tra*cking, fuel smuggling, to control of gambling and betting, and money
laundering. This event, which constitutes one of the two cases compared in this thesis, will
be thoroughly Chapter 7.
Public budgets and contracts
The appropriation of public budgets by AUC warlords was common in all cases of parapoli-
tics: irrespective of warlords’ political drive, electoral support always implied rewards in pub-
lic contracts, either within the framework of co-governance arrangements or under more in-
strumental settings. Although it is extremely di*cult to establish to total amount of money
embezzled from public co(ers, this item in the AUC’s balance was likely more than significant.
The cases of the Caribbean departments – the hegemonic model – were particularly dra-
matic and reveal the entrenchment of the political and economic rationales. In these depart-
ments the main targets were the public healthcare system and oil and coal royalties. Northern
68
the arrangements of parapolitics
Bloc commander “Jorge 40” established a strategy for corruption over public resources. Of
theminimumpercentage established in each contract, i.e.10%, 3.3%went to to the local AUC
structure; 3.3% to elected politicians involved; 1% to local treasurers (VerdadAbierta, 2012).
Misappropriation in the healthcare system was a major business. Warlords controlled ap-
pointments of managers of hospitals and healthcare providers. The mayor of Riohacha – La
Guajira’s departmental capital – was arrested in 2006 along with ten city o*cials. They were
found guilty of diverting approximately USD 60,000 from healthcare funds for the poorest to
the AUC (Semana, 2011). The accountant of “Jorge 40” indicated that the extortion of the
public healthcare in the Atlántico department between May and July 2004 generated a profit
of USD 550,000. In this case the alliance with then Senator Dieb Maloof, a parapolitician
convicted in 2013, created a network of family members and fellow politicians that managed
the looting of public healthcare provider José Prudencio Padilla through the creation of 13
cooperatives. From a USD 45 million budget, Maloof’s network diverted USD 12.7 million
to “Jorge 40” (Semana, 2011). In Córdoba, AUC’s Elmer Cárdenas Bloc penetrated the local
healthcare system through the creation of providerOrsalud. Politicians gave the AUC access
to healthcare contracts in six municipalities. It was established that only in the case of Arbo-
letes municipality, the mayor diverted 40% of the health budget to commander “El Alemán”.
All mayors and several town councillors were imprisoned (Caracol Noticias, 2011).
Oil royalties constituted another key target in AUC finances. In Sucre, it was proven that
former Governor Salvador Arana twice paid fifteen public works’ contracts funded with roy-
alties in the late 1990s in Tolú municipality. In 2002, as the department still owed contractors
money from these contracts, Arana fully settled all contracts again, and commander “Diego
Vecino” was granted USD 270,000 (VerdadAbierta, 2013).
But this was not only the case in the Caribbean region. Casanare, located in eastern Colom-
bia, is one of the richest departments as it is the second oil producer in the country. Oil has
traditionally put Casanare in the crosshairs of armed clientelism, andwas for decades an ELN
guerrilla stronghold. Drug tra*c has also fuelled the internal conflict in the department as
it constitutes a point for cocaine processing and a tra*c route towards southern Colombia.
In this context, parapolitics took place under the form of point alliances with its instrumen-
tal exchange of votes and protection of illegal business for access to oil royalties. For the
2003 elections, “Martin Llanos”, the local AUC commander, promoted the “Casanare Pact”,
signed by Milton Alvarez, candidate to the Governor’s O*ce, and candidates to Tauramena,
Villanueva, Maní, Sabanalarga and Monterrey mayoralties, who agreed on diverting 50% of
local budgets and 10% of each public contract to the AUC in exchange for electoral results.
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All candidates were elected. The AGO stated that “the commitment [of politicians] with the
Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare was that electoral results were the responsibility of
paramilitaries in exchange for controlling local budgets and contracts” (Semana, 2007), and
established the diversion of public funds to the AUC. It is calculated that the six mayors man-
aged oil royalties worth USD 185million during their time in o*ce, of which the AUC received
what they established in the pact. All o*cials were convicted.
Other public fronts were infiltrated by the AUC-politicians alliances. “Jorge 40”, supported
by politicians, cooperated with a firm that won a twenty-year concession to collect taxes in
Barranquilla district (Atlántico) that reportedly produced USD 17.7 million between 2002
and 2006. Indications are that “Jorge 40” may have taken as much as half of these revenues
(Revista Cambio, 2008).
Rural land
In many a department, AUC commanders either reinforced their status of landed elites or
became part of a new landed bourgeoisie through violent dispossession or fraudulent acqui-
sition of peasant land. A common purpose of land accumulation was the consolidation of
corridors for drug tra*cking, and this vein, AUC warlords created “security cordons” of
rural property in these strategic areas. This was possible because the Colombian state has
been historically incapable of enforcing property rights, a weakness that had a most perva-
sive impact on the poorest end of rural land ownership. According to judicial investigations,
“Macaco” was AUC’s top land grabber in the paramilitary with 50,000 hectares, followed
by “Don Berna” (45,000), Salvatore Mancuso (25,000), “Cuco” (24,000) and “Monoleche”
(20,000) (El Tiempo, 2012). It has been calculated that almost one million hectares were lost
to the complex webs of land seizure created by paramilitaries, politicians, land and registrar
authorities, and legal entrepreneurs, of which approximately 400,000 hectares belonged to
over 450,000 displaced peasant families and the rest was to public waste land.
In Magdalena, authorities identified 1,500 ghost land sale contracts, with false documents,
that accounted for 68,000 hectares of land grabs in Plato, Sabanas de San Ángel, Chivolo,
Tenerife and Ariguaní (El Tiempo, 2013). According to the Land Registrar’s O*ce, in most
cases local politicians and o*cials were AUC accomplices, including former Senator Jorge
Castro and the respective mayors. In Carmen del Darién and Riosuciomunicipalities (Chocó),
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the AUC snatched 25,479 hectares of Afro-Colombian collective land.10 Over 4,000 families
were displaced in 1997, and their land was soon after used for large-scale palm oil and cattle
ranching activities. By 2001, several legal entrepreneurs had started joining the agro-industrial
project. Commander Vicente Castaño, who is said to have managed to legalize 1,000 hectares
of this land in only four days, stated that bringing legal entrepreneurs to these projects was
very convenient insofar as once the legal rich arrived, then came state institutions, those that
helped legalizing the land usurpation (La Silla Vacía, 2011).
the geographic and partisan distribution of parapolitics
As shown in Figure 2 and Map 2, the largest concentration of congress members investigated
by authorities belong to the departments of Antioquia (27), Córdoba (18), Atlántico (14)Mag-
dalena (13), Bolívar (11), Cesar (11), and Sucre (10), all located in Losada’s hegemonic clus-
ter. In all cases, paramilitaries succeeded not only in fully capturing the subnational public
space (local elections, appointments and public contracting) but also colluding with politi-
cians who had important positions in Congress (prominent leaders of Uribista parties and
key congressional commissions such as the budget assignation commission). As many as 106
of 165 members of congress involved in parapolitics belong to the Caribbean departments,
that is 64% of all those implicated. Guajira, the outlier with only 2 cases seems strange in
this Caribbean context. A hypothesis could be that given its location along the Venezuelan
border, the historical dynamic of this department – deeply connected to smuggling – strongly
di(ers from the rest of Caribbean departments. This case is quite similar to NDS, included by
Losada in the predominance within restricted competition model, and one of selected cases
of this thesis.
In the case of departments under the predominance within restricted competition type, 40
politicians (24% of the total) were involved: Santander (10), Caldas (9), Tolima (9), NDS (4),
Valle (4), Casanare (2), and Meta (2). Levels of collusion in Santander, Caldas and Tolima
are impressive but in spite of the number of cases, there is no evidence of the building of
any political project at the subnational level, as occurred in the Caribbean region. These
departments are typical cases of point electoral alliances, as discussed below.
10Indigenous and Afro Colombian communities are entitled to own collective territory, which is inalienable
and thus cannot be subject to sale contracts.
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Figure 2: Number of Congress Members Investigated and/or Convicted for Parapolitics by
















































































































(*) Author’s calculations based on the SCJ and AGO information. Updated: August 2013.
Risaralda, which falls under the apparent electoral indi"erence type, had only one reported
case of collusion. If we add the other departments, the number of alliances are very low or
zero: Boyacá (2), Cundinamarca (0) and Quindío (0). All together, with 3 cases, they account
for only 2%, a number that confirms that in spite of the existence of several municipalities
in these departments with paramilitary presence, AUCwarlords proved indi(erent to politics.
The case of the “out of the reach of paramilitary control” departments seems to confirm
the argument of guerrillas’ hegemony and/or the little relevance of politics or economics to
the paramilitaries’ strategy. With 16 cases – Chocó (4), Nariño (3), Cauca (2), Caquetá (2),
Amazonas (2), Putumayo (1), Huila (1), Guainía (1), Guaviare (0), Arauca (0), Vichada (0),
and Vaupés (0)- the participation with 10% is still proportionally lower insofar as we are than
that of the former group.
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Map 2: Geographic Distribution of Congress Members Involved in Parapolitics11
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Mapped by the author.
The Uribista coalition and parapolitics in Congress
As discussed before, the agglomeration of parties towards to right end of the political spec-
trum in Colombia was factor that played a significa t role in the politicization of crimi als
and the criminalization of politicians. In many departments, these right-wing emerging par-
ties made coalitions with liberals and conservatives who, by keeping their labels, established
common strategies in line with those of AUC warlords.
11Author’s calculations based on theNationalRegisterAuthority (NRA), SCJ andAGO i form ion. Updated:
August 2013.
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It can be observed in Figure 2 that Liberal, Conservative, Radical Change and U Party
parties exhibit the heaviest involvement in parapolitics: 37, 33, 28 and 25 congress members
were involved, respectively. It is noteworthy that the Liberal party participation relatedmainly
to congress members elected in 2002. For the 2006 elections, when the party experienced
further atomization, the levels of Liberals involved substantially decreased as they had moved
to other groups.

























































































































































Author’s calculations based on the SCJ and AGO information. Updated: August 2013
The Uribista coalition had the largest proportion of parapoliticians elected to Congress
in 2002 and 2006. Many of the winners in the 2002 elections merged with other parties or
recycled into new movements after the 2003 electoral reform, increasing their participation
in the country’s political power. This is particularly sensitive in the case of the Liberal party.
The National Progressive Movement, MORAL, and a sector of Popular United Movement
merged into Democratic Colombia; another part of Popular United Movement became Cit-
izen Convergence; Wings and Colombian Team merged into Wings-Colombian Team. The
U Party and Radical Change took in other remnants. Other parties such as Liberal Opening
kept the label and structure, and were successful in increasing electoral capital in spite of the
investigations against many of their members. Wings-Colombian Team, Democratic Colom-
bia, Citizen Convergence and Liberal Opening grew or maintained their electoral strength
for the 2006 and 2007 elections.12 The only party linked with parapolitics that lost its elec-
12Source: NRA.
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toral attraction was Colombia Alive. The largest parties of the Uribista coalition – Radical
Change and U Party – experienced the most spectacular electoral success: the former won 35
congressional seats in the 2006 elections; the latter’s success is even more striking: created
only in 2005, it won 50 seats in Congress. In terms of parapolitics, these parties were the most
compromised: Radical Change has 28 of its Congress members investigated and U Party 25.
As a product of the media pressure and of the increasing judicial action over parapolitics,
the Liberal, Conservative, Radical Change and U Parties excluded from their lists some candi-
dates whowere presumably linked to the AUC.However, there was no actual cleansing insofar
as other politicians involved with the AUC were later admitted in the parties, and those ex-
pelled were soon welcomed in other Uribista parties (Semana, 2006). On the whole, many
parties experienced a significant loss of congressional seats by the uncovering of parapolitics.
According to Table 1 below, of 382 seats won in the 2002 and 2006 elections, 165 have been
or are currently under investigation. TheUribista coalition had the highest number of investi-
gated seats (121), followed by the Liberal Party (37). Most of the investigated seats were filled
with “alternate” congress members13, and in this fashion parties managed to keep all their
seats. However Wings-Colombian Team and Social Action Party lost all seats and ran out of
“alternates” as they were also being investigated (which explains the negative remaining seats
in the cases of Democratic Colombia and Colombia Alive below). Some departments were at
the edge of losing all congressional representation: such is the case of Sucre, which by 2007
lost all native senators and all but one Representative’s seats.
13In Colombia, elected congress members may be replaced by the non-elected candidate from the same elec-
toral list with the second highest voting in the following cases: death, physical incapacity to exercise the con-
gressional position, resignation, dismissal, investiture loss, criminal convictions that do not include promotion,
financing or belonging to criminal organizations, committing crimes against democratic participation or against
humanity.
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56 165 221 121 100
Wings-Colombia Team (*) 0 5 5 5 0
Liberal Opening 5 5 10 6 4
Radical Change 9 35 44 28 16
Democratic Colombia (*) 0 5 5 7 -2
Colombia Alive (*) 0 2 2 4 -2
Citizen Convergence 8 15 18 9 9
Civic and Popular
Convergence (**)
5 0 5 3 2
Social Action Party (*) 0 1 1 1 0
Conservative Party 34 47 81 33 48
U Party (*) 0 50 50 25 25
LIBERAL PARTY 84 53 137 37 100
OTHERS 14 10 24 7 17
Moral 4 1 5 1 4
Regional integration
Movement
2 4 6 2 4
National Progressive
Movement
2 1 3 2 1
New Huila Liberal
Movement (*)
0 2 2 1 1
Popular United Movement 4 2 6 1 5
TOTAL 154 228 382 165 217
(*) Parties created after the 2002 elections
(**) Parties that ceased existing after 2002 elections or merged with other parties
The 2009 political reform established that political parties with members investigated for
colluding with criminal actors can no longer make replacements with “alternates”, and con-
sequently parties will be punished with the so-called “empty seats”, that is by having to leave
seats vacant. To date there are five vacant seats in the Colombian Congress (U Party 3, Radical
Change 1 and Liberal Party 1).
14Author’s calculations based on the NRA, Supreme Court of Justice and Attorney General’s O*ce informa-
tion. Updated: June 2013.
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The capture of local o%ce
Parapolitics was not exclusive to the national legislature. Collusionwas also endemic amongst
local elected o*cials. AUC commanders supported candidates to governor’s o*ces, may-
oralties, town councils and departmental assemblies of parapoliticians elected in Congress;
in other cases they made their front men elected. In many cases, the relationship between
paramilitaries and local o*ce was instrumental, solely related to the predation of local bud-
gets and contracts. But in many other cases, the control over local o*ce was part of the
strategies of co-governance of paramilitaries that sought to coherently scale from the micro
to the national level. As stated by Urabá commander “El Aleman”: “the strategy was first
reaching mayoralties, town councils which are, say, the base of democracy. Second, reaching
Departmental Assemblies, House of Representatives and Senate, and in one way or another,
supporting presidential candidates” (VerdadAbierta, 2009b).
In other regions, the strategy worked slightly di(erently. By winning congressional seats
for supported candidates in 2002, the AUC significantly determined the candidates for 2003
local elections of departmental, mayors, town councillors, and departmental deputies from
the same political parties, and largely controlled appointments to o*ce. For the 2003 elec-
tions, 251 mayors were elected under the labels of Colombia Alive, Yes Colombia, Civic Pop-
ular Convergence, Popular IntegrationMovement, United Popular Movement, Wings, Moral,
Democratic Colombia, Liberal Opening, Citizen Convergence, Colombian Team, National
Movement and Conservative Progress Movement. On the aggregate, these movements won
almost 4,000 town councils’ seats. The Liberal party won 231 mayoralties and the Conserva-
tive party 160. As for the parties created for 2006 congressional elections, Radical Change
won 3 departmental administrations and 112 mayoralties; the U Party won elections for 7
departmental administrations, 123mayoralties and 59 departmental deputies.15 It is notewor-
thy however that not all these elected o*cials were involved in parapolitics; but the fact of the
proven involvement of their parties and of many fellow congress members, suggests that an
important share of these local elections had some kind of paramilitary interference, at least
in regions in which the AUC exerted full control.
For the 2003 local elections paramilitaries used similar patterns to those of 2002 congres-
sional elections inmany regions: they created “electoral districts” (clusters of 3 ormoremunic-
ipalities linked by electoral fraud chains and other electoral o(ences), supported unopposed
15Source: NRA.
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candidates16, participated in electoral fraud, and assassinated candidates. The Federation of
Colombian Municipalities reported restrictions in campaigns in 200 municipalities, 22 mu-
nicipalities with single candidates in Antioquia, Córdoba, Sucre, Magdalena, Meta, Guajira,
Chocó andNDS, and the resignation of 87 candidates for departmental governors, departmen-
tal deputies, mayors and town councillors who had been threatened by the paramilitaries.
To date, 470 elected and appointed local o*cials have been linked to parapolitics cases, as
shown in Figure 3 below. Except for the case of a former governor of Sucre17, all cases are
strictly related to corruption in public contracting and electoral fraud in alliance with the
AUC.
















Source: AGO. Updated: August 2013
16Magdalena department’s governor Trino Luna was elected in 2003 as the Colombia Viva candidate after
running unopposed. All other candidates quit, citing threats from the AUC. Cesar department also had a single
gubernatorial candidate in 2003, Hernando Molina. His two opponents quit also under AUC threats.
17Salvador Arana, elected in 2003, was found guilty of the assassination of El Roble municipality’s mayor, in
2003, and convicted to 40 years of imprisonment.
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the investigation of parapolitics
The investigation of parapolitics has been a particularly complex process. When the SCJstarted investigating the links between politicians and paramilitaries in 2006, AUC’s
demobilized members were already being prosecuted under the framework of the Justice and
Peace Law (JPL). This cross-judicial process has proved extremely di*cult. To date, the ju-
dicial system has opened over 600 investigations against congress members and elected and
appointed o*cials, which constitutes a very impressive advance given the structural weakness
of the Colombian judicial apparatus. Nevertheless, according to the AGO in the framework
of the JPL, demobilized paramilitaries and victims have contributed enough information to
open 11,179 investigations against 1,124 politicians, 1,023militaries and policemen, 393 pub-
lic o*cials, and 10,329 private persons – including entrepreneurs – and paramilitaries as pos-
sible participants in the phenomenon (VerdadAbierta, 2012). But besides the magnitude of
information that would make the judicial system collapse, there are also problems of scarcity
of valuable information. On the one hand, to date not a single politician has voluntarily con-
fessed or cooperated with the justice administration. A common feature is the systematic
denial of the alliances with paramilitaries. On the other hand, several AUC top commanders
were extradited to the U.S. in 2008 under charges of drug tra*cking and money laundering,
a situation that superposed an additional and extra-territorial jurisdiction that has further
complicated the investigations. Peace and Justice Attorneys have experienced innumerable
di*culties in advancing in the investigations when AUC warlords are imprisoned in Ameri-
can jails: the PJL is not a U.S. priority, and extradited warlords are being prosecuted for drug
tra*cking but not for crimes against humanity or for parapolitics.
The political front during the Uribe administration was not helpful either as the investi-
gations jeopardised its coalition in Congress. All congress members claimed that the SCJ
launched a strategy for undermining the Uribe administration’s legitimacy (Semana, 2006a),
a political ruse that would have not had any e(ect if vastly popular President Uribe would
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have not admitted these arguments and used them against the media and the SCJ. Despite
continuous verbal attacks, the Court’s investigations continued and congress members opted
for diverse strategies as fleeing the country1, resigning to the seat and waiving jurisdiction in
order to be prosecuted by the AGO and not by the SCJ.2 President Uribe’s attitude vis-à-vis
the phenomenon was protective. Some of the involved were appointed in the Foreign Service3
and others were publicly supported.4 The government, strongly backed by its congressional
coalition, was active in promoting – with little success – mechanisms for circumventing the
judicial action in the parapolitics cases. Governmental e(orts included attempts to change
some definitions of types of crimes and turning them into non-bailable o(ences (El Tiempo,
2007). The government also frustrated a legislative project that sought to establish norms of
political responsibility of parties that endorsed politicians involved with organized crime (El
Espectador, 2006; Semana, 2008). Likewise, the government proposed removing the compe-
tence of investigating Congress members from the SCJ.
In spite of di*culties – reflected in 74 cases that have not progressed from the preliminary
stage – the judicial system has proved independent and e*cient in punishing parapolitics: to
date 55 Congress members have been convicted, 18 are being under formal investigation and
trial, and there have been very few acquittals and closures.
Consistent with the analysis of Chapter 2, the length of convictions issued by the judiciary
reveals di(erent levels of involvement of politicians. The collusive behaviour varied from oc-
casional assistance to meetings with paramilitaries; protection of electoral enterprises and
electoral fraud; and conspiracy to commit crimes. It is however noteworthy that there is not
a single investigation that went beyond preliminary stage in which collusion was the outcome
of fear or threats. Of a total of 55 convictions 18 politicians were convicted to less than 5
years of prison (34%), 34 have been sentenced between 5 and 10 years of prison (64%) and
1The former governor of Sucre Salvador Arana left the country in 2006 and Senator Mario Uribe, President
Uribe’s cousin, tried to obtain political asylum at the Costa Rican embassy.
2This strategywasmassively used by parapolitics: using theGAOallows fragmenting the investigation insofar
as the latter accuses and a judge decides, and allows for appeal and a second instance. Under the SCJ’s jurisdiction
the Courtroom for Criminal A(airs (Sala Penal), in plenary, investigates and decides, and there is no appealing or
second instance . Fifty-three out of 165 investigated congressmembers opted for AGO’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
in 2009 the SCJ announced that all congressional cases could no longer be investigated by the AGO.
3The former Sucre governor, Salvador Arana was appointed as ambassador to Chile whereas former DAS
director Jorge Noguera was appointed as consul in Milan. However given the course of criminal investigations,
the politicians resigned and returned to Colombia.
4This is the case of the Colombian Army General Rito Alejo del Rio who was investigated and convicted for
colluding with paramilitary groups in the Urabá region (Antioquia) and held responsible for several massacres of
civilians by the time when president Uribe was Antioquia’s department governor (mid 1990s), and that of Jorge
Noguera Cotes, former Secret Service director, who is currently under prosecution for the large-scale penetration
of the AUC in the institution.
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Author’s calculations based on the SCJ and AGO’s information. Updated: August 2010.
only one congress member received a sentence of more than 10 years, which is the case of
Senator Alvaro García from Sucre department who was sentenced to 40 years of prison, the
highest conviction in the Colombian criminal system, for the massacre of 15 peasants and
the assassination of an electoral witness. In this specific case it was proved that the AUC was
organic to the García House, which used terror in order to consolidate its position.
Although most of the cases against local elected o*cials are still in preliminary stage, the
case of Sucre’s former governor Salvador Arana is noteworthy. Besides charges of formation
of a paramilitary group and corruption he was found guilty of the 2003 assassination of an
elected Mayor. The cases of Senator García and Governor Arana are a landmark insofar as
for the first time in Colombian judicial history, politicians have been sentenced under charges
of crimes against humanity according to international standards.
Besides the fact that parapolitics is by far the greatest scandal of political corruption in
Colombian history, the phenomenon has also had profound implications for human rights,
both in the domestic and international spheres. Human rights organizations entirely dedi-
cated many of their Colombian reports to this issue (AI, 2008; HRW, 2008). The prosecutor
of the International Court of Justice has visited the country on two occasions and although
he recognized the e(orts of the Colombian judicial system, he expressed deep concerns about
the restricted scope of the Justice and Peace Law as it only provides for the investigation of
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members of the AUC but is not aimed at punishing and putting an end to the paramilitary
phenomenon as awhole, that is, including its economic and political support. He also stressed
his worries about the potential collapse of the Justice and Peace jurisdiction because of the
overwhelming number of cases that are being investigated (El Espectador, 2008).
the demobilization process and the transitional justice system: the re-
wards of parapolitics
As indicated above, although not all AUC warlords had a strong political drive, the fact is
that in all but a few cases warlords sought to demobilize and legalize their judicial situation
regarding committed crimes and illicit wealth. The building of innumerable alliances with
politicians not only served the purpose of amassing incredible wealth with which, among
other things, AUC commanders bought politicians via campaign financing, but also – and
most importantly – paved the road that facilitated their reintegration into civilian life.
Eliminating political status as a condition for signing peace agreements
In the early 2000s the existing legal framework only authorized the national government to
sign peace agreements with illegal armed actors that had previously been granted political
status. It was under that framework where many Colombian guerrillas demobilized in the
1990s or agreed to cease fires and peace talks. But it was also the framework under which
paramilitaries were systematically excluded from peace talks. Although it was not possible
to grant political status to paramilitaries, Law 782 of 2002, one of the first moves by Presi-
dent Uribe’s administration with large congressional support, eliminated political status as
sine qua non condition for negotiating peace agreements. The new legal framework made
the AUC eligible for peace negotiations, a matter that completely transformed their legal per-
spective. Under the new conditions, paramilitaries could demobilize avoiding regular judicial
procedures and could be granted pardon, conditional suspension of judicial sentences, as well
as the termination of previous judicial procedures, among other benefits.
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Demobilization and disarmament
Of 40 AUC structures, 35 collectively demobilized between November 2003 and August 2006.
Metro Bloc (Medellín), Capital Front (Bogotá), Counterinsurgent Wayúu Front (Guajira),
Peasant Self-Defence of Casanare (Casanare) and Guavilá Heroes Bloc (Cundinamarca) did
not participate in the peace process. These structures remained active either because comman-
ders increasingly divorced from the AUC commandership (the Castaño family and Salvatore
Mancuso), or because they did experience a loss of military power due to internal struggles,
during which some commanders were killed. Thus, their structures lost territorial control
and did not participate in the process.
Warlords created five groups in order to organize the demobilisation process of combatants:
Peasant Self-Defence of Córdoba andUrabá (PSDCU)with 19 structures; Central Bolívar Bloc
(CBB)with 8 structures, Peasant Self-Defence ofMagdalenaMedio (PSDMM)with 3, Eastern
Alliance (EA) with 2, Independent Structures (IE) with 2; and Security Rings (SR), one struc-
ture created for providing security to commanders during the negotiation and demobilization
process.
During its military peak (1998–2002) the AUC became one of the biggest and best-armed
non-state actors in the world. Flush with AR-15 assault rifles, M60 machine guns and Galil
rifles, the AUC also amassed ammunition, a feature consistent with its poor fire discipline.5
The dismantling of 35 paramilitary structures signified the demobilization of 31,671 armed
personnel, but although many paramilitaries were not AUC rank members and performed
as logistics, financial and political support, according to the OAS, the rate of arms handed
over to the government during the demobilization process was low: 0.58 for each demobilized
member (a total of 18,051 weapon). During the process 30% of the weapons handed were
in poor condition or unusable according to the Inter-institutional Group of Anti-Terrorist
Analysis, and national authorities found several coves with brand new arms bought on the
black market or imported with forged permits of the national military industry.6 The fears
of re-armament were confirmed after 2006: several paramilitary structures re-emerged and
started to operate in many a region, a matter that still continues to be a main security concern
in the country.
5According to forensic reports, most paramilitaries’ victims have been found dead with over 15 gunshot
wounds each on average. Source: National Institute of Forensic Sciences.
6It has been established that severalmiddle-rankmilitary o*cers participated in the Indumil fraud. According
to the National Police almost all guns had manufacture serial numbers that corresponded to year 2003. Most of
the arms found were of Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, Chinese, North Korean and German origin.
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Justice and Peace Law (JPL)
The JPL (Law 975 of 2005) was enacted as a transitional justice instrument for the AUC. The
law -widely criticized by the domestic and international opinion for its lenient terms – was
by far the greatest benefit obtained by paramilitaries through their alliances with politicians.
“All those electorally supported by the AUCwithout exception voted for the JPL in Congress”
(Interview, Pardo, 2009).
The law created a special investigative jurisdiction and established alternative sentences of
between five and eight years for all crimes committed before the demobilization, for which
demobilized individuals had to confess crimes and hand in personal assets for a victims repa-
ration fund. Among the many controversies the enactment of the law, the most polemic point
was that the JPL did not establish any di(erence between crimes against humanity and other
less severe o(ences, completely disregarding the universal principles of proportionality, ne-
cessity and reasonability. In 2006, the Constitutional Court ruled on the JPL and settled to a
considerable extent the existing controversies by introducing a better balance between benefits
for former combatants and the victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation.7
As indicated above, the magnitude of the information collected by the judicial system since
the JPL was enacted exceeds by far its capacity for investigating, prosecuting and convicting
paramilitaries. According to the AGO, ex-combatants have confessed 52,000 crimes and the
Justice and Peace system has recognized 300,000 people as victims of paramilitary violence.
However, the Justice and Peace jurisdiction has only been capable of convicting 14 paramili-
taries since 2005. Although the Constitutional Court established that all paramilitaries’ assets
had to be handed in for compensating victims, the frontmen chains are so complex that cata-
loguing assets has proved extremely di*cult: there are only 11 in process of handing in assets
for the reparation fund.
There is a large portion of ex-combatants who did not join the Justice and Peace system,
including some commanders. AUC members not involved in crimes against humanity were
automatically freed under the JPL terms, and joined the National Reintegration Agency pro-
7After the Court’s revision of the JPL, ex-combatants risk losing all JPL benefits if they do not confess all
crimes, hand in all ill-gotten assets and pay reparations to victims, and they are liable for all crimes committed by
their blocs. The ruling holds them liable for victim reparations beyond the first degree of kinship directly a(ected
by their illegal group’s action. It also reiterates the state’s responsibility to ensure reparations if the ex-combatants’
assets are insu*cient, requires that victims have full access to information throughout the legal process and gives
judicial authorities a longer period to investigate and verify a confession (CC-C/370, 2006).
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grammes, which provide education and subsidies for ex-combatants. Others, about 12,000
according to the National Police, joined re-emerging structures.
In thewords of amember of theNational Reparation andReconciliationCommission, “the
general balance [of JPL] is a good dose of truth, a little reparation and almost no justice at
all”.
the breach of trust and extradition: the reversal of parapolitics
Although parapolitics significantly rewarded paramilitaries, warlords also experienced seri-
ous lowering of their expectations. After the legislative triumph of the PJL, the Constitutional
Court’s ruling on the JPL constituted a reversal and former AUC commanders publicly com-
plained in 2006 claiming a breach in governmental compromises and lack of legal security
(Semana, 2006b).
At the point of the ruling, the alarms of paramilitary reactivation and of former AUC war-
lords’ relapsing in criminal activities were already triggered, and President Uribe confined the
AUC commandership in high-security prisons. Simultaneously, the SCJ had started investigat-
ing parapolitics cases, and as indicated above, the common strategy of politicians on trial was
the systematic denial of the linkages with the AUC, a strategy that triggered paramilitaries’
confessions against their once allies.
Extradition
Before the enactment of Law 782 of 2002, paramilitary commanders expected being granted
political status not only to engage in peace negotiations with the national government but
also to avoid the U.S. judicial system, since in Colombia extradition does not apply to polit-
ical crimes, and in this vein drug tra*cking would be considered as an o(ence connected to
sedition (Interview, Ramón*, 2009). However, as mentioned, it was not possible granting po-
litical status to the AUC. “The demobilization process was nothing but a government’s sham
in order to obtain resources from the international cooperation. There were too many lies.
We commanders gave up everything because they [the government] said there would be no
extradition. Extradition was always the grey cloud over the peace process; a constant cause
of distrust and tensions during the process” (Interview, Ramón*, 2009).
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In May 2008, arguing that ex-AUC commanders continued committing crimes from jail,
President Uribe took the sudden decision of extraditing fourteen AUC commanders to the
U.S.8 wanted by Federal Courts under drug tra*cking and money laundering charges. The
Executive’s decision was widely criticized as it severely harmed the process of truth and repa-
ration. The then Attorney General declared that the institution “did not find elements that
support the extradition of AUC commanders” (Herald, 2009). A representative of the Vic-
tims of Paramilitary Violence Committee wrote after meeting Mancuso in his U.S. prison: “I
confirmed that the extradition of the paramilitary leadership was deeply related to the immi-
nence of the most decisive confessions which would involve the President’s political, military
and economic allies.” (Prensa Rural, 2009). Mancuso stated month later that “along with
me, President Uribe extradited the truth”.9 AUC commander Carlos Castaño’s words before
his death were prophetic: “the destruction of theAutodefensas lies on its narco-feudalization,
and it will be impossible for the government to distinguish drug tra*ckers from real war-
riors [...] sooner or later the commandership will end up being accountable in U.S. courts”
(Aranguren, 2001).
what came next?
Re-emerging structures: the recycling of the AUC?
After 2006 newparamilitary structures – now called BACRIM (forBandasCriminales –Crimi-
nal Gangs) emerged, organized under di(erent labels –ÁguilasNegras, Los Rastrojos and Los
Urabeños – and are active in approximately 200municipalities characterized by coca/cocaine
economies. The Uribe administration claimed these groups were disconnected from the AUC
whereas some NGOs and analysts argued that re-emerging structures proved the resilience
of the AUC (ICG, 2007; MAPP-OEA, 2007; Restrepo, 2008) The National Reparation and
Reconciliation Commission made a thorough analysis and found many nuances and varia-
tions within the phenomenon; it established a distinction between emergent, re-armed and
dissident structures (CNRR, 2007). According to the report, the fact that some mid-ranking
ex-AUC members are in charge of these structures does not necessarily imply that these new
groups are a simple extension of the AUC. Dissident structures correspond to those AUC
8Salvatore Mancuso, “Don Berna”, “HH”, “Cuco”, “Jorge 40”, “Gordo Lindo”, “El Tuso”, “Pablo Sevil-
lano”, “El Patrón”, “El Burro”, “Diego”, “El Cabezón”, “El Viejo”, and “Macaco”.
9Letter from Salvatore Mancuso to Liberal Senator Piedad Córdoba (See: La Silla Vacía, 2009)
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structures that did not demobilize. Re-armed structures reflect the fragmentation of an orga-
nization that lost its structure and the “diaspora” of some demobilized paramilitaries. The
emergent structures reflect the underlying crimes exploited and protected by the AUC before
the demobilization process and the need of filling the vacuum left by demobilization. The
report considered that in all cases drug tra*cking is a common – and only – objective. The
Commission claims the recycling of specialists in the use of violence can be either understood
as a transitional characteristic common in demobilization processes, or alternatively as a new
stage of collective violence, but the report clearly dismisses any continuity.
Two basic di(erences between this new paramilitary generation and the AUC phenomenon
confirm the Commission’s approach. The first and most important one is related to the po-
litical dimension. Authors like C. López and Sevillano (2009) have contested the political
influence of these emerging structures, and to date there is not a single piece of evidence that
demonstrates political aspirations. Although demobilizedAUCwarlords continued to control
drug tra*cking activities from jail, the political project and muscle exhibited by the organi-
zation in its active years were nolonger evident in subsequent electoral processes. The second
di(erence relates to the military sphere. The new structures lack the military organization
and command lines of the AUC, and do not perform under the basic strategic and tactic mili-
tary principles. They rather oscillate between common delinquency and organized crime. It is
therefore probable that the judicial system’s proactivity in investigating and prosecuting para-
politics prevented this new generation of criminal to connect with politicians and vice-versa.
BACRIM are instead expressions of the criminal inertia of almost three decades of paramili-
tarism in varying combinations with drug tra*cking and therefore explain the continuity of
violence even after other causal triggers had disappeared (Pizarro, 2004). In many Colom-
bian cities crime rates significantly increased again since 2007, and this rise is deeply related
to these new structures. This was the case of Medellín, where the homicide rate increased
by 43% between 2008 and 2009, of which 68% corresponds to settling of scores, territorial
disputes and contract enforcement.
The survival of parapoliticians by the means of intermediaries
The 2010 Congressional elections proved that despite the e(ects of the paramilitary demobi-
lization on the electoral processes, elections might be still vulnerable to infiltration by illegal
actors. Compared with the 2002 and 2006 elections, the elections of 2010 showed a decrease
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of 27% in electoral violence – the least violent of the last 20 years – but cash votes increased
(Semana, 2010), a matter that shows the risks of compromising the integrity of campaign
financing. The infiltration of drug money was reported in Valle department.
Although electoral manipulation did not constitute a risk factor in 2010, parapoliticians
proved being resilient. “There are two ways in which they [parapoliticians] seek to reproduce
their influence. The first one is through the re-launching of campaigns of those who have
not yet reached a serious judicial stage. The second one is the resort to family members and
allies as political frontmen” (López, interview, 2009). Many parapoliticians used the latter ap-
proach through the creation of two new parties. The first one was the National Democratic
Alliance that reincarnated Citizen Convergence, which had disappeared because of parapoli-
tics. However, since it could not meet the 2% representation threshold established by the law,
its members along with the remains of Democratic Colombia founded the National Integra-
tion Party, which ran 100 candidates for congressional elections. The party obtained almost
one million votes and won 22 congressional seats, of which 14 belonged to direct heirs of para-
politicians: nieces, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, wives or simply frontmen. The Liberal
and U parties recycled 4 parapoliticians in the same fashion.
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Source: RNEC
As mentioned, BACRIM do not seem to have the required political drive as the AUC to
seize the local state and control electoral processes, and seems more centred in protecting the
illicit trade of drugs and enforcing its contracts. Notwithstanding the AUC’s demobilization,
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the vast and complex power structure of drug tra*cking and its relationship with politics, the
economy and society has the enormous potential of mutating and adapting to new circum-
stances. On the one hand machine politics continue to be the means through which specific
subnational authoritarian regimes reproduce and through which the linkages between the re-
gions and the centre are built. On the other hand, drug tra*cking is still strong. “Organized
crime has a natural tendency to seek representation. Unlike the AUC, the emerging groups
lack a national military and political coordination; however they are still the same mafias;
they are the heirs of the likes of ‘Don Berna’ and ‘Macaco’ and although they are still very
young they can always find the way” (Inteview, Pardo, 2009). In a similar vein journalist Clau-
dia Lopez stressed that the 2010 congressional elections made clear that “political structures
built upon thousands of assassinated and dispossessed Colombians are still being reproduced.
After everything they have achieved in terms of political success it is hard to believe that the
interests of a political power obtained illegally and illegitimately will not survive. The re-




THE AUTHOR ITAR IAN SUBNAT IONAL STATE : A GENERAL
BACKGROUND FOR THE CASE OF SUCRE
“The hens on the top crap on the hens on the bottom”1
Sucre is perhaps one of the most striking cases of parapolitics in the country. The depart-ment, located in the Caribbean region, fits Losada’s hegemonic type (2006) and repre-
sents a case in which despite the relevance of greed, the logic of politics prevailed over the
logic of market. With some of the highest levels of proved alliances between politicians and
warlords and a large spectrum of state capture, parapolitics followed a distinct process of
political economy based on a consociational arrangement of traditional politicians and local
warlords that sought to reproduce, through violence, land dispossession and drug tra*cking,
a regressive political and social status quo built in Sucre for over a century, as well as pre-
modern forms of accumulation based on rents generated from rural land. Why and to what
purpose did the local establishment and paramilitary groups collude in Sucre? Why and how
did all these consequences unfold?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter o(ers a general background of Sucre that ac-
counts for the subnational historical interaction of the five key dimensions discussed in Chap-
ter 2, which shaped the specific path of parapolitics found in this research. I address Sucre’s
late and precarious process of territorial and social integration to the central state bureau-
cracy and the impossibility of the state to overcome the competition of subnational Liberal
“houses” that have not promoted territorial integration but instead fostered fragmentation,
building an authoritarian enclave traditionally resistant to democratizing and modernizing
reforms, and have used patronage and o*ce in personalized systems of loyalty and rewards.
In this context society has been vertically integrated via patron-client ties that evolved from
classic dyadic clientelist relationships to the rise of machine politics.
I also discuss the economic dimension, which also reveals Sucre’s weakness, and the role
and value of land in the reproduction and maintenance of traditional powers. Sucre’s integra-
1Interview, Ramón*, 2009
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tion to markets has been feeble, a situation significantly explained by pre-modern forms of
accumulation mainly based upon rents on latifundia. The connection between these forms of
economic accumulation and the abovementioned subnational power system, as explained be-
low, has provided few incentives for Sucre’s rural rich to diversify and make the department’s
rural economy. The consolidation of the landholding status under the latifundia model gen-
erated an inequality gap, which was at the root of the highest levels of struggles over land
ownership in Colombia between rural rich – in many cases politicians – and landless peasant
communities.
Regarding democratizing reforms, I show that the poorly regulated reforms indeed filtered
Sucre’s subnational regime but were seized by politicians and warring actors alike in order
to feed personal and/or organizational agendas. Reforms made public resources particularly
vulnerable to corrupt practices of politicians who predated public funds tomaintainmachines
running and cash-voting practices alive, and in this fashion they have been successful in over-
coming the competition of other political actors. Regarding the guerrillas and paramilitaries,
these groups have also taken advantage of reforms and through armed clientelist practices
have been able to influence local governance and taken over public finances via contract diver-
sion. In the case of Autodefensas, armed clientelism facilitated paramilitary access to local
power structures.
I additionally examine the dynamics of the internal conflict in Sucre. I discuss how the
intensification of guerrilla warfare in Sucreño territory from the 1980s made the subnational
establishment react against kidnapping and extortion by resorting to the privatization of pub-
lic security via the formation of paramilitaries, and how the use of the AUC’s violent muscle
contributed to the maintenance of the latifundium structure and political status quo. The
local establishment financed, positioned and even commanded several AUC structures, creat-
ing a distinct form of parapolitics in which the Autodefensas were incorporated into a ruling
coalition. The inflexibility of the political regime in interaction with the intensification of
the internal conflict resulted in a frightened and disengaged society, unable to counteract the
e(ects of clientelism, corruption and violence, which have constituted themain “rents of polit-
ical power” in Sucre (J. Sánchez, 2002). Political competition, the emergency of independent,
alternative or Left-wing politics have been pushed out of the political landscape.
Concerning the endogenous connection of the internal conflict with drug tra*cking at the
subnational level, despite the significant scale of cocaine tra*cking from Sucre’s coastal areas
over the last three decades, I emphasise that the connection was not as strong as in other cases
in which, unlike Sucre, local criminal structures existed prior to the AUC’s emergence, coca
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crops were developed, and robust legal economies permitted large-scale money laundering
activities.
Finally I discuss the dramatic levels of fragmentation, de-institutionalization and criminal-
ization of themajor political parties, mainly the Liberal party, and the ways in which the party
system at the local level became a “system of protection”, creating room for parapolitics.
In sum, Sucre o(ers a case of a weak, fragmented territory with boundaries closed to the in-
fluence of a modernizing and democratizing central state, a narrow political space with stable
clienteles and pre-modern forms of accumulation, internal conflict dynamics that favoured the
privatization of public security via paramilitarism, and political parties prone to criminaliza-
tion. The interaction of these variables created a hyper-criminalized political space in which
politicians and warlords governed the department and embezzled its finances for almost seven
years. Sucreño politicians reproduced their power at the subnational and national levels and
represented warlords at the congressional sphere and participated in the provision of the legal
framework for demobilisation.
basic characterization
Along with the Bolívar and Córdoba departments, Sucre is part of the so-called coastal sa-
vannah in the northwestern Caribbean region of Colombia. Until the mid-1960s, all three
departments belonged to the Bolívar province2 (map 3). Although the Caribbean region was
progressively integrated to the state and markets throughout the 20th century, Sucre still re-
mains a relatively peripheral area.
2The other province was that ofMagdalena, which comprised the current territories of Atlántico,Magdalena,
Cesar and la Guajira departments.
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Map 3: The Caribbean Region before and after the mid-1960s
Mapped by the author.
Sucre consists of 26 municipalities and is divided into five natural regions: a) Montes de
María, a mountainous area shared with Bolívar department, independent from the Andean
mountain range. The subregion comprises the municipalities of Sincelejo, Ovejas, Chalán,
Morroa and Colosó; b) a coastal area located along the Morrosquillo gulf that covers the
municipalities of Coveñas, Palmitos, Tolú, Toluviejo and San Onofre; c) a central savannah
region that includes Sincé, El Roble, San Pedro, Sampués, Los Palmitos, Galeras, Buenavista,
Corozal and San Juan de Betulia: d) La Mojana’s wetlands in the south that contains Sucre,
Majagual and Guaranda; and e) the San Jorge river’s wetlands that comprises San Marcos,
San Benito Abad, La Unión and Caimito.
The department is amulti-ethnic space with high levels of racial mixing of indigenous, afro-
Colombian, and white population, and an important community of Colombians of Syrian
and Lebanese descent. Except for two urban centres of intermediate importance (the Sincelejo
and Corozal conurbation), the department is semi-urban and rural. For 2011, Sucre had a
projected population of 818,663 inhabitants. Sincelejo, Corozal, SanMarcos and San Onofre
account 51.7% of that number. The department has experienced a dramatic demographic
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change in its rural-urban composition. According to Aguilera (2007) between 1995 and 2004
the urban population increased by over ten per cent due to the internal conflict and changes
in the agrarian structure.
Map 4: Sucre Subregions
Mapped by the author.
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The Observatory of the Colombian Caribbean (OCC, 2011) revealed that Sucre’s average
contribution to the national GDP between 2000 and 2011 was of 0.76% and of 4.7% to that
of the Caribbean region. In the period between 2006 and 2010, the Caribbean departments
experimented a drop of their contribution to the national GDP: the highest is that of Sucre
with 10.5 per cent in 2006. The department’s per capita GDP in 2011 (USD3,002) was far
below the national indicator (USD7,240).
Although the department has increased its participation in the internal markets and to a
lesser extent in exports – mostly via primary products.3 On the whole, its integration to
markets is far from significant. Sucre has a small and barely diversified industrial sector but
has high potential for agro-industrial production, micro businesses and handicrafts. Yet pro-
ducers lack resources, have deficient administrative skills, and high levels of intermediation.
Besides the services sector, the primary sector is central to the departmental economy. The
land has been catalogued as highly productive, 74.4%, (Aguilera, 2007), a feature that pro-
vides important comparative advantages to the agricultural sector; however most of the land
is dedicated to extensive stockbreeding, which leave land use well below its potential. Only
11.9% of the land is dedicated to agricultural production (NSD, 2002). Tertiary capacity is
very low insofar as productive activities have little aggregate value, the generation of employ-
ment is poor, and labour mobility is limited. Investment in the department is also precarious
and therefore does not generate a demand for more qualified labour. In terms of competi-
tiveness, of 29 departments assessed by ECLAC (2012) for 2010 and 2011, Sucre was ranked
19th. In 2012 the Colombian Caribbean Observatory ranked Sincelejo penultimate of 22 cities
assessed.
The department’s main exports are shellfish, meat and cement4; however, apart from the
illegal drugs trade, its integration into global markets is far from significant. Although it is
di*cult to quantify the impact of drug tra*cking on the local economy, the shares of the
business do not seem to have irrigated it to the extent observed in other regions, such as in the
neighbouring Córdoba department. No relevant changes have been observed in variables such
as urban construction, property price speculation, black market currency, and conspicuous
consumption in Sucre, which constitute important barometers of the penetration of illegal
money in the economy across Colombia.
3Sucre has increased its participation in internal markets as the first producer of cassava, and also through
rice and tobacco.
4The department exports meat to Venezuela, and to some Central American and Caribbean countries it has a
small participation in meat exports. It also exports cement to the U.S, the Caribbean and South America. Cement
production is the most important industrial process in the department but is not significant if compared to the
cement industries in Bogotá and Medellín.
95
basic characterization
Sucre’s structural problems regarding the generation of formal employment, along with the
massive forcible displacement of peasants to urban and semi-urban centres, have significantly
enlarged the informal economy over the last decades, maintaining unemployment above the
national rate (OCC, 2011). Informality and low quality of employment have severely reduced
the quality of life in the department. Of 24 assessed departments in 2008, Sucre was 20th in the
UN Human Development Report with an index of 0.7266, similar to that of Algeria (UNDP,
2009). In 2012 the index rose to 0.775 (UNDP, 2013), yet still in the group of departments
with lowest performances (Bogotá D.C. exhibits the best with 0.904). Sucre’s low index has
been mainly the outcome of its poor performance in income generation and distribution, and
education variables.5
López H.; Núñez (2007) showed that poverty increased by 24.5% in Sucre between 1996
and 2004, and that by 2005 it became the second poorest department in Colombia, with
poverty reaching 69.46% of the population and the segment of population below poverty
line estimated at 22.6 per cent. According to the National Statistics Department (NSD), in-
come poverty in Sucre was of 53% in 2011whilst the national number was of 39.8%. Extreme
poverty was of 16.2% for the same year.
While the national incidence of multidimensional poverty in 2011 was of 49% (80.1% ru-
ral and 39.1% urban), the department reached a Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of
73.10% (91.9% rural and 62.5% urban). Compared to the national average, Sucre exhibits
a high deprivation of the MPI’s variables of habitat and public services, in which deprived
households are double the national average. Another variable with high incidence is that of
illiteracy. According to NSD, at the national level, 18.5%of households have at least a person
over 15 years old in state of illiteracy in 2012. In Sucre this percentage is of 38.9%, very close
to that of Chocó department, the highest in the country with 41.7%. The most dramatic
MPI’s variables are disaggregated as follows and compared to Bogotá D.C (lowest incidence)
and Chocó (highest incidence):
5According to the report, an average Sucreño has a per capita income (real) of approximately US$918. UNDP
(2008), Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, 2002–2007.
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Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1,931,372 42.1% 813,401 7.9% 153,465 4.6% 89,142 21.4% 413,184
Chocó 85,608 78.4% 67,102 41.7% 35,715 24.5% 20,971 44.0% 37,669
Sucre 166,540 74.8% 124,655 38.6% 64,223 8.7% 14,488 35.1% 58,373









Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1,931,372 9.2% 177,519 2.6% 49,456 27.4% 529,573 77.2% 1,490,256
Chocó 85,608 35.2% 30,127 6.8% 5,838 68.0% 58,204 97.4% 83,364
Sucre 166,540 22.7% 37,822 3.3% 5,528 61.5% 102,457 96.9% 161,360











Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1,931,372 21.9% 422,885 4.3% 82,928 1.5% 28,110 2.0% 38,468
Chocó 85,608 58.6% 50,137 19.4% 16,630 79.6% 68,121 79.4% 67,946
Sucre 166,540 41.3% 68,862 5.9% 9,841 27.2% 45,363 40.3% 67,125
National 10,572,280 29.6% 3,125,839 6.3% 664,276 17.2% 1,817,629 17.0% 1,794,807
Inadequate flooring Inadequate walls Overcrowding
Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1,931,372 0.7% 13,014 0.8% 15,610 14.1% 272,703
Chocó 85,608 6.1% 5,184 27.6% 23,640 22.7% 19,454
Sucre 166,540 36.8% 61,209 17.2% 28,685 34.9% 58,127
National 10,572,280 10.0% 1,059,478 4.8% 510,791 19.5% 2,065,159
Source: NSD (2013).
Regarding its fiscal situation, Sucre is heavily reliant on central government transfers and
exhibits a poor capacity in generating local revenues and attracting investment. Although Su-
cre’s tax revenue has increased by 51.86% and non-tax revenues by 34% between 2008 and
2011, according to the Central Bank, the department’s fiscal autonomy is at 24%, significantly
below the national average (35%), with a dependency on transfers of 71%, which reflects the
relative stagnation of productive activities and the low income of the majority of the popula-
tion.
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The somewhat improving yet still discouraging situation of Sucre is the result of more than
a century of political and economic fragmentation, and mismanagement. Clientelism, social
and political exclusion, corruption and collective violence all contribute to this departmental
backwardness, and explain to a considerable extent the vulnerability of the state and society
to criminal powers.
state formation, creation of political parties and the nature of early
politics in sucre
Sucre’s trend of political economy can be examined within a larger context, which is that
of the Caribbean region. The region exhibits an uneven process of state formation in which
urban centres in Atlántico, Magdalena and Bolívar departments were relatively successfully
modernized and integrated to the state and markets, mainly through international trade,
while the rest of the territory remained peripheral in this process of incorporation. In this
context, Sucre – peripheral in its urban and rural dimensions- experienced a two-fold process
of exclusion, both from the regional and national integration processes. On the one hand, as
shown in Map 3, Sucre belonged to Bolívar department until 1966. Before that, its distant
location from Cartagena – Bolívar’s capital and regional political centre – and the precarious
road system significantly contributed to the marginalization of Sucre, a matter that can be
observed in other parts of the Caribbean region before the creation of new departments.
On the other hand, although geographic fragmentation partially explains the isolation of
peripheral areas from the central state, the long-term political exclusion of the Caribbean re-
gion from the centre constituted the main marginalizing factor. According to Álvarez (2004),
between the mid-19th and the mid-20th century Colombia was governed by the spirit of the
conservative 1886Constitution, which embodied a confessional and centralist political project,
closed to regional participation in the decision-making processes. None of the constitutional
reforms that took place during that period sought to integrate the regions to national devel-
opment, creating a divorce between politicians’ formal discourse at the centre and concrete
political practices at the subnational level. In this context, the latter was left untouched in
the forms of traditional society and in the reproduction of unequal opportunities. González
(1977) stresses that this divorce or fragmentation allowed semi-institutionalized subnational
parties’ factions to create strong local political federations and fed clientelist practices in the
Caribbean region.
98
state formation, creation of political parties and the nature of early politics
In a framework of isolation, the Caribbean region built a distinct political culture that
privileged individualistic and utilitarian ways of consolidating power spaces as platforms for
feeding personal interests (Álvarez, 2004). In a similar fashion to that of southern Italian poli-
tics, subnational powers took advantage of the primitive character of electoral dynamics, and
used universal su(rage at the service of authoritarian principles of rule and the entrenchment
of clientelist practices. The main role of political parties was the formation and selection of
cadres and not the channelling the interests and needs of electorate, reducing political action
to the electoral activity (Leal & Dávila, 1990). Múnera (1996) argues that in this context the
weak Colombian Andean centre created an image of the Caribbean as a cultural frontier and
as an impenetrable space lacking social order. This hegemonic discourse, based upon the
primeval dichotomy between the coast and the highlands, still remains a fundamental divide.
For Steiner (1994) and Roldán (1998, 2002) this construction has been nothing but the expres-
sion of a national power incapable of penetrating peripheral areas, of imposing institutional
order and political discipline, as well as of overcoming political competition during the 19th
century and part of the 20th. In the absence of state capacity to integrate these territories into
its networks, the Liberal and Conservative parties, – but mainly the former – played a cen-
tral role in the incorporation process. Parties linked the relations of interdependence between
subnational elites with their respective clienteles in the context of freemasonry and guilds
(J. Jaramillo, 1976; Loaiza, 2007; Morales, 2004) as well as the hacienda structure (Guillén
Martínez, 1986).
In 19th century Colombia, partisan cohesion at the national level was weak insofar as the
Liberal and Conservative corporations were endemically plagued by factionalism and defec-
tion of splinter groups (Leal & Dávila, 1990). This situation generated successive Liberal–
Conservative civil wars strongly anchored to subnational cleavages. Nevertheless, factional-
ism prevented total war and the breakdown of the system – a matter that could also be ob-
served during the mid-20th century La Violencia - and was popular without mass disa(ection
because of the reliance on patron-client ties as the dominant ruler-ruled nexus. National par-
ties sought to penetrate the local level very early in the aftermath of the independence from
the Spanish crown, during the so-called “agrarian period”, when the dyadic relations were
stronger than later in the stages of urban growth and industrialization; but as discussed be-
fore, the model of penetration was permanently challenged in peripheral Colombia by one of
territorial di(usion. The Liberal party – dominant in Caribbean territory – was then built in
a bottom-up fashion in which local structures progressively articulated to the national level.
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This process created a semi-institutionalized structure with deep internal fractures, as dis-
cussed below.
The Liberal origins in the region can be mainly explained by the pioneering support of
regional elites to the ban of the slave trade (D. Jaramillo, 2005)6 and the embracing of the
ideals of free trade and markets by Caribbean entrepreneurs who strongly opposed protec-
tionist conservative principles (Álvarez, 2004). The Caribbean urban centres of Barranquilla,
Santa Marta and Cartagena were some of the most important Colombian cities during the
19th and early 20th centuries insofar as all international trade activities took place through
these cities’ ports. Nevertheless, Caribbean Liberalism evolved into a quite atypical ideology,
a matter that is significantly explained by the rise of a particular breed of freemasonry. As
in other Western contexts, freemasonry was a key instrument for the di(usion of politics in
19th century Colombia. The Caribbean was no exception. The Supreme Council of Carta-
gena, the highest regional freemason organ created in the 1830s played a significant role in
the process of parties’ di(usion. The Caribbean freemasonry became the main source of so-
cial and political status and as such it operated as an associative structure that defined regional
elites. The most distinguished members of the Caribbean society, who were in turn freema-
sons, were appointed to key o*ces, reached the highest military ranks in the region, and were
elected in Congress. Besides integrating elites, the Supreme Council incorporated an emerg-
ing intelligentsia of entrepreneurial and white-collar middle class. The Council also actively
participated in the creation of the regional Craftsmen Democratic Societies, not only the first
guild created in Colombia but also the first form of political organization (J. Jaramillo, 1976),
which served as organs for the transmission of parties’ ideology and values.
But far from supporting the Liberal struggle against the public influence of the Catholic
Church, the Supreme Council promoted a peculiar hybrid ideology between moderate Lib-
eralism and Catholic values. According to Morales (2004) the Caribbean freemasonry was
nothing but a Catholic association that oddly accepted priests in its lines with the aim of
resisting the mid-19th century radical Liberal governments and reforms. Supported by the
Catholic Church, freemasonry established clientelist networks through the Church’s charities
and other activities of social control. Loaiza (2007) brings this argument further and claims
the existence of a close relation between the trajectory of freemasonic networks in the region
6The Caribbean region, which exhibited the largest concentration of slaves along with that of the south-
western department of Valle and Cauca in the Pacific coast, promoted the first massive manumission act in Colom-
bia in 1851. It is to note that the slave trade was temporarily banned in 1810 during the ephemeral existence of
the state of Cartagena in the aftermath of the independence from the Spanish crown. For a more detailed account
on the Caribbean Liberal agenda, see Tovar (1986) and J. Jaramillo (1976).
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and the definition of an authoritarian regional political tendency. In the same line it is pos-
sible to argue that the Caribbean freemasonry contributed to the shaping of the regressive
economic ethos that has characterized the largest share of the region’s territory. The tensions
that emerged between the regressive freemasonry and Bogotá and southern radical and anti-
clerical lodges generated an ideological rupture and a territorial division of economic interests
with the centre, a matter that according to Fals-Borda (1981) further isolated the Caribbean
region. Such tensions progressively overlapped with the political strains unleashed by the lay
educational reforms launched by the 1870s Liberal radical administration. Caribbean elites
resisted the implementation of these reforms in the region and deepened the Catholic influ-
ence in schools. To a great extent the Supreme Council of Cartagena became the political
cradle of the Catholic republic of La Regeneración (The Regeneration) established from 1886
to 1899 by Conservative Cartagena-born President Rafael Núñez. The Liberal–Conservative
tensions were also evident in the economic sphere. Tensions between traders, landowners and
democratic societies emerged. Hacendados and craftsmen opposed the agro-exports model
promoted by radical Liberals insofar as it linked to anti-associationist policies, free trade of
property and the creation of free social and labour relations in the countryside. These sectors
progressively advocated for protectionism, which constituted another Regeneration’s corner-
stone. Excepting for modern Caribbean urban centres, the region entered a reversal of devel-
opment process.
There is no robust historiographical evidence of the role of native freemasons in what cor-
responds to the current Sucre’s territory. In fact freemasonry as well as democratic societies
were most of all active in urban centres, and in the 19th century Sincelejo was a remote semi-
urban area. Nonetheless, the closest democratic society was that of Carmen de Bolívar, lo-
cated nowadays in Bolívar’s share of Montes de María, which had an important role in the
foundation of Sucreño politics and Corozal’s parish church was active in charity work with
the poor (Loaiza, 2007; Morales, 2004). In the absence of freemasons and craftsmen in Sucre’s
rural environment, the hacienda structure did the most relevant part of the political work, as
discussed below.
It was only during the first half of the 20th century that Caribbean politics was progressively
integrated into national politics through inter-party struggles (Posada Carbó, 1999). This
phenomenon implied a process of bargaining and competition not only between national and
subnational elites, but also among the latter. This tension entailed a ferocious quest to main-
tain power, with three main consequences. The first is the further de-institutionalization of
parties. The second, the increasing internal fragmentation of parties – mostly the Liberal
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Party – in local factions that further complicated the unity and coherence from the top. The
third outcome is the spread of corrupted practices in electoral processes. During the first
three decades of the 20th century, systematic fraud discredited the institution of su(rage in
the Caribbean region, dramatically increasing the levels of abstention7, and also creating a
degree of tolerance vis-à-vis fraud and the stagnation of political habits. The outcome was a
political culture of what Posada Carbó (2000) refers to as no participation and permissiveness
of transgression. Parties became voting manipulators and abusers of power in order to bene-
fit private interests. This culture configured ruling elites who fed the vision of su(rage as an
occasional institution and as a means for bargaining with electors (Leal & Dávila, 1990). An
editorial from Cartagena’s newspaper La Patria in 1929 commented: “... This is the real orga-
nization of politics: fraud in all possible forms and political delinquency. From the criminal
subtraction of votes to the falsification of electoral register forms and supplanting of voters.
Caciques, local politicians and cunning devils who sell and buy votes are exalted and glori-
fied. And those who call themselves statesmen, respectful of morality and law, are nothing
but visible heads of the most repulsive manoeuvres” (Patria, 1929).
Since the late 1920s, in a context of discredited politics and in the aftermath of the infamous
1928 banana workers’ strike8, alternative liberal and socialist discourses started to take over
in the Caribbean territory. Palacios (1995) points out that in spite of the multi-class nature of
traditional parties in Colombia, the continued popular attachment to the parties’ structures
had prevented the Caribbean “oppressed groups” from recognizing their collective interests,
and in this context, working classes consequently failed to create more “class-conscious” po-
litical parties. Historically, the impact of the Left in the Caribbean region has been limited.
In that time, port and agro-industrial labourers9 were the only workers who proletarianized
under the Socialist Revolutionary Party – SRP10 (Agudelo, 2011; Solano, 2001). In the absence
of organized labour force, Sucre did not experience the emergence of the Left during a long
period of the 20th century.
7Álvarez (2004) interestingly illustrates abstention in the 1927 elections in Bolívar department, where at some
electoral posts votes would not exceed 10 votes.
8In the old Magdalena province, the watershed banana workers’ strike was the product of years of tension
between the United Fruit Company and its workers in the “banana zone” of Ciénaga, and of a determined organiz-
ing drive by anarcho-syndicalists and the Revolutionary Socialist (later the Communist) Party. The Conservative
government intervened by deploying troops, calling a state of siege, and carrying out the infamous massacre at
Ciénaga in December 6, 1928, with an estimated death toll of 1,000 labourers. The 1928 strike is perhaps the
single most investigated event in Colombian labour history. See, e.g., Urrutia (1969), White (1978), and Herrera
and Romero (1979). The episode is also masterly portrayed by Gabriel García Marquez inOne Hundred Years of
Solitude.
9Port labour force was located in Cartagena and Barranquilla, and agro-industrial unions in Ciénaga.
10The SPRwas the predecessor of theColombianCommunist Party, whichwas created in 1930. TheKomintern
had recognized the SPR during the 1920s.
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Another case is that ofGaitanismo, a political movement named after Jorge Eliécer Gaitán,
the most important liberal populist caudillo from the 20th century. Gaitán, who strongly
appealed to the working and middle class, led a national, pivotal movement of popular mobi-
lization and resistance to the existing relations of power from the late 1920s until his assassi-
nation in April 1948. After Bogotá, Gaitanismo had its greatest stronghold in the Caribbean
coast: Gaitán enjoyed outright majorities in the departments of Atlántico (52.8%) and Bolí-
var (50.4%) and won the majority of the Liberal vote in Magdalena (Weiss, 1966). Yet the
Gaitanista vote remained mainly urban. The pronounced rural landlessness in the Caribbean
region, amatter discussed next, madeGaitán’s views on property very appealing: coastal land
tended to be held in large haciendas, and between the 1880s and the 1930s relatively little pub-
lic land had been distributed among the landless population. In these terms, Gaitanismo
o(ered a dramatic challenge to the hegemony of the established parties insofar as traditional
landowners represented political power and the hacienda system structured patron-client ties
(GuillénMartínez, 1996). However, in spite of the “struggle for socialism” renewing discourse,
the Caribbean regions’ political isolation played its part: Liberal and Conservative machines
managed to hinder the expansion of this discourse in the countryside via the intensification of
the clientelist exchange. Many of the largest haciendas actually expanded during that period
(Green, 1996).
The Gaitanistamovement was ultimately defeated by Gaitán’s assassination and its politi-
cal victories were lost to violence in many a region, but only at great and enduring cost. For
many analysts, Gaitán’s killing along with a series of subnational agrarian conflicts in depart-
ments such as Tolima, Antioquia and Valle del Cauca were the most notorious triggers of
La Violencia, the ferocious mid-20th century Liberal–Conservative struggle (Palacios, 1995;
Roldán, 2002; G. Sánchez & Meertens, 1983). La Violencia, however, was much less pro-
nounced in the Caribbean coast. Historical evidence proves that La Violencia tended to erupt
more likely in: a) Conservative strongholds as it was a more “ideologized” party, b) areas of
aggressive competition between the Liberal and Conservative parties’ patron-client based pol-
itics; and c) contexts of agrarian conflicts. The absence of these features in the Caribbean re-
gions during that time significantly explains the non-interference of interparty violence. The
old Bolívar province did not exhibit patterns of “defensive patronalism” (Schmidt, 1974) as
in other Colombian regions where clients became patrons’ soldiers during La Violencia.
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the opening of the internal frontier and the first wave of colonization
In the mid-19th century Colombia experienced a significant process of opening of internal
frontiers, which did not respond to a strategic and long-term project of the state but instead
to forms of private appropriation of territories linked to extractive colonization processes
(LeGrand, 1998; Machado, 1986). The Caribbean region and the Sucreño territory were
much the case. Extractive colonization processes took place in Sucre’s territory during the
19th and early 20th century. The internal frontier was first opened in the 1840s through the
agricultural expansion of sugar cane and rice haciendas in La Mojana region, as well as to-
bacco haciendas in Montes de María by commercial houses from Barranquilla, Cartagena
and Medellín (Ramírez del Valle & Rey Sinning, 1994). The opening of the internal frontiers
in the 19th century constituted not only an opportunity for private entrepreneurs but also
an advantageous circumstance for marginal groups from other Colombian regions (mestizos,
afro-Colombians, white background poor and landless) who sought to break traditional link-
ages to land through dependency ties.
Short-cycle booms characterized the economy developed in the context of the Caribbean
agricultural hacienda until the early 20th century and that of Sucre was no exception. Ocampo
(1984) claims that the then frequent imbalance of the external markets of primary commodi-
ties forged a distinct Caribbean agro-exporting mentality that mainly responded to specu-
lation. In this vein, rural entrepreneurs dismissed fundamental aspects such as the need of
increasing quality controls and modernizing pre-capitalist production relations; the widen-
ing of the productive capacity and developing techniques to improve e*ciency of production
processes. Given the few industrial and technological changes introduced in the sector, the
competitiveness of their commodities in the markets was strongly limited, making exports
unfeasible. The fall of the agro-exporting market and the development of one of internal
supply were also explained by the region’s inhospitable geography that lacked the basic in-
frastructure required for articulating the agrarian production onto regional markets, the lack
of road infrastructure, and the absence of investment capital for intensive agricultural pro-
duction.11 Likewise, to the extent to which the region was scarcely populated, the scarcity
of labour for cropping made agricultural trade and exports extremely di*cult. This was the
case of the tobacco industry in Sucre (Sastoque, 2011). In this context, agricultural haciendas
11Meisel (1990) interestingly explains how in the period in which regional private banks existed in Colombia
(1872–1925) the Cartagena banks – controlled by the city’s families of traders and exporters – privileged loans
and investments for exports of cattle from areas close to Cartagena and other port areas.
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in Sucre were progressively transformed into cattle ranching haciendas. In this perspective,
extensive cattle ranching became a more suitable option than intensive agricultural produc-
tion. All these factors account for the rationale behind the economic reconversion of the
Sucreño economy (Meisel, 1988; Tovar, 1986), contrary to many interpretations, such as that
of Kalmanovitz (1982) that insist on the Caribbean hacienda’s high levels of irrationality.
Between 1850 and 1900 this type of hacienda significantly multiplied throughout the old
Bolívar province. Posada Carbó (1988) argues that the intense periods of floods and drought
of alluvial Caribbean savannahs generated the need of greater extensions of land to move
cattle in search of provisions of water and pastures. Cattle ranching hacendados – whose
economic and social ascent facilitated their increasing representation in public institutions
and other political spheres from the 1860s – started concentrating a significant share of public
wealth, mainly in the form of public wasteland (Solano, 2010). Through their presence in
the Assembly of Bolívar, these hacendados-turned-politicians imposed local legislation that
facilitated access to these bald territories – inmany cases occupied by peasant colonizers. The
ine*ciency of the central state in guaranteeing property rights and enforcing a strong agrarian
reform systematically undermined the settling attempts of these colonizers, leading frontier
settlers to cyclic situations of dispossession and dependency (Fajardo, Mondragón, & Arcila,
1994) as discussed below.
Another target of hacendados was land under a corporate property regime, i.e. indige-
nous territories. Political manoeuvering caused the substantial reduction ofZenú and Embera
Katío reservations in the old Bolívar province during the late 19th century and early 20th. The
expansion of this type of hacienda created tensions with indigenous communities and entire
neighbourhoods as hacendados did not seek to appropriate wasteland but instead land with
a higher value given its proximity to urban helmets, water, pastures, roads and port infras-
tructure (Solano & Flórez, 2007). According to Botero (1994), in the early 1900s only seven
indigenous reservations survived out of twenty-six created under the Spanish colonial rule
in the Bolívar province. In the 1920s only one reservation survived. Supported in some vari-
ations of the liberal discourse of equality and rights of the citizens, subnational politicians
suppressed these collective territories. Although the central government sought to legislate
in order to protect indigenous communities’ territories, subnational politics counteracted the
centre’s attempts in this direction.
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from tradional forms of clientelism to machine politics
For over a century, the party system in the Caribbean coast substituted politics for loyalty
and promoted inter-class paternalist relations, which constituted the basis for clientelist links
(Leal, 1989; Oquist, 1980). The clientelist logic promoted a system of loyalties and favours
(Figueroa, 2007) that constituted one of the most e*cient spaces for reproducing traditional
forms of power and domination through the hacienda structure.
Rural entrepreneurs who were simultaneously political power brokers led the hacienda
structure. But economic extraction preceded politics. As rural entrepreneurs opened the
Caribbean internal frontier and organized the hacienda extractive processes in a stateless and
unregulated context, they became central in the process of social articulation and regulation
(Guillén Martínez, 1996), as well as in the provision of goods. These “pioneers” were cru-
cial to the process of di(usion of political parties discussed above. The hacienda structure
fostered a dual role to landowners and peasants. Landowners were also political bosses and
the hacienda labour force were correspondingly clienteles or “locked-in electorates” under
systems of loyalty and dependency based upon the provision of security and protection in
exchange for votes or military support. As in many other settings such as southern Italy, the
patron-client bond was encapsulated within a set of moral obligations (e.g. via godparent-
hood), which strengthened a model of social vertical integration. Hacendados had the wealth
and power required to establish enduring – yet rarely even – relationships of reciprocity.
The self-perpetuating and immobile nature of this type of dyadic clientelism, which made
economic, social and political transformations extremely di*cult, had historical limits in all
hemispheres. As in other countries, the breakdown of Colombian traditional clientelism and
the evolution into machine politics happened along similar lines to those depicted by Lange
and Tarrow (1980) and Graziano (1977) in southern Italy: the traditional bonds were no
longer possible under modernization processes, politics of o*ce, or drastic and fast changes
in the social structure. The growth of what Clapham (1982) refers as to “mass clientelism” in-
troduced a high degree of factionalism and fragmentation, displaced local notables by party-
directed patronage, as well as individual benefits by collective material rewards. The rise of
power brokers made the exchange more corporate and decreasingly interpersonal, and the
new loyalties became di(use and less stable. The authority of the machine, which no longer
stemmed from the moral realm, began to derive from its distributive activity (Scott, 1972), i.e.
its e(ectiveness. Unsurprisingly, patronage, spoils, bribery and corruption became inevitably
associated with machine politics.
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Nevertheless, Schmidt accounts for specific permutations of clientelist networks in Colom-
bia, finding a significant degree of subnational variations, due to the interaction of variables
such as economic structures and the ways in which these related to the intensity of La Vio-
lencia (Schmidt, 1974, 1977). The case of Sucre, generalizable to the Caribbean coast, with
little impact of the interparty discord, low modernization of the agrarian production and no
changes in the landholding structure is an example of slow loosening of classic patron-client
ties. In other regions dyadic relations were thoroughly destroyed duringLaViolencia and even
a decade before (G. Sánchez &Meertens, 1983). In Sucre the structural change in the loyalty
system took place in the 1960s.
Scott (1972) claims that the progression towards machine politics occurs in periods of rapid
socioeconomic change, increase of electoral competition, mass/universal adult su(rage, and
significant degree of party competition over time. The case of Sucre slightly varies as it was
more centred in the widening of the electoral scope and there were increasing levels of intra
and inter-party competition. The urbanization, education, and secularization processes in-
tervened in the process but arguably to a lesser extent as these were not as salient in Sucre as
in other regions.
Two processes were at the base of the rise of machine politics in Sucre. The first one, the
Frente Nacional consociational agreement from the late 1950s empowered regional operators
at the expense of the centre as discussed before, a matter that to a large extent explains the
decay of traditional caciques and the emergency of machine politics in Colombia. Traditional
parties started internally atomizing through factions organized around family groups known
as “houses”. The Liberal party experienced a stronger internal implosion than that of the
Conservative party, mostly since the 1970s. The former subdivided into more “houses” than
the latter that competed along personalistic lines rather than along ideological ones, and in
order to survive houses “owners” increasingly empowered their subnational operators. Ac-
cording to Leal and Dávila (1990) the competition ended up not only weakening the Liberal
party’s cohesion at the top but also further de-institutionalizing it at the regional level, where
politicians in a more or less autonomous fashion dedicated to feed their clienteles and collect-
ing votes.
The second one, coincident with the former process and generalizable to the whole region,
is related to the rise of Sucre as a new territorial entity. The old Bolívar province lost a large
part of its territory with the creation of Sucre and Córdoba departments in 1966 and 1967,
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respectively.12 This process was strongly influenced by Caribbean political elites in Congress
insofar as it implied bureaucratic growth, local revenues and increase of transfers from the cen-
tral government. In other words, it meant fresh and more resources for the patronage system.
The other two processes at play were the profound demographic changes in the aftermath of
La Violencia due to new colonizing waves, and the social conflict over landholding structure.
The latter will be thoroughly discussed below.
The transformations implied the emergence of new political actors, which although linked
to traditional parties, jeopardized the status quo of traditional political bosses. The latter,
at risk of being displaced by emerging professional politicians, bargained and adapted to the
new machine politics. The emergent new class of politicians included not only professional
descendants of rich hacendados and merchants but also political newcomers. In turn, a new
generation of clients emerged – mostly urbanized and newly settled in shantytowns in the
context of the central government attempt to introduce an agrarian reform as it will be dis-
cussed below – behaved more like free agents seeking jobs or cash for their votes. An o*cial
interviewed in Sincelejo said “what happened in Sucre in the 1960s was that as political com-
petition increased, clientelism had to become more “technical”; modern if you like. In this
context, voters started to experience greater freedom of electoral choice, of electing candi-
dates that provided more and better resources. The Tamara family [a Liberal “house”] who
controlled this department for over 60 years represented the “old school”. They were real
caciques and gamonales who owned large haciendas. Families of the likes of the Nule and
Dager Chadid [who represented other Liberal “houses”], which emerged in the 1960s, rep-
resented the new “technical clientelism”. Alvaro García and every other politician involved
nowadays with paramilitaries are direct descendants of this “new school” of politics” (Inter-
view, Porras, 2009).
inequality, social conflict and the failure of the agriarian reform
Posada Carbó (1988) rejects the depiction of the cattle ranching hacienda labour force as one
under semi-servile conditions, as often represented. This assessment is based upon an ex-
tensive analysis of the cattle business in the 19th century, which reveals a relatively complex
chain of transactions and actors that involved levels of specialization according to the pro-
duction phases of breeding, raising and fattening. LeGrand (1998) reinforces this argument
12The same process occurred toMagdalena department when La Guajira and Cesar departments were created
in 1965 and 1967, respectively, in the Caribbean region.
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by accounting for alternative forms to cattle ranching latifundium. Yet, it is undeniable that
the expansion of cattle ranching generated a major inequality gap in Sucre’s land property
system – which persists today – insofar as it did not generate an equal distribution of pub-
lic wealth among the di(erent actors that integrated the agrarian social tissue. The labour
market, tied to the land and diverse forms of social restraints, was deeply a(ected.13 As seen
before, the main beneficiaries were hacendadoswhomanaged to appropriate an large share of
public resources through the colonization of the agricultural frontier, followed by small and
intermediate owners. Although it is important to note that there is evidence of buying and
selling processes of small and medium-sized rural property (Solano, 2010), these were minor
compared to the access to public and communal land via local legislation.
This situation became worse as a second cycle of peasant colonization took place in the
old Bolívar province during La Violencia times. As discussed, collective violence was then
much less pronounced in the Caribbean coast, and experienced massive migration of forcibly
displaced and expropriated families from the Andean regions where the inter-party strife was
fierce. The correlate of this phenomenonwas the increasing pressure over land in the northern
savannahs and coastal areas of Colombia. In the absence of agrarian reform mechanisms
and the state’s endemic regulatory weakness, cattle ranchers continued resorting to legal and
illegal means to enlarge latifundia and exclude peasants from access to rural property.
The extensivemonopolization of Sucreño savannahs and their transformation into pastures,
and the impossibility of consolidating peasant property, reduced frontier settlers to cheap
labour force, subject to diverse renting and share cropping arrangements, through which the
latter razed forest, grew food and then sowed grass for cattle. In the mid-1960s, this process
had exhausted the tropical forests, and the peasant binding to haciendas had lost its economic
function. The political dyadic ties entered a critical stage (Fals-Borda, 1996; LeGrand, 1998).
One of Colombia’s most prominent social conflicts in the 20th century was about to erupt in
Sucre.
By the 1960s Sucre was consolidated as a closed internal frontier: the colonization process
had been relatively stabilized to the extent that the forms of production and accumulation
– mostly of the agrarian type – had also been solidified and so had the status of land in the
form of latifundia. The mechanisms of social integration and regulation had been already
consolidated through patron-client ties and machine politics. Although clienteles became
13According to Meertens (2000), the cattle ranching hacienda generated a system in which peasant tenants
were allowed to exploit some hectares of waste land for a period of four or five years but were obliged to share
the harvest with landowners. After that period wastelands were incorporated to the hacienda for the further
expanding of pastures for cattle raising.
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unstable, the political culture of dependency adapted to the new model of intermediation
between the new power brokers and the state. It is in this context, in the late 1960s and early
1970s, where the tensions over land tenure and means of production finally reached a peak.
Successive attempts at agrarian reforms had failed in Colombia since the 1930s. The 1936
reform undertaken under Alfonso López’s first administration (1934–1938) was implemented
in the context of the strengthening of the industrial sector and therefore ended up favouring
big landowners. The legal framework sought to foster the agrarian modernization but based
upon large properties. Commercial agriculture deeply transformed land tenancy in the coun-
try but failed in democratizing the access to land as it left rural economic and social structures
untouched (Reyes, 1978; Zamosc, 1986).
A new reformist wave took place during Carlos Lleras Restrepo administration (1966–1970)
that sought to redistribute idle land and empower the peasant organization. In this context
the government created the National Association of Peasant Users (Asociación Nacional de
Usuarios Campesinos - ANUC). As expected, landowners and politicians reacted strongly
against the reform and peasant empowerment. Between 1971 and 1972 the elected conserva-
tive government of Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) reversed the democratic gear of the reform
under a strong parliamentary pressure, and a counter-reform e(ort strengthened once again
traditional landowners. A Sucre ANUC leader interviewed said that between the late 1960s
and early 1970s “over 30,000 families were expelled from rural lands because their presence
constituted a risk of state intervention and agrarian reform. Theywere displaced toCaribbean
urban centres and Venezuela” (Interview, Villadiego, 2009).
The policies of the early 1970s promoted rural industrialization and in this context some
enclaves of capitalist agriculture were created in Sucre as some technological upgrade was in-
troduced in haciendas. Nevertheless, a non-labour-intensive and low-risk cattle-raisingmodel
continued to prevail in the region. In this context and under the motto of “the land for those
who work it”, ANUC carried out a first wave of land invasions in the early 1970s in Sucre
and a second wave in the mid-1980s, with blockades, marches, and sit-ins. Peasants forced
the government to install and enforce programs of land distribution. The invasions occurred
throughout the Caribbean region, of which the case of Sucre was salient insofar as land inva-
sions took place throughout the whole territory. No other department experienced such an
activity in every single municipality. It is noteworthy that ANUC’s strength and contentious-
ness in Sucre were higher from ANUC’s levels elsewhere in the country. This was mainly due
to the fact that in Sucre the Association strengthened its organizational drive in a bottom-up
fashion whereas in the rest of the country ANUC was promoted in a top-down fashion by
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the Lleras Restrepo administration, a factor that enabled the co-optation of the Association
by traditional parties. This di(erence provoked Sucre’s divorce from the ANUC’s o*cial line,
through the creation of the so-called “Sincelejo line” that lost all o*cial support: “ANUCwas
mainly created for serving politicians’ interests. That is why on the whole the organization
was passive and represented no threats to landowners and politicians. This was not the case
in Sucre. The government turned its back on us because we were not willing to accept an
intermediated struggle for land” (Interview, Villadiego, 2009).
In the context of a total agrarian reform backlash ANUC’s Sincelejo line was violently
repressed during the Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) and López Michelsen (1974–1978) admin-
istrations: “we were brutally beaten and incarcerated, and our houses and plantations were
burnt. In 1972 the Police assassinated our leadership, and the association’s archives were set
on fire, destroying our collective memory” (Interview, Villadiego, 2009). During the 1970s,
many politicians – mainly those from the Caribbean departments – who were in turn lati-
fundia owners, strongly influenced the Executive’s regressive gear vis-à-vis the 1960s agrarian
reform. ANUC was dramatically weakened and the issue of rural inequality was left unre-
solved. Turbay Ayala’s administration (1978–1982) was no better. Characterized as one of
the most repressive time of Colombia’s 20th century, military repression was heavily focused
on agrarian conflicts.
Despite the tensions regarding agrarian policies, Sucre experienced an important transfor-
mation of rural land ownership. A comparison of the 1970–1971 and 1990 data shows that
latifundia of 500 hectares or more, which made up 41.6%of the total productive land in 1970,
were substantially reduced (by 214,500 hectares) and made up only 15.9% of the productive
land in 1990. It should not be assumed, however, that all the latifundia loss of extension
was transferred to peasant hands. According to Reyes (1978) only a sixth of expelled fam-
ilies during the 1960s resettled by informally occupying land or via land acquisition by the
Colombian state: 5,000 out of 30,000 evicted families were granted land plots in Sucre. The
National Agrarian Authority (Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria – INCORA) redis-
tributed 102,530 hectares in Sucre between 1968 and 1995, almost half of the total area lost by
the largest haciendas. This land, along with a little over 10,000 hectares of public land whose
ownership had been legally granted to peasants already settled there, accounted for the 6,200
new units of 50 hectares or less (113,895 hectares) registered in the 1990 agrarian census.
Something di(erent occurred with the other 100,000 hectares apparently lost by the largest
haciendas. As a mechanism of property protection, landowners subdivided properties of
40,000 hectares into smaller estates of between 100 and 500 hectares and the remaining 60,000
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hectares were segmented into properties ranging from 50 to 100 hectares. Partitioned plots
under 500 hectares were then trust deeded to sons, daughters and other close relatives of
landowners, and rented to peasant families. Another ANUC leader interviewed tells how a
well-known landowner from San Onofre managed to avoid the expropriation of his unpro-
ductive latifundia by the National Agrarian Authority: “INCORA had already expropriated
part of his hacienda and land was ready to redistribute but no one wanted to take it as he [the
landlord] would constantly threat any potential beneficiary. What he did later was dividing
his estate and renting plots to peasants so he would not lose his land. To date the situation
remains the same, and not long ago he had paramilitary support to avoid further peasant oc-
cupations” (Interview, Lara, 2009). Formally, the subdivision of estates played an important
part in transforming the countryside tenure structure into smaller properties; however the
actual distribution of land was not transformed according to democratizing demands.
the failure of the social movement, the renewal of clientelism and the
rise of the garcía house
The analysis of parapolitics in Sucre demands taking into account two events that developed
both within and outside institutional channels and had pervasive influence on regional poli-
tics since the mid-1980s and were strongly interrelated. The first one is that the enacting of
democratizing reforms had pervasive e(ects in Sucre’s politics insofar as did not transform
political customs. On the contrary, it reproduced them as politicians distorted the poorly reg-
ulated reforms and used them to their own advantage, as discussed below. The second one is
the explosion of collective violence.
The failure of the social movement and the rise of machine politics
Peasant struggles in Sucre during the 1970s were not only instrumental to the relations of pro-
duction in haciendas. Land demands were also directed against the state by appealing tomore
abstract concepts of equality, justice and democracy (Zamosc, 1986). Despite the increasing
contention over land and other issues related to democratization, politicswas not transformed
in Sucre in the context of agrarian conflicts and ANUC never became a significant electoral
force. On the contrary, politics continued to tie the Sucreño population to clientelism. Agrar-
ian struggles coexisted with clientelist practices and ANUC, the strongest social organization
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in Sucre, could not transform politics. Cristina Escobar (2002) in her analysis on the rise
of ANUC amidst a strong clientelistic culture, argues that clientelism continued to exist in
spite of – not in the absence of – “class consciousness”. The apparent contradiction between
peasant empowerment and the resilience of clientelism has to be understood in the context
of a precarious economic situation and the shift from traditional forms of clientelism, all en-
compassing and durable, to modern impersonal machine politics. Following the argument
by Caciagli and Belloni (1981), competition between brokers and their dependence on state
resources made traditional Sucreño patrons progressively fragile figures to clients’ eyes. It is in
this breach of traditional dyadic relations that the dispute over land status and peasant mobi-
lization reached its peak in Sucre. Despite the fact that the Sincelejo line was not co-opted by
politicians and as such the ANUC did not grease electoral machines, the precarious economic
situation of the department kept on forcing important sectors of the population to value the
immediate benefits of exchanging their votes over the more long-term and abstract benefits
of political and social representation. In this vein most ANUC militants who were landless
or smallholders lacking resources remained clients. An ANUC leader from San Onofre com-
mented: “I voted for [a SanOnofre town councillor] not long ago as he promised to improve a
rural road in exchange for his vote. I voted for him. He actually improved the road” (Interview,
Lara, 2009).
The 1980s democratizing reforms encouraged ANUC leaders to run for municipal coun-
cils, department assemblies, and even Congress (Pinzón, 1989). However, the results were
poor as the majority of rural voters supported political machines. Other emerging political
actors – demobilized guerrilla members from the early 1990s14, indigenous groups and reli-
gious minorities – experienced the same frustration. Between 1988 and 2002, non-traditional
parties represented 25%of the lists competing for municipal elections yet only 15.5%of non-
traditional candidates were elected to town councils, and 29.2% elected as mayors, i.e. 7 out
of 24 elected mayors.
The internal conflict also had pervasive e(ects over the social movement. Sucre, a tradition-
ally peaceful department, became increasingly violent since the 1970s. According to some an-
alysts, in was in this context in which ANUCmoved closer to guerrillas (Reyes, 1987). Others
claim ANUC remained independent from subversion and that guerrillas – especially the EPL,
14The Popular Liberation Army – EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación), 19th of April Movement – M-19
(Movimiento 19 de Abril), and Revolutionary Workers’ Party PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores)
guerrillas demobilized in 1991. The Socialist Renovation Stream – CRS (Corriente de Renovación Socialista)
reincorporated in 1994.
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Table 3: Elected Mayors (Traditional and Non-Traditional Parties in Sucre), 1988–2000
Year Traditional Parties Non-Traditional Parties Total
1988 19 79.2% 5 20.8% 24
1990 23 95.8% 1 4.2% 24
1992 17 70.8% 7 29.2% 24
1994 23 95.8% 1 4.2% 24
1997 19 79.0% 5 21.0% 24
2000 20 87.0% 3 13.0% 23
Source: RNEC
notwithstanding using the agrarian discourse for launching the insurgent project, emerged in
Sucre during the decline of ANUC and not during its boom (Interview, Restrepo, 2009).
According to Rudqvist (1983) it is di*cult to classify ANUC as a Left-wing union, despite
the multiple attempts from the left at co-opting its discourse. An ANUC leader interviewed
said: “I think we [ANUC] have been liberals at heart [...] Relations with the Left have al-
ways been di*cult because it could never cope with the fact that we peasants have an en-
trepreneurial drive. We want productive land, and generate income and employment. It is
a sin to think as “capitalists”. The Left has this strange vision of access to land as an end.
It seems the whole thing is pretty much about just dispossessing the rich; it’s like revenge”
(Interview, Villadiego, 2009). An interviewed academic complemented this statement: “The
agrarianmovement has been quite plural in Sucre; both liberal and conservative peasants have
converged. To some extent its liberal edge can be described as Gaitanista” (Interview, Re-
strepo, 2009). The source of the irrigation of violence in the rural context seems to have been
more linked to the tensions between peasant and the local elite over the rural development
model project than in ANUC’s apparent closeness to the Left: “ANUC was never co-opted
by guerrillas, thus the fact that peasants have been traditionally victimized is because of the
agrarian issue; not because they are actually considered as guerrillas’ supporters” (Interview,
Restrepo, 2009).
ANUC leaders have been systematically victimized in Sucre over the last four decades, but
the trends dramatically increased in the late 1990s, which coincides with the rise of AUC struc-
tures in the department. As analysed below, parapolitics also served what Figueroa refers as
to the “authoritarian modernization” of the Sucreño countryside (2007), i.e. a domination
model based on violence, localism and tradition that deeply undermined the peasant move-
ment and the democratization of access to land. A Sucreño warlord interviewed brought
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an argument that clearly reflects this model: “Traditional landowners are the only ones who
know how to maintain the land; not peasants. Do not ever leave it to peasants!” (Ramón*,
2009)15.
Money politics
As mentioned before, the economic structure of Sucre created the inequality that lies at the
foundation of clientelist transactions. However, this socioeconomic situation is a necessary
but not always su*cient condition for clientelism to prevail; it is also necessary that political
bosses continue to control the resources that clients need. Despite the modest electoral results
of non-traditional candidates since 1988, the timid enlargement of the political spectrum still
meant a challenge for Sucre’s political machines.
The reforms of the 1980s made political campaigns progressively more expensive: party
fractionalization boosted electoral competition and politicians required large campaign teams,
intermediaries, advertising, transportation, and most importantly, they needed to mobilize
clients. In order to lure politically disenchanted and sceptical voters in a competitive environ-
ment, the Sucreño political machines, as elsewhere, resorted to cash vote buying. But where
did the money come from? The increasing need for cash made politicians resort to di(erent
strategies. The first one is the control over public resources and contracting. It is noteworthy
that Sucreño politicians, excepting for renting from latifundia and some surpluses from cattle
ranching, have neither been entrepreneurs nor have they based their power upon controlling
monopolies or owning economic empires. That is why politicians’ wealth has mainly grown
at the state’s expense through corrupt practices (Escobar, 2002).
Central government transfers from oil royalties became the main target of politicians in Su-
cre and represent themost striking source of corruption. Although Sucre is not an oil producer,
Coveñas and Tolú municipalities have four oil piers – Caño Limon-Coveñas, Ocensa, O.D.C.
and Ecopetrol-Dol pipeline terminal points – from which between 77 and 83%of Colombian
oil has been exported over the last 40 years. Until 2012 royalties represented at least 75% of
revenues of Coveñas and Tolú and an important share of those went to the department’s cof-
fers. The creation of Coveñas municipality in 200216 further multiplied corruption over these
resources. A peasant leader interviewed stressed that Sucreño politicians are so corrupted that
15It is noteworthy that Ramón* belongs to the Sucreño rural and political aristocracy, and FARC guerrilla
victimized his family.
16Before its creation, Coveñas was a county of Tolú municipality.
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they even “created amunicipality [Coveñas] in order to fully predate it” (Interview, Villadiego,
2009). According to the Colombian legislation royalties are to be invested by departments and
municipalities in health, education, drinkable water, public sanitation programmes and road
infrastructure. Given Tolú and Coveñas’ extraordinary income from oil royalties, these mu-
nicipalities should have the highest social indicators in the department. However, royalties
have not had any multiplier e(ect in Sucre, and have become instead a negative externality.
Systematic corruption such as ghost contracting; payment of unfinished public works; multi-
plication of the value of contracts within short periods of time; and a weak internal control
and accounting systems left Tolú and Coveñas as two of the poorest municipalities in Sucre.
The second strategy used by politicians to cope with the escalating cost of political cam-
paigns was the direct appropriation of pork-barrel funds through the creation of fictitious
non-profit development agencies to which the funds were diverted. The creation of regional
development agencies had a sudden explosion in Sucre in 1986 and increased throughout 1987
and 1988.17 These private foundations were created not only by the heads of the main politi-
cal machines of the department but also by middle-rank brokers in order to sustain political
groups. A third campaign funding strategy was increasing private sources: traditional dona-
tions from cattle hacendados, who were interested in keeping local power in their localities,
and the compulsory contributions from state employees to their political bosses. As the esca-
lating costs of political campaigns and the commercialization of votes were not easily covered
by these sources of financing, drug money started permeating Sucreño politics from the 1994
campaigns18, a trend that would dramatically intensify in elections to come, sponsored by the
AUC.
The rise of the García house
As mentioned, the fragmentation of traditional parties continued in the context of the enact-
ment of the 1980s reforms, and new houses emerged in Sucre – most importantly those of
the García and Merlano families – as the outcome of the atomization of Dager Chadid and
1723. The o*cial creation of 12 development foundations and corporations was registered in the o*cial re-
gional newspaper of Sucre. Source: Gaceta Departamental de Sucre, January 31, 1986; April–June 1987; July–
August 1987; September 1987; November 1987; April–June 1988.
18For the 1994 elections, Cali cartels’ money importantly penetrated the Liberal Party’s campaign, especially
ex-president Ernesto Samper (1994–1998). This scandal made Samper’s administration and the Congress deeply
illegitimate.
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Guerra houses19. García and Merlano houses became great electors by co-opting political
niches at the municipal level in order to counteract the e(ects of the popular local elections.
The case of the García house is worth analysing as it not only illustrates the survival and adap-
tation of political machines in the context of decentralization and subnational elections but
also, and above all, because the house was central in the criminalization of Sucreño politics
and the capture of the subnational state by the AUC.
The García house became the indisputable owner of Sucreño machine politics soon after
politician Alvaro García “divorced” from the Guerra house. This house has left a footprint in
local politics by disproportionately campaign funding, creating and disarming political coali-
tions, changing votes in the boards of public corporations, and controlling the Departmental
AccountingO*ce andOmbudsman. The political power of the housewas built in three stages.
During the first stage the house’s strength was built upon family ties (Figure 7) and increased
its political capital in both Sucre and neighbouring Bolívar department. However, the family
power structure started to crumble due to successive corruption scandals at the end of the
1980s. The second stage is characterized by the incorporation of García’s close friends and
faithful co-partisans into his power network. For the third stage, Alvaro García incorporated
paramilitaries and in this fashion the house continued having extraordinary political success.
Originally fromOvejasmunicipality, the patriarch Juan José García, a prosperous hacienda
owner and tobacco entrepreneur, was elected deputy for the Bolívar Departmental Assembly
in the 1960s.20 His eldest son Juan José García was the first to become involved in politics,
starting at the departmental level and then reaching Congress, but lost his senatorial seat after
a series of irregularities in a telecommunications contract were detected in Bolívar department
and the use of pork-barrel funds to finance the Foundation for the Improvement of Education,
Health, Sports and Public Works of which his mother Mady Romero was chair. Juan José’s
wife, Piedad Zuccardi, inherited his political capital, and has been successively elected in
Congress for over a decade. The patriarch’s second son Alvaro started his political life in
the Guerra house and was appointed mayor of Ovejas in 1974 at the age of 21. Later he was
appointed to the Departmental Home Secretary as well as elected as Sincelejo town councillor
and Departmental Assembly deputy. In 1978 he won a seat at the House of Representatives
andwas re-elected for two successive terms. For the 1986 elections, having amassed significant
19The Guerra house started crumbling in the early 1980s because of strong personal di(erences between broth-
ers José and Julio Guerra Tulena. The Dájer Chadid house collapsed after a series of mismanagement scandals
in the department.
20It is important to remember that Sucre’s department was created in the mid 1960s; before that it belonged
to the Bolívar department
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political capital, García left the Guerra house and created the New Liberal Force party with
which he won a seat in Congress and for 1988, the year of the first mayoral elections, his
movement won several mayoralties. For the 1990 elections he was not elected as a consequence
of the large-scale corruption scandals of brother Juan José. Nevertheless, García succeeded
in getting his mother elected as Representative in 1990.
His brother Hector García, former Director of the National Housing Institute, and his wife
Martha Abondano, then Vice-Minister of Urban Development were investigated in the early
1990s for a corruption scandal that involved the change of land usage of a plot the couple
had previously bought near Cartagena while in o*ce. His cousin Gabriel García was elected
mayor of Cartagena and was involved in a scandal-ridden contract with the Cartagena Port
Society.
Figure 7: The García Family Power Structure
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scandalous infiltration of Ernesto Samper’s presidential campaign by the Cali Cartel. During
this second stage, he joined the ProgressiveNationalMovement a d empowered close political
partners. For the successive elections, he kept on migrating from one party to the other, and
maintained his power in Congress as well as at the subnational level. This phenomenon is
118
the failure of the social movement
intimately related to the creation of the AUC in Sucre in 1997, a matter that will be thoroughly
analysed in the next chapter.
According to a public o*cial interviewed, “García ‘technified’ clientelism in Sucre because
he eliminated traditional nepotism21 and shared power with his “putative sons”. I am mainly
talking about all the popularly elected governors in Sucre [since 1993]: Edgar Martínez, Héc-
tor Pérez, Eric Morris, Salvador Arana and Jorge Anaya. They are all García’s men” (Inter-
view, Porras, 2009). He added: “during those years Alvaro García became stronger than ever
by impressively expanding his clientelist network and by increasing his political quotas at the
departmental and national levels. All these appointed o*cials owe everything to him. As
for clients, his house was open doors for everyone who came for help, for whom he usually
provided solutions. His campaign co(ers seemed inexhaustible: he always over-financed his
campaigns. Let’s say a congressional campaign cost 50 pesos, he would finance it with 150. It
was Joaquin García [prominent Sucreño rural rich] who providedmost of the funding. García
always repaid Joaquin García by usurping public resources, and in this fashion they kept the
machine running”. It is well known that García’s other resource for keeping in power was
electoral fraud. He has been called the ‘the Registrar’s O*ce Magician’.”
García was above all a shrewd politician. Although throughout his long congressional ca-
reer his parliamentary initiative was almost non-existent22, he managed to reach the strategic
Budget Commission in Senate in 1998 and remained there as the most powerful voter until
2007. “García is an unbeatable political animal; he always knows what he is doing. He gets
whatever he wants whenever he wants. He manages to soften his political adversaries by mak-
ing them believe they are his partners. He never lost a fight because he never engaged in useless
arguments. While in Congress he was THE budget man. Every year he negotiated his vote
for the national budget in exchange for contracts and bureaucratic quotas. Besides, he always
belonged to the national ruling coalition” (Interview, Porras, 2009).
García built a sultanistic regime of sorts in Sucre, deeply anchored at the local and national
levels, which pursued personal goals around family and friends. García mastered the distri-
bution of patronage, creating a white-collar middle class out of Sucreño bureaucracy. These
quotas have been carefully and strategically administrated by his house, which managed to
fill every single space in the subnational public sector, avoiding the creation of “grey areas”
prone to be filled by competing machines or independents. The social tolerance vis-à-vis tra-
21García married late and has no children. In this sense he has shared his political capital with close friends
who have been long-standing co-partisans.
22The only legislative initiative García had was a project that sought to modify intellectual property rights in
2006. The law project was filed in 2007.
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ditional politics has also permitted the maintenance of the García house over time. Besides
the socioeconomic vulnerability and the institutional factors that allowed political machines
to reconfigure and survive in Sucre, factors inherent to Sucreño society are also at play in the
reproduction of the subnational forms of political power and dominance. Apart from the
undermining of social control as the obvious consequence of the intensification of collective
violence in the department, the deficit of public opinion is explained to a considerable extent
by the existence of a small and weak middle class, of increasingly disengaged social organiza-
tions and of an anaemic media. Social networking is too weak to stand up against traditional
practices and promote an alternative political culture in the department. Instead, a political
culture of permissiveness prevails: “the state has always been central in Sucre. It is the “it”
factor insofar as it constitutes the main source of employment and unique provider. To the
extent towhich the state is deeply intermediated by politics it entails a serious collective action
problem. Although the state as a “privatized” entity has traditionally manipulated misery via
clientelism, the Sucreño society of free riders is also to blame. It is in the political culture.
Even at its most organized levels, society accepts clientelism, corruption, violent illegal ac-
tors, state capture, electoral fraud, and so on. Politics is seen as “someone else’s job”. In this
context, Sincelejo -the only important urban centre in the department- has still a very weak
opinion vote, so there are no counter-weights in this regard” (Interview, Restrepo, 2009).
All these factors have allowed the house to maintain the status quo of its dominant po-
litical machine in spite of crises and the competition of the Merlano house. Jairo Merlano
was elected mayor of Sincelejo in 1992 supported by Alvaro García. Once in o*ce, he and
his brother Jaime created their own political group, the Liberal Independent Movement, sep-
arating from the García house. The Merlano house has remained in power ever since and
has made Sincelejo mayoralty its stronghold. They have been also successful in controlling
Sincelejo’s Town Council, Sucre’s OmbudsmanO*ce and Local Accounting O*ce. Merlano
was elected to Congress in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006. Although this meant the end of
the hegemonic power of the García house, the control over Congress as well as most of the
subnational public space makes García house extremely di*cult to displace.
García has also been a standard-bearer against agrarian reform, a matter that was visible
in his congressional career. For example, when a new attempt at agrarian reform took place
in the late 1980s, the congressional voting session was broadcast on television and García’s
voting was registered. He voted against it four times. There were more votes than congress
members voting that day. Although the fraud was made public, the law did not pass.
120
political atomization and the dominance of the garcía house
In the late 1990s, as collective violence took over Sucre’s territory and jeopardized the sub-
national status quo, García undertook its third strategy which consisted of allying with the
AUC under a criminal consociational arrangement. This process constitutes next chapter’s
main subject.
political atomization and the dominance of the garcía house
Sucre was no alien to the process of atomization of parties in the context of the breakdown
of the bi-partisan hegemony. The Conservative, but mostly the Liberal party lost internal
cohesion and legitimacy due to the mid-1990s corruption scandals. In Sucre, political actors
also moved from o*cial lines towards newly created parties, which were nothing but Right-
wing electoral microenterprises that belonged to the Uribista coalition and that had a salient
participation in parapolitics. Neither independents nor the Left succeeded in competing for
the dominant houses’ vote.
Tables 4 and 5 below show the tendencies of defection of traditional parties towards tran-
sitional movements in Sucre. Between 2002 and 2006 elections for House of Representatives,
José Luis Feris Chadid and Juan Carlos Rodríguez moved from the Liberal Party to Opening
Liberal Movement and Colombia’s Communal and CommunityMovement, respectively. The
case of Tulio Alvarez, fromMOIR to the Alternative Democratic Pole is di(erent as it reflects
the consolidation of the Left in the movement. In 2002, 6 out of 14 candidates belonged to the
Liberal Party, one to the Conservative Party, two to the Left (MOIR and AD-M19) and the rest
to other movements. In 2006, from 13 candidates, traditional parties and the Left had only
one candidate each whereas the rest belonged to other movements, mostly to Uribista parties.
The strength of Uribista parties is even more striking in the case of Senate elections. Except-
ing for Muriel Benito, who consistently ran for the Conservative party (in 2002 for House of
Representatives and in 2006 for Senate), all candidates, Liberals before the 2002 elections, ran
as transitionals in 2002 and 2006.
The cases of Alvaro García and JairoMerlano also demonstrate the mobility amongst tran-
sitionals. The former left the Liberal Party and migrated to the National Progressive Move-
ment in 2002. For the 2006 elections he moved again to the Democratic Colombia Party. Mer-
lano made a similar transfer: traditionally Liberal, he moved in 2002 to the Radical Change
Movement and in 2006 to the U Party. Although it does not completely explain electoral suc-
cess, it should be noted that the candidates’ moves for 2006 favoured them. Alvaro García and
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his partners had the highest voting in the department, followed by Merlano’s team. Neither
the Left nor independents had representation in Sucreño politics for the Senate.
Table 4: Defection Tendency: Comparative Elections 2002 and 2006 for the House of Repre-
sentatives
Candidate 2002 2006
Party Elected Party Elected
Jorge Luis Feris Chadid Liberal Party Yes Liberal Opening
Movement
No










Marta Del Carmen Vergara De Perez Popular Civic Con-
vergence Movement
Yes
Muriel De Jesus Benito Rebollo (*) Conservative Party Yes
Anibal Jose Monterrosa Ricardo Liberal Party No
Orlando De Jesus Peralta Castro U Party No
Mario Israel Bolaño Hernandez Liberal Party No
Miguel Angel Cabrera Castilla Serious Colombia
Civic Movement
No
Neila Amira Hernandez Vasquez Democratic Alliance
M-19
No
Hermes Dario Perez Urzola National Salvation
Movement
No




Roger Alfonso Fajardo Cardozo Liberal Party No
Manuel Elias Gutierrez Benavidez Liberal Party No
Jairo Alfredo Fernandez Quessep Social Action Party Yes
Gabriel Antonio Espinosa Arrieta Liberal Party Yes
Erik Julio Morris Taboada (**) Democratic Colom-
bia Party
Yes
Gustavo Montes Radical Change
Party
No
Enrique Bernardo Fadul Jattin U Party No
AntonioDe JesúsMartínezHernández Conservative Party No
Jorge Arturo Ospina Vergara Wings Team Colom-
bia Movement
No
Enrique Roman Puerta Prieto Centre Option Party No
Rafaela Del Socorro Arias Cordoba Mira No
Julieta Bonilla Libreros C4 No
(*) Muriel de Jesús Benito ran for Senate in 2006, also for the Conservation Party, but was not elected.
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Table 5: Defection Tendency: Comparative Elections 2002 and 2006 for the Senate
Candidate 2002 2006
Party Elected Party Elected





Jairo Enrique Merlano Radical Change Party Yes U Party Yes
Antonio Guerra De La
Espriella (*)
Radical Change Party Yes
Jorge Visbal Martelo U Party Yes
Muriel De Jesus Benito
Rebollo (**)
Conservative Party No
(*) Antonio Miguel Guerra de la Espriella was Senator (1998–2002) for the Liberaly Party.
(**) Muriel de Jesús Benito was House Representative (2002–2006) for the Conservative Party.
Source: NRO
The case of Presidential elections in Sucre also provides evidence of the “defrosting” of
traditional parties and of defection tendencies. As shown in tables 6 and 7, and despite Uribe’s
national victory via theColombia First transitional party, Sucre voted overwhelmingly Liberal
in 2002 elections. The Liberal party obtained 119,038 voteswhereasUribe received 58,631. But
in 2006 this trend was fully reversed for Uribe’s re-election as he obtained the highest vote in
Sucre, 114,009, whereas the Liberal candidate gained only 56,826 of the votes. The fact that
García supported the Liberal party in 2002 and then Uribe in 2006 significantly explains the
shift in the presidential vote in Sucre.
Table 6: Presidential Vote in Sucre (2002)
Candidate Party Votes
Horacio Serpa Uribe Liberal Party 119,038
Alvaro Uribe Velez Colombia First 58,631
Luis Eduardo Garzón Social And Political Front 9,066
Noemi Sanín Yes Colombia Movement 4,195
Harold Bedoya Pizarro Colombia Strength Movement 1,312
Francisco Tovar Garces Citizen Defence Movement 474
Ingrid Betancourth Pulecio Green Oxygen Party 439
Augusto Guillermo Lora Ramírez 19th Of April Movement 227
Alvaro Cristancho Tozcano Communitarian Participatioon Move-
ment
216
Guillermo Antonio Cardona Moreno Colombian Comunal And Communitar-
ian Movement
172
Source: NRO [data available only for the departmental level]
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Table 7: Presidential Vote in Sucre (2006)
Candidate Party Votes
Alvaro Uribe Velez Colombia First 114,009
Horacio Serpa Uribe Liberal Party 56,826
Carlos Gaviria Diaz Alternative Democratic Pole 44,219
Enrique Parejo González National Democratic Reconstruction
Movement
2,018
Alvaro Leyva Durán National Reconciliation Movement 666
Antanas Mockus Sivickas Social Indigenous Alliance Movement 632
Carlos Arturo Rincon Barreto Colombian Comunal And Communi-
tarian Movement
227
Source: NRO [data available only for the departmental level]
On the whole, Sucreño congressional politics became mainly of the transitional type, and
so did the vote for presidential elections, with insignificant results for the Left and indepen-
dents. Following the national trend, the strength of Uribista parties in Sucre demonstrates a
clear move towards the Right, a reflection of politicians’ anti-subversive spirit discussed below.
Stronger atomization and defection could be observed in the case of the Liberal party than
in that of the Conservative party, but under no circumstances did Liberal shift towards the
conservatives or vice versa. High mobility of transitionals could be also observed: the e(ects
of the 2003 reform made many transitional parties disappear and regroup under new labels
without consequences in the ideological and programmatic fields. They kept on representing
the dominant Uribista coalition. As in the rest of the country, the decline of the hegemony of
traditional parties did not imply any kind of renovation in political customs. On the contrary,
the change in political labels and defection from traditional lines became a new strategy of
survival for the Sucreño political powers, which continued exerting the same forms of domi-
nation with the increasing support of paramilitary groups as examined in the next chapter.
the intensification of the internal conflict, armed clientelism and the
criminalization of politics
Another important element that significantly played in parapolitics is the escalation of vio-
lence outside and within institutional channels. Traditional studies have underlined the ad-
vantages of clientelism as an alternative to violence and class conflict, but the case of Sucre
– generalizable to Colombia – proves counterintuitive: clientelism has not precluded the pos-
sibility of violence. On the contrary, the latter has contributed to the former’s reproduction
124
the intensification of the internal conflict
and the other way round. Moreover, since the mid-1990s both phenomena intertwined and
mutually fed generating a case of highly criminalized politics.
Guerrillas appeared rather late in Sucre compared to other Colombian regions23 and they
operated in Sucre in twowaves. The first one corresponds to the emergence of the Popular Lib-
eration Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) in the late 1970s, followed in the 1980s
by the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Revolucionario del Pueblo – PRT), the Revolu-
tionary People’s Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo – ERP) and Socialist Renovation
Trend (Corriente de Renovación Socialista – CRS).24 Despite having little success in building
a social infrastructure among the peasant population (Rudqvist, 1983), this first generation of
guerrillas emerged intrinsically connected to agrarian conflicts. They were all Caribbean “na-
tive” and the CRSwas born inMontes deMaría region. This is noteworthy insofar as most of
these guerrillas’ combatants, commanders and ideologues were directly linked to subnational
agrarian grievances. These guerrillas entered in a stage of critical military weakening in the
late 1980s, which explain their demobilization in the early 1990s.
The second wave of guerrillas corresponded to the late appearance of FARC and ELN in
Sucre in the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the demobilization of the first wave groups, as a
consequence of spectacular military defeats by paramilitary groups in neighbouring depart-
ments. The ELN progressively filled the spaces left by demobilized guerrillas through the
Alfredo Gómez Quiñónez and Jaime Bateman Cayón fronts in La Mojana and Montes de
María regions, followed by FARC through the creation of the 35th and 37th Fronts. The en-
trance and territorial expansion of these guerrillas was intimately connected to the enacting of
decentralization and local elections. This connection, as in other Colombian regions, signifi-
cantly reshaped the dynamics of the internal conflict in Sucre. The insurgent newcomers were
not local but instead belonged to branches of groups that emerged in other regions. FARC and
ELN made no alliances with key social actors – politicians, peasant movements or criminal
syndicates – but instead concentrated on extorting and kidnapping rural rich and shopkeep-
ers. Edward Cobo – who later became AUC political commander in Sucre under the alias
“Diego Vecino” – was the first cattle rancher kidnapped by FARC in 1995.
These guerrilla groups also engaged in systematic armed clientelist practices, mainly in
Montes de María region where they extorted and threatened local governments. One NGO
23The main Colombian guerrillas (FARC, ELN and EPL) emerged in the mid 1960s.
24FARC, ELN, and EPL guerrillas emerged in the early 1960s. The Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS)
was created in 1991 as an ELN splinter group. It operated in the northern areas of the country and demobilized
in 1994. The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) was created in 1985 also as an ELN splinter group and
operated in Tolima, Sucre and Bolívar departments. It demobilized in 2007.
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director stressed: “Montes de María was completely controlled by FARC by the mid-1990s.
They fully determined public contracting fromwhich they kept a high percentage. As if it was
not enough, FARCwould also extort or kidnap contractors and ended up diverting almost all
contract resources. In Sucre there is no such thing as an accountability culture and therefore
politics has been very di*cult here. In that time many mayors from Montes de María had to
govern from “exile” in Sincelejo, Cartagena or Bogotá because of guerrillas’ threats and pres-
sure. By then Sincelejo [the capital] was also besieged by FARC; no one dared to travel outside
the city between 6 p.m. and 5 a.m. That brought a complete economic debacle. Moreover,
Sincelejo was staring to become an important recipient of massive waves of forcible displaced
population [...] The department became unviable and at some point we thought we were at
the verge of collapse” (Interview, Hernández, 2009).
This security crisis is central to the explanation of parapolitics in Sucre: the escalation of
guerrilla warfare produced the stabilization of private security, a “necessary evil” according
to a source interviewed (Interview, Ramón*, 2009). Instead of seeking a public response to
guerrilla violence, Sucreño rural rich and politicians increasingly involved in financing private
armies, the already mentioned Convivir and AUC structures which were also largely profited
by the military and police in counter-insurgent tasks and strategies, as well as by drugtra*ck-
ers who controlled cocaine exports through the Morrosquillo gulf.
The AUC changed the war balance in the department by weakening guerrillas and exerting
terror among its alleged social base. The fact that FARC and ELN never engaged in drug
tra*cking in Sucre determined the small size of their structures and made them vulnerable
in terms of financial support and territorial control. By the time the AUC was established in
Sucre, FARC guerrilla, under the infamous alias “Martin Caballero” command, had no more
than 300 men-at-arms organized under the 35th and 37th Fronts. These fronts were rapidly
weakened and expelled from Sucre. The paramilitary “pacification” process brought an sig-
nificant improvement in the security situation – mainly a substantial drop in kidnapping and
extortion cases – but at the same time an overwhelming humanitarian crisis and deteriora-
tion of human rights for a large portion of Sucreño society. The correlate of more security for
the rich was violence and terror for the poorest: massacres, selective assassinations, forcible
disappearances and forcible displacement dramatically increased since the mid-1990s.
In his analysis on warlordism and local politics in the Philippines, Sidel (1989) argues that
violence and mobilization of private armies in armed patron-client sets play an important
role in political competition and survival. The predatory incomes derived from it mark the
accumulation of wealth of actors involved. This is very much the case in Sucre. The paramil-
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itarization of Sucreño life did not only a(ect security issues or fostered the counterinsurgent
field. Most importantly it favoured the subnational agrarian and political status quo. The
landholding model was at stake, notwithstanding the systematic failure of agrarian reforms.
So were electoral enterprises in the context of institutional reforms and the fragmentation
and atomization of parties. As Gutiérrez (2007) claims, politicians and rural rich incorpo-
rated paramilitary violence to the asset basket in order tomaintain the land tenancy structure,
control political competitors, and keep a dynamic flow of clients. Although the AUC was a
much more complex phenomenon than a violent instrument formed by local elites, the fact
is that by including warlords in governing coalitions, the Sucreño establishment successfully
mobilized paramilitaries in order to maintain and reproduce the latifundium structure and
the García’s house political machine, as thoroughly examined in the next chapter.
But parapolitics did not only benefit local powers; paramilitaries also had their share. The
e(ective protection of cocaine exports allowed the AUC to displace pre-existing small cartels
and rapidly monopolize drug tra*c in Sucre. Likewise the massive forcible displacement of
peasant population served the warlord strategy of what Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by
dispossession”, making AUC commanders an important emerging landed bourgeoisie. But
most importantly, they participated in politics and were represented by the Garcia house in
Congress, securing votes for the enactment of the Peace and Justice Law.
Parapolitics was to a significant extent possible in Sucre because worldviews of the rural
bourgeoisie were compatible with those of AUCwarlords on primitive forms of accumulation,
rural land status and traditional politics. But apart from this a*nity, the ease at which para-
politics seized the subnational state and criminalized politics can be also explained by other
factors. First, the absence of organizational complexity within the state, with fully controlled
bureaucracies by the García and Merlano houses that made most institutions vulnerable to
seizure. Second, the absence of a strong civil society, citizen culture, political opposition, and
media generated a wide social permissiveness and tolerance vis-à-vis the phenomenon, hin-
dering the possibilities of bringing “the public” back in.
127
5
THE CAPTURE OF THE STATE IN SUCRE : ALL ABOUT POL IT IC S
“I have earned my seat by the way of e"ort; by the way of sweat”1
The last chapter’s analysis on the historical background of Sucre discusses a series ofkeys that facilitated the distinct process of parapolitics that took place in this terri-
tory. The department constitutes a peripheral space characterized by a weak state ruled by
corrupted politicians who, via the creation of a narrow political space with stable clienteles,
have closed subnational boundaries to the influence of the centre’s modernizing and democ-
ratizing reforms. Sucre has not overcome pre-modern forms of accumulation that mainly
derive from rents on rural land and uncompetitive extensive cattle ranching, and therefore its
integration to markets has been extremely weak. Politicians along with rural rich, and more
recently supported by the paramilitarymuscle, have violently hindered the democratization of
the access to rural land – highly concentrated in few latifundia owners, generating one of the
deepest rural inequality gaps in Colombia. The interaction of these variables created a hyper-
criminalized political space in which politicians and warlords co-governed the department
and looted its finances for almost seven years. Although paramilitary groups participated in
overcoming the security crisis generated by guerrillas, paramilitary formation primarily re-
sponded on the one hand to the needs of maintaining the status quo of rural land and politics
in the department, and on the other hand serving the AUC’s urge for demobilizing in order
to legalize and legitimate wealth and political power accumulated by warlords during their
active time in Sucre.
As discussed in this chapter, there are four distinctive features that characterize parapolitics
in Sucre. The first one is that the logic of politics prevailed over the logic of market. The main
accumulation means – public resources, patronage, and rural land – were in the hands of the
local establishment, and despite the fact that theAutodefensas enjoyed a significant share, the
connections to the sources of suchmeans were a monopoly hard to grab from local politicians
and rural rich. Although AUC warlords controlled drug tra*cking, its relevance was not as
1Alvaro García Romero’s speech at the Colombian Senate during the debate in which he was pointed by
Senator Gustavo Petro as allied of the AUC in Sucre, October 2006
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prominent as in other Colombian regions insofar as it was restricted to cocaine exports – the
weaker end of the business for Colombian criminals, and consequently did not constitute the
main focus of paramilitaries. The greater strategic value of Sucre was indeed politics. They
not only actively participated in the governance of the department but also had the García
and Merlano houses representing the Autodefensas’ interests in Congress.
The second trait is that the Sucreño establishment locally induced paramilitary formation.
According to the SCJ, “political elites organized and financed paramilitary structures; they
first made personal financial contributions and later created their own private army and used
public resources in order to maintain them” (SCJ-32672, 2009). Although Sucre fits Losada’s
hegemonic type, the hegemony did not stem from warlords but from the García house, the
AUC’s actual commander in Sucre. The internal induction -interpreted by many as a saviour
and patriotic gesture against guerrillas, along with the fact that politicians, more precisely
the García house, were in command of AUC structures, generated a great deal of social ac-
ceptance vis-à-vis paramilitarism. The arrangement between politicians and warlords proved
extremely di*cult to counter-balance: neither competing political actors nor guerrillas were
strong enough in this regard.
The third characteristic is that paramilitary groups had little competition. In other regions,
paramilitary warfare was conducted in territories where guerrillas and/or existing organized
crime structures were extremely di*cult to overcome due to their deep rootedness in the ge-
ography, society and economy. In those cases, despite the use of huge military manpower, the
AUC could not fully overcome armed competition. Sucre was di(erent. Paramilitary warfare
was not labour intensive as guerrillas were not as strong as in other areas, has meagre polit-
ical support and a weak financial infrastructure given the fact it never participated in drug
tra*cking.
Fourth, parapolitics in Sucre entailed the participation of warlords in governing the depart-
ment. Politicians and paramilitaries created a complex legal/illegal power structure, fuelled
by violence. The legal wing, mainly composed by the García house, increasingly allowed the
illegal wing – the AUC – to control subnational appointments, bureaucracies and budgets in
exchange for electoral protection and vote maximization. This process generated a win-win
situation for both actors: politicians reproduced their power whilst paramilitaries obtained
political representation at the congressional level. Alvaro García, along with his power struc-
ture of elected governors, departmental deputies, mayors and town councillors was central
for the AUC expansion and consolidation and was active in crystallizing a political project
through which the AUC captured the state. That explains why the SCJ in most of its sen-
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tences refers to the existence of a “power structure” rather than to individuals in collusion
with paramilitaries (VerdadAbierta, 2010a).
Despite the robustness of parapolitics in Sucre, there is no such thing as an invulnerable
criminal enterprise. As discussed below, the alliance was not immune to fractures caused
by internal divisions along the AUC commandership, defection, and betrayals. Moreover,
notwithstanding the compactness of the alliance, the criminal project faced a few yet impor-
tant “grey” institutional areas, that is, public o*cials who were neither controlled by the Gar-
cía house nor the AUC. The conjunction of these and other factors brought the enterprise to
disintegration yet the conditions under which the criminal power structure was built remain
untouched.
In this chapter I substantiate the process through which subnational political elites and
AUC warlords allied. I analyse the creation of the AUC in Sucre by the local establishment;
the conditions under which paramilitaries expanded throughout the territory and became the
hegemonic warring actor; the inclusion of the AUC in the subnational ruling coalition and
the establishment of a legal-illegal consociational arrangement; and finally its fall.
the strategic value of sucre’s territory: geography, resources and un-
derlying criminality
The Sucreño geography lacks strategic value for warring actors given the scarcity of mountain
chains and rain forest. This situation explains in large measure why FARC and ELN never
reached a strongmilitary control in northwestern Colombia if compared to the levels attained
in other regions, owing to an important extent by the Amazonian rain forest in the south and
the Andean mountains in the centre. According to an academic interviewed, “the fact that
Sucre’s territory is of little strategic value in terms of guerrilla warfare made the intensity of
collective violence rather low for a while if compared to other geographic areas in the country.
Sucre is mainly a zone for guerrillas’ dispersion. Guerrillas have never been strong here and
will never be [...] in terms of financial resources, extortion of rural rich has been an important
predatory mechanism but if you compare Sucre with [neighbouring] Córdoba department,
cattle ranching activities are not that important [...] Sucre has a mediocre economy. In my
view, Sucre’s real strategic value for any warring actor is the public budget” (Restrepo, 2009).
Sucre has also been marginal in terms of underlying criminality – that is, structures of orga-
nized crime and illegal activities that existed prior to the emergency of guerrillas and paramil-
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itaries. Although drug tra*cking significantly increased under the control of the AUC, the
narcotics trade in the department has never been relevant.2 First, unlike the case of the Bolí-
var, Córdoba andMagdalena departments, there are no coca crops in Sucre (Map 5). Second,
cocaine-processing activities were of intermediate importance, compared to those located in
neighbouring departments. Third, in terms of cocaine exports, the Morrosquillo gulf was
far from being the most salient shipment point in the Caribbean region: the largest share of
cocaine produced in the Caribbean is tra*cked from the Dique Canal in Bolívar, Puerto Es-
condido in Córdoba, and Santa Marta harbour in Magdalena. Fourth, there was neither a
local cartel nor any major Sucreño drug tra*cker. Moreover, FARC never became involved in
the business. TheMedellín Cartel largely controlled cocaine export activities during the 1980s
and after its collapse small syndicates led by Pablo Escobar’s former lieutenants controlled
them. The Medellín Cartel’s heirs controlled the business through local intermediaries in
other cities. These aspects largely explain why drug tra*c never irrigated the departmental
economy as it did in other cases.
Map 5: Location of Drug Tra*c Activities in Sucre and Neighbouring Departments
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The absence of strong illegal activities in Sucre had two important consequences for the
AUC’s military strategy. As coca has never been cultivated in the department, the paramili-
2It is to note that in the context of the Caribbean coast, the departments of Bolívar and Magdalena are the
most salient coca leaf producers and cocaine export points. Magdalena department has a long-standing tradition
in the field since the 1970swithmassive production and tra*cking ofmarihuana, the so-called “marihuana boom”.
The latter was followed since the 1980s by coca leaf and cocaine processing. Bolívar department became important
since the late 1980s when the southern and mid-western areas started to experience an impressive increase of coca
crops.
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tary warfare neither entailed a dispute with guerrillas over crops control and protection, nor
the needs of protecting and regulating coca labour force – mainly harvesters, as was the case
in the neighbouring department of Bolívar. This significantly explains why the AUC neither
generated a huge military manpower nor an organic workforce. The second consequence is
related to the cocaine trade. Given Sucre’s feeble underlying criminality, AUC warlords mo-
nopolized cocaine processing and shipment activities very soon, and with almost insignificant
levels of violence.
the building of the criminal enterprise
Despite the long-term political success of García and Merlano houses in Sucre, their alliance
with the AUCmade their electoral performance reach extraordinary results between 2002 and
2006. The convergence ofmachine politics, landed interests and paramilitary violence became
the perfect recipe for the electoral success of politicians and for the paramilitary urge for
representation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that these political houses had di(erent
processes vis-à-vis paramilitarism. The evidence shows that the García house created and
commanded paramilitary groups whereas the Merlano group was co-opted by the AUC in
the context of internal AUC fractures, as thoroughly substantiated in this chapter.
The criminal enterprise of politicians and the AUC was built between 1997 and 2006, and
comprised three stages: a) the creation and financing of AUC structures; b) the military con-
solidation of the AUC and its inclusion in the subnational ruling coalition; and c) the crisis
and shift in the paramilitary strategy.
The creation and financing of AUC structures (1997–2001)
The first stage took place between 1997 and 2001, and the relationship between politicians
and paramilitaries was mainly grounded at the level of violence provision. The Sucreño estab-
lishment financed AUC structures in order to provide private security to the rural rich3 as well
as protecting the local economies from guerrillas’ predatory activities. The García house was
3Between 1996 and 2004, 633 kidnappings were registered in Sucre according to the Ministry of Defence,
although it is worth noting that these strongly decreased over time, from 114 in 1999 to 39 in 2004. 1999, 2001
and 2002were the years with the highest number of kidnappings of which the FARC is alleged to have participated
in 185 (29%), followed by the ERP with 140 (22%), the ELN with 79 (12%), common delinquency with 69 (11%)
and the AUC with 29 (5%).
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central in the creation, financing and expansion of the AUC’s Montes de María Heroes Bloc
– MMHB (Héroes de Montes de María). However, by that time García enjoyed a long-term
electoral strength, and during that first stage the AUC was not used for electoral protection
but for clearing the department from subversive actors and alleged bases in order to stabilize
the region. Parapolitics came later.
In the pre-AUC era, paramilitary presence in Sucre was sporadic and intermittent between
1985 and 1996. During that period, private armed groups were created by drug tra*ckers
mainly linked to the Medellín Cartel, and involved with the rise of coca crops in the Bolí-
var and Córdoba departments and the creation of cocaine routes through the Morrosquillo
gulf. These paramilitary units were fragmented and rather autonomous. They lacked any
o(ensive strategy or tactics; they neither settled in the region nor did they e(ectively con-
trol the territory. They operated in small commandos with specific missions in the coastal
areas linked to the security of cocaine shipping. At that time, FARC and ELN dominated
the Montes de María and La Mojana subregions and exerted control over local economies,
especially through the diversion of public budgets, cattle theft as well as extortion and kid-
napping of rich landowners and cattle ranchers. From 1994 these paramilitary structures were
progressively embraced by rural security cooperatives – Convivir.
Although it is alleged that a first approach between the Sucreño elite and the AUC took
place in 1996when rural rich Joaquín García travelled toMedellín in order to create a paramil-
itary structure in the department, the actual “foundational” moment took place in 1997 dur-
ing a meeting of sixty members of the local establishment – including Alvaro García, and
prominent warlords of the likes of Salvatore Mancuso. All participants agreed on bringing
together the existing scattered paramilitary structures that operated in Sucre and creating an
AUC bloc, the MMHB. Rodrigo Mercado – a former Convivir member – was chosen as the
local AUCmilitary commander under the alias of “Cadena”. The bloc was created to operate
in Sucre and Bolívar (Appendixes 2 and 3), under the Northern Bloc’s (Bloque Norte) line of
command.4 Although the MMHB depended from the Northern Bloc commandership, the
4Paramilitary leaders Salvatore Mancuso and Rodrigo Tovar (alias “Jorge 40”) led the AUC expansion
throughout the Caribbean Coast region in Colombia. Its largest structure, the Northern Bloc, brought together
a wide network of local paramilitary groups that operated in an independent fashion until they were co-opted,
subordinated or subdued between 1997 and 2002. Before the Northern Bloc demobilization process started, Jorge
40 and Mancuso controlled the north of Colombia from the Sinú and San Jorge rivers’ basin in Córdoba and Su-
cre departments to the Venezuelan borders in the east. Between 1998 and 1999, Mancuso and Jorge 40 defeated
the ELN guerrilla in order to control coca crops in Bolívar. They further advanced towards the lower regions of
the Magdalena department, the city of Barranquilla and reached the rural areas of Uribia in La Guajira depart-
ment, controlling the entire drug tra*cking and smuggling strategic corridors. In late 2004, approximately 8,700
soldiers from the Northern Bloc started demobilizing in a process that ended in 2006.
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latter – as other AUC blocs – was not exactly a vertically articulated structure but a confed-
eration of warlords strongly linked to drug tra*cking, with dissimilar and at times opposite
histories, backgrounds, and interests.
Besides a special task command, the MMHB comprised three principal structures: the
Dique Canal Front (area 1 in Map 6) under “Juancho Dique’s” command that operated in
the bordering municipalities to the Dique canal in Bolívar department. The Central Bolí-
var Front (area 2) under the command of “Román Zabala” that operated in the coca crops
mid-areas of Bolívar. The Morrosquillo Gulf Front (area 3) commanded by “Cadena” that
controlled the Sucreño central and coastal areas. The MMHB had 594 combatants before its
demobilization in July 2005.
Another AUC structure, La Mojana Front (LMF), was created in 1998 in order to operate
in southern Sucre for the protection of a cocaine-processing laboratory5, under the “Ramón
Mojana” command. Its operational radius comprised the municipalities of San Benito, Caim-
ito, Guaranda, Majagual and Sucre (area 4 in Map 6). This front was created as an indepen-
dent structure from MMHB and depended directly from the Northern Bloc. Cattle ranchers
also used this AUC structure for protecting their extensive landholdings from peasant occu-
pations.6 This front demobilized 109 soldiers in 2005. Alvaro García and Joaquín García
were also involved in the creation of LMF. The then Sucre’s governor Salvador Arana -one of
García’s top men – diverted public funds for providing guns, ammunition, and other logistic
support. A key witness in Arana’s trial stated: “[when] Joaquín García asked Arana how was
he planning to get the money, Arana replied that as Sucre’s municipality mayor was close to
him, he would collaborate with the funding” (SCJ-32672, 2009). The SCJ established that
the funds came from a ghost contract for the building of an embankment. The contractor re-
ceived a 50%contract’s advance of US$20million inNovember 1998. The day after he handed
a US$14 million cheque to a paramilitary, and the rest of the money was in AUC’s hands be-
fore the end of the year. The embankment was never built. Along with other charges, Alvaro
García and Arana were later prosecuted and convicted under charges of embezzlement.
According to Ramón* (2009), the AUC had three military strategic goals in Sucre. The first
one was concentrating e(orts in San Onofre, Tolú, Toluviejo, and Ovejas municipalities in
order to control cocaine exports through the Morrosquillo gulf. The second goal was weak-
ening guerrillas and cutting their mobility and supply lines in the Montes de María region
5Salvatore Mancuso confirmed that he sent coca base from the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander and
from the south of Bolívar to La Mojana region for processing and export purposes (VerdadAbierta, 2009b).
6According to La Mojana Environmental Corporation (CORMOJANA), 95% of the subregion’s land is ac-
cumulated by 5% of registered landowners and is used for extensive stockbreeding.
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Map 6: Geographic Location of the MMHB and La Mojana Structure
5 
 
Dique canal in Bolívar department. The Central Bolívar Front (area 2) under the command of “Román 
Zabala” that operated in the coca crops mid-areas of Bolívar. The Morrosquillo Gulf Front (area 3) 
commanded by “Cadena” that controlled the Sucreño central and coastal areas. The MMHB had 594 
combatants before its demobilization in July 2005.  
 
Another AUC structure, La Mojana Front (LMF), was created in 1998 in order to operate in southern 
Sucre for the protection of a cocaine-processing laboratory5, under the “Ramón Mojana” command. Its 
operational radius comprised the municipalities of San Benito, Caimito, Guaranda, Majagual and Sucre 
(area 4 in Map 6). This front was created as an independent structure from MMHB and depended directly 
from the Northern Bloc. Cattle ranchers also used this AUC structure for protecting their extensive 
landholdings from peasant occupations.6 This front demobilized 109 soldiers in 2005. Alvaro García and 
Joaquín García were also involved in the creation of LMF. The then Sucre’s governor Salvador Arana –
one of García’s top men – diverted public funds for providing guns, ammunition, and other logistic 
support. A key witness in Arana’s trial stated: “[when] Joaquín García asked Arana how was he planning 
to get the money, Arana replied that as Sucre’s municipality mayor was close to him, he would 
collaborate with the funding” (SCJ-32672, 2009). The SCJ established that the funds came from a ghost 
contract for the building of an embankment. The contractor received a 50% contract’s advance of US$20 
million in November 1998. The day after he handed a US$14 million cheque to a paramilitary, and the 
rest of the money was in AUC’s hands before the end of the year. The embankment was never built. 













According to Ramón* (2009), the AUC had three military strategic goals in Sucre. The first one was 
concentrating efforts in San Onofre, Tolú, Toluviejo, and Ovejas municipalities in order to control 
cocaine exports through the Morrosquillo gulf. The second goal was weakening guerrillas and cutting 
their mobility and supply lines in the Montes de María region through an offensive campaign, and 
increasing the recruitment base by promoting desertion of guerrillas as well as incorporating deserter 
guerrilla members to its ranks. The third aim was expanding the AUC’s control to the areas with more 
dynamic economic activities such as La Mojana (agriculture and cattle breeding) and urban areas 
Source: Presidential High Commissioner for Peace (mapped by the author)
through an o(ensive campaign, and increasing the recruitment base by promoting desertion
of guerrillas as well as incorporating desert r guerrilla members to its ranks. e third aim
was expanding the AUC’s control to the areas with more dynamic economic activities such as
LaMojana (agriculture and cattle breeding) and urban areas (Sincelejo and Corozal) in order
to obtain economic support by extorting cattle ranchers, retailers, wholesalers, transporters,
shopkeepers and households in exchange for paramilitary protection.
The logic of territorial control of the MMHB and LMF corresponds to what González,
Bolívar, and Vásquez (2003) refer as to a “meso-regional dynamic”, that is, a dispute over the
military and political control of regions of fast economic expansion and integration to mar-
kets mainly via drug tra*c activities. The Sucre and Bolívar departments are a case in point:
the latter constitutes one of the most important areas of coca crops in northern Colombia
and a relevant cocaine export point through the Dique Canal. Sucre, although not as sig-
nificant as Bolívar, is still an important shipping point. The AUC structures in Bolívar and
Sucre had a clear division of labour vis-à-vis the illegal business: Central Bolívar Front con-
trolled coca crops, La Mojana Front controlled cocaine processing, and Dique Canal and
Morrosquillo Gulf Fronts controlled cocaine shipping. Even more interesting is the fact that
none of these structures had a cross-departmental jurisdiction, as shown in Map 6. The fact
that these were clearly contained within departmental limits suggests unambiguous political
and electoral goals, a pattern analysed below.
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Counter-insurgent campaigns: the weakening of guerrillas and the creation of geographies of
terror
The intensity of collective violence in Sucre was rather low until 1996 compared to other de-
partments in Colombia. This situation changed in the context of FARC’s and ELN’s aggres-
sive territorial expansion, and the emergence of AUC structures. Paramilitaries first settled in
the Morrosquillo gulf area, of which the municipality of San Onofre became the main oper-
ational node. FARC was concentrated in Montes de María (Map 7), and despite occasional
hit-and-run operations in other areas (extortion and kidnappings), the insurgents’ supplies,
logistics and conscription centres were located in those mountains. ELN operated in La Mo-
jana with poor mobility and scarce manpower. From 1998 MMHB and LMF contested the
control of territory with guerrillas by expanding towards the San Jorge and La Mojana sub-
regions. Montes de María – the poorest region in the department, of small to intermediate
peasant landholdings – did not provide any strategic value to the AUC in terms of financial
resources and social networks support, but constituted an area of contention of guerrillas’ pro-
gression towards the coastal areas. This explains why paramilitary operations in Montes de
María were particularly bloody. However these did not entail direct confrontation with guer-
rillas but were instead targeted against civilians through massacres and forced displacement,
as a means to weaken any social support available for guerrillas. Following Kalyvas (2006),
terror against civilians had a clear function of social control. Montes de María experienced
the most dramatic human rights abuses and humanitarian crisis in the department during
the AUC’s times. Systematic violence against civilians was a shared AUC-establishment goal,
which more than being a strategy against guerrillas, was the dominant strategy for protecting
rural rich land. On the one hand it entailed the ultimate weakening stage of the agrarianmove-
ment and on the other hand, the possibility of grabbing legally unprotected peasant small and
intermediate landholdings.
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The paramilitary o(ensive in Sucre was very e(ective in the weakening of guerrillas. In the
early 2000s, FARC had nomore than 300 combatants organized under the 35th and 37th Fronts
and ELN structures were at the verge of disappearing. On the civilian side it had devastating
e(ects. In term of homicides, the low ntensity registered between 1990 and 1995 experienced
a shift in 1998 with the dramatic increase in homicides against civilians (Figure 8). Similar
patterns can be observed in the case of massacres (Figure 9) and forcible displacement (Figure
10). It is noteworthy that the highest peaks in all cases have a temporal coincidence between
2000 and 2002. The curbing of massacr s from 2002 and of for ible displacements from 2003
suggests a success in the strategy of social control, the stabilization of land structure and the
reach of the AUC’s hegemonic military position in Sucre.
Under the monthly quota of thirty deaths imposed by “Cadena”8, at least 3,000 people
were killed and disappeared (most human remains buried in mass graves). A further 150
people were killed in 29 massacres. Over 70,000 civilians were displaced between 1997 and
2005. The most infamous massacres were perpetrated in Montes de María with a death toll
of over 100 victims. The best-known are those of El Salado (18th of February 2000) with
36 victims, Chengue (17th of January 2001) with 27 victims, and Macayepo (October 2000)
with 15 victims. The latter was clearly orchestrated by Alvaro García and Joaquín García.
8Ademobilized paramilitary told how alias “Cadena” imposed this quota and that his lieutenants had to hand
in a report everymonth. Besides the report, Cadena’smen had to bring the victims’ national ID as further evidence,
which were burnt. (Justice and Peace Public Hearing of Emiro Correa Viveros, alias “Convivir”, demobilized from
the Montes de María Heroes Bloc, January 12th, 13th and 14th 2010).
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A week before the collective killing took place the National Police intercepted a telephone
conversation inwhich JoaquínGarcía askedAlvaroGarcía to negotiatewith the departmental
MarineCorps commander thewithdrawal ofmilitary troops fromMacayepo in order to allow
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Figure 10: Forcible Displacement Perpetrated by the AUC (1997–2006)7
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the AUC incursion. Both the AGO and the SCJ established that two days before the massacre
the area was cleared of military troops facilitating the paramilitary manoeuvre.
The AUC created what Oslender (2008) calls “geographies of terror”, that is, the produc-
tion of landscapes of fear in which social relations collapse as inhabitants are massacred and
displaced. “We decided to stay right after the [Chengue] massacre. Almost everybody left
on that same day [...] we stayed because we had nowhere to go and because my daughter is
crippled [...] it’s a miracle we were not killed that day. I happened to be in Ovejas selling
cows; otherwise I would not be telling the story [...] we stayed in fear. We never slept again
thinking they would come back and kill us all [...] the town felt ghostly, one could feel the
ghosts of those who died in the massacre wandering around at night [...] we were a very close
community before but after that we just stopped communicating [...] we were like the living
dead [...] fear was too much to handle with so we finally left” (Ambrosio*, 2009).
The de-territorialisation process via forced displacement mainly sought to undermine the
peasant movement, and in this fashion terror deepened the existing social tensions over land
property. Most victims of massacres were active ANUC militants. “In the early 1990s we had
over 10,000 ANUC a*liates, but by 2002 only about 2,000 were still active”, said an ANUC
leader interviewed (Villadiego, 2009). He added: “massacres and displacements weakened
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our bases. There were also selective homicides: only in 2000, 24 ANUC a*liates were killed
by paramilitaries. Everybody left. We were left alone and stigmatized. They said we sup-
ported guerrillas but they were too blind to see the truth. We were not supporting the FARC.
I confronted FARC in many occasions because I always thought that is was not correct to use
the peasant struggle for their warring purposes”.
The infiltration of security agencies
It was during this first phase that the AUC started capturing the local state by infiltrating secu-
rity agencies. This constituted a fundamental strategic step given the AUC’s need of immunity
and impunity to operate. During the expansion process in Sucre, paramilitaries enjoyed full
support from Colonel Rodrigo Quiñónez, then commander of the Marine Corps Brigade at
Corozal with a long-standing history of human rights abuses9, and Colonel Norman Arango,
departmental police commander. Salvatore Mancuso acknowledged this situation during a
public hearing in which he accepted ordering the Colosó massacre. The warlord pointed out
that former AUC leader Carlos Castaño “...gave us a mobile number of a general or colonel
Quiñónez; he told us that if something ever happened he was the person we should contact at
all times”. He added that two days before the crime he arranged with police and military o*-
cers the clearing of the area in order to perpetrate the massacre. During his interview, Ramón*
(2009) said he was in charge of liaising with the armed forces in the region, coordinated with
the police and the military a series of selective assassinations in SanOnofre, Ovejas, Sincé and
Sincelejo and used his influence to provide his closest men with military intelligence ID cards.
The Chengue massacre case, substantiated by the AGO and the Solicitor General’s O*ce,
also reveals the ways in which a high level of cooperation was reached between the Marines
and the AUC in the region, involving Colonel Quiñónez.
The support of the military and police forces was not restricted to the counter-insurgency;
they also collaborated in the illicit drugs trade. According to “Diego Vecino”, the AUC was
supported by the Colombian Air Force and Navy: “our infiltrated people in the Navy facil-
itated us updated reports on the location of corvettes and other domestic and international
ships in order to avoid the maritime interdiction of our fast boats” (Semana, 2010b).
9In 1994, Quiñonez was investigated for the assassination of over 50 trade-union workers, politicians, and
human rights activists in Barrancabermeja (Magdalena Medio region). A military court later acquitted him.
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The accumulation logic of the AUC
The AUCwarlords’ participation in legal business was marginal in Sucre.10 To a large degree,
this limitation can be explained explained by the department’s poor economic performance.
Hence, they were heavily reliant on other available resources: drug tra*cking, rural property,
and public funds. However, during this first stage the AUC concentrated in accumulating
wealth via the cocaine market, extortion and the grabbing of rural property.
It is calculated that the MMHB’s war e(ort cost approximately US$250,000 per month.11
Although it is di*cult to estimate the AUC’s total income in Sucre, the scattered information
suggests that the income exceeded by far the maintenance of the military structure costs;
it seems clear that the surplus obtained via drug tra*c, extortion, land dispossession and
during other stages public contracting diversion fed warlords’ personal finances as well as
their political strategy.
Accumulation by violent dispossession
The economic e(ects of collective violence varied among subregions and social sectors in Su-
cre. One of the clearest direct e(ects of paramilitary violence was the deepening of the social
tensions over land property and use. The consequences were two-fold: negative for small and
intermediate producers inMontes deMaría, and positive for traditional landowners, paramil-
itaries – as the new landed elite – and for new agro-industrial investors in other subregions.
The logic of violent dispossession not only served the objectives of military control and
of social and political stabilization of the territory. It also supported the aggressive capitalist
penetration and control over areas close to cocaine shipping points. The “pacification” of
the territory forced small and intermediate agricultural producers to abandon their land or
sell it far below market prices in view of the threats and terror, and in the absence of regula-
tory mechanisms for enforcing private property rights.12 The vast majority of dispossessed
peasants were members of the ANUC who had been struggling for the land for decades. In
this regard, the humanitarian crisis generated by the forcible displacement dynamics not only
reversed the process of a more democratized access to land, but also the productive model
10“Cadena” owned some shopping centres and gasoline stations as well as he controlled the wholesale foods
market and the moto-taxi business (private motorbikes used as taxies, which constitute the most used means of
transport in urban centres in Sucre).
11According to “Diego Vecino’s” version, the MMHB’s monthly payroll was of US$150,000 (Semana, 2010a)
12In many a Colombian region, peasants have no formal land titles, and when they do, there is no existing
strong authority to watch for dubious sale contracts.
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of intensive agriculture of small and intermediate landholders. The latter was upturned by
extensive stockbreeding.
Tolú, Toluviejo and San Onofre are the municipalities with the largest number of cases
of dispossession in the Morrosquillo gulf area, as well as San Benito Abad in La Mojana
region. It has been calculated that almost 60,000 hectares were forcibly abandoned and/or
sold between 1998 and 2006 in Sucre (CNRR, 2010). This situation is not only the result of
the creation of an important drug tra*cking corridor connecting both areas, but also of the
creation of distinct electoral districts, as discussed below.
The case of La Alemania farm in Montes de María is illustrative. After years of struggle,
fifty-two peasant families created the Alemania Communitarian Company on 556 hectares
allocated by the National Agrarian Authority in 1997. In 1998, paramilitaries displaced the
families and in 2001 “Cadena” took possession of the land, looted and dismantled the farm’s
existing infrastructure and created an operational base there. While displaced in Sincelejo, the
impoverished families saw how the debt contracted with the Agrarian Bank for agricultural
production hopelessly increased. The AUC assassinated sixteen members of the Alemania
community between 1998 and 2005. In May 2010, the company’s legal representative since
2006, RogelioMartinez, was killed in Sincelejo. To date, families have not been able to recover
the land, which has been tangled up in a complex chain of front menwith legal property deeds
almost impossible to challenge. Another example is that of La Setenta farm, located in the
outskirts of San Onofre. “Cadena” grabbed the land from its owners, and through forcible
sales and displacement, he expanded La Setenta from 70 to 300 hectares in less than two
years (Lara, 2009). According to an ANUC leader interviewed, “San Onofre went from being
an agricultural territory to a cattle breeding one in very short time. The coincidence of this
phenomenon with the inrush of the AUC is clear. Nowadays only 10% of rural land has an
extension of up to 10 hectares. The rest is latifundia” (Alvarez, 2009).
The Morrosquillo gulf was easily consolidated as a cocaine shipping area since the 1980s
as the surrounding rural property was in the hands of members from the Medellín Cartel.
“DiegoVecino” and “Cadena”, who rapidlymonopolized the business, appropriated or bought
most drug tra*ckers’ properties in SanOnofre, Palmitos, Tolú, Toluviejo andCoveñas coastal
municipalities, El Palmar and Las Melenas being the most renowned. These properties be-
came barracks, operational nodes and even the site of common graveyards (El Tiempo, 2008).
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Drug tra%cking
During this first stage, the provision of private security to elites and territorial ‘cleaning’ was
complemented by the consolidation of corridors for cocaine tra*c. By 2000, the Northern
Bloc had established itself as the cartel that controlled the entire illicit drugs chain in northern
Colombia. The MMHB and La Mojana Front constituted central links in coca production
as well as in cocaine processing and exports. All the embarked alkaloid belonged to “Diego
Vecino” and “Cadena”, who controlled all the maritime routes in Sucre, and “Juancho Dique”
who controlled those in Bolívar13. The cocaine processed in the Paramillo knot (Córdoba)
and in La Mojana region was transported to El Palmar rural estate, where it was packed;
it was then sent to a camp called Matarratón and embarked to Jamaica (Justice and Peace
Public Hearing, 2010). Although it is very di*cult to calculate the AUC’s drug tra*cking
income in the region, or exactly how much cocaine was shipped, it is estimated that warlords
exported almost 35,000 kilos between 1997 and 2005 from the Morrosquillo gulf and Dique
canal (VerdadAbierta, 2009a). According to Garzón (2005), the MMHB was financially self-
su*cient when the structure demobilized in 2005 and it was almost fully financed by drug
tra*cking activities. Drug tra*cking provided the AUC a substantial financial advantage for
supporting itswar e(ort, andmost importantly themuscle for seeking political representation.
Although Sucreño politicians never became directly involved in drug tra*c, they were deeply
tolerant vis-à-vis the business.
Politics
As stated above, during this first stage, the collusion between warlords and politicians was
mainly limited to the contracting of violence.14 Only until 2002 the AUC was included in the
subnational ruling coalition.
13“Jorge 40” controlled the cocaine aerial tra*c routes in the Caribbean coast. Jorge 40 dispatched cocaine to
Venezuela in small airplanes that operated from illegal runways located in the Cesar department (Semana, 2007a).
14For the 2007 local elections, Eric Morris, one of García’s closest political partners, won the Governor’s
O*ce under rigged conditions. The fraud provided Morris 3,000 extra votes, which made him beat his opponent.
San Onofre’s Secretary of Planning and electoral witness, Georgina Narváez, publicly denounced the fraud. The
public denunciation resulted in her assassination in November 1997. The Supreme Court of Justice established
that Alvaro Garcia masterminded the crime and the AUC executed it. According to a key witness in García’s
process, “the solution was killing her because she had the evidence of vote counting [....] García and Arana said
that they had to give $10million [US$8,300] to San Onofre’s paramilitaries to kill her [...] right after that Joaquín
García let the AUC know that there were $10million available [...] after a few days the woman was assassinated”
(SCJ-32805, 2010).
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For the 1998 congressional elections, Alvaro García joined the National Progressive Move-
ment and won his first senatorial seat with 38,111 votes. His partners for the House of Rep-
resentatives, Jorge Anaya, obtained 51,736 votes, and Aníbal Monterrosa gained 37,675. For
that same year’s presidential elections, García, as it was his tradition, supported the winner.
For the first round he supported Liberal candidate Horacio Serpa but for the second round he
backed Conservative candidate Andres Pastrana, who was elected president. Regarding the
2000 local elections, Garcíawon theGovernor’sO*cewith SalvadorArana, threeDepartmen-
tal Assembly seats, and eleven mayoralties (See Figure below. The shaded areas correspond to
politicians who were later prosecuted and/or convicted for colluding with the AUC).
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took place in 2005. 
 
The aforementioned Ralito Agreement was forged in 2001 and constituted the platform for the AUC’s 
infiltration of the Legislature. Besides other Caribbean politicians, key Sucreño politicians signed it: three 
TheMerlano House got Jairo Merlano elected as Sincelejo mayor, his brother Jaime won a
seat at theDepartmental Assembly, and entered Congress for the first timewith Felipe Villegas
at the House of Representatives. Although the power of the Merlano house could never be
compared to that of the García group, it controlled Sincelejo politics until the mid 2000s. As
in the case of the García house, theMerlano group did not collude with the AUC for electoral
purposes during this period.
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The consolidation of the AUC and its inclusion in the subnational ruling coalition (2002–
2006)
Since the early 2000s, the Colombian army a d the Autodefensas had weakened guerrillas
as well as their alleged social networks in the countryside. The AUC had penetrated the
urban areas by creating its own support networks. This situationmade it increasingly di*cult
for insurgents to obtain economic resources; the lack of any sort of social support critically
undermined their networks and recruitment sources. From this point paramilitary groups
stopped using indiscriminate violence and shifted to more selective forms by targeting specific
victims15, a strategy they followed until the demobilization process took place in 2005.
The aforementioned Ralito Agreement was forged in 2001 and constituted the platform for
the AUC’s infiltration of the Legislature. Besides other Caribbean politicians, key Sucreño
politicians signed it: three mayors, two sta(ers from Ovejas and Sincelejo mayoralties, and
most importantly governor Salvador Arana Figure 13). Arana was central in this context.
According to the SCJ, he “promoted the paramilitaries’ qualitative leap to the political realm
[...] he used his influence as departmental authority in order to benefit the reproduction and
stability of the paramilitary organization [...] he signed the Ralito Agreement without any
kind of pressure” (SCJ-32672, 2009).
15One of the most dramatic cases is the assassination of Eudaldo Díaz, mayor of El Roble (one of the few
mayoralties won by the Left in Sucre). Díaz’s publicly denounced governor Arana and Alvaro García’s links with
the AUC and departmental mismanagement in a public televised meeting with President Alvaro Uribe in March
2003. “Mister President, I know I’m going to be killed for bringing all this information into the public light” said
Díaz. He was killed one month later. A key witness in former Governor Arana’s process declared that the elected
o*cial paid “Cadena” US$100,000 for assassinating Díaz. “I was there when [a ‘Cadena’ lieutenant] said: Arana
gave the order [to kill Diaz] and everything has been already paid; what are we waiting for?” President Uribe later
appointed Arana as Ambassador to Chile. In 2009, he was sentenced to 40 years of prison under charges of first-
degree murder. The former director of Sincelejo prison was convicted to 28 years of prison for her participation
in Diaz’s murder. She granted two AUC members permission to leave the premises in order to commit the crime.
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TheRalitoAgreementwas at the heart of the extraordinary expansion of politicalmachines.
Every single politician that signed it was elected or appointed in the 2002 elections with a large
number of votes, as proven by the SCJ.
Figure 13: Fragment of Ralito Agreement Signatures (facsimile)16
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The political partnership of the AUC and the García and Merlano houses emerged during the second 
stage. During this period, both political barons experienced spectacular electoral success and warlords co-
governed the department, influenced appointments and systematically preyed upon local public resources. 
Moreover, they managed to obtain an unequivocal representation in Congress for achieving political 
status and the passage of the Justice and Peace Law.  
 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of warlords in the subnational ruling coalition, García and his fellow party 
members were the actual commanders of the criminal enterprise. The SCJ argued: “political elites sealed 
a criminal alliance and the man in charge was Alvaro García” (SCJ-32805, 2010). Many people 
interviewed agreed on that “Cadena” was never recognized as commander in Sucre given his modest 
social background and disconnection with the local establishment; something similar happened with 
“Diego Vecino”.
17
 AUC commanders were therefore in charge of the dirty work, in exchange for an large 
share of public finances and some degree of co-governance, whilst politicians drew the strategic lines. A 
public official stated: “García would never follow instructions from someone like “Cadena”, who was 
illiterate and ignorant and as such he could have never entered the Sucreño political circle. García would 
refer to him as a “chimpanzee”. He did not have the stature of the likes of [AUC commanders] Mancuso 
or “Jorge 40” who belonged to Córdoba and Cesar departments’ landed elites” (Porras, 2009). According 
to a warlord, “Cadena was just a butcher from Macayepo18. He was chosen as commander because he was 
the biggest hijueputa [son of a bitch] in Sucre. García was his top boss. So were [ex-Governors] Salvador 
Arana and Eric Morris” (Ramón*, 2009). A witness in Arana’s trial stressed: “we [paramilitaries] feared 
Arana. He was very powerful. We did not dare to become involved with the organization’s civilians 
because they could kill us” (SCJ-32672, 2009). 
The electoral performance of García and Merlano houses
The political partnership of the AUC and the García andMerlano houses emerged during the
second stage. During this period, both political barons experienced spectacular electoral suc-
cess and warlords co-governed the department, influenced appointments and systematically
preyed upon local public resources. Moreover, they managed to obtain an unequivocal repre-
sentation in Congress for achieving political status and the passage of the Just ce and Peac
Law.
Notwithsta ing the inclusion of warlords in the subnational ruling coalition, García and
his fellow party members were the actual commanders of the criminal enterprise. The SCJ
argued: “political elites seale a crimina alliance and the man in charge was Alvaro García”
(SCJ-32805, 2010). Many people interviewed agreed on that “Cadena” was never recognized
as commander in Sucre given his modest social background an disconnection with the local
establishment; something similar happened with “Diego Vecino”.17 AUC commanders were
16The first signature corresponds to SalvatoreMancusowho used “Santander Losada” as one of many of noms
de guerre.
17“Diego Vecino” was born as Edward Cobos Téllez in Santander department of urban middle-class back-
ground. His family owned cattle breeding farms and where victimized by guerrillas. When he was 12 years old
M-19 guerrilla’s men shot him. In the 1990s he moved to Sucre where he became cattle-ranching manager. He
was kidnapped by FARC in 1995. In 1998 he joined the AUC and demobilized in July 2005.
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therefore in charge of the dirty work, in exchange for an large share of public finances and
some degree of co-governance, whilst politicians drew the strategic lines. A public o*cial
stated: “García would never follow instructions from someone like “Cadena”, who was illit-
erate and ignorant and as such he could have never entered the Sucreño political circle. García
would refer to him as a “chimpanzee”. He did not have the stature of the likes of [AUC com-
manders] Mancuso or “Jorge 40” who belonged to Córdoba and Cesar departments’ landed
elites” (Porras, 2009). According to a warlord, “Cadena was just a butcher fromMacayepo18.
He was chosen as commander because he was the biggest hijueputa [son of a bitch] in Sucre.
García was his top boss. So were [ex-Governors] Salvador Arana and Eric Morris” (Ramón*,
2009). A witness in Arana’s trial stressed: “we [paramilitaries] feared Arana. He was very
powerful. We did not dare to become involved with the organization’s civilians because they
could kill us” (SCJ-32672, 2009).
As pointed out before, warlords required political muscle in order to face a peace negoti-
ation process; however, there were divergent approaches to this matter within the AUC. For
most warlords, allying with traditional politicians constituted the fastest and most secure way.
For others, the goal was creating the AUC’s own politicians and reach Congress directly. This
divergence became the first factor at the heart of AUC’s internal fractures in the department.
“Diego Vecino”, believed in creating AUC’s own politicians in order to combat caciquismo
and political machines and also to have a more reliable political muscle. In this line, “Vecino”
made a strange move: he co-opted the traditionalMerlano house and used its power to launch
the AUC’s first direct candidate Muriel Benito, a conservative from San Onofre with no prior
electoral success, as discussed in a previous chapter.19 This move sought to counter-balance
the power of Alvaro García. Muriel Benito stated: “I knew ‘Diego Vecino’ was a paramilitary
in January 2002. He told me the AUC wanted to venture into politics. They wanted to have
their own candidates and they were contacting people in Sucre and Bolívar in order to know
the kind of compromise they had with their regions. He also emphasized the AUC’s interest
in a demobilization process” (Semana, 2007b). It is important to underline that, unlike the
case of the García house, which was at the base of the creation of the AUC in Sucre and was
in command of the Autodefensas, the Merlano house neither participated in the process of
paramilitary formation nor in the command line. This house was more instrumental.
18This is not in a figurative sense. “Cadena” was a butcher until 1994 when he moved to San Onofre where he
was in charge of a Convivir until 1997. In 1997 he joined the AUC.
19This odd alliance of ex-Liberals and Conservatives was not a surprise insofar as parties’ indiscipline reached
its highest peak for the 2002 elections. In Sucre, two conservative streams emerged: one of them led by García and
the other one by Merlano. In this fashion, marginal Conservatives increased their political weight by joining the
great Uribista coalition.
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The other line, that of relying on political barons, constituted the prevalent approachwithin
the AUC, and was backed by top commander Salvatore Mancuso: “we considered Caribbean
coast politicians as our ‘natural’ partners for the demobilization process. We already had mil-
itary power but we needed more political power in order to engage in a peace process with
the government. That is why we needed the support of regional elites in order to consolidate
a political project that expressed the AUC’s interests” (Semana, 2010d). He added: “creating
an AUC list for Congress would have generated a massive conflict with the owners of local
politics” (Semana, 2010d). In Sucre, “Cadena” was in favour of this strategy. García, with
his electoral success at stake because of “Diego Vecino’s” support to Merlano and Benito,
made two moves. First, he left the Progressive National Movement and joined the Demo-
cratic Colombia party – key in the Uribista coalition – for the 2002 elections, a move that
responded to the usual strategy of supporting the presidential winner. The second move was
allying with “Cadena”. García won a Senate seat again with 58,506 votes, almost doubling his
1998 vote. His partners for the House of Representatives, Jorge Luis Feris – brother of AUC
commander Salomon Feris alias “08” – obtained 53,396 votes, andMarta de Pérez 51,989. For
the 2003 local elections the house won the Governor’s O*ce with Jorge Anaya, García’s 1998
congressional partner; 4 Departmental Assembly seats, and 16 mayoralties. The house won
mayoralties where it was not traditionally strong. This is the case of La Mojana subregion:
Majagual (1,741 votes in 1998 and 3,924 in 2002); Sucre (2,929 and 4,895, respectively); San
Benito Abad (337 and 2,101); and San Marcos (3,123 and 5,524).






Although Sucre’s case of atypical voting (above 50% of votes for a specific candidate) and conformation 
of “paramilitary electoral districts” was never as striking as those of Magdalena and Cesar departments 
(Losada, 2006), it can be observed in Map 8 below that Congressional voting for García and Feris was 
strong in almost the same municipalities where the tandem won. Nevertheless, atypical voting patterns do 
not coincide. Where García obtained the largest number of votes, Feris’s voting was atypical and vice-
versa. García obtained atypical voting in Buenavista (71% of the total voting), and in Sucre (59%). Feris 
had atypical results in Buenavista and Majagual, with 52 and 57% of total votes respectively. 
 
 
Map 8 – Alvaro García and Jose Luis Feris’ voting for 2002 congressional elections 
 
Source: National Registry Office (mapped by the author) 
 
 
On the side of the Merlano house, the co-optation by the AUC represented its electoral consolidation not 
only in its traditional stronghold, Sincelejo with Jaime Merlano as mayor, but in municipalities where it 
did not have any prior political strength: San Pedro, Ovejas, and most importantly, in San Onofre where 
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Although Sucre’s case of atypical voting (above 50% of votes for a specific candidate) and
conformation of “paramilitary electoral districts”was never as striking as those ofMagdalena
and Cesar departments (Losada, 2006), it can be observed in Map 8 below that Congres-
sional voting for García and Feris was strong in almost the same municipalities where the
tandem won. Nevertheless, atypical voting patterns do not coincide. Where García obtained
the largest number of votes, Feris’s voting was atypical and vice-versa. García obtained atyp-
ical voting in Buenavista (71% of the total voting), and in Sucre (59%). Feris had atypical
results in Buenavista and Majagual, with 52 and 57% of total votes respectively.
Map 8: Alvaro García and Jose Luis Feris’ voting for 2002 congressional elections
Source: National Registry O*ce (mapped by the author)
On the side of the Merlano house, the co-optation by the AUC represented its electoral
consolidation not only in its traditional stronghold, Sincelejo with Jaime Merlano as mayor,
but in municipalities where it did not have any prior political strength: San Pedro, Ovejas, and
most importantly, in San Onofre where the house concentrated 57.35% of votes. Jairo Mer-
lano, who joined the Radical Change party, was elected Senator with 41,071 and his partner
and AUC candidate, conservative Muriel Benito won a Representative seat with 44,365 votes.
Map 9 below shows that Merlano and Benito had the majority of votes in the same munic-
ipalities, which confirms the pressure exerted by the AUC in these places for people to vote
Merlano and Benito in tandem. Although in Merlano’s case no atypical voting was regis-
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Figure 15: Jairo Merlano Power Structure (2002–2003)
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Map 9 below shows that Merlano and Benito had the majority of votes in the same municipalities, which 
confirms the pressure exerted by the AUC in these places for people to vote Merlano and Benito in 
tandem. Although in Merlano’s case no atypical voting was registered, Benito won her seat with 67.72% 
in San Onofre, a striking result for a newcomer with no electoral background at all.  
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The paramilitary-led electoral process of 2002 generated a strong feedback in the 2003 local elections. As 
shown in Map 10 below, the latter exhibited strong atypical voting patterns, which tend to coincide with 
those municipalities where atypicality was identified in 2002. For the gubernatorial election, Jorge Anaya 
had an overwhelming triumph over the other candidates. His voting was atypical (over 60%) in seven 
municipalities. For mayoralties, Majagual elected mayor won with 85.79% of voting; San Marcos’ with 
61.92%; San Pedro’s with 59.48%; and Sucre with 62.96%. The case of San Onofre deserves a special 
mention insofar as besides the striking atypicality of 77.86%, it was a single candidate case: Jorge Blanco 
Fuentes, the second AUC-made candidate. The atypical patterns in the mayoral elections tend to coincide 
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Map 10 – Atypical Patterns - 2003 Mayoral and Gubernatorial Elections 
tered, Benito won her seat with 67.72% in San Onofre, a striking result for a newcomer with
no electoral background at all.
Map 9: Jairo Merlano and Muriel Benito voting for 2002 congressional elections
Source: National Registry O*ce (mapped by the author)
The paramilitary-led electoral process of 2002 generated a strong feedback in the 2003 lo-
cal elections. As shown in Map 10 below, the latter exhibited strong atypical voting patterns,
which tend to coincide with those municipalities where atypicality ident fied in 2002. For
the gubernatorial election, Jorge Anaya had an overwhelming triumph over the other can-
didates. His voting was atypical (over 60%) in seven municipalities. For mayoralties, Ma-
jagual electe mayor won with 85.79% of voting; San Marcos’ with 61.92%; San P dro’s
with 59.48%; and Sucre with 62.96%. The case of San Onofre deserves a special mention in-
sofar as besides the striking atypicality of 77.86%, it was a single candidate case: Jorge Blanco
Fuentes, the secondAUC-made candidate. The atypical patterns in themayoral elections tend
to coincide with those of gubernatorial elections.
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Map 10: Atypical Patterns – 2003Mayoral and Gubernatorial Elections
Source: National Registry O*ce (mapped by the author)
All municipalities that experienced atypical electoral results had hegemonic AUC influence
and there is su*cient judicial and journalistic evidence that demonstrates that most winner
candidates colluded with warlords in order to maximize votes. Moreover, the patterns of
“illegal” electoral districts where Senate and House of Representative candidates were elected
in tandem are clear, as shown inMaps 8, 9 and 10. For the 2002 and 2003 elections the levels of
electoral participation were significantly above the national average and void and null votes
were well below thereof. According to the main electoral watchdog in Colombia20, in all
municipalities with atypical voting two mechanisms were used: the paper ballots handed to
electors were already marked, or the results were altered during the count. Paramilitaries
worked thorough electoral rolls and retained national ID cards in each influencedmunicipality
in order to control the voting.
San Onofre: the recipe for success
The main strategy for the spectacular electoral results of political houses was a blending of
terror and fraud. The case of San Onofre illustrates the strategy at its best. Peasant orga-
20Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE).
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nizations were closed down, and ANUC leaders had to meet in Sincelejo with great secrecy.
Every single household and business was extorted. Public o*cials had to give a monthly share
from their salaries. “Cadena” imposed a curfew during two years, under which after 6 pm no
one could transit or fish because at that time the maritime routes for the narcotics trade were
activated.
Rural estates seized by warlords were used as concentration and torture camps. The most
renowned case is that of El Palmar. There was a huge rubber tree to which “Cadena” tied
detainees for days; a torture room called “the last tear”, and a crematorium.21 To date, over
a hundred skeletons have been put together from mortal remains found in mass graves. “Ca-
dena” was also known for his binges: he treated politicians and cattle ranchers with smug-
gled champagne and whiskey, prostitutes, live music and banquets. He also organized beauty
pageants in El Palmar – Muriel Benito was member of the jury on several occasions – and
participants were sexually abused. A young girl interviewed said “my friend ‘X’ was one of
‘Cadena’s’ girlfriends. She won one of his beauty pageants once. He would give him presents
every day: gold chains, cuddly toys, and perfumes. She even got a motorbike. No one dared
to look at her. “Cadena” was crazy jealous. ‘X’ convinced me to participate in one of the
pageants with the promise of finding myself a nice and rich boyfriend [...] they gave us lots
of alcohol and everything turned really bad [...] three men raped me for almost a week and
tied me up to a huge tree there [...] I was almost dead when they put me in the back of a truck
and threw me somewhere along the road. I remained in hospital for weeks [...] I was told that
my father and my brother were disappeared. I heard they went to El Palmar to look for me
and never came back home. My mother goes there every day there to see if their remains have
been found in the mass graves” (Paola*, 2009).
The terror regime – with 330 homicides and 17,660 forcibly displaced peasants between
2000 and 2006 – made San Onofre a fertile ground for electoral manipulation and coercion.
According to a communal leader interviewed, “for the 2002 elections, San Onofre’s commu-
nities were completely terrorized so it was easy to force their voting. They had to vote for
Alvaro Uribe, Muriel [Benito] and Merlano. In 2003 it was the same. People were forced to
vote for Anaya and Jorge Blanco [elected mayor]. All of them were imposed by the AUC [...]
people were picked up in trucks in neighbourhoods and rural areas and were massively taken
to Plan Parejo County, where they were told that they had to vote for Merlano and Muriel
21I had the opportunity of visiting El Palmar rural estate during my fieldwork in November 2009. It is under
property recovery process and has a permanent forensic team assigned for the recovery of remains found in several
common graves waiting to be identified.
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Benito [...] ‘Cadena’ put papers with the names of all town councillors in a bag. He took two
and said he was going to kill them if Muriel did not win” (Lara, 2009).
The co-government of warlords
For the 2003 local elections, Jorge Anaya paid “Cadena” US$670,000, diverted from public
contracting, in order to support his campaign for the Governor’s O*ce (SCJ-31943, 2009); as
stated above, he won an overwhelming victory. In exchange, “Cadena” had his brother-in-law
appointed as departmental Secretary of Education, and one of his front men as Secretary of
Finance. Once in o*ce, both secretaries systematically extorted employees and contractors.
The funds were shared with “Cadena” and Anaya (SCJ-31943, 2009). “Cadena” also sup-
ported Departmental Assembly deputies Angel Villarreal, Johnny Villa, Nelson Stanp and
Walberto Estrada. “Vecino” stated: “Cadena and I brought these guys to the Departmental
Assembly and we had the largest voting in 2003. We made Stanp the Assembly’s President”
(Semana, 2010b). Something similar happened in San Onofre. As soon as he took o*ce,
Mayor Jorge Blanco removed all appointed o*cials from o*ce in order to appoint paramili-
tary quotas. By the time I did my fieldwork in 2009, dismissed o*cials had neither been able
to claim their work benefits nor their severance pay. A similar story happened to the local
hospital workers.
During this second stage the AUC heavily influenced and diverted the flow of public ex-
penditure. Elected and appointed politicians supported by paramilitaries supplied the AUC
with strategic information about contracting and contractors as well as they dealt with all the
legal matters involved. Twelve Sucreñomunicipalities were identified as part of the Northern
Bloc’s public contract “taxation” network system.22 In all municipalities almost 80% of pub-
lic contracting was done via direct contracting and not by bidding. Most direct contractors
were paramilitary frontmenwho diverted over 30%of the total cost from each public contract
to the AUC (Foro Nacional por Colombia, 2008).
Oil royalties became the main AUC target. As mentioned before, these resources have con-
stituted the major source of political and fiscal instability in the Morrosquillo gulf subregion.
Despite the fact that Sucre received substantial royalties of over US$1 billion between 2001
and 200523, their systematic predation via ghost contracting; payment of unfinished public
works; duplication of the value of contracts within two years; and no internal control or clear
22The Northern Bloc’s “taxation” strategy in the Caribbean coast departments involved over 100 municipali-
ties (Semana, 2008a).
23Source: National Royalties O*ce.
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accounting systems left Tolú and Coveñas fiscally broke and with unsatisfied basic needs of
almost 57%. In Tolú, the local public debt in 2005 amounted to USD50 million, of which
almost USD11.5 million were subject of irregular contracts. Two mayors, three town coun-
cillors and several contractors who opposed corrupt practices were assassinated during that
period. In turn, Coveñas has had 13mayors between 1996 and 2009, all involved in corruption.
None of them remained in o*ce for more than a year. Luis Alberto Guevara, a prominent so-
cial leader was assassinated in 2006 after publicly denouncing corruption and irregularities in
public contracting and the linkages between local politicians and “Jorge 40”. It is known that
local contractors obtained a percentage of the total cost of the projects by lending the AUC
their companies’ names. Contractors also obtained a share by signing the contract after which
they either transferred it to MMHB frontmen or handed all the money to paramilitaries. A
large share of these municipalities’ budgets fed the co(ers of MMHB and the Northern Bloc,
whilst most of the public works contracted during that period were never concluded and some
did not even started. According to the General Accounting O*ce, just for 2003 the MMHB
embezzled over USD1 million from Coveñas’ budget only in ghost contracting and the local
authorities justified those transfers in the categories of services and acquisitions.24
“Vecino” revealed that they created a firm called Coopsabana for auditing public works’
contracts in Coveñas, Tolú, Toluviejo, San Antonio de Palmitos and San Onofre, and that
the firm’s creation was also orchestrated by the respective mayors. According to the warlord,
Coopsabana ended up being “the worst public budget bleeding factor [...] we contracted the
Coveñas aqueduct but you cannot have a single glass of drinkable water there”, and that very
soon the firm became the main public works contractor in the subregion (Semana, 2010a).
A local NGO director interviewed stressed that the mayors of Coveñas, Tolú, Toluviejo, San
Antonio de Palmitos and SanOnofre created an association of municipalities25 in 2004, which
was used tomagnify the scale of contract diversion in theMorrosquillo gulf subregion: “think
about an average contract of US$800,000. In the best of cases, they would only adequately
spent US$500,000 and divert the remaining percentage. As for the rest, ghost contracting was
the rule” (Hernández, 2009). It is noteworthy thatCoopsabana audited contracts in the same
municipalities of the association.
24Among the categories of services and acquisition used to divert public resources, the General Accounting
O*ce found: solid residues and management, acquisition of uniforms, printing of IDs for meddlers, transform-
ers’ supplies, civil works’ contract auditing, latrine construction, administrative consultancy, creation of public
services companies, environmental management plans, local hospital infrastructure adjustment, among others
(Semana, 2010a).
25The association of municipalities is a legal figure meant for generating economies of scale in public invest-
ment.
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Another strategy was the diversion of the central government transfers to the indigenous
reservation of San Andrés de Sotavento (Palmito, Sampués and Sincelejo municipalities).26
“Vecino” and “Cadena” in alliance with mayors and indigenous captains diverted these re-
sources for buying cattle. The operation consisted in stealing cattle in Montes de María sub-
region, transporting the animals to the Morrosquillo gulf area and hiding them in Cadena’s
rural properties in San Onofre. AUC’s frontmen negotiated the sale of the stolen cattle in
public bids where the Palmito, Sampués and Sincelejo administrations bought the livestock
from the indigenous communities. The business was extraordinarily profitable: municipali-
ties bought each stolen animal at twice its market value27; indigenous captains and mayors
were given a share. According to a demobilized AUC member, “Cadena” financed these may-
ors’ campaigns as well as he hosted parties for the indigenous captains: “he treated them as
kings [...] he used to say ‘I am going to civilize these people by giving them clothes, watches,
and even little mirrors, as in the Colonial times” (Justice and Peace Public Hearing, 2010).
Another case is that of the University of Sucre, the institution with the second largest bud-
get in the department, a factor that made it a political stronghold with a long history of
corruption. According to a student leader, “in Sucre even students’ elections are corrupted.
For the last elections each vote cost US$20. Yahir Acuña28 was the one buying the votes”
(Dairo*, 2009). A former Vice-chancellor candidate remembers: “I went to the house of one
of the University’s Board of Directors members in order to discuss my appointment [...] to
my surprise [Yahir] Acuña was there along with physicianWiller Cobo and Humberto Frazer
[AUC’s frontmen in charge of extorting local administrations]. There was a rifle next to Cobo
and I thought, what am I doing here? I simply cannot do this. The university was completely
infiltrated by the AUC. I did not accept the appointment” (Daniel*, 2009). The person who
was later appointed as Vice-Chancellor, Rafael Peralta, was found guilty of diverting US$6.6
million to the AUC, for appointing seven members of his family to positions at the university,
and for irregular student admission processes (El Heraldo, 2009).
26The San Andrés de Sotavento reservation also comprises the municipalities of Purísima, Momil, Chimá, Sa-
hagún y Chinú in Córdoba department. It is estimated that 85,420Zenú indigenous people live in the reservation.
27Between 2000 and 2005 over 30members of this communitywere assassinated: somewere killed for opposing
the business and the others -participants – for settling of scores (VerdadAbierta, 2010b).
28Yahir Acuna is currently Sucre’s Representative, former departmental assembly member and former student
leader. He will be mentioned later in this chapter.
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The social front for peace: crisis and shift in the AUC strategy
The 2002 and 2003 elections allowed the political consolidation of the AUC in the department.
Warlords’ interests were successfully represented in Congress. Muriel Benito told the press:
“after I got elected I met him [“Vecino”] again in Bogotá at the end of 2002. By that time the
first drafts of the Justice and Peace law project were circulating and he was really interested in
discussing this matter” (Semana, 2007b). In 2005, the lawwas enacted and without exception,
all elected Congress members from Sucre voted for the law.
Before the 2006 elections the AUC’s internal fractures increased in Sucre. It is worth re-
membering that “Vecino” and “Cadena” had divergent views on the ways of seeking political
representation. “Vecino” stated post-demobilization that after 2003 “Cadena” led a coup
d’état against him in order to feed his personal financial greed: he depleted public co(ers in
alliance with the García house but gave very little of it to the organization. According to “Ve-
cino”, this explains why politics in Sucre became “too degraded, too dirty” (Semana, 2010b).
“Cadena” got along with his own personal project, mostly because he was strongly backed by
the García house. As long as “Cadena” delivered votes and money, politicians did not care
about the AUC’s internal struggles. Politicians were in charge of everything; they were the
real commanders. However, the coup d’état put “Cadena” in an internal di*cult situation,
mostly with Northern Bloc commander “Jorge 40”.
In July 2005, 700men-at-arms from theMMHBwere demobilized. “Cadena”mysteriously
disappeared during the demobilization process. It is said that “Jorge 40” – one of the last AUC
warlords to demobilize – ordered his assassination and sought to rapidly fill the vacuum left by
theMMHBdemobilization and “Cadena’s” disappearance. For this purpose, he delegated the
control of Bolívar and Sucre to two of his closest lieutenants, “Don Antonio” and “Gonzalo”.
In 2006, the AUC launched the so-called “Social Front for Peace”. The Front represented
the AUC’s qualitative political leap in the Caribbean region. The aim was to legitimize the
political project of demobilized warlords: although they still sought to use the leverage of
García andMerlano houses, theywanted to promote their own politicians by reaching a broad
consensus in Sucre and Bolívar and not by resorting to sheer violence and intimidation. This
explains to a great extent why “Jorge 40’s” demobilization took longer. Warlords had to
secure their political future in the Caribbean region.
In 2006, the Colombian authorities confiscated a laptop belonging to “Jorge 40” with in-
formation that was central for the judicial substantiation of the Sucreño parapolitics trials.
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The most important pieces of evidence were a series of recorded meetings that took place in
January 2006, prior to that year’s electoral process. The recordings revealed that “Jorge 40”,
under the divide et impera logic, sought to take advantage of the existing political strife be-
tween Alvaro García (whose partner for the House of Representatives was Eric Morris) and
Jairo Merlano (with Muriel Benito) in order to start giving room to the AUC’s own polit-
ical project. The objective was continuing to use Garcia’s influence, but concentrating on
supporting Jairo Merlano. This time they did not support Vecino’s protégée Muriel Benito,
but instead they backed their own politician, Conservative Antonio Martínez as Merlano’s
partner (Semana, 2006a).
One of the recordings clarifies the nature and reach of the Social Front for Peace. “Don
Antonio” said: “from the seven departments we control in the Caribbean coast, I can say that
our political work is particularly solid in Sucre. That is not the case of Bolívar where we are
militarily stronger but we still have a longway to go in politics. I reckon Sucre is ours; hundred
per cent sure [...] Sucre was in chaos but once we started working there we sent the message
that things were going to change [...] We are demobilized now but that does not mean we have
lost the political power because this power is what’s going to project us into the future [...]
“Vecino” coerced people to vote for Muriel [Benito] but we are no longer letting him do this.
He’s demobilized now. It is fine for me if people vote for Muriel because she’s an excellent
politician, but not because people are forced to do so [...] politics cannot be done with guns
[...] we have to promote ideas and projects. That’s the politics I am interested on now. I used
to be on the military side and did not know shit about politics. Now I am learning. This is
the line we have to follow now” (Semana, 2006c). In another recordedmeetings paramilitaries
and politicians discuss the distribution of electoral support, the taxation of public contracting,
and again, the nature of the political project (Appendix 4).
For the 2006 elections, Alvaro García left the Progressive National Movement and joined
the Democratic Colombia party, supporting again Alvaro Uribe’s candidacy for presidential
re-election. García won a seat in Congress again – his last one – with 52,014 votes. His part-
ners Eric Morris – ex-Governor – and Gabriel Espinoza entered the House of Representatives
with 33,365 and 33,794 votes, respectively. Although this time García’s votes did not surpass
his 2002 result, he and his partners recorded the largest number of votes in Sucre. García domi-
nated in Sampués, Los Palmitos, Colosó, La Unión, Sincé, El Roble, Morroa andGaleras with
voting of over 30%; the highest concentration was in Sampués, Galeras and Colosó. However,
unlike 2002 elections, this time no atypical voting patterns were registered.
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The 2007 local elections proved the biggest success for the García house. This time, besides
winning again the Governor’s O*ce with Jorge Barraza, García won six Departmental As-
sembly seats and 22 mayoralties. Although there is no evidence of paramilitary coercion or
fraud, the triumph of the García house was linked with alleged electoral fraud, a technique
traditionally mastered by Alvaro García.29
Figure 16: Alvaro García’s Power Structure (2006–2007)
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The Merlano house won a senatorial seat with Jairo Merlano (41,257 votes), who moved
from Radical Change to the U Party. However, his 2002 partner Muriel Benito was not suc-
cessful, a foreseeable outcome given “Diego Vecino’s” demobilization and “Jorge 40’s” lack
of support. By then she was already being investigated for her links with the AUC. Merlano
had three partners for the Hous of Representatives, of whom only one was elected: Jairo
Fernández. Antonio Martínez (“Gonzalo’s” candidate) and Nasly Ucrós did not succeed.
The Guerra house returned to the political arena after being fully displaced by the AUC.30
Antonio Guerra entered the Uribista coalition (Radical Change) and won a senatorial seat
29For the Governor’s O*ce elections, García’s candidate was competing with Julio César Guerra. The polls
pointed Guerra as the winner; however, an alleged fraud made Barraza become the last minute winner. Electoral
witnesses also confirmed fraud in Sucre, Los Palmitos, Ovejas and San Onofre; “in Sucre, even the dead voted”,
one of them said.
30It is to note however that the Guerra family displacement from the electoral arena happened only in Sucre.
In the neighbouring Córdoba department they kept being strong as well as at the national level. Uribe’s former
Minister of Telecommunications was María del Rosario Guerra, daughter of the patriarch José Guerra Tulena
and sister of Antonio Guerra.
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with 16,763 votes. His uncle Julio César Guerra ran for the Governor’s o*ce but lost due to
Alvaro García’s support to his candidate Jorge Barraza through alleged elect ral fraud.
The paramilitary muscle provided great success to political houses again. Nonetheless, the
ambitious Social Front for Peace project did not materialize. There are two reasons that ex-
plain this situation. First, the organi ation was almost fully demobilized by then and was
significantly exposed to the public light, mostly because of the concerns about the reach of
the Justice and Peace Law. Second, there was already an on g ing public debate on the phe-
nomenon of parapolitics, many politicians names were involved, and the judicial system was
starting the investigations, including the Social Front for Peace connections. However, there
are other explanations at play, related to the subnational political mechanics and to the situ-
ation of politicians vis-à-vis paramilitarism. Even if “Jorge 40” sought to make his frontmen
elected and appointed, bypassing traditional politicians and machines was out of the ques-
tion at this stage. They were the ones with the connections and the clienteles. Paramilitaries
were indeed central in the García andMerlano houses extraordinary electoral success over the
last decade. In return, politicians allowed warlords co-governing the department and feeding
their personal greed; moreover, politicians represented paramilitaries’ interests at the highest
level and gave them what they wanted. However, as stated before, politics came first. The
García and Merlano houses existed before the AUC era and were robust enough to control
the region-centre linkages without resorting to violence. Moreover, in the case of Sucre, politi-
cians were never subordinate to paramilitary power. On the contrary, they were the ones who
orchestrated paramilitary formation, as well as created and commanded the advantageous
criminal political network. “Jorge 40” sought to have his first elected Governor, but failed.
Alvaro García imposed Jorge Barraza. The warlord candidate for the House of Representa-
tives, Conservative Antonio Martinez, attracted few votes and was not elected to Congress.
Even if both sides of the alliance were subject to the action of justice, it is possible to stress
that at the end politicians won, mostly the García house. Although García was convicted to
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40 years of prison, he managed to keep his machinery working from jail. Something similar
has happened to the Merlano house. Paramilitaries met a more bitter end.
unveiling the criminal enterprise
The shift in key agencies at the subnational level
From 2003, an open o(ensive against guerrillas and paramilitaries was launched by the na-
tional government in the Montes de María region, a situation that completely changed the
military-paramilitary balance in the department. The new military and police commander-
ship, Colonels Rafael Colón and Rodolfo Palomino, respectively, proved unsympathetic to the
AUC. A military o*cer interviewed stressed: “before 2003, it was clear that both theMarines
and the police supported the paramilitary expansion in Sucre. Their support was crucial
for AUC consolidation [...] their commitment with the AUC proved harmful for the armed
institutions. Operationally they were implacable with guerrillas but protective of the paramil-
itaries [...] police Colonel Arango was a bandit” [...] the victims of the massacres committed
during those years were not insurgents. They were unarmed peasants [...] when this all be-
gan Sucreño society was a slave to paramilitaries. When Colón arrived, people started talking
and collaborating with the authorities. This change was central for investigating paramilitary
crimes and the finding of mass graves in El Palmar” (Daniel*, 2009).
Regarding the judicial system at the subnational level, the evidence also demonstrates the
resilience of the departmental Attorney’s O*ce to infiltration and capture. On the 29th of Au-
gust 2002, departmental attorney Yolanda Paternina and two subordinates were assassinated
in Sincelejo. She had been thoroughly substantiating the Chengue massacre investigation
against 80 AUC members involved.
The Attorney General’s O%ce and the Supreme Court of Justice
Sucre was the first case of parapolitics exposed in the public light. InMay 2005, Left wing Rep-
resentative Gustavo Petro led a public debate in Congress in which he denounced the “Sucre
connection” and constituted the starting point of what became the AGO and the SCJ central
task for the years to come, and unveiled an avalanche of collusion cases in many departments.
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The once solid alliance between politicians and warlords started experiencing a serious
breach of trust, insofar as two converging – yet independent – judicial roads were being fol-
lowed. On the one hand, investigations and trials against politicians and on the other hand
the processing of AUC ex-combatants under the Justice and Peace jurisdiction. The attitude
of exposed politicians vis-à-vis the accusationswas denial and hence a complete lack of collab-
oration in revealing the truth. In turn, AUC warlords, feeling betrayed by their former allies,
and given the complications that emerged in the framework of the Justice and Peace Law as
well as under the extradition treaty with the U.S., started to provide valuable information re-
garding the alliances through various documents and explosive interviews. The situation was
further aggravated by the attitude of President Uribe’s administration, which was publicly
interpreted as one of complicity with its Congressional coalition.
Sucre is to date the department with the highest number of elected and appointed o*cials
involved in parapolitics: 4 Senators, 6 Representatives and 36 locally elected and appointed
o*cials (Appendix 5). The second-worst case is that of the Magdalena department in the
Caribbean coast with a total of 19 parapoliticians.
The García House
The sentences against García and Arana are unique in the universe of the parapolitics pro-
cesses. They were convicted to 40 years of prison under charges of plot to commit crime,
first-degree murder and embezzlement. The García house brought the collusion to its high-
est level: for the first time in Colombian judicial history politicians have been sentenced for
being responsible of crimes against humanity. García was held responsible for the Macayepo
massacre and the assassination of an electoral witness in San Onofre. Salvador Arana was
convicted for the murder of El Roble’s mayor in 2003. In January 2011, a new trial against
him was initiated, accused of diverting public funds.
Eric Morris was the first politician to be convicted for collusion with paramilitary groups
in Colombia. He was sentenced to six years of prison in 2007 for promoting, arming and
financing illegal armed groups, and plotting to commit crime by using o*cial position and
public resources. In his case, the SCJ stated “he is one of the main men responsible of promot-
ing the paramilitary organization in Sucre in a progressive scale” (SCJ-26118, 2007). Morris’
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alternate at theHouse of Representatives, JoséMaría Conde31was also accused of first-degree
homicide plot and sentenced to 5 years of prison.32
Jorge Anaya was sentenced to seven years and six months of prison under charges of first-
degree plot to commit crime. According to the SCJ, “the behaviour of Anaya demonstrates his
clear belonging to the AUC [...] his relationship with the AUC did not stop once Anaya was
elected but on the contrary it lasted throughout the time he remained at o*ce” (SCJ-31943,
2009).
Departmental Assembly deputies Angel Villarreal, JohnnyVilla,Walberto Estrada andNel-
son Stanp got sentences of six years each under charges of promoting the paramilitary orga-
nization in Sucre. According to the Sincelejo Criminal Court, “they undertook the task of
directing the AUCmilitancy with the strongest conviction of paramilitary principles [...] they
were responsible for the AUC support to governor Anaya” (SCC-2007–00016–00, 2007). All
mayors and town councillors involved were sentenced between six and eight years of prison
for supporting the AUC and under charges of embezzlement.
Piedad Zuccardi, Alvaro García’s sister-in-law and political baroness from the Bolívar de-
partment, is being investigated for parapolitics in Bolívar department and is being trialled
since March 2013 by the SCJ.
The Merlano House
Muriel Benito was sentenced to six years of prison in 2008 for being electorally supported by
the AUC. She was the only Sucreño politician to acknowledge links with “Vecino”; hence she
obtained an significant reduction of almost half of the sentence.
A Bogotá Court first acquitted Jairo Merlano in 2008. Nonetheless, the GAO appealed
the sentence, arguing strong evidence of the electoral support provided by the AUC. Merlano
was finally convicted by the SCJ to eight years of prison. His son Carlos Eduardo, who was
elected at the House of Representatives after his father was being trialled, is currently trialled
for parapolitics by the SCJ.
31Conde replaced Morris when he resigned to his seat because of his legal situation.
32 Conde is being held responsible for planning the assassination of Victor Ramírez from the Left party Demo-




All warlords went behind bars – excepting for “Cadena” who was allegedly murdered during
the demobilization process. Salvatore Mancuso, AUC General Sta( commander, and “Jorge
40”, Northern Bloc commander were extradited to the U.S. inMay 2008 under charges of drug
tra*cking. “Ramon Mojana” was extradited under identical charges in December 2009.
A U.S. court has thoroughly requested the extradition of “Diego Vecino” but the SCJ has
systematically opposed it on the grounds of his collaboration with the Justice and Peace sys-
tem. According to the Court, “the seriousness of crimes committed abroad cannot be com-
pared with that of massacres, forcible disappearance, torture, and forcible displacement com-
mitted by paramilitaries” (VerdadAbierta, 2010c). Last June, he and “Juancho Dique” were
the first AUCwarlords sentenced under the Justice and Peace jurisdiction. Eachwas convicted
to eight years of prison – the maximum sentence allowed by the transitional law – after they
accepted their responsibility in many crimes.
State security agents
Based upon the available evidence on the Chengue massacre, the Solicitor General’s O*ce
sanctioned Colonel Quiñónez, and other two o*cers and five sub-o*cers. However, the
AGO precluded the penal investigation by arguing that no convincing proof of collusion with
paramilitaries was found in the trial. It was also found that the information contained in the
police register books about the time where the paramilitary trucks were seen was altered. In
2007 the Attorney General’s O*ce found strong evidence to accuse Colonel Norman Arango
from the National Police, another o*cer and two sub-o*cers.
the post-parapolitics era
It is clear that Sucre has to a great extent overcome collective violence and for many Sucreños
the department is going through a “post-conflict” stage. Despite the re-emergency of paramil-
itary structures, paramilitary violence has been considerably curbed with the demobilization
of the AUC, and guerrillas have been significantly weakened.
Nonetheless, the department is facing a dead calm period rather than a post-conflict situa-
tion. According to Father Rafael Castillo, “Sucre is experiencing a disturbing transition. The
conflict is not yet over and warring actors are re-accommodating. All the conditions for reac-
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tivating collective violence are given: the ways of making politics, the tensions over land, and
an extremely weak society” (Castillo, 2009). The “pacification” of Sucre is to a considerable
extent attributable to the delegation of security to private agents. Although paramilitaries
were not able to militarily defeat guerrillas, they were successful in removing their alleged so-
cial bases, which ended up in the dismantling of the peasant movement. On the whole, FARC
and ELN were considerably weakened not only by paramilitary action but also by the state’s
o(ensive from 2003, and withdrew toMontes deMaría areas. Although insurgents have tried
to fill the vacuum left by the AUC, they no longer have the military strength and lack the
social support to succeed in this objective.33 This explains the dramatic increase in the use of
landmines by guerrillas. The fact that the department also became one of the most important
operational theatres for the national government since 2003, made the Morrosquillo gulf lose
its relevance as a drug tra*cking point. It is no longer the free harbour it used to be at the end
of the 1990s. The activities are now concentrated in Córdoba and Urabá region in Antioquia.
A new paramilitary structure called “Banda de los 40” emerged in the Caribbean coast de-
partments during the post-demobilization time, allegedly under alias “Salomón”, lieutenant
of Jorge 40.34 “There is an evident breakup between the AUC and these new structures. The
judicial prosecution of regional elites frustrated the AUC continuity. What we have now are
typical organized crime structures; not paramilitaries”, a Sucreño academic pointed out.35
Unlike the AUC, this structure lacked political drive, hence its emphasis on drug tra*cking.
In fact, there is no evidence of paramilitary interference in electoral processes after 2007. The
“Banda” mainly taxed cocaine shipments and collected related debts through the so-called
debt-collecting o*ces. The gang reached almost 200 members in 2007. It is calculated that
in Sucre the group operated with 27 people of whom at least six were former members of
public security forces. The fact that the underlying crime in Sucre prior to the AUC emer-
gence was feeble made the “Banda de los 40” subject to contestation by external stronger
organized crime structures. The much-feared Envigado debt-collecting o*ce from Medellín
and the Múnera clan from Arauca department sought to control the Morrosquillo gulf drug
tra*cking activities. The outcome was a ferocious war – it is calculated that almost 50% of
homicides perpetrated in Sucre between 2006 and 2009 are related to this dynamic – leading
33Public schools in Sincelejo have become targets for illegal armed groups’ recruitment. Students are invited
to go the southern departments in the country, where FARC is still a strong actor. In other cases, the youngsters
are o(ered to go to Córdoba department in order to protect coca crops by re-emerging paramilitary structures.
34Since Jorge 40’s extradition, “La Banda de los 40” su(ered an accelerated process of decomposition. The
Múnera brothers, known as Los Mellizos, who commanded an AUC structure in Arauca department, as well as
“Don Berna” the AUC leader in Medellín took over the group, seeking to control the drug tra*cking businesses




to the “Banda’s” disappearance. Nowadays, The Envigado o*ce controls the cocaine trade
from the gulf.
Politics was no longer influenced by paramilitaries after the 2007 elections. Cash votes
replaced bullets in Sucre. A person from SanOnofre said: “now they give us things, not bullets,
and treat us right. At least there is more flexibility for elections. In the past, candidates were
imposed with violence” (Semana, 2006b). Also, candidates started to proliferate in Sucre:
according to the National Register O*cer, the number of candidates to mayoralties went
to 77 in 2003 to 142 in 2007. A similar situation was experienced during the 2010 electoral
process, which was the least violent of the last twenty years.
However, traditional politics has prevailed. The García house remained in command de-
spite having Alvaro García and his partners behind bars. Its political muscle has proved invin-
cible, even in the absence of paramilitary violence: for the 2010 elections the house had the
highest voting in the department once again.36 García’s party – the Colombian Democratic
party – was one of the most a(ected by the parapolitics phenomenon as most of its seats in
Congress were investigated. That is why ex-Colombian Democratic Party members “refur-
bished” the party by giving it a new name, the National Integration Party (PIN). As stated
before, investigated and sentenced politicians used the PIN and other Uribista coalition par-
ties to launch relatives or close friends as political frontmen. Teresa García, Alvaro García’s
sister, won a seat in Senate with 48,210 votes in 2010. Salvador Arana used Yahir Acuña – al-
legedly close to paramilitary groups as well – who got elected at the House of Representatives
with 45,775 votes. The Merlano house managed to get EduardoMerlano, Jairo’s son, elected
as Senator for the U Party with 37,195 votes; he is now being trialled by the SCJ for colluding
with the AUC.
Parapoliticians’ heirs considered that they acted independently from what happened with
their predecessors. Someone from Teresa García’s campaign argued: “what explains the fact
that we are being supported by people in Sucre is a spontaneous feeling of gratitude for almost
40 years of working really hard for the communities’ well-being” (Semana, 2010c).
As for victims, the truth and reparation processes have been di*cult. Although the con-
victions of “Vecino” and “Juancho Dique” and those of politicians involved with the AUC
constitute a positive advance in the truth process, the crimes committed by “Cadena”, which
36According theNational PrisonsAuthority and theHomeMinistry, AlvaroGarciawas themost visited inmate
between January andMarch 2010, whereas ex-Governor Salvador Arana managed to leave prison almost 40 times




constitute the vast majority, will remain unpunished as the warlord was killed immediately af-
ter the demobilization of MMHB. The reparation issue is even more complicated. Warlords’
assets have been immunized from the victims’ claims given the lenient terms of the Justice
and Peace Law, let alone the fact that most of these assets are entangled in complex webs of
frontmen. A recent scandal in the National Anti-Narcotics O*ce, which is the institution in
charge of managing illegal assets, revealed that a large number of drug tra*ckers’ assets disap-
peared from the databases and that many frontmen ended up receiving confiscated properties.
A similar situation was identified in the Rural Development Institute: many rural properties
destined for the return of several displaced groups were allocated to warlords’ frontmen (Se-
mana, 2010e).
The state’s e(ort to facilitate the return of displaced people has been slow and full of bu-
reaucratic obstacles. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Unit for Land Restitu-
tion, dispossessed peasants are formally claiming the restitution of over 51,000 hectares but
only 3.3% of land has been returned to dispossessed peasants. The humanitarian demining
operations, which have proved extremely di*cult, also constitute a major obstacle in the re-
turn process. Also, as pointed out before, threats against land claimants still continue. As
a consequence, people are returning under the so-called “silent return” modality, that is, the
sporadic return to the parcels for the purpose sowing and harvesting. Peasants commute to
the countryside and work during the day. At night, they return to the slums in urban centres
were they found refuge since they were displaced.
The incipient peace has brought another disturbing phenomenon: under the shelter of
promising mega-investment projects (gas and oil extraction) the acquisition of large exten-
sions of rural land inMontes deMaría region started to take place in 2008, further impacting
the unstable small and intermediate landholding structure. “Peasants who were lucky enough
not be displaced during the war, or some of those who had their land returned started selling
it for peanuts [...] entrepreneurs from Medellín came out of the blue, cash in hand, unleash-
ing an unprecedented speculative fever. They bought hectares for $300,000 pesos [US$250]
each and now they cost $2 million [US$1,670] [...] these entrepreneurs, who by the way are
very close to the Uribe administration mostly through campaign financing, created compa-
nies exclusively for buying land in Montes de María [...] the land is being used for producing
dairy on a large scale, on land with great soil for agricultural production. More of the same:
fields full of cows. It’s the cheapest option. No impact on work generation whatsoever. It’s
a shame” (Hernández, 2009). In November 2008 the Governor’s O*ces of Sucre and Bolívar
froze land sales in Montes de María. “This was not a bad move, but the problem is that you
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cannot do that unless you o(er alternatives. I mean, the people who were selling the land
are mainly displaced peasants. When they started to return they found their land reduced to
nothing. All the improvements made for years were lost. Moreover, most of them were being
choked by debts fromwhich the government did not protect them. I guess they felt they didn’t
have a choice but selling and now they cannot do it” (Villadiego, 2009).
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6
OF PROSPEROUS ENTREPRENEURS AND CR IM INALS : A
GENERAL BACKGROUND FOR NORTE DE SANTANDER
Norte de Santander (NDS) illustrates a di(erent process of parapolitics. Although itis not as striking as that of Sucre in terms of the number of politicians involved, it
has salient dimensions. Located in northeastern Colombia, NDS fits Losada’s predominance
within restricted competition type (2006) and represents a case in which the logic of the mar-
ket significantly prevailed over the logic of politics. The emergence of the AUC in NDS and
therefore parapolitics were not connected to the political process as it was in Sucre. Instead, it
was mainly driven by the AUC’s needs of controlling illegal and informal economies. In this
fashion, violence was mainly aimed at disputing the control over the narcotics production
and trade with FARC, as well as other businesses with other criminal actors. Contention over
land was never as strong as in Sucre.
Although politicians and warlords colluded in NDS, the department did not experience
the criminalization of politicians and the politicization of criminals in the magnitude of Su-
cre. Involved politicians sought to maximize votes, as in Sucre, but AUC warlords neither
participated in governing the department, nor were they represented in Congress by politi-
cians. The evidence shows that parapolitics in NDS had broader and deeper linkages with
the AUC’s economic activity, and weaker, shallower political bases and bonds, opposite to
Sucre’s experience. Unlike Sucre, where politics was first and crime came later, in NDS crime
and politics have historically co-evolved. Contraband has played a central role in the depart-
ment’s economic configuration since the 19th century, and prior to the arrival of the Autode-
fensas in NDS, strong organized crime networks connected to smuggling and the narcotics
trade were consolidated. Although politicians have neither controlled these networks nor
have they served as front men thereof, many politicians have traditionally protected criminal
enterprises in exchange for campaign financing. This relationship continued during the AUC
era, when warlords violently monopolized criminal activities in NDS. Parapolitics was then
about protecting the paramilitary economy. However, the connection remained small in scale
– it did not involve the whole establishment or all active politicians – and short-lived in dura-
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tion, with continuing instability, contestation and flux. The fact that prior to the arrival of
the AutodefensasNDS had a more pluralistic and competitive political field, in which diverse
legal and illegal economic interests were represented by some politicians but not in a suc-
cessfully consolidated or stabilized fashion, presumably explain the attenuated and unstable
linkages between warlords and politicians, making NDS Sucre’s counter-example. In Sucre
politicians had traditionally owned the main subnational means of production - rural land –
and therefore experienced more enduring, stable and larger scale forms of proprietary wealth,
creating a di(erent – and late – relationship with crime and paramilitarism. Despite the fact
that the AUC’s support to political campaigns generated extraordinary electoral successes to
the García andMerlano houses, it is worth recalling that the paramilitary boomwas possible
because of politicians and that the García house commanded the MMHB. This was not the
case of NDS as paramilitary formation was triggered in an exogenous fashion, as analysed in
Chapter 7.
This chapter o(ers a general background of NDS that accounts for the subnational his-
torical interaction of the five key dimensions discussed previously, which shaped this specific
local path of parapolitics. It is noteworthy that NDS exhibits subregional variations in terms
of state building and economic integration, which has created a modern urban NDS and a
peripheral rural NDS, a matter thoroughly discussed in this chapter and the next, and subject
to systematic comparison. Modern NDS is characterized by a stronger state and a modern
and relatively strong economy, well-integrated into the domestic and international markets:
Cúcuta, the departmental capital and one of the largest Colombian cities, has been the centre
of the trade with Venezuela, one of the country’s main trade partners since the 19th century.
Instead of the flourishing of landed rural elites intimately linked to the political realm as seen
in Sucre, NDS created urban elites connected to trade and industry, largely divorced from pol-
itics. This phenomenon is mainly explained by the fast decline of the hacienda structure in
and the early industrialization and connection to trade activities.
In contrast with modern NDS, peripheral NDS – the Catatumbo region – became a no
man’s land with the decline of the hacienda, and was subject to aggressive forms of accumula-
tion via oil exploitation and coca production as well of as chaotic colonization waves. These
processes occurred in the absence of the state, a vacuum historically filled by private firms,
guerrillas and paramilitaries, which make this region a di(erent kind of periphery from that
of Sucre.
Regarding politics, NDSpoliticians never owned themeans of production and consequently
the labour force never served electoral purposes, unlike in Sucre where the hacienda solidified
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patron-client ties. The existence of a more diverse economy has perhaps generated a more di-
verse, factionalized and contentious political space. These characteristics along with the fact
that NDS has been primarily urban (75% of the population lives in Cúcuta’s metropolitan
area) have had important consequences in the political configuration of the department. Re-
gardless of the predominance of traditional parties and of clientelist practices, political power
has been diluted. Although the Conservative party has been the strongest in NDS, it has never
been hegemonic as the Liberal party was for a long time in Sucre. Not a single political house
has owned the department’s politics like the García house has in Sucre. These features had
two implications that contrast with case of Sucre. On the one hand, it precluded the building
of an authoritarian subnational enclave, and on the other hand, it generated less severe levels
of fragmentation, de-institutionalization and criminalization of political parties. These two
factors contributed to narrowing the space of parapolitics.
On the whole, despite the existence of a modern NDS, the rule of law and the state’s regula-
tory capacities have been weak in the department, a matter that largely explains the intensity
of collective violence, the rise of massive illegal and informal economies, and the hijacking of
democratizing and modernizing reforms by politicians, guerrillas, and paramilitaries. These
phenomena have not only taken place in peripheral NDS but has also a(ected modern NDS
to the extent to which Cúcuta has become one of the most prominent centres of criminal
transactions in Colombia as well as one of the most violent. Unlike Sucre, where the “rents
of political power” were at the base of the intensification of the internal conflict and the rise
of parapolitics, in NDS it was about capturing the rents of legal and illegal businesses. The
mixture of private prosperity and state weakness opened the doors to criminals and irregular
warring actors to pervade departmental life, particularly since the 1980s, and through their
increasing involvement with drugtra*cking activities NDS became the largest producer of
coca and cocaine exporter in northern Colombia.
In sum, NDS o(ers a case of a fragmented territory with a strong division between moder-
nity and periphery. On the whole, although subnational boundaries have been relatively open
to the influence of a modernizing and democratizing central state, and despite exhibiting a
wider political space, unstable clienteles and modern forms of accumulation, the weakness
of the state has made NDS a highly criminalized space that revolves around all sorts of il-





NDS is located in northeastern Colombia, along the border with Venezuela. Many territorial
divisions occurred before the department was definitively created in 1910. Although consid-
erably linked to the state and international markets since the 19th century, the department’s
development has been uneven, a matter that has generated a dramatic development gap be-
tween the urban Cúcuta area and the rest of the department. The gap is particularly notable
in the case of the Catatumbo region, the most peripheral area of the department. But in the
overall, it is possible to stress that in many respects NDS exhibits higher levels of integration
than Sucre.
Geography and demography
NDS is characterized by two di(erent landscapes, a mountainous area corresponding to the
eastern Andean branch, and a flat one located in the east central and north (Appendix 8). The
department is divided in six subregions of which the eastern, northern andwestern subregions
are the focus of this research (Appendix 9). The eastern subregion comprises themetropolitan
area of Cúcuta, which is the fifth largest urban centre in Colombia with almost 1.3million in-
habitants. Cúcuta, Los Patios, Villa del Rosario, SanCayetano, El Zulia and Puerto Santander
form the metropolitan area.
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Map 11: Cúcuta Metropolitan Area
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In spite of its exceptional geo-strategic location along the border with Venezuela, Cúcuta’s
enorm us trade potential has be n reduced due to the poor road infrastructure. Org nize
crime, illegal armed groups, and smuggling informal agents have exploited this weakness, as
t will be seen l ter. Besides Cúcuta’s area, the dep rtment has two other urban centres of
intermediate importance: Ocaña in the Catatumbo region and Pamplona in the south. The
rest of t e department is semi-urban and rural.
The orthern andwestern subregions form theCat tumbo region, which constitutes almost
50 per cent of the departmental territory, and has been characterized by extractive economies
that range from co(ee and oil to coca. This region has a complex geography – a mixture of
mountains and tropical valleys – and can be divided into three zones (map 12). The flat zone
comprises the municipality of Tibú centre of the oil industry and the coca economy. El Tarra,
Sardinata and El Zulia municipalities constitute the intermediate zone. One portion of this
territory is located in plains and the other in the mountains. An important 16,619 hectares
irrigation district was created in El Zulia and as a consequence some capital-intensive agricul-
ture has been developed in its territory El Tarra and Sardinata are areas of agricultural and
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stockbreeding activities, increasingly displaced by coca crops since the early 1990s. El Carmen,
Convención, Teorama, San Calixto, Hacarí, La Playa andOcañamunicipalities constitute the
mountainous area, characterized by peasant economies and the most important activities are
related to coca crops.
Map 12: Catatumbo region by zones
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The urb n and rural population is mainly of whit and mestizo background. The B rí-
Motilón and U’wa ethnic groups inhabit in the northern areas of the Catatumbo region and
the southeast of he d partment, respectively. The demography s very dynamic in the d -
partment due to di(erent factors. The first one is that Venezuelans and Colombians are al-
lowed f ee transit cross he border and have the right to remain indefinitely in either territory.
Besides the existence of an important established Venezuelan community in Cúcuta and a
Colombian o e right on the other side of the border, many people from both nationalities
temporarily migrate, according to the economic trends of either side of the border. The sec-
ond factor is related to the internal conflict, which has significantly changed the urban-rural
composition via forcible displacement. The third factor is the mobility generated by the coca
industry in the Catatumbo region: in times of harvest the region’s population increases as





NDS has a relatively large economy and overall its socioeconomic indicators are better than
those of Sucre. The strategic location along the border with Venezuela has generated a dy-
namic economy mainly based on trade, banking and transport services which are concen-
trated in the metropolitan area of Cúcuta. The industrial sector, of intermediate importance,
is composed of food and drinks, chemical products, cement and footwear. In turn, Catatumbo
region is rich in natural renewable and non-renewable resources, mainly coal and oil.1 Like-
wise, stockbreeding and agriculture are important activities with co(ee, sugar cane, potato,
rice, and tobacco. Although rural land in the department is not as productive as that of Sucre,
the agricultural sector in NDS has proved more productive than that of Sucre. This is mainly
explained by a di(erent land structure in which small, intermediate and large landholdings
coexist; hence there is less property concentration. This mixture also indicates that land has
di(erent uses, more intensive in seasonal and permanent crops, unlike Sucre where most of
the land is dedicated to pastures for stockbreeding.
NDS’s average contribution to the national GDP between 2000 and 2011 was at 1.66%,
almost double that of Sucre with an average growth of 2.29% between 1990 and 2005.2 The
department’s per capita GDP in 2011 (US$4,214) was above Sucre’s, yet far below the national
indicator (US$7,240).
In terms of competitiveness, of 29 departments assessed by ECLAC (2009) NDS was 12th,
better ranked than Sucre. In 2012 the Colombian Caribbean Observatory ranked Cúcuta in
place 13th whilst Sucre was penultimate of 22 cities assessed. Despite NDS’s economic poten-
tial, informality, illegality and the absence of state regulation in many sectors have severely
worked against the possibilities of a strong economy. Unlike Sucre, NDS has been dynami-
cally integrated to domestic and international markets3 since the 19th century given its strate-
gic location along the Venezuelan border, mainly through clothing and footwear, mining and
agriculture. However, the trade integration process with Venezuela has been traditionally
poorly regulated and therefore has generated a large informal economy, which has been pro-
1Oilfields are located in the Catatumbo region and are an extension of the highly prolific Maracaibo lake
basin of Venezuela. Oil has a cumulative production of over 450 million barrels and 500 billion cubic feet of
gas. Tibú produces 657,000 barrels of high quality petroleum per year. However, the oilfields on the Colombian
side are almost insignificant if compared to those of the neighbouring country. As for coal, its reserves have been
estimated in 300million tonnes, the largest in Colombia.
2“Agenda para la competitividad: documento regional – Norte de Santander”, Departamento Nacional de
Planeación, 2008.
3Venezuela is NDS main trade partner with over 95 per cent of exports, followed by the U.S., Ecuador, Chile
some Caribbean countries, China, Japan and Brazil. Source: Central Bank.
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gressively criminalized by contraband, drug tra*cking and money laundering. Unlike Sucre,
drug tra*cking has dramatically pervaded theNDS’s economy: significant changes have been
observed in variables such as urban construction and real estate speculation since the 1990s.
But perhaps the most pervasive e(ect thereof, besides coca bush cultivation, is the flooding of
the market with drug money via massive laundering e(orts and the dramatic growth of the
foreign exchange black market. These factors have significantly contributed the department’s
economy shrinkage over the last two decades, not only growing below the national average
but also disconnected from the national tendencies. In 1990 the department had the eleventh
largest economy in the country with a contribution of 1.93% to the national GDP; however
in 2007 it dropped to the eighteenth place with a share of 1.53%.
The agricultural sector, which used to be at the core of the economic activity of NDS, has
considerably declined over the last two decades. The end of the protection for agricultural
products as part of economic liberalization strategy of the early 1990s, the fall of international
co(ee prices, smuggling, collective violence, and the introduction of coca crops are the main
factors that explain the rural crisis in the department. Besides trade and agriculture, NDS
has been characterized by enclave economies from oil since the early 20th century to coca over
the last 20 years. Informalized trade and extractive activities have given rise to high levels
of cash circulation and consumption but have not created productive chains. Consequently,
productive activities have little aggregate value, the generation of employment is poor, and
labour mobility is precarious. Informality and low quality of employment have hijacked the
economic space and severely worsened the quality of life in the department. NDS has one
of the largest informal economies in Colombia: it is calculated that over the last decade on
average over 60% of Cúcuta’s population participated in the informal economy. According
to the Statistics National Agency, the informality ratio between 2000 and 2006 was of almost
three informally occupied people for each person with a formal job on average (DANE, 2007).
Almost 80%of the population displaced by guerrillas and paramilitaries has settled inCúcuta,
a situation that has notably enlarged the informal market over the last decade.
In terms of basic indicators the department has performed better than Sucre but given the
nature of its economy NDS’s overall situation is still precarious. NDS has a Human Develop-
ment Index of 0.796 in the 2011 UN Human Development Report, better than that of Sucre
but still in the group of departments with lowest performances. NDS’s index is quite complex.
According to theMinistry of Planning, from a list of 1,115 assessedmunicipalities Cúcutawas
located in the sixty-second place whereas the rest of NDSmunicipalities were located between
the 600th and 996th places. This di(erence accounts for the historical socioeconomic gap be-
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tween Cúcuta’s area and the rest of the department and this gap generates a particularly low
indicator.
According to the National Statistics Department (DANE, 2012), income poverty was of
40.6% in NDS in 2011 whilst Sucre’s was of 53%. Extreme poverty was of 9.9%, almost
half that of Sucre (16.2%) for the same year. Compared with the national average, NDS
has a higher multidimensional poverty index (MPI) incidence, but lower if compared with
that of Sucre. While the latter’s MPI was of 73.10% in 2011, NDS’s was of 58.2% (86.22%
rural and 50.26%urban). Educational achievement and formal employment are the variables
with the highest incidence in the department (70.8% and 93.8% deprivation respectively).
Other critical variables are child labour, childcare, health, and employment. Unlike Sucre,
habitat and public services variables exhibit lower incidence levels. The MPI’s variables are
disaggregated as follows and compared to Sucre, Bogotá D.C and Chocó:
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Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1931372 42.1% 813401 7.9% 153465 4.6% 89142 21.4% 413184
Chocó 85608 78.4% 67102 41.7% 35715 24.5% 20971 44.0% 37669
Sucre 166540 74.8% 124655 38.6% 64223 8.7% 14488 35.1% 58373
Norte de
Santander
295285 70.8% 208994 23.1% 68256 11.5% 33949 30.0% 88454









Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1931372 9.2% 177519 2.6% 49456 27.4% 529573 77.2% 1490256
Chocó 85608 35.2% 30127 6.8% 5838 68.0% 58204 97.4% 83364
Sucre 166540 22.7% 37822 3.3% 5528 61.5% 102457 96.9% 161360
Norte de
Santander
295285 21.4% 63330 6.0% 17695 42.2% 124552 93.8% 276841











Households % Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1931372 21.9% 422885 4.3% 82928 1.5% 28110 2.0% 38468
Chocó 85608 58.6% 50137 19.4% 16630 79.6% 68121 79.4% 67946
Sucre 166540 41.3% 68862 5.9% 9841 27.2% 45363 40.3% 67125
Norte de
Santander
295285 35.7% 105448 8.0% 23633 17.2% 50835 13.6% 40029
National 10572280 29.6% 3125839 6.3% 664276 17.2% 1817629 17.0% 1794807
Inadequate flooring Inadequate walls Overcrowding
Households % Households % Households % Households
Bogotá
D.C
1931372 0.7% 13014 0.8% 15610 14.1% 272703
Chocó 85608 6.1% 5184 27.6% 23640 22.7% 19454
Sucre 166540 36.8% 61209 17.2% 28685 34.9% 58127
Norte de
Santander
295285 9.8% 29083 3.5% 10481 27.3% 80522
National 10572280 10.0% 1059478 4.8% 510791 19.5% 2065159
Source: DANE (2012)
The fiscal performance of NDS is superior to that of Sucre: over the last ten years, after a
series of fiscal adjustment policies, the department has exhibited a positive current balance
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and a goodmanagement of the debt. NDS is less dependent than Sucre on central government
transfers. Over the last decade the reliance on the central government has decreased and
currently stands approximately 58%. Departmental revenues have increased in spite of the
struggle to raise tax revenue: most cigarettes, alcohol and fuel are smuggled, a situation that
significantly weakens the departmental tax base.4
state formation: the role of international trade and resource extrac-
tion
Although political parties played a central role in moving Sucre within the orbit of the central
state, NDS followed a rather di(erent process. The economic dynamics in NDS have been
historically at the centre of institution building and of social integration to the state.
State formation was an uneven process in NDS. On the one hand there are the rapid mod-
ernization, urbanization and industrialization processes in Cúcuta, with some impact in Pam-
plona andOcaña, and on the other hand the backwards situation of the rest of the department.
Cúcuta’s area was progressively integrated to the central state since the 19th century. Its strate-
gic commercial proximity to Venezuela rapidly provided this part of the department with a
relatively large bureaucracy –mainly linked to customs and tax collection activities – and road
infrastructure. Trade also generated a significant industrial capacity and both activities trig-
gered an important urbanization process. These factors along with the premature dissolution
of the hacienda system in the Catatumbo region, discussed below, made urban centres increas-
ingly attractive. By 1880 the British-built Cúcuta-Zulia railroad was fully operating and the
introduction of aviation in the 1920s further expanded the “industrial revolution” in Cúcuta.
Through the 1930s the department industrialized mainly through oil and cement. Between
1938 and 1951NDS had an urban growth index of 1.12, the seventh in the country during that
period (Weiss, 1966). Besides Cúcuta, the municipalities of Ocaña and Pamplona also became
important intermediate urban centres in the department. This process significantly contrasts
with the marginality of Sucre’s urban formation, state building, and industrialization.
As stated before, there are important sub-departmental variations in terms of the periph-
eral situation vis-à-vis the centre in NDS. The central, southwestern and southeastern regions
are characterized by stable intermediate and small-scale agriculture with some concentration
4In Colombia taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, as well as fuel surcharge constitute important sources of de-
partmental and municipal revenues.
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around Cúcuta, Ocaña and Pamplona. The Catatumbo region is the most peripheral subre-
gion, a situation that worsens towards the North and West (intermediate and mountainous
areas). Given its di*cult geography, the region is poorly connected to any development pole.
It is also an area of open frontier that has been historically subject to aggressive extractive
economies with little impact in welfare, unstable and disorganized population processes, and
a scenario of illicit economies and collective violence during the last decades.
The hacienda structure: the first colonization wave in Catatumbo region
The opening of the agricultural frontier in NDS came before that of Sucre. According to
Ramos (2005) the settlement process in the Catatumbo river basin started during the 18th cen-
tury, still under colonial rule in the context of the free-trade process promoted by the Bourbon
crown. Royal policies stimulated the expansion of the agrarian frontier through slave-based
cacao bean and sugar cane haciendas in wastelands and territories inhabited by the Barí in-
digenous community located in the flat areas of the Catatumbo region. The frontier was then
expanded from the Maracaibo region (now located in Venezuela), Salazar de las Palmas, Cú-
cuta and Pamplona. The expansion of the agricultural frontier was conflictive, as opposed
to that experienced in Sucre. Barí people resisted the expansive process to which local elites
reacted by creating military enterprises. Violence was complemented with missionary com-
panies that actively participated in the subjection of indigenous communities and facilitated
the formation of haciendas and villages in the natives’ ancestral land (Ramos, 2005).
Emulating the Venezuelan success in growing and exporting co(ee, Cúcuta traders pro-
moted the rapid displacement of cacao bean and sugar cane haciendas by the co(ee hacienda
in the mid-19th century. The latter generated the further opening of the agrarian frontier from
the flat to the mid-mountainous areas in Catatumbo. The co(ee activity grew very quickly
and NDS became one of the principal co(ee-growing regions in Colombia: it is calculated
that in the 1870s the regional co(ee production grew by almost 90% (Kalmanovitz, 2003) sig-
nificantly competing with Brazilian, Venezuelan and Costa Rican exports. By the 1980s co(ee
had displaced the cacao bean economy. According to A.Machado (1988), the co(ee economy
inNDSdisplaced the slave-based hacienda system and brought along the aparcería (sharecrop-
ping system) as the predominant labour relation, mostly based on white and mestizo labour
force. The burden of compulsory labour was very little or inexistent and therefore moved
in the opposite direction of the almost servile labour relations common to other Colombian
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regions until the late 19th century.5 Co(ee introduced a dualistic agrarian structure (Arango,
1977) in which the peasant economy expanded in parallel to the hacienda structure, intro-
ducing a relative modernization in the production relations. This process also sharply di(ers
from Sucre’s colonization in which, as explained before, the hacienda system did not allow
for a peasant economy to develop and was based for a long time upon compulsory labour;
the share cropping system developed later in the 20th century.
The co(ee industry soon declined in NDS and the co(ee hacienda rapidly dissolved. In the
early 20th century a large wave of peasant colonization moved from southern and northeast-
ern Colombian regions to wastelands located in central-western areas where colonizers estab-
lished models of small and intermediate co(ee production (Ocampo, 1989; Palacios, 1979).
This type of production rapidly expanded insofar as co(ee could be easily propagated and its
smaller scale production entailed less costs than those of the hacienda. This situation, along
with the availability of suitable land and a better exports infrastructure in this newly colo-
nized region generated the erosion of the co(ee hacienda model throughout the country. By
the 1940s, NDS’s share of Colombia’s co(ee production had dropped to 34%.
This phenomenon importantly determined land relations not only in the Catatumbo re-
gion but also elsewhere in the department. Latifundia never became a predominant form of
land property. In contrast with Sucre, this fact not only generated di(erent productive rela-
tions but most importantly, di(erent forms of political integration and social tensions. Even
during the times of La Violencia, which was very intense in NDS, rural land was never at the
centre of the conflict as it happened in other Colombian regions like Tolima, where partisan
strife mainly revolved around the late hacienda structure. More importantly, the fact that
the hacienda structure disappeared before political parties reached maturity in NDS did not
create a political culture of dependency as observed in Sucre, or at least never to that extreme.
The oil industry: the second wave of colonization
The Catatumbo region was one of the first settings for oil exploitation in Colombia. Al-
though minor exploitation took place in the first decade of the 20th century, the industry
became important in the 1930s when the so-called Barco Concession was granted to the
American-based Colombian Petroleum Company (COLPET). The concession comprised al-
5Most of the hacienda system in Colombian regions (Caribbean coast and central and southern Colombia
was of the regressive type based on compulsory labour for tenants. In the southwestern departments such as Valle
and Cauca, the sugar cane hacienda was relied on slave labour force of indigenous and African descent.
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most 200,000 hectares in the flat area of Catatumbo region with its centre in Tibú, in Barí
territory. This situation made the phenomenon highly contentious insofar as Barí people, as
in the case of the hacienda expansion, violently reacted against the concession and COLPET
used the Colombian Army to repel the attacks.6
During the 19th century, the settlement processes were activated by the hacienda structure
in Sucre and NDS alike. However, during the 20th century these processes diverged. Unlike
Sucre, where settlement processes continued to be generated by the quest for land, in NDS
the trigger was the establishment of the oil industry, which generated a second wave of col-
onization, not only at the inter-departmental level but also from other Colombian regions,
and later by the coca boom. Between 1930 and 1950, oil exploitation generated the typical
rapid settlement by large groups of people attracted to an industry with almost unlimited
resources that, contrary to their expectations, hardly o(ered permanent employment. As a
consequence, many immigrants established themselves as colonizers in a disorderly process
that exerted further pressure over Barí land. The situation was worsened asWorldWar II and
La Violencia temporarily paralyzed the industry in the mid-1940s. Most newly unemployed
joined the colonization process whereas others moved to the other side of the border where
Venezuelan farmers illegally imported Colombian labour force to El Zulia region.
In 1950 the oil exploitation was reactivated and until the mid-1960s another wave of oil col-
onization took place, this time by peasants displaced by La Violencia from all over the country.
As demand for work was larger than supply, the new immigrants brought further chaos into
the colonization process at the expense of Barí territory, with violence, dispossession and
massive displacement of native people. According to Pineda (1995) the Barí community went
from 1,800 people in 1950 to 800 in 1960.7 Unlike the case of Sucre where Zenú people –
which was also significantly expelled from its territory – were absorbed by the hacienda struc-
ture, in NDS the Barí community remained as outsiders, systematically de-territorialized and
decimated.
Despite the chaotic nature of this colonization wave, an important social process developed
in the context of the oil industry in Catatumbo: the unionization of oil workers through the
Workers’ Trade Union (Union Sindical Obrera - USO) in the late 1950s8, and along with it,
6It is calculated that Barí people killed almost 250 oil workers in 1939. Although the number of Barí deaths
is uncertain, nine communities were violently displaced towards the mountainous areas.
7A study fromBeckerman (1979) presents a decreasing sequence ofBarí people along the first half 20th century,
from 2,500 in 1910 to 800 in 1960, a decimation of almost 70%. In 1964 Barí communities stopped resisting the oil
penetration and white colonization and came to a series of agreements with the national and local governments.
8USO was created in 1923 and constitutes perhaps the largest trade union in Colombia, which covers all the
Ecopetrol (Colombian Petroleum Company) workers. The organization has led an important process in favour
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other sectors such as peasants and teachers also organized. The rise of the social movement
was deeply connected to the region’s progressive peripheral confinement and the exclusion of
workers, indigenous communities and colonizers from oil boom benefits.9 Vega and Aguilera
(1995) calculated that between 1939 and 1975 Catatumbo’s oil exploitation generated rev-
enues of no more than USD53 million for the Colombian state, a derisory sum if compared
to the oil companies’ benefit of about USD8 per each invested dollar in the field during the
same period. The accumulation of grievances over time generated a strong civic movement
in Catatumbo whose claims helped to generate a massive social mobilization that took place
in 1987 known as the Northeastern Civic Strike. Claims mainly revolved around public ser-
vices, housing, education, health, road infrastructure, natural resources, and importantly, the
recognition of the Barí territory. Almost 150,000 organized agrarian and urban workers from
NDS, Cesar, Santander and Arauca departments mobilized against political violence and gov-
ernmental neglect, making the strike one of the most salient in Colombian history. In this line,
NDS’s social movement formation was not connected to the landholding structure but to a
wider range of claims from di(erent marginalized sectors.
The oil boom in Catatumbo lasted about 30 years. Although the oil industry still remains
central, and is showing important recovery signs, the reserves were apparently exhausted dur-
ing the concession’s first three decades. In the absence of state intervention and regulation in
the region’s settlement and socioeconomic development, the oil path brought forth chaotic
and violent colonization patterns, which, as discussed below, also allowed the entrance of
guerrillas, paramilitaries and coca.
Coca: the ‘armed’ colonization process
The ultimate wave of colonization took place in the early 1990s as coca crops were intro-
duced on a massive scale in Catatumbo “no-man’s land”, a feature that makes the NDS case
significantly di(erent from that of Sucre. Coca crops not only dramatically increased in the
Amazonian basin in southern Colombia, but also expanded in areas of the traditional agri-
cultural frontier, like the Catatumbo region.10 Besides the lack of an e(ective state response
of the nationalization of hydrocarbons in Colombia with a significant impact in the continuous re-negotiation of
the oil exploitation contract with multinational companies.
9In 1993, 55% of Catatumbo municipalities still lacked electricity, 59 per cent did not have running water,
and sewage systems were absent in 75% of them.
10According to UNODC, Colombia reached by 2000 the largest expansion of coca cultivation in the world,
of over 160,000 hectares, and increased cocaine production from 230 metric tonnes of alkaloid in 1995 to 520 in
1999.
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to the northeastern strike claims, the rise of the coca economy was explained by three main
factors. The first one was the increasing unviability of traditional small agriculture. The
agricultural decline in the Catatumbo region was a consequence of the end of protection for
agricultural products in Colombia as part of the economic liberalization strategy introduced
by the national government at the beginning of the 1990s. The second factor was related to
the shifts experienced by the illegal drugs industry: after the decline of the big cartels (Medel-
lín and Cali) and of coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia, Colombia’s competitiveness shifted
from cocaine tra*cking – which became increasingly monopolized by Mexican cartels – to
the agro-industrial and processing phases of coca leaf. The third factor is that guerrillas and
paramilitaries, in the absolute absence of state presence and action, found an extraordinary
financial source in the drugs trade that substantially funded their war e(ort. The new war
economy allowed warring actors to engage in expansive campaigns throughout the territory,
making violence and coca crops expand hand in hand.
Although coca crops existed in the region since the mid-1980s, it was with FARC that these
reached an industrial scale. Before the end of the 1990s the region had the largest expansion
of coca crops in northern Colombia. Besides drawing impoverished Catatumbo peasants
and former oil workers into illegal crops, the coca economy also attracted people from other
Colombian regions, generating a newwave of colonization prominently driven by FARCunder
the logic of extraction (A.Machado, 2004). The coca economy process was further intensified
by the emergence of the AUC in the late 1990s.
It is estimated that before the coca economy came into existence, La Gabarra county (the
centre of coca activity in Tibú) had approximately 7,000 inhabitants. The population in-
creased up to 25,000 in themid-1990s, when FARC fully controlled coca production. Although
some of the new inhabitants were part of an itinerant labour force that moved throughout the
country seeking to work during the di(erent coca leaf harvest seasons, most of them settled in
the region and expanded the colonization from the Catatumbo’s tropical valleys to the moun-
tainous areas. The coca economy deeply a(ected the already existing fragile social fabric by
the floating nature of the majority of labourers, and in the hands of the new settlers it gener-
ated new and pervasive agricultural production patterns. In the first instance peasants added
coca bushes to basic foods crops. However, due to FARC’s pressure, peasants not only ended
up substituting legal crops by coca but also further expanding the internal frontier.
According toA.Machado (2004) coca colonization has an extensive impact on territories as
it increases cultivated areas at a fast pace. The widening of the agricultural frontier responds
to the needs of moving the crops away from the reach of aerial eradication. In the case of the
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Catatumbo region, the largest concentration of coca crops was located in Tibú and El Tarra
(area 1 inmap 13 below) until 1999. From that year, the dynamics of the dispute between FARC
and AUC for the control over coca crops as well as the state anti-narcotics strategy displaced
coca in an east-west direction towards the mountainous areas, more specifically towards the
Catatumbo national park (area 2).
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outcome of the fact that licit agricultural activity was pointless in the absence of state support, 
infrastructure and means for commercializing products and access to markets. 
 
Again, Barí people were particularly victimized in the context of the coca economy. What was left of 
their ancestral territory after the oil boom was devastated and exhausted by coca crops and the new 
colonization waves; some indigenous people were forcibly incorporated as labourers in coca fields, 
and most of them were progressively displaced by guerrillas and paramilitaries towards to 
mountainous areas, where many of them suffered from disease and starvation under forcible 
confinement. Before the independence from the Spanish crown, the Barí people were granted a 
territory of 21,000 square kilometres, which by the mid-20
th
 century was reduced to 16,000. Only up 
to 10,000 kilometres of Barí area was left in 2003.  
 
Another dimension of Catatumbo’s extractive economies is the pervasive environmental impact 
generated since the entrance of the oil industry and worsened by coca production: oil exploitation, 
systematic use of chemicals, monoculture of coca, and aerial fumigations. Moreover, the coca 
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financial backbone is undeniable11 it was clear that grievances from the Northeastern strikes
were still largely unaddressed. Hence collective action was mainly the outcome of the fact
that licit agricultural activity was pointless in the absence of state support, infrastructure and
means for commercializing products and access to markets.
Again, Barí people were particularly victimized in the context of the coca economy. What
was left of their ancestral territory after the oil boom was devastated and exhausted by coca
crops and the new colonization waves; some indigenous people were forcibly incorporated
as labourers in coca fields, and most of them were progressively displaced by guerrillas and
paramilitaries towards to mountainous areas, where many of them su(ered from disease and
starvation under forcible confinement. Before the independence from the Spanish crown, the
Barí people were granted a territory of 21,000 square kilometres, which by the mid-20th cen-
tury was reduced to 16,000. Only up to 10,000 kilometres of Barí area was left in 2003.
Another dimension of Catatumbo’s extractive economies is the pervasive environmental
impact generated since the entrance of the oil industry and worsened by coca production:
oil exploitation, systematic use of chemicals, monoculture of coca, and aerial fumigations.
Moreover, the coca industry has generated a loss of almost 200,000 hectares of forests with
the consequent loss of biodiversity due to the dramatic change in land usage and the contam-
ination and exhaustion of water resources.
Land
As seen, conflicts over land in NDS have mainly stemmed from the occupation of Barí ter-
ritory; not from landholding structure, as it was the case of Sucre. Native lands were first
usurped by hacendados followed by the Colombian state when granting the oil exploitation
concession, and further seized throughout successive colonization waves. In Sucre, despite
the dramatic integration of native Zenú people and territory to the hacienda structure, the
process was never as violent as the territorial loss of the Barí community.
The landholding structure has not been a historically contentious issue in NDS. This is
mainly explained by the early decline of the hacienda structure and the types of colonization
11Unlike the case of Bolivia, there is no cocaleromovement that articulates the sector’s subnational grievances
in Colombia; cocaleros lack a national leadership and political representation. This ismainly explained by the fact
that the coca economy is marginally connected to traditional use and its labour force is highly unstable. FARC’s
mobilizing capacity was particularly clear in the June 1995 strike, as the mobilization of over 1,500 coca growers
and harvesters from Catatumbo took place simultaneously with other massive mobilizations in Putumayo and
Guaviare departments in southern Colombia.
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that have taken place in NDS. Under these circumstances, small, intermediate and large prop-
erty developed in a more or less simultaneous way and, contrary to Sucre’s experience, this
situation largely explains why there is no such thing as a traditional “landed class” in the
department. Until the late 1990s the coexistence of these structures was rather peaceful. Be-
tween 1971 and 1980 ANUC promoted 97 land occupations in Sucre whereas only eight cases
occurred in NDS (CNRR, 2010; Zamosc, 1983). It is also worth noting that ANUC in NDS
belonged to the o*cial governmental strand, hence far less belligerent than Sucre’s where the
organization had divorced from the institutional line.
In her study on internal displacement, Ibáñez (2010) found that in spite of the intensity
of collective violence and forcible displacement in NDS since the late 1990s the structure of
rural land remained relatively stable, in contrast with Sucre. However, over the last decade
an emerging agro-industrial model started displacing the traditional peasant structure. In the
context of the construction of the irrigation district in El Zulia, there has been an important
expansion of permanent crops – mainly oil palm – in recently created large landholdings lo-
cated in eastern Catatumbo and Cúcuta’s rural area, in which the AUC and even politicians
have been involved, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Notwithstanding this situation,
the logic of “accumulation through dispossession” was not a main drive in the political econ-
omy of warring actors, as was the case in Sucre.
the illegal tradition and underlying criminality
The most important part of the border with Venezuela is concentrated in Cúcuta’s metropoli-
tan area on the Colombian side, and in San Antonio, Ureña and San Cristobal on the Venezue-
lan side. The poor levels of regulation in the commercial, border and foreign exchange has
made the majority of transactions to take place in the black market. The comparative advan-
tages of the Venezuelan exchange rate and price control have also played a significant role in
this black market dynamic, generating further conditions for the flourishing of informality
and criminality in NDS.
Smuggling has been the main illegal activity in NDS, making Cúcuta perhaps the most crit-
ical contraband node in Colombia. Besides the authorities’ tolerance vis-à-vis illegality and
the wide social acceptance thereof, contraband generated a whole infrastructure for other il-
legal activities to flourish, in this case, drug tra*cking: routes, transport, bribing techniques,
contacts and the like. Moreover, it has constituted the perfect platform for massive money
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laundering operations. Likewise, smuggling has generated optimal conditions for the repro-
duction of informality.
Smuggling
Although there is an significant volume of legal exports and imports registered in Cúcuta,
legality has been historically overridden by the magnitude of the unregistered trade -goods
from the basic food basket smuggled in small scale- and large-scale contraband -consisting of
fuel, chemical supplies, stolen cars, guns, ammunition and drugs. The intensity and direction
of smuggling activities have altered according to changes in the exchange rate (Colombian
Peso-Bolivar) and in levels of economic growth on both sides of the border.
Contraband is neither new in the department nor exclusive to it. The activity can be traced
back to the 18th century and constitutes a tradition in all Colombian frontier areas (Ecuador,
Peru, Brazil and Panama) and seaports along the Caribbean and Pacific coasts alike. Dur-
ing the 1860s and 1870s salt, spirits, fabric and other manufactures were massively smuggled
through Cúcuta from San Antonio in Venezuela, and by then the magnitude of contraband
was already significant in the context of the regional economy. According to Laurent (2008)
the phenomenon developed around the poorness of local customs infrastructure, corruption,
and mainly the lack of agreement between the Colombian and Venezuelan tari( systems.
After decades of steady economic growth, Cúcuta started to experience a process of im-
poverishment from the early 1980s. This phenomenon was unleashed by the dramatic fall of
international oil prices and the increase of the Venezuelan fiscal deficit. Consequently, the Bo-
livar devalued and the traditional trade flux in which Colombian exports were dominant was
inverted. Simultaneously, drug tra*cking money was already irrigating Cúcuta’s economy
and smuggling activities grew like never before.
This situation was maintained throughout the 1990s and worsened over the 2000s. Several
factors were at play. The first one is that the border is very porous, customs controls are loose
and o*cials are easily corrupted.12 Smuggled goods are mainly transported in trucks and
cars that transit at ease through the principal roads, but there are also the so-called trocheros
(path-crossers), young men who cross the Táchira River – which divides the two countries –
12It is said that the VenezuelanGuardia Nacional (National Guard) charges between 2,500 and 5,000 Bolivars
for vehicles loaded with smuggled goods on the border bridge in San Antonio, depending on their size.
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in adapted bikes that support up to 200 kilos of merchandise. Path-crossers use myriads of
semi-urban paths in Cúcuta’s area that allow an easy passage through the river.
The second factor was the implantation of three di(erent exchange rates by the Chávez
administration in 2003. The first one (US$1 = 2.60 Strong Bolivars) applies to the sectors of
foods, health, machinery imports, science and technology, and everything related to the public
sector. The second one (US$1 = 4.30 Strong Bolivars) applies to the oil sector and imports
of other machinery. The third one corresponds to the free market exchange rate; although
it is illegal to publish the price of this so-called “parallel dollar”, it may oscillate between
6.25 and 9.20 Strong Bolivars. The latter is the one that has further stimulated contraband;
transactions are made in US dollars and can be easily converted in the black market. As a
consequence, according to the Central Bank, Colombian exports to Venezuela fell by 45.35%
in the mid-2000s and it is calculated that for each tonne of Venezuelan goods that entered
legally the Colombian market, there were four tonnes of smuggled goods being distributed in
a parallel fashion.
The third factor is related to price control. The prices of Venezuelan regulated goods –
foodstu(s and fuel – have fallen in real terms, seriously distorting the relative prices of the
same products in Colombia. Subsidies have significantly reduced these goods’ prices, and are
sold through the so-called Mercal network.13 This situation has further stimulated contra-
band. According to the Venezuelan Ministry of Food, in 2004 the monthly consumption of
goods from the basic food basket was of 121.5 kilos per person in the frontier small munici-
palities of San Antonio, Ureña and Rubio – critical points in the contraband route, whereas
in Caracas, with almost 5 million inhabitants, it was of only 33.5 kilos. Venezuelan goods
are sold in Colombia at thrice their price, yet they continue to be cheaper than Colombian
products or those legally imported. For example, the so-called “Chavez’s milk” (evaporated
milk produced exclusively for theMercal network distribution) is at times extremely di*cult
to find in Venezuelan markets but is usually available everywhere in Cúcuta at thrice its regu-
lated price in Venezuela, a situation that explains the dramatic decline of NDS industrial and
agricultural activity.
Another target in the smuggling business is Venezuelan livestock, which is very cheap com-
pared to Colombian animals. A Venezuelan meat trader has the option of locally selling live-
stock for 5.5 Strong Bolivars (US$2) per kilo (the maximum price fixed by the government) or
13 Mercal is the abbreviation of Mercado de Alimentos (foods market) and is one of the most important
Chavez’s social programmes. The government is in charge of building supermarkets and shops and providing
food and other basic goods at low prices for the poorest parts of the population.
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selling it in Colombia for US$ 1.27. Nevertheless the trader can resort to the free market and
increase the benefit to 7.93 Bolivars per kilo by using the corresponding exchange rate (min-
imum 6.25 Bolivars per dollar) (El Espectador, 2008). Livestock trade has been mainly used
for money laundering in the so-called “livestock carousel”: part of the livestock introduced
in Colombia is taken to illegal slaughter houses and the meat is sold on the black market, but
another part of the livestock is sold on the free market in Cúcuta, then returned to Venezuela
and then back to Colombia to be sold again, and so on until the animals weaken and die
of exhaustion. In the carrousel dynamic a single animal is sold three times average and, in
the absence of sanitary controls, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have been registered in
NDS. In 2009 Cúcuta’s meat processing plant activity fell from 300 slaughtered animals per
day to 30. It is calculated that approximately 10,000 head of cattle illegally enter Colombia
through that part of the border.14
However, the most dynamic and profitable smuggled commodity is fuel, which has been
traditionally subsidized by the Venezuelan state but reached an unprecedented peak under
Chávez administration. Nowadays Venezuela provides the cheapest oil in the world at the do-
mestic level.15 In Cúcuta, two types of illegal fuel trade have developed: retail and wholesale
(large volumes of fuel are stored in warehouses called escurrideros and the distribution chan-
nels operate beyond the departmental borders). Smuggled fuel is not only meant for cheaply
supplying the high vehicle demand, but also for drug tra*cking insofar as it constitutes one
of the main ingredients for cocaine processing. Twenty-six litres of gasoline cost only 1.80
Bolivars in Venezuela and Colombian retailers sell the whole lot for 42 Bolivars in Cúcuta
with a profit margin of over 1,600 per cent.16 However, the business is even more lucrative:
retailers usually resell the fuel to a second intermediary who in turn resells it in neighbour-
ing departments for 71.45 Bolivars. There are approximately 6,000 a*liates to a co-operative
street sellers of fuel; the co-operative has significantly grown over the last decade because Cú-
cuta stopped o(ering job opportunities. As in the case of food, the flight of fuel is originated
close to the border. According to a report of the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Oil, the
department of Táchira, with only 185,000 vehicles registered, has a larger consumption of
fuel that that of the Caracas Metropolitan area with over 2million cars.
14All the information related to smuggled livestock was collected in downtown Cúcuta in conversation with
slaughterhouse workers and butchers.
15It is calculated that in 2007 Venezuelan vehicles consumed 400,000 barrels of liquid fuel (70% gasoline) per
day, and that the annual subsidy ascended to US$ 12,500. In this fashion, the state is giving each vehicle an average
subsidy of US$3,000 (IPS, 2008).
16All the information related to fuel smuggled was collected in downtown Cúcuta in conversation with street
retailers.
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It is possible to observe an impressive number of large vintage American cars coming back
and forth from Venezuela. They are used for smuggling fuel since they have large tanks, some
on them modified for transporting more than 100 litres. A litre of fuel costs US$ 0.4 (cheaper
than a can of soda) whereas in Cúcuta, where legal fuel is cheaper as a means of preventing
contraband, it costs 60 cents and in Bogotá one dollar. It is hard to find a gas station inCúcuta;
most of them have shut down. On the other side, in San Antonio, one sees the big cars on
the left side of the road and drivers making signs to the moscos (flies) who are the people in
charge of taking bribes from smuggling cars. Moscos pass and as they collect the money they
make a chalk mark on the bonnets, indicating that the bribe was already collected. Once the
marked cars reach the border, guards from the Guardia Nacional Bolivariana let them pass
without inspection. The same mechanism is applied for food and other smuggled goods. Of
course, further bribes are demanded on the Colombian side.
Currency exchange black market
The foreign exchange market in Cúcuta is one of the largest in the country. Professionals of
the sector buy and sell considerable amounts of Bolivars and then bureaux de change cash
the Bolivars in registered Venezuelan bank accounts where they are converted into US dollars.
The dollars are later converted into pesos in Cúcuta, returning to their natural market. The
peso/bolivar, bolivar/dollar and dollar/peso conversion has been a favourite in the field of
money laundering, generating massive profits for the foreign exchange market guild.
However, the ultimate way of playing with the exchange rate is through the Venezuelan
Cadivi card, a subsidized credit card provided by the government. Each Venezuelan has a
spending limit of US$4,000 per year when travelling abroad, and under the Cadivi scheme
dollars are almost three times cheaper than on the black market. Users pay the debt by instal-
ments in devaluated Bolivars. Venezuelans go to well-known shops in Cúcuta’s downtown,
which have specialized in ghost purchasing operations. Users swipe their cards for any given
value and get that value in cash; shops charge a commission of between 10 and 30 per cent of
the transaction and provide customers ghost receipts (dental and plastic surgeries, air tickets,
hotels). Venezuelans later sell the cash with a better exchange rate. Although in 2009 the
Chávez administration reduced the Cadivi spending limit to US$2,500 and imposed restric-
tions to operations made in Colombia, the business has become increasingly sophisticated:
Cúcuta’s shopkeepers have card readers that connect the transactions to ghost businesses in
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Ecuador and Panama and provide clients with false air tickets and passport stamps as proof
of travel to either of these countries.
Drug tra%cking
Although NDS was used as an occasional platform for cocaine exports in the 1980s, the de-
partment’s strategic criminal potential only started being fully exploited since the early 1990s.
NDS is one of the few departments where all the stages of the drugtra*cking chain take place
within the territory. First, there is the peripheral Catatumbo region with the largest coca ex-
pansion in northern Colombia (which reached over 12,000 hectares in 2004) and an important
processing infrastructure.
Second, the poorly controlled border with Venezuela has become one of the main cocaine
exports points as a consequence of the relative exhaustion of the traditional Caribbean routes
mostly due to the U.S. interdiction programmes. Over the last years Venezuela has become a
strategic point in the route for cocaine tra*c to Europe17 where the use of cocaine is on the
rise and has tripled in a number of countries during the last decade. Third, as discussed be-
fore, contraband has not only transferred the criminal know-how and infrastructure to drug
tra*cking, but has also served as an important means for laundering money and obtaining
cheap chemical ingredients for cocaine processing. And fourth, there is the dynamic currency
exchange black market in Cúcuta that has served money-laundering needs. At some point
during the early 2000s drug tra*cking money flooded the market in Cúcuta through shops,
restaurants, bars, and gambling places. In 2003, the National Revenues’ O*ce reported al-
most 70,000 suspicious operations that had taken place in businesses located in Cúcuta’s
metropolitan area.
Besides being an illicit activity, drug tra*cking can be also classified as informal, under-
stood as a source of informal jobs (Martin-Masso, 2008). It absorbs labour from declining
economic sectors (Lee, 1998): the coca/cocaine economies are important employers who di-
rectly hire coca bush growers, seasonal coca leaf harvesters, leaf merchants, truck drivers,
chemists, couriers, small aircrafts and pilots, and so forth. The bulk of this labour force is
engaged in the agricultural end of the business, and it is estimated that in 2005 there were
17The route to Europe is very complex. According to UNODC (2007), once the cocaine reaches Venezuelan
territory it is shipped to western Africa where it is stored and repackaged in countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory
Coast, and Guinea Bissau. Nigeria is the main hub for drug distribution towards Europe and the drug enters
mainly through the Iberian Peninsula and the Netherlands.
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almost 3,000 labourers in coca cultivation. Nonetheless, the labour force is increasingly im-
portant in urban centres, through tra*cking (exports and domestic micro-tra*cking) and
money laundering. The informal nature of this market has also greatly expanded as drug traf-
ficking connects with other activities such as arms tra*cking, vehicle theft, smuggling, and
prostitution among others.
In sum, NDS and Sucre exhibit radical di(erences as far as underlying criminality is con-
cerned. As seen, Sucre did not experience a strong organized crime phenomenon before the
emergence of the AUC. It has been a cocaine tra*c point of intermediate importance, con-
trolled by small non-local mafias. Moreover, coca crops have never developed in Sucre. Infor-
mality has not stemmed from illicit economies but from a rigid agrarian structure and a little
diversified economy.
On the contrary, illegality has importantly hijacked NDS’s economy, blurring not only the
lines between other criminal activities and the informal market, but also those between ille-
gality and legality. The peripheral situation of the Catatumbo region and the tradition of
contraband made NDS one of the main Colombian organized crime centres with a large in-
formal economy. This situation had major consequences for the intensification of collective
violence from the 1990s, and decisively shaped paramilitary formation, forms of accumula-
tion and politicization in the department, a matter thoroughly analysed in the next chapter.
political configuration and transformation
The political configuration of NDS is radically di(erent from that of Sucre. Three factors are
at the base of the distinction: the early decline of the hacienda structure, the fact that histor-
ically most of NDS population is urban, and the lack of hegemonic status of any traditional
party or political house.
As discussed, Sucre was characterized as a traditional Liberal stronghold and the party was
practically hegemonic. Although NDS is considered the cradle of the Conservative party in
Colombia18 the party has never managed to achieve political hegemony. Of 40municipalities,
only 16 have been historically Conservative and 13 traditionally Liberal, Cúcuta included,
where most of the Liberal vote is concentrated. The rest have had no distinct partisan a*li-
18One of the party’s founders was José Eusebio Caro, a politician born in Ocaña. Caro fervently promoted the
defence of constitutional order and legality against dictatorship and monarchy, the protection of property rights
against communism, that of Roman Catholic morality against atheism, the equality of citizens before the law, and
the victory of “civilization against barbarism”.
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ation. Nonetheless, it is possible to assert that the department has a Conservative majority
since the party’s foundation in 1849.
Between 1939 and 1945 NDS was the department with the third largest Liberal vote in the
country – 76.5%of the departmental vote – (Pinzón, 1989); this electoral behaviour coincides
with the so-called national Liberal hegemony (1930–1946), when all elected Presidents were
Liberal. In this context the Gaitanista vote in 1946 was 38% of the departmental Liberal
vote and only 20.4% of the departmental total vote. But between 1946 and 1949 hegemony
shifted to the Conservative party with 58.7%(Pinzón, 1989), coinciding this timewith the last
two consecutive Conservative governments (1946–1953) before the short General Rojas Pinilla
and the Junta Militar dictatorships (1953–1957). This situation reveals that the predominant
political orientation in NDS shifted according to that of the party in presidential o*ce (Weiss,
1966). From 1958 to 1966 – during the Frente Nacional’s era – the liberal vote dropped to
39.4% (Pinzón, 1989).
Unlike Sucre, La Violencia greatly a(ected NDS, a matter that is mainly explained by the
Liberal pressure over Conservative municipalities since 1930, when the Liberal party won the
presidency after the so-called Pax Conservadora when the Conservative party took presiden-
tial o*ce in the aftermath of the Thousand Days War19 in 1902 and remained in power until
1930. According to Guerrero (1991), once the Liberal party took o*ce in 1930, Liberal may-
ors were appointed in Conservative municipalities, generating strong inter-party tensions that
later ended up in collective violence. In 1948 NDS had a homicide rate of 48 for 1,000 inhab-
itants and 79 in 1949 while the average national rate for those years was of 10.20 However,
violence decreased after 1949; that is why NDS is characterized as a department of “earlyVio-
lencia” (mostly located in the eastern areas of Colombia), in contrast with central andwestern
areas of “late Violencia” such as Antioquia, Tolima and Cundinamarca, where changes in vi-
olent patterns took place in the early 1950s.
Much like other Colombian departments, NDS has not been alien to partisan clientelism
and machine politics. However, due to the fact that the hacienda system soon disintegrated
and other forms of land structure from latifundia developed, the scope and reach of traditional
clientelism was limited. Moreover, the fact that in a region such as Catatumbo colonization
19The Thousand Days War was the eighth and last Colombian civil war in the 19th century. As the previous
wars, this was also a partisan strife between the Conservative and Liberal parties’ radical factions. In 1899 the
ruling conservatives were accused ofmaintaining power through fraudulent elections. The situationwasworsened
by an economic crisis caused by falling co(ee prices in the international market, which mainly a(ected the Liberal
opposition.
20Source: Ministry of Justice.
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processes were disorderly made the building of stable clienteles more di*cult. Another im-
portant limitation to traditional forms of clientelism is that Cúcuta’s process of urbanization
and industrialization generated the conditions for the ascent of a new elite linked to trade
and industry and not to land. It also consolidated a significant middle class, an industrial
proletariat and a wide popular sector.
The explanation for the emergence of machine politics is no di(erent from that in Sucre:
the pyramidal structure that once linked the great Liberal and Conservative national factions
to their respective subnational operators started crumbling at the end of the Frente Nacional
regime. A progressive disaggregation of parties took place at the local level with politicians
becoming increasingly autonomous from their national chiefs. In this context, NDS also expe-
rienced the emergence of professional politicians, a trend that increased electoral competition.
From the mid-1980s, in the context of decentralization and elections of mayors and governors,
national political chiefs were almost completely displaced from subnational politics.
Electoral competition in NDS stemmed mostly from the internal fragmentation of tradi-
tional parties and to a lesser extent from competition from the Left and other alternative
movements. Notwithstanding the fact that the Communist party and later the Patriotic Union
party (UP) hadmore relevance inNDS than in Sucre –mostly because of the strong social plat-
form they built upon oil trade unions and the 1980s northeastern strikes – the Left has never
constituted a significant force. “The trajectory of the Left in NDS has never been too strong
and its electoral strength has been quite marginal. Perhaps the UP enjoyed some success in
the late 1980s and early 1990s in some Catatumbo municipalities, or more recently the Alter-
native Democratic Pole”, noted an interviewed analyst. He added “the greatest sin of the Left
in the department is that it never generated a strong base; it never did a thorough work at the
neighbourhood level or anything of that sort. The Left got stuck in the world of trade unions”
(Oviedo, 2009). Another important factor is that NDS did not experience the political impact
of local or regional guerrillas’ demobilization processes like the cases of EPL or CRS in Sucre.
However, the relative weakness of the Left did not immunize the department from the wave
of political violence against social movements since the mid-1980s.
As in Sucre, politicians in NDS have not exhibited entrepreneurial energy; instead the con-
trol over public resources and contracts has been the main source of personal wealth and
campaign financing. The enlargement of central government transfers, in particular royalties
from the oil and mining industry, also became a source of diversion: oil and coal exploitation
as well as the usufruct of the Caño-Limon pipeline have generated royalties of over US$10mil-
lion per year. However, political campaigns have not only been financed via the diversion of
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public resources in NDS. It is said that political campaigns have traditionally received funds
from smugglers and bureaux de change owners, and more recently, from drug tra*ckers via
well-known intermediaries, a matter discussed in the next chapter.
Although the Liberal party was never the strongest force in the department, it managed for
decades to prevent the consolidation of a conservative hegemony. NDS’s politics remained
bi-partisan until the end of the 1990s when traditional parties “defrosted” and atomized in a
myriad of micro-electoral enterprises. The fact that in NDS the atomization’s impact was not
as strong as it was in Sucre as less new political parties and movements derived from the Con-
servative lines, which clearly held the majorities. Nevertheless, the Liberal party experienced
an important electoral loss since the mid-1990s, as observed in Table 9 below. From five active
Liberal houses in 1997, only one house survived in the party’s o*cial line; the rest migrated
to the Uribista coalition.21 The Conservative party, although never a hegemonic force, clearly
held the majorities, and its politicians proved to be more disciplined than their counterparts
in Sucre. Although in the 2002 elections the Conservative party experienced a slight curbing
in its subnational representation because of the competition of emerging parties, by joining
the Uribista coalition it remained a majority force.
As in Sucre, departmental politics followed the national trend of moving towards the right,
and neither independents nor the new Left became as strong as in other parts of the country,
which is somewhat puzzling insofar as Cúcuta is one of Colombia’s largest cities, with a great
potential for independent vote.
21The Cristo family house is the only house that remained within the Liberal party o*cial line. The Salcedo,
Colmenares, Silva and Flórez houses migrated to other parties and movements.
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political configuration and transformation
The impact of new parties was stronger in Congress than in local elections (Table 10). Ig-
noring Conservatives, the coalition had two Senators and four Representatives elected in 2002,
and two and one respectively in 2006. They neither had great impact in the Departmental As-
sembly nor did they constitute a major threat in mayoral elections. This outcome suggests
that to an important extent traditional parties kept most of the local machines greased and
running.
Two cases are particularly striking in this transitional process. That of the Colombia Alive
Party which right after its launching in the department for the 2003 local elections, won two
mayoralties, including Cúcuta’s with 127,800 votes, the largest vote in Cúcuta’s history; ma-
jorities in town councils in four municipalities, and three seats in the Departmental Assembly.
The other case is that of the Citizen Convergence Movement, which went from obtaining
2,806 votes in 2002 congressional elections to over 38,000 in 2006, growing by 1,633%. This
extraordinary electoral growth seems to be connected to the paramilitary interference in pol-
itics, discussed in the next chapter.
As for the Left, UP party won only onemayoralty in 1998. The new Left (Alternative Demo-
cratic Pole) obtained one seat at the Departmental Assembly in 2007 and won one mayoralty
in the same year.
As shown in Table 11 below, there was less proliferation of parties in NDS than in Sucre
for congressional elections: seven in 2002 and five in 2006, in contrast with twelve in Sucre for
each period. The levels of defection were also lower than in the case of Sucre, and unlike in
the latter, NDS’s politicians proved to be more disciplined with two of them running for the
Conservative party in both elections and one for the Liberal party. Likewise, three politicians
who for the 2002 elections joined new movements returned to the Liberal and Conservative
parties in 2006.
In 2002, the Coalition movement – a departmental Uribista movement – had the largest
voting (103,122), followed by the Liberal party with 81,628. Conservatives had poor results
in a department of conservative majority with 41,288 votes. However, the latter considerably
recovered in 2006 with the largest vote with 112,941 as a result of the joining to the Uribista
coalition. The U Party, following the national trends, had the second largest vote with 101,070
whereas Liberals experienced an notable decline (26,864), belowCitizenConvergence (38,344).
In the overall, Uribista parties and movements proved popular in the department.
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political configuration and transformation
Table 11: Defection tendencies in congressional elections (Comparative 2002–2006)
2002 2006
Party Chamber Votes Party Chamber Votes
Jorge Alberto
Garcia - Herreros



































Liberal Party S 29,016 Liberal Party S 26,884
Eduardo
Augusto Benitez

















HR 38,712 U Party HR 27,263
Manuel
Guillermo Mora











(*) Alternate Representatives or Senators
Source: NRO
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As in Sucre, presidential elections in NDS (2002 and 2006) also provided evidence of the
right-wing direction of politics. As shown in Tables 12 and 13, Alvaro Uribe was the winner
in 2002 and 2006 elections, unlike Sucre’s case in which the Liberal candidate had the largest
vote in 2002 but in 2006 Uribe was the winner.
Table 12: Presidential Vote in NDS (2002)
Candidate Party Votes
Alvaro Uribe Velez Colombian First 207,710
Horacio Serpa Uribe Liberal Party 83,619
Noemi Sanín Conservative Party 26,104
Luis Eduardo Garzón Political And Social Front 15,866
Harold Bedoya Pizarro Go Colombia Movmt. 1,867
Ingrid Betancourth Pulecio Green Oxigen Party 1,818
Francisco Tovar Garces Citizen Defence Movement 803
Augusto Guillermo Lora 19th Of April Movement 648
Guillermo Antonio Cardona Moreno Comunal And Comunitarian Colombia
Movmt.
512
Alvaro Cristancho Comunitarian Participation Movement 424




Table 13: Presidential Vote in NDS (2006)
Candidate Party Votes
Alvaro Uribe Velez Colombia First 239,334
Carlos Gaviria Diaz Alternative Democratic Pole 67,193
Horacio Serpa Uribe Liberal Party 36,221
Antanas Mockus Sivickas Indigenous Social Alliance 2,679
Enrique Parejo González Democratic National Reconstruction
Movmt.
1,372
Alvaro Leyva Durán National Reconciliation Mvmt. 590





the intensification of collective violence
the intensification of collective violence and the further criminaliza-
tion of the departmental economy
Unlike in Sucre, where the escalation of collective violence was strongly related to the survival
of traditional politics and the extermination of the agrarian movement, in NDS it was to a
significant extent explained by the extraordinary advantages provided by extractive, illegal
and informal economies. The internal conflict’s dynamic was not only superposed on the
uneven development map of NDS, but also contributed to the further enlargement of the
urban/rural gap.
NDS has been a privileged scenario for warring actors. Besides the strategic unregulated
borderwithVenezuela, thewestern subregion o(ers access to theCaribbean coast throughCe-
sar department; the southwestern subregion to the centre of the country and the southeastern
areas to the Orinoquía region, the centre of the Colombian oil industry. Catatumbo region
has been particularly strategic: given its location along the Venezuelan border and complex
geography, this subregion has constituted one of the most valuable rearguards for irregular
armed groups since the 1970s.
The oil rush
The chaotic processes of internal colonization and extractive economies have facilitated the
entrenchment of irregular warring actors in Catatumbo. Guerrillas first appeared in NDS in
the 1970s, with the ELN linked to the oil industry against which the group had developed a
radical discourse calling for nationalization of natural resources. Its emergence in NDS took
place in the context of a profound internal restructuring process.22 The group abandoned
its foundational Cuban rural foco conception of guerrilla struggle and political action and
initiated a process of territorial expansion in order to obtain financial resources and link to
urban centres (Rudqvist, 2006). As a result, the Camilo Torres and Carlos Armando Cacua
fronts started to systematically sabotage the oil infrastructure, extort the industry, and prey
upon local public finances.23 In this fashion, Catatumbo’s flat lands became ELN’s financial
22The ELN’s restructuring process was the outcome of a massive military defeat by the Colombian Army in
July 1973 that led the organization to the verge of extinction; however from 1975 ELN managed to survive and
recoup its strength in the course of the following years.
23The 780 kilometers Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline (which pumps around 105,000 oil barrels per day) has
been the central ELN guerrillas’ sabotage target since 1986. The pipeline blasting campaign has been aimed at
pressuring transnational oil companies to abandon their operations in Colombia. However, the sabotage activities
201
the intensification of collective violence
base whereas the intermediate andmountainous areas remained as rearguard. The insurgents
also understood the potential of accessing the Venezuelan border and creating a corridor with
neighbouring Arauca department – the centre of oil industry in Colombia – in order to seize
and prey upon the local oil economy24, much larger and important than that of NDS. The
ELN not only strengthened its military front but also its political reach by connecting to the
USO trade union in Tibú, and expanding to Cúcuta where the organization was successful in
creating strong urban militias in slums. The ELN’s politico-military activity reached its peak
during the already mentioned Northeastern Civic Strike25.
The Popular Liberation Army guerrilla (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) appeared
in NDS in the early 1980s with the Libardo Mora Toro and Ramón Gilberto Barbosa Fronts,
following a similar politico-military trend to that of ELN. Although EPL demobilized in 1991,
it continued operating in NDS through a small dissident group, and although weak, the group
concentrated on kidnapping, extortion and sabotage operations.
The guerrillas’ connection to the oil industry, particularly the ELN, was at the base of the
intensification of collective violence in the department in the 1980s – which coincided with
the local popular elections and decentralization reforms – long before the AUC emerged, con-
trary to what happened in Sucre where the internal conflict intensified in the 1990s. As in
Sucre, central government transfers of oil royalties became the guerrillas’ main financial tar-
get, particularly in Catatumbo municipalities. The conflict in NDS was further exacerbated
in the late 1980s by two factors. On the one hand, there was the emergence of FARC with the
33rd and 44th Fronts, andResistencia Barí andArturo RuizMobile Columns in the mid-1980s,
when the organization was experiencing an unprecedented military growth. This group ex-
panded in NDS as part of the strategy of creating a massive corridor along the Andean moun-
tains, from the border with Ecuador to that with Venezuela through a long chain of guerrilla
fronts. On the other hand, and as a response to the insurgency escalation and generalized
social unrest – the latter interpreted as part of the former – there was a noticeable growth of
human rights abuses by state’s o*cers and intermittent operations of paramilitary comman-
dos in the Ocaña area. It is worth noting that the first paramilitary activity in NDS, which
have been strongly connected to the pipeline repairing business. Both ELN and FARC have systematically taxed
repairing companies’ contracts, obtaining a sizeable income out of this process. The pipeline repairing business
became for over a decade a most profitable business for companies and guerrillas whereas it has generated massive
environmental and economic losses for the country.
24The ELN controlled the monopoly of the oil industry extortion for over a decade, from which the organiza-
tion derived an important share of its income. Nevertheless the high profitability of the extortive business became
a source of conflict between the ELN and FARC, unleashing a ferocious war between the two insurgent groups.
25For a detailed account on the ELN’s influence on the strike see Restrepo and Contreras (2000).
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took place in the late 1980s, coincides with the occurrence of the Northeastern Civic Strike.
As in the case of Sucre, these pre-AUC paramilitary structures were not settled in NDS’s terri-
tory and despite their “local” nomenclature – Ocaña’s Friends Society and the Convención’s
Moral Committee – these groups had their centre in neighbouring Cesar department (Arcinié-
gas, 2009). They operated in an inter-departmental space that also included Santander and
Arauca departments and one of the aims was that of curtailing the northeastern social move-
ment.
It was in this conjuncture that political violence dramatically increased in NDS. The gov-
ernment’s response to the strike was the militarization of the region against the protest, and
unionized workers were stigmatized as the ELN’s political agents (Loingsigh, 2007). Over
fifty strike leaders and participants were assassinated between July and December 1987 and
over a hundred had to leave the department under threats. The o(ensive against the social
movement continued and has been a constant ever since, aggravated by the emergence of the
AUC in the late 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 7.
Drug tra%cking and internal conflict
The endogenous connection of the internal conflict with drug tra*cking is much more salient
in NDS than in Sucre. By the end of the 1990s, FARC was bigger and stronger than ELN in
the department. Although FARC’s strengthening in NDS was to some extent connected to
the oil industry, it was actually the coca economy that made the organization financially and
militarily powerful, a phenomenon also observed in the Amazonian basin. FARC’s 33rd Front
promoted coca crops in Catatumbo’s flat area (Tibú and La Gabarra). When the AUC arrived
in NDS and the war against FARC over the control of coca started, crops started expanding
towards the intermediate area (El Tarra and Sardinata) and the mountainous area (Teorama,
Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, and San Calixto). During the 1990s FARC controlled the
entire border with Venezuela in the rural areas and the ELN was predominant in Cúcuta.
Besides the obvious extraordinary economic benefit, the coca economy has provided war-
ring actors with important social bases, mainly composed of the labour force linked to illicit
cultivation. It is worth underlining that FARC’s territorial approach in NDS significantly dif-
fered from of those of ELN and EPL guerrillas, just as it was the case in Sucre. The latter
sought to build strong politically driven social bases in the Catatumbo region, whereas FARC
sought a more instrumental support in coca communities. In this respect, Sucre and NDS
203
the intensification of collective violence
share similar patterns of guerrilla formation, with early generations seeking to promote “rev-
olutionary” communities in contrast with a latecomer FARC thatwas largely disengaged from
social processes and focused on accumulation.
The rise of the AUC in NDS is largely explained by the subnational security crisis, as in
Sucre and elsewhere in Colombia. The escalation of guerrillas’ actions, particularly FARC,
contributed to the stabilization of private forms of security. However, paramilitary formation
in NDS, as in Sucre and elsewhere in Colombia, involved other factors. In Sucre, it was the
land structure and the survival of political power structures that triggered the creation of
AUC structures. In NDS it was about controlling the largest illegal and informal economies
in northern Colombia and the entire available infrastructure required for it.
From 1999 the AUC burst in the department mainly in order to dispute FARC’s fierce grip
on coca production. Until 2004, when AUC’s Catatumbo Bloc demobilized, the war was fe-
rocious and coca crops expanded throughout the region. Besides the control of coca crops
in Catatumbo, the AUC also disputed the control over Cúcuta’s metropolitan area to ELN
guerrilla. The informal and illegal economic infrastructure built over decades in the capital’s
area also constituted crucial spoils of war for paramilitaries. As analysed in next chapter,
paramilitaries did not only politically cleanse Cúcuta but also controlled every illegal, infor-
mal and poorly regulated transaction in the area, subdued the existent criminal workforce and
allied with powerful drug tra*ckers. In sum, the AUC created in NDS perhaps its strongest
economic base by connecting for the first time the periphery to the departmental centre: the
coca/cocaine production in Catatumbo region with its distribution and other complementary
activities such as money laundering and contraband fuel in Cúcuta. Besides controlling the
underworld, the AUC proved instrumental to some legal interests in the department like the
oil exploitation and agro-industrial activities. As stated by a union worker who participated
in theNortheastern Strike, “Catatumbo leaders have beenmassively assassinated because this
is a rich zone”.26
Although this is the subject of analysis of the next chapter, it is worth anticipating that in
NDS the “guild-party-militia” trinity found in Sucre where a distinct power structure created,
financed and even commanded theAUC in order tomaintain the rural status quo and electoral
power did not materialise in NDS. As noted above, NDS’s political configuration very much
di(ers from that of Sucre and this is largely explained by a series of factors related to distinct
processes of state and politics formation, human settlement, integration into markets and
26Taken from Arciniégas, F. (2009), “Santander, Atlántico y Magdalena: Territorios signados por la violencia
antisindical”, Documentos de la EscuelaNo. 77, Bogotá D.C.: CUT/Ediciones Escuela Nacional Sindical, p. 17.
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connections between drug tra*cking and the internal conflict. As thoroughly discussed next,
the case of NDS is not one of a subnational establishment privatizing security but instead a
case of organized crime providing itself with a big and strong military structure. Because of




NORTE DE SANTANDER INC . : THE HYPER -CR IM INAL IZAT ION
OF THE ECONOMY
“When paramilitaries arrived and guerrillas fled –Nicolás remembers – [paramilitaries]
gathered the whole town and informed us that from that very moment they were in
command [...] at 5 a.m. they knocked on my door and put a gun in my head. “You’ll die
today, son of a bitch, so pray and cry”. They tied me up and I waited 24 hours to die. They
didn’t kill me but I had to serve them for as long as they stayed.”1
Asdiscussed, there are substantial di(erences between Sucre and NDS regarding the tra-jectory of the political economies in historical perspective, a matter that entails di(er-
ent paths and rationales of parapolitics. Notwithstanding the subregional variations between
Cúcuta area and the peripheral Catatumbo region and the state weakness in its regulatory
powers, NDS constitutes a more integrated space to the centre and markets, in contrast with
Sucre’s peripheral and significant disconnected situation. In terms of its political configura-
tion, despite the historical influence of the Conservative and Liberal parties, NDS has had
a more pluralistic and competitive political field that that of Sucre, which was characterized
by the predominance of single houses of Liberal origin that tightened the department’s au-
thoritarian boundaries. NDS’s parties proved more discipline than those of Sucre in terms of
fragmentation and atomization. Although politics showed the same trend of moving towards
the Right, not all houses succumbed to this tendency, making many parties and groups free
of parapolitics.
Unlike Sucre, where the long-lasting hacienda structure linked politics to the economic
accumulation process, and shaped society’s dependence on politics and clientelist ties, the
rapid collapse of the hacienda structure inNDS and the rise of trade activities drew a clear line
separating the political and economic accumulation processes. The ascent of an influential
entrepreneurial class detached from the political realm isolated political powers from local
forms of accumulation. Consequently, NDS society has been chiefly shaped bymarkets – legal
and illegal – rather than by its dependence on politics, making clienteles di(use and unstable.
1Testimony of a coca leaf harvester from the AUC’s arrival to La Gabarra in 1999, El Espectador, 2012.
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Another di(erentiating feature is NDS’s “border town” phenomenon, which facilitated its
early integration tomarkets, di(erent fromSucre’s traditionalmarginalization, stemmed from
pre-modern forms of accumulation. Nevertheless, the flourishing of trade has historically oc-
curred in the absence of basic regulations regarding border control and exchange rate mar-
kets, which consequently has created a complex display and overlapping of legal and illegal
economic activities both in modern and peripheral NDS. The former constitutes a typical
enclave model (oil, coal and coca), where the concentration of capital has not come from
within and legal and illegal activities apparently do not interconnect. The latter had instead a
complex and intertwined circuit where legal and illegal activities cross with local and outside
capital in the context of a highly unregulated trade activity with Venezuela. In this context,
political powers were instrumental to economic powers by adopting a laissez faire stance and
being protective of this economic complexity, but have never actively participated therein.
The interaction of these variables created a hyper-criminalized economic space in which
parapolitics was limited to the protection of warlords’ accumulation interests by politicians
in exchange for votes and o*ce. The collusion never reached the realm of co-governance ex-
perienced in Sucre. The research in NDS strongly suggests that unlike the political strategy
followed by theAUC in Sucre, and theCaribbean region as awhole, the strategy of theAutode-
fensas in NDS – generalizable to Arauca department also located in northeastern Colombia –
was mainly aimed at controlling the coca economy, cocaine exports through the Venezuelan
border, and other illicit and informal transactions. The patterns of state capture in NDS do
not seem to have been aimed at capturing politics as such and seeking representation from
politicians but more targeted at obtaining immunity and impunity from judicial and security
agencies. The fact that parapolitics in NDS occurred in a di(erent time frame than that of Su-
cre and did not coincide with the voting on the Peace and Justice Law, reinforces the argument
that the AUC’s logic of market overrode the logic of politics. This variation largely explains
the magnitude of the penetration of these institutions in NDS compared to Sucre. Although
some politicians benefited in di(erent ways from the AUC’s violent and financial muscle and
were important in the warlords’ strategy, collusion seems to have been more restricted in the
sense that it did not pervade the whole political space. There was never a consociational ar-
rangement based upon violence in NDS and the AUC did not co-govern as in Sucre. In this
context, and juxtaposed with Losada’s hegemonicmodel identified for Sucre, NDS rather fits
the predominance within restricted competition typology (Losada, 2006) in which paramil-
itaries were relatively indi(erent to politics – not to politicians – and supported candidates
amongst a limited pool, kindred to warlords’ interests.
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There are five features that make the case of NDS dissimilar from that of Sucre and largely
explain the prevalence of the economic rationale. The first di(erence is that drug tra*ckers
and sectors of the Colombian army and police participated in the AUC formation process;
not NDS’s establishment. To a significant extent the AUC was externally induced, a matter
that sharply contrasts with Sucre’s internally driven process.
The second variation relates to the nature of paramilitarywarfare and strategies for control-
ling resources. In NDS guerrillas were stronger in both the military and political dimensions
than those in Sucre. Insurgents embedded in the department not only because of the strategic
value of its geography but also because of the impressive amount of available resources: oil,
coca, and public budgets. This situationmade the paramilitary strategy di*cult and complex.
Despite the fact that the AUC also used a terror-intensive model against civilians in NDS as a
means of weakening guerrillas and succeeded in controlling a large share of the coca/cocaine
economies, theAutodefensas could not fully overcome FARC and to a lesser extent ELN com-
petition, unlike in Sucre where the war balance was soon tipped in favour of the AUC.
A third distinction is the role of the AUC vis-à-vis extractive economies, a feature com-
pletely absent in Sucre: the dispute with FARC over the coca economy with over 15,000
hectares of illicit crops, and the protection of the re-activating oil industry and coal exploita-
tion concessions in the Catatumbo basin. Regarding the question of rural land, unlike the case
of Sucre, the logic of accumulation through dispossession was marginal in NDS. Forcible dis-
placement was mainly instrumental to the coca economy and to the balance of war but not a
means for warlords to accumulate land or to protect the rural establishment’s status quo. Be-
cause latifundia has not been the predominant land structure in NDS and consequently there
has never been a strong agrarian movement, the AUC was not instrumental to the rural rich
interests of weakening agrarian collective action. Nevertheless, the AUC apparently used vio-
lence for the late partial alteration of the rural land structure in the Catatumbo region where
approximately 6,000 hectares were violently or fraudulently expropriated from small farmers
for the cultivation of palm oil.
The fourth di(erence is that NDS, and more specifically Cúcuta’s area, had traditionally
hosted criminal organizations connected to contraband and drug tra*c. This pre-existing
criminal structure became one of the main spoils of war for AUC warlords and the fact that
the Autodefensas had a military force of over 1,400 men facilitated the progressive monopo-
lization of criminal activities in urban areas. Consequently, the fifth peculiarity of NDS is that
the relation between criminals and politicians existed long before the AUC emerged, and al-
though it is possible to stress that on the whole politics and crime have been separated spheres
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in the department, they have traditionally co-habited and at times of elections they have in-
teracted, mostly through a complex chain of intermediaries, a matter explained later. In the
AUC era the traditional functional relation between criminals and politicians was maintained
and political actors accommodated to the characteristics of this new illegal actor.
In this chapter, parapolitics in NDS will be not only compared with Sucre but also the con-
trast between the rural and urban dynamics will be substantiated, following the comparative
line established in Chapter 6. This chapter will be divided into two sections, the first one ad-
dressing the dynamics of the internal conflict and the AUC accumulation logic in NDS, and
the second one related to parapolitics and the capture of the local state. It is noteworthy that
the available evidence for the NDS case is not as rich as that of Sucre and therefore there are
several missing pieces from the parapolitics puzzle. Despite the gaps, the bits and pieces found
allowed establishing robust tracing of the paramilitary process in the department and making
series of inferences of the relationship between the AUC and politics.
part i — the capture of the state
the strategic value of nds
NDS has had a bigger strategic value for irregular warring actors and illegal war economies
than those of Sucre in many respects. First, NDS’s territory comprises the last leg of the
Andes Mountains and the Catatumbo rain forest, which represent the most valuable guard
areas in northern Colombia. Second, Catatumbo region is the centre of the coca economy in
northern Colombia. Third, NDS location provides key mobility corridors that connect the
department with the rest of the country. The Perijá Mountains, one of the Andes Mountains’
foothills, constitute a traditional drug tra*cking corridor towards the Caribbean coast (Map
14). Fourth, the long unregulated border with Venezuela facilitates a wide array of illegal
transactions as well as the integration of NDS with the Arauca-Casanare geographic cluster
within the Orinoquía basin, the richest oil region in Colombia and also an important drug
tra*cking zone. Finally, the access to central Colombia facilitates massive trade of smuggled
Venezuelan fuel through NDS.
As already discussed there was a noteworthy pre-existing criminality in NDS by the time
the AUC emerged in the department, as a consequence of the poorly regulated border with
Venezuela and of a series of comparative advantages derived from the neighbouring country’s
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exchange rate policies. NDS has traditionally hosted criminal organizations dedicated to
large-scale smuggling activities in Cúcuta area and, since the 1980s involved in drug tra*cking
and money laundering, among others. Likewise, at the time of the AUC’s arrival, NDS had
the largest coca economy in northern Colombia and some of the most important tra*cking
routes via Venezuela.
The strategic value of NDS defined the Autodefensas’ military strategy along the urban-
rural divide – deepening the existing gap even further yet connecting modern and peripheral
areas in a complementary fashion – nd had major conseque ces o the subnational war
equation. In the Catatumbo region the AUC implanted a violence-intensive model that de-
manded a large military capacity in terms of manpower and arms. This is explained by the
magnitude of th coca-cultivated area – over 15,000 hectares in 1999 – that involved a bloody
territorial dispute with FARC, and the needs of controlling the large labour force involved
in planting and harvesting coca as well as processing cocaine. In terms of t e war equation,
although FARC lost the absolute control over the coca economy in the confrontation with the
AUC, paramilitaries never managed to monopolize it. As discussed below, the coca economy
delivered un er perman nt co frontation.
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In urban areas, the AUC resorted to a di(erent strategy that better adapted to the needs of
controlling dispersed illegal and poorly regulated legal businesses aswell as cocaine tra*cking.
The consolidation of organized criminal syndicates prior to the AUC’s emergence provided
an extraordinary platform for paramilitary control of Cúcuta’s area. Although paramilitaries
exerted large amounts of violence in the metropolitan area, the model demanded a smaller
military capacity. The organization operated in network mode, supported in pre-existing
criminal nodes. Unlike the Catatumbo case, the AUC was successful in inverting the urban
confrontation balance with guerrillas – particularly the ELN -, which was defeated in Cú-
cuta’s shantytowns.
the dynamics of the internal conflict
As previously discussed, between the early eighties and the late nineties NDS society lived un-
der guerrillas’ threats and violence. Both FARC and ELN assassinated and displaced civilians,
kidnapped farmers andmerchants, and systematically preyed on the economy. By the time the
AUC emerged in NDS, FARC was the dominant guerrilla. The ELN – who had strengthened
its military position in NDS given its ability to extort the oil industry and sabotage the oil
infrastructure in the 1980s, had experienced a progressive loss of military and political pre-
dominance during the 1990s. This is mainly explained by the decline of the oil industry and
the ELN’s disconnection with the drugs trade.2 FARC’s arrival and expansion in NDS was
mainly encouraged by the coca economy, and in Catatumbo it found an extraordinary finan-
cial resource for enlarging and strengthening its army.
The internal conflict radically intensified in NDS upon the entrance of the AUC in 1999.
On the rural front there was the dispute with FARC over the coca economy, and in the Cúcuta
area the ELN was displaced and the entire criminal market the area appropriated. A matter
that cannot be found in Sucre is that a major consequence of the intensification of the con-
flict in NDS was the displacement and contagion e(ects on the other side of the border. As
examined later, the Venezuelan territory became a safe haven for FARC under the alleged of-
ficial protection of the Chávez administration, where the organization also became involved
in extortion and kidnapping activities. In response, many Venezuelan rural rich who opposed
2Given its “theology of revolution” Catholic background, the ELN has been traditionally separated from
drug tra*cking activities. This is perhaps one of the main variables at play in the ELN decline. Although the
organization has tried to win a small share of the business in recent years, FARC and paramilitaries have been
dominant actors for a long time.
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the Chávez regime allegedly started to finance paramilitary structures with the support of the
Autodefensas.
Paramilitary formation
One the main di(erences between Sucre and NDS is the process of paramilitary formation.
While paramilitarism was an internally induced process in Sucre, NDS was externally stim-
ulated: security forces, drug tra*ckers and other criminals – with distinct interests in NDS
territory, implanted AUC structures formed in other Colombian regions. “Paramilitarism as
we know itwas an external phenomenon inNDS; it is not something that sprang fromwithin”,
said an academic interviewed. “It came from Montería [Córdoba’s capital in the Caribbean
region, considered the AUC’s cradle] with a clear goal of anti-subversive control and also with
the objective of controlling drugs and arms tra*cking corridors” (Bautista, 2009). The direc-
tor of local NGO PARCOMUN argued that the AUC did not arrive in NDS on its own: “the
‘marriage’ to the public force and drug tra*ckers had clear strategic interests in the narcotics
production” (Oviedo, 2009). According to an investigation by the Solicitor General’s O*ce,
the overall departmental strategy was indeed externally planned (Verdad Abierta, 2008): the
paramilitary campaign originated inCórdoba as the outcome of an agreement betweenAUC’s
top commanders Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso, two top-ranking o*cers from the
Colombian Army, as well as Los Pepes3 and Los Azules, criminal structures with an significant
participation in the drugs trade in NDS prior to the paramilitary entrance.
Before the creation ofNDS’s paramilitary structures, the AUC organization from the neigh-
bouring Cesar department (Autodefensas del Sur del Cesar – AUSC) engaged in counter-
insurgency tasks in the western Catatumbo territory from 1997, aimed at blocking a tradi-
tional ELN corridor along the NDS- Cesar border. Nonetheless the AUSC did not actually
control NDS’s territory; it only developed “hit-and-run” operations in Ocaña, Ábrego, La
Playa and La Esperanza.
It was only in 1999 that the Catatumbo Bloc (CB)was created as an exclusive AUC structure
for NDS. Although the CB belonged to the same Sucre’s MMHB jurisdiction, the Northern
Bloc, the CB was not put under “Jorge 40’s” command but under Salvatore Mancuso’s. The
fact that a commander of the stature of Mancuso took direct control of the CB reveals the
3One of the Los Pepes family members was Gerson Gonzalez, alias “Kiko”, one ofMancuso’s right handmen
who would later manage the AUC’s only cocaine processing laboratory in the Catatumbo region (Verdad Abierta,
2009a).
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strategic importance of this structure for the organization. The CB, with 1,434men, was com-
posed of two structures: La Gabarra Front (LGF) which operated in Tibú, El Tarra, Sardinata
and San Calixto commanded by Armando Perez, alias “Camilo”. La Gabarra Front had a
special group, the Fronteras Front (FF), commanded by Jorge Iván Laverde, alias “El Iguano”,
in charge of Cúcuta’s metropolitan area, Puerto Santander, Chinácota and Pamplona (Map
15). The second structure was the Mobile Catatumbo Bloc (MCB) under alias “Felipe” com-
mand, concentrated in Hacarí, Ocaña, Teorama, Convención and El Carmen. The CB was
active between mid-1999 and December 2004when the whole bloc was formally demobilized.
Map 15: Influence areas of AUC and guerrillas in NDS
Source: Presidential O*ce of the High Commissioner for Peace. Mapped by the author.
The CB had two distinct strategies in NDS. A rural strategy aimed at controlling the coca
economy in the Catatumbo region where the organization challenged FARC for the control
of approximately 15,000 hectares of coca crops during almost five years and hindered the
ELN from operating in the oil exploitation areas. It is important to note that except for
the Catatumbo region, rural areas in NDS seemed to lack strategic importance for the AUC.
These are characterized as middle and small traditional agricultural areas of closed frontier
not as peripheral as Catatumbo and therefore not suitable for developing illicit crops on a
large scale. Although the CB operated in other rural regions it did not actually exert or fight
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with guerrillas over the control of these territories. As shown inMap 15, guerrillas controlled
other departmental areas, namely southern and mid-western zones.
The urban strategy was directed at controlling the pre-existing criminal infrastructure and
opportunities aswell as eliminating the ELN’s influence in shantytowns. Notwithstanding the
distinctiveness of each strategy, there was a strong complementarity between the rural and the
urban approaches. “Catatumbo and Cúcuta’s dynamics were not isolated from each other;
they were connected through a well-structured strategy, and made part of a project against
insurgents, subjection of the population and the capture of the state” (Oviedo, 2009). But
above all, the existing evidence demonstrates that a stronger complementarity existed in the
field of illegal markets. Controlling Cúcuta’s metropolitan area had three main critical conse-
quences for the AUC. First, it provided control over the black market of Venezuelan fuel and
consequently it generated a dramatic reduction in the costs of coca paste production in the
Catatumbo region. Second, it facilitated the control of strategic corridors for cocaine tra*ck-
ing through the neighbouring country.4 Third, the extraordinary cash flows generated in the
Catatumbo region could find innumerable channels and mechanisms for money laundering
in Cúcuta.
The rural dynamic of the conflict
According to the consulted judicial and police files, theCBfirst emerged inCúcuta’smetropoli-
tan area (phase I-Map 16) and within days it emerged in the Catatumbo region, specifically
in Tibú and El Tarra (phase II). By 2001 the AUC had progressed to the intermediate zone in
El Carmen and Convención (phase III), and by early 2002, the organization had reached the
mountainous area of Teorama, San Calixto, and Hacarí (phase 4).
The CB arrived in the Catatumbo region in 1999 when FARC was at its peak in terms of
controlling territory and the coca economy. The ELN, although not as strong as FARC, has
managed to control in the oil exploitation areas. The CB first operated in Tibú (low lands),
particularly in La Gabarra County. Once the flat area was under paramilitary control, the
AUC progressed towards the region’s intermediate and mountainous areas following FARC’s
ascending coca colonization in order to control the guerrillas’ labour force and coca harvest.
4The main corridor is Tibú – Puerto Santander – Cúcuta, with a turno( in Sardinata, where there are many
passages into Venezuela. The second one is a set of corridors structured around the road that communicates
Cúcuta with Tibú and Ocaña: the corridors connect the Catatumbo region with the Cesar department and the
highway to the Caribbean coast.
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Map 16: Catatumbo Bloc expansion in NDS (1997–2004)
Mapped by the author.
While the CB exerted influence over the flat and the intermediate areas, the AUSC from Cesar
department sought to control the mountainous regions. However, although FARC lost the
monopoly over the coca economy, the organization remained strong in Catatumbo’s moun-
tainous area.
This process generated a spiral of confrontation fed by large amounts of violence. As a
result FARCandAUC temporarily delimited their areas of influence: the formerwould control
the Catatumbo River’s left bank and the latter the right bank. However the agreement was
unstable and fragile and the non-aggression pact was soon broken by FARCwith themassacre
of 34 coca harvesters in LaGabarra in June 2004. The progression of the armed confrontation
from the flat areas to the mountains is consistent with the expansion of AUC throughout the
territory.
Unlike Sucre’s case, the fact that the AUC in NDS had to struggle with guerrillas over both
the production of coca and the tra*cking of cocaine entailed using large amounts of human
and financial resources. It is no surprising then that the CB was one of the AUC’s largest
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structures. The rural strategy entailed not only employing large amounts of violence against
civilians but also using an sizeable part of the available manpower for the protection of coca
crops, cocaine processing laboratories and tra*cking routes to Venezuela.5 Drug tra*cking
activities also implied exercising strong social control over coca growers and harvesters, coca
base and cocaine producers, and small drugs retailers. It required taxing buyers and sellers
and enforcing transactions; guaranteeing the flux of chemical precursors (mainly fuel and ce-
ment) for transforming coca base. It also demanded constructing infrastructure for accessing
isolated areas and to export cocaine, like roads, river docks and clandestine runways.
Violence followed exactly the same geographical path described above. As the confronta-
tion progressed from lowlands to themountainous area, guerrillas and paramilitaries engaged
in a spiral of violence that left a death toll of over 11,200 civilians, the disappearance of al-
most 200, and the forcible displacement of at least 19,000 families.6 Homicide rates more
than doubled between 1999 and 2001, and reached the peak of 180 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants in 2002. Between 1999 and 2000 murderous violence was very intense in the flat
area; violence increased substantially during the year 2000 in the intermediate area, and in the
mountainous area between 2001 and 2003. This dynamic not only involved the elimination of
the “enemy-competitor” labour force, but also that of leaders of social organizations, human
rights activists and Barí people.
5NDS is the main drug-tra*cking route to Europe, via western Africa, through Venezuela, and to a lesser
extent to the U.S. Due to the increasing anti-narcotics enforcement in Colombia, the AUC established operation
bases in Venezuela with the alleged support of Venezuelan authorities, in particular, the Guardia Nacional.
6Source: (CALCP, 2009).
216
the dynamics of the internal conflict
Figure 18: Catatumbo region homicide rates (1999–2005)
Source: National Police
As shown in Figures 19 and 20, massacres7 and forcible displacement followed similar pat-
terns. Assassination and forcible displacement became a strategy to guarantee the reliability
of the Catatumbo region as a strategic area for illicit crops and drug tra*cking. The de-
population and repopulation processes in the Catatumbo mainly conformed to the logic of
securing a reliable workforce for the coca/cocaine industries from other regions. But forcible
displacement also served emerging agro-industrial interests, specifically in the palm oil sector,
a matter discussed below.
7Among many massacres, the ones perpetrated in Tibú in 1999 (one with 11 victims and another with 32)
and in El Tarra in 2000with 20 victims constituted an important milestone in the AUC territorial control process.
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Figure 19: Massacres in the Catatumbo Region (1999–2005)
Source: Presidential O*ce of the High Commissioner for Peace
Figure 20: Forcible Displacement in the Catatumbo Region (1999–2006)
Source: Presidential O*ce of the High Commissioner for Peace
Coca crops moved in the same direction of the confrontation noted above – from the flat ar-
eas to the mountains. Nevertheless, contrary to what happened in other Colombian regions,
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the total area of coca crops did not grow: they experienced a dramatic decline from 15,000
hectares in 1999 to 3,055 in 2004 (Figure 21). Besides the relative e(ectiveness of the Colom-
bian police and U.S. government joint aerial eradication in the region, the displacement of
crops from the flat areas to the mountains in a short period of time reduced the stability levels
of the crops8: in 1999 the geographic core of illicit crops was located in Tibú and El Tarra,
where most crops were located. As crops moved towards the mountains, the nucleus moved
to the intermediate areas. In 2005 there were hardly any crops left in the flat area. For many,
this phenomenon reveals the alleged pacts between the AUC and multinational oil companies
for making the flat area more competitive and safe.
Figure 21: Evolution of cultivated and eradicated (*) hectares of coca crops in the Catatumbo
region (1999–2008)
(*) Each hectare is fumigated in average 2.5 times in order to successfully eradicate coca bushes
Source: DNE (Anti-Narcotics National O*ce)
Contrary to the case of Sucre, the AUC never became a dominant warring actor in NDS not
only because it did not seek to control the whole departmental territory – the CB specifically
concentrated in the Catatumbo region and Cúcuta’s metropolitan area – but also because it
could not overcome the competition of one of FARC strongest structures in the country. The
AUC succeeded in e(ectively controlling the flat areas and also gaining a large zone of influ-
ence in the intermediate areas where guerrillas were still active. FARC became predominant
in the mountainous area.
8The stability level is a measure used to account for the capacity of expanding coca crops overtime without
abandoning the initial nucleus of crops. Stability levels depend mainly upon the e*cacy of eradication policies:
if they are successful the crops will move towards areas out of the reach of eradication policies leaving behind the
initial nucleus; if not, coca crops expand by maintaining the initial nucleus as a reference. According to UNODC
(2008a), NDS’s average stability level for 2000–2005 was the lowest, 0.5, whereas the national average was 6.9.
219
the dynamics of the internal conflict
As for the ELN, the organization was progressively weakened by the AUC in the flat area
where the organization had strengthened thanks to the oil industry. The categorical rejection
of drug tra*cking activities, a stance mainly based on the argument that the drugs economy
had contributed to increasing corruption, impunity and the criminalization of political power
(Gutiérrez, 2008), is a factor that played a significant role in the ELN’s weakening and shrink-
ing. However, the organization shifted towards coca and cocaine markets since 2005, but has
not been able to compete with FARC and re-emerging paramilitary structures.
Cúcuta: the urban strategy
Cúcuta, the sixth largest city in Colombia, has one of the strongest economies in the country.
Nonetheless, a week rule of law, unregulated basic transactions, informality and exclusion
are factors that explain to an important extent the flourishing of organized crime and collec-
tive violence. Before the AUC emerged in the urban areas, guerrillas, particularly the ELN,
controlled shantytowns. “Cúcuta’s metropolitan area was fully controlled by guerrillas; the
police would not leave the stations and the army would not operate. They were confined to
barracks” (El Espectador, 2009c). Nonetheless, neither ELN nor FARC had any sort of con-
trol over organized crime in Cúcuta; the guerrilla-criminals connection was restricted to coca
paste deals.
The AUC emerged in the area of Cúcuta a couple of weeks before it arrived in the Cata-
tumbo region. As in the case of the latter, the creation of the Fronteras Front – FF – was
externally arranged. According to the Solicitor General’s O*ce, the Castaño brothers and
Salvatore Mancuso sent “El Iguano”, one of their most trusted men, to Cúcuta in order to
create an urban structure. The designation of “El Iguano” as commander of the FF was not
fortuitous. He had played a key role in the pacification process in Urabá region (Antioquia)
under the Castaño brothers’ command, which explains his rapid ascent in the organization
and his transferral to strategic areas for the AUC. “El Iguano” had specialized in penetrating
urban centres: infiltrating security agencies, combating insurgent groups, absorbing existing
criminal structures, monopolizing illegal activities, implementing complex extortion struc-
tures, creating intelligence networks, and controlling the slums. These qualities made him
well suited to the challenging task of taking over Cúcuta; hence he was transferred to NDS to
operate under Mancuso’s orders where he remained until the CB demobilized in 2004.
220
the dynamics of the internal conflict
According to “El Iguano”, “CarlosCastaño called ameeting inUrabá [northwesternColom-
bia] [where] he told me that he had already made arrangements to break in Catatumbo [...]
a trader from Cúcuta and friend of Castaño known as Papo had said that they were in need
of urban and rural Autodefensas in the area of Cúcuta. We arrived there on the 9th of May
1999 [...] five commanders [...] Papo organized us” (La Opinión, 2007). The FF commander
also indicated that he and his men had the task of merging with a gang known as Los Polleros
with fifteen men specialized in social cleansing in the metropolitan area slums. “El Iguano”
absorbed this gang – as he subsequently did with all urban gangs – and in this fashion the FF
was formed.
The FF operated in two complementary directions. On the one hand, it functioned as an
agent of political contention through an aggressive counter-insurgency cleansing campaign in
the comunas (shantytowns) through a war waged under a “bloc by bloc” dynamic from the
very beginning. “El Iguano” stated: “we got there [Cúcuta] [...] and the other group reached
Catatumbo twenty days later. When the latter arrived, we [FF] had already assassinated 60
ELN urban militia members in Cúcuta” (La Opinión, 2007). The ELN’s weakening was par-
ticularly notorious in Cúcuta between 1999 and 2001 with the AUC’s arrival en masse.
On the other hand, paramilitaries operated like a highly sophisticated organized crime
structure. Unlike the AUC’s rural structures, which were organized in a military fashion, the
FF mainly operated as a network in which AUC cells and all pre-existing criminal structures
constituted individual nodes. This architecture strongly di(ered from the urban paramilitary
organization in Sucre, which aside from some protection rackets was hardly di(erent from
that of the countryside. “El Iguano” soon monopolized dispersed criminal structures of all
sorts, co-opting some and eliminating others, and created a complex network of extortionists,
hit men, money launderers, large-scale smugglers, and contract enforcers.
The urban process had two phases. The first one consisted of cleaning the comunas from
guerrillas’ bases and “undesirables” as well as absorbing the available scattered criminal work
force and infrastructure. Besides murderous violence, the FF created a complex protection
racket that comprised households, small shops, unlicensed security firms, and wholesale food
markets among others. The structure succeeded in covering almost every neighbourhood
through vigilante groups supported by intelligence networks formed by guerrilla defectors,
taxi drivers, small shopowners and private guards.9 In this fashion, the FF built significant
9Paramilitaries were also deeply involved in the private security business. Besides the security firms’ profits
the FF used guards as information sources, as El Tiempo reports. In Colombia, the private security sector is
poorly regulated and as a consequence an important share of companies operate without a license. Investigators
a*rm that the AUC forced the unlicensed companies’ managers to resign in order to designate trusted people
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networks in Cúcuta’s downtown and shantytowns and extended the AUC’s influence to crim-
inal sectors in those areas, maximizing its operational capacities and financial resources. In
Cúcuta’s rural zones the AUC established camps in El Zulia, Puerto Santander and Villa del
Rosario used for cocaine processing and tra*c. At the end of 2002, the AUC exerted full
coercive control over Cúcuta and its metropolitan area.
It is estimated that between 2002 and 2005 the FF perpetrated 42 massacres (154 peo-
ple assassinated), 5,200 selective homicides and over 600 forcible disappearances in the area
(CALCP, 2009). Regarding the latter, “El Iguano” revealed that the FF built two crematoria,
one in Villa del Rosario and the other in Puerto Santander, in order to disappear the front’s
victims without a trace. In 2001, 98 victims were cremated. During two years the crema-
toria replaced the traditional paramilitary practice of corpse dismemberment and burial in
common graveyards.10
The National Forensic Institute reported 2002 as the most violent year in Cúcuta’s history
and consequently the Institute was declared in state of emergency given the massive activity
of removal of bodies. For that year the homicide rate was of 115 per 100,000 inhabitants. This
wave largely involved the social cleansing campaign against prostitutes, drug addicts, petty
thieves, LGBTI, homeless, and peddlers, as well as violence against resilient gangs. In turn,
the political cleansing strategy with over 150 victims was not as territorially defined as the
social cleansing one, and was aimed at public o*cials, human rights activists, community
leaders, union workers, left wing activists, and university students.11 The most notorious
cases were those of Pauselino Camargo, independent politician and former Cúcuta mayor, as-
sassinated in February 2000; Iván Villamizar, head of the Libre University in Cúcuta, former
NDS Ombudsman and Secretary of Finance, killed in February 2001; Enrique Flórez, an ex-
ternal legal advisor to the Mayor of Cúcuta, murdered in 2003; and Tirso Vélez, a left wing
candidate for the Governor’s O*ce in 2003, was shot dead in June 2003, a few months before
in these positions. The AUC’s penetration of the private security business was so great that the FF paramilitary
commanders were able to call all managers to meetings in Juan Frío, 30minutes fromCúcuta, in order to establish
the monthly “contribution” that these firms should pay the AUC in order to operate as well as to define the
mechanisms used by guards in order to collect valuable information. Before contacting the police, private guards
warned the AUC about guerrillas, robbers, lowlifes or car thieves in the di(erent neighbourhoods (El Tiempo,
2004).
10According to “Hernán”, Villa del Rosario’s AUC commander, the crematoria were banned by the AUC
commandership in 2003 because “it was against the International Court of Justice”, and therefore, in an “act of
extreme consideration”, AUC stopped cremating victims and instead their corpses were thrown into the Táchira
River in Venezuela. See El Espectador (2009a) and Verdad Abierta (2009b).
11The Francisco de Paula Santander University Campus became a main AUC target: students and professors
were systematically threatened. One of the most notorious cases is the assassination of students Edwin Lopéz and
Gerson Gallardo in 2002. Weeks after they went missing they were found shot dead, with evidence of torture.
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the elections. By then he was leading the polls. Vélez had been mayor of Tibú in 1992 for
the Patriotic Union Party, and while in o*ce he and his family were subjected to innumerable
threats. He was also departmental deputy, member of the National Commission for Peace
and founder of the local NGO Redepaz.
During this first phase “El Iguano” was also successful in infiltrating state security agencies
-the national police and the secret service – and the departmental Solicitor’s O*ce. The sec-
ond phase of the urban strategy consisted in colluding with politicians, a process thoroughly
discussed in the next section.
Overall, the urban process was much more complex to the extent that Cúcuta is far more
institutionalized than the Catatumbo region and the spectrum of criminal, political, social
and economic activities are wider. However, the strategy was very successful as FF monopo-
lized organized crime, controlled the comunas, infiltrated state agencies, and kept guerrillas at
bay. During this process ELNmilitias were brought to the edge of disappearance and FARC’s
urban structures had to withdraw to rural areas.
Conflict displacement and contagion
When the Uribe administration launched its o(ensive against guerrillas in 2002, both FARC
andELN sought refuge in the areas bordering Ecuador andVenezuela in order to avoidColom-
bian military sweeps. One of the main consequences of the intensification of the internal
conflict in NDS was – and continues to be – its increasing movement towards Venezuela.
The paramilitary-guerrilla confrontation has not only generated thousands of Colombian
refugees in Venezuelan territory but has also pushed FARC to use Venezuelan territory as a
strategic rear guard. This situation has contributed to the deepening of the historical tensions
between the two countries.12
Over the last decade the Colombian internal conflict has become a threat to the regional
security and stability as it has not only displaced towards neighbouring countries but has
also had a contagion e(ect. The phenomenon has been particularly sensitive in the case of
12For over a century Colombia and Venezuela have had a territorial dispute over a share of the border that has
not been solved n spite of the diplomatic e(orts and has therefore constituted a source of tension. Nevertheless,
it is the armed conflict situation in the border the matter that has reached the highest contentious point more
specifically the alleged protection of FARC by Hugo Chávez administration has been a highly contentious matter
over the last decade.
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Venezuela. However Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Panama, have also experienced it.13 For
many regional governments, this situation has been significantly caused by U.S. military in-
volvement in Colombia. They argue that the military o(ensive against FARC and the aerial
eradication of illicit crops have pushed rebels and coca across the borders. This situation has
not only redefined the regional alignment vis-à-vis the U.S (Tokatlian, 2006) in which an in-
creasing number of countries oppose U.S. policies but has also had a pervasive impact on the
diplomatic relations.
TheColombian conflict experienced an important change since Colonel HugoChávez took
o*ce. It has been repeatedly purported that the progressive displacement of the conflict to
Venezuelan territory, specifically to Táchira, Zulia and Apure states, is the outcome of the pro-
tection received by FARC under Chávez’s administration. This situation has generated severe
diplomatic tensions, mostly during the Uribe administrations (2002–2006 and 2006–2010).
For almost a decade both governments became involved in a deeply polarized debate about
the U.S. military and anti-narcotics involvement in Colombia. President Uribe systematically
accused Chávez’s administration of being ine(ective in combating drug tra*cking activities
and of supporting guerrillas through arms supply and the provision of refuge. In turn, Chávez
accused the Uribe administration of unconditional alignment to the U.S. and even of plotting
to assassinate him.14 By putting forward threats to the national defence, Chávez used the bor-
der as a potential war scenario between the two countries.15 The continuous crisis generated
temporary suspensions of trade activity, a matter that further contributed to the promotion
of informality and illegality on both sides of the border.
The polarization of the debate had consequences beyond bilateral relations. On the one
hand, the region experienced a contagion e(ect. Chávezmanaged to align Ecuador, Nicaragua
13Another diplomatic crisis was unleashed with Ecuador in March 2008, the Colombian Air Force launched
an air raid in Ecuadorian territory and bombed a FARC’s camp in Sucumbíos department, during the so-called
Phoenix Operation (Operación Fénix), in which alias “Raul Reyes” – FARC’s second commander – and other 22
rebels were killed. A diplomatic crisis resulted as President Correa argued that Colombian had violated Ecuador’s
sovereignty during the military operation and Uribe’s administration claimed the complicity of the Ecuadorian
government with guerrillas.
14According to Venezuelan o*cial sources 130Colombian paramilitaries were detained on the 9th ofMay 2004
in a rural estate near Caracas. The men were ordered to assassinate President Chávez. Venezuelan Vice President
José Vicente Rangel revealed photographs of a supposed paramilitary training camp in Homestead (Florida) and
his claimed commander, a former o*cer from theGuardia Nacional. According to Rangel, the group was trained
by the opposition to operate in Venezuela against Chavista targets (Voltaire Net, 2004). More recently, elected
president Maduro stated that ex-president Uribe had plotted to assassinate him.
15Venezuela’s military expenditure dramatically increased over the last decade. It is estimated that Chávez’s
administration spent US$4,400 million only in weapons purchase between 2003 and 2008. Russia has been the
main supplier of combat airplanes, submarines, helicopters, and assault rifles.
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andBolivia against Colombia; butwas not successfulwith Brazil16 andArgentinawhoworked
mainly as mediators. Colombia received support from Chile, Peru, Mexico and Panama. The
rest remained at the margin. On the other hand, the armed conflict displacement also gener-
ated internal tensions in Venezuela. Táchira’s state governor of that time, who belongs to the
Social Christian Party (COPEI), the opposition party to Chávez’s Fifth Republic Movement
(Movimiento V República), was accused of promoting the entrance of Colombian paramil-
itaries into Venezuelan territory, and in turn the governor insisted that Chávez protected
Colombian guerrillas, which had introduced and dramatically increased practices such as ex-
tortion and kidnappings in some Venezuelan provinces.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric and the increasing polarization of the bilateral – and at times
regional – debate, the fact is that the Colombian conflict has indeed a(ected the neighbour-
ing country. It is calculated that between 2004 and 2006 there were 5,779 deaths reported in
Táchira, Zulia, Barinas and Apure states as consequence of the expansion of the conflict.17
In September 2003 alone forty-six Venezuelans were kidnapped (El Tiempo, 2003). There has
been no doubt that FARChas been using the Venezuelan territory over the last decade not only
as a refuge area but also as a rear guard. It is alleged they have access to clandestine runways
from which they launch operations for recovering wounded combatants from the Colombian
territory as well as tra*cking cocaine. According to Mancuso, members of the Venezuelan
army supported FARC’s 33rd Front in several confrontations with the AUC in the early 2000s
(Verdad Abierta, 2009c).
But there is also evidence of AUC involvement in this situation. It is known that the AUC
extended its military and economic rationale in the neighbouring country. Commander Car-
los Castaño accepted in 2002 that the AUC entered Venezuelan territory: “we have gone as
far as 14 kilometres into Venezuelan territory in hot pursuit of FARC members”. The BC’s
responsibility in the assassination of over 50 members of the peasant movement created un-
der Chávez’s Land Law has been established. The evidence points towards Venezuelan cattle
ranchers and agricultural entrepreneurs as responsible for many of these crimes with the com-
plicity of sectors of the army in the city of Barinas, out of fear of expropriation under the
Bolivarian revolution (Prensa Rural, 2004). Paramilitaries have been also held responsible for
the kidnapping of Richard Boulton, president of the multinational Servivensa. Likewise, it
16In spite of the border problems with Brazil, the situation has never led to an inter-governmental confronta-
tion. Lula’s administration implemented a mega-programme for the defence of the Amazonian basin significantly
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was established that every shopkeeper and trader in San Antonio del Táchira paid the AUC a
monthly “contribution” of between US$60 and US$600. As in the case of FARC, the paramil-
itary phenomenon not only moved beyond the border but also generated a contagion e(ect.
When asked about the provision of assistance to the then emerging “United Self-Defence of
Venezuela” (AUV), Carlos Castaño said that “they [AUV] are joining us in solidarity [...] we
have some people giving instruction in Venezuelan territory. We maintain communication. It
is a process that is still in its early stages” (World Press, 2002).
the accumulation logic of the auc
As stated before, drug tra*cking generated a pervasive integration of peripheral Catatumbo
into Cúcuta’s metropolitan area. It established a clear division of labour in which the coca
activity was located in the former and the tra*c and benefits thereof in the latter. The director
of the Regional Observatory for Peace and Development in NDS (ORDICOP) stated: “at
the same time the AUC was securing the Catatumbo territory they were controlling Cúcuta.
Catatumbo andCúcuta’s dynamics are complementary. The coca boom in the former boosted
the tra*c routes through the latter, money laundering via the foreign exchange sector, fuel
smuggling, car theft and other activities. The strong alliancesmade in the underworld greased
the AUC’s infiltration of the state” (Bautista, 2009).
The AUC took over the narcotics trade either by confronting guerrillas, making alliances
with well-established criminals or by eliminating “un-cooperative” competitors. As men-
tioned before, some drug tra*ckers were at the base of the creation of the CB. Upon AUC’s
arrival in NDS there were at least five criminal structures in charge of the business, relying
on FARC for the protection of crops. Almost all these structures were absorbed by the AUC,
except for the Mejía Múnera brothers known as Los Mellizos (the twins) from neighbouring
Arauca department, who had a significant grip on NDS coca and cocaine economies. Los
Mellizos were di*cult competitors for the AUC as they had established themselves as domi-
nant drug tra*ckers in northeastern Colombia. The Castaño brothers and Mancuso settled
the dispute by selling Los Mellizos an AUC franchise with which they created the Arauca’s
Victors Bloc.18 “El Iguano” recruited 53men in Cúcuta – of whom 15 were children between
11 and 13 years old – to feed the Múnera brothers’ army (Vanguardia Liberal, 2004). In ex-
18In spite of their counter-insurgent e(ort, the Colombian government did not accept this structure’s demobi-
lization attempt and the twins remained in the underworld. They created a criminal structure called Los Nevados
in 2006 after payingUS$5million for the ex-AUCTayrona Bloc inMagdalena department in the Caribbean region.
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change for some counterinsurgent operations in that department they could control the local
coca crops and tra*c routes to Venezuela from Arauca as well as have an important share of
the NDS business.
An important point is that the narcotics trade became a vehicle for the AUC not only to
extend its control over other criminal activities but also to transform the criminal landscape in
NDS. Petty crime decreased during the expansive process of theAUC in the urban areas, giving
way to a criminal model of “protection-regulation-ownership”. Under this new logic the FF
penetrated criminal forms of larger aggregate value; monopolized the contract killing mar-
ket; created a vast extortion network that systematically levied forcible contributions from
marginal households and many economic transactions; and infiltrated a share of the legal
economy. In this context, extortion constituted a central mechanism for social and market
regulation. Forcible contributions were required to keep the illicit economies running as they
guaranteed property rights, business protection and the stability of prices.
As seen in the case of Sucre, the accumulation logic of MMHB was completely di(erent.
The absence of illicit crops put paramilitary involvement in drug tra*cking in a completely
di(erent perspective. Cocaine exports were not contested by FARC and were not labour or
violence-intensive activities, at least to the extent observed in NDS. Besides drug tra*cking,
the MMHB accumulation logic was mainly centred around the violent expropriation of rural
land and the diversion of public resources. In Sincelejo the situation was also completely dif-
ferent. The latter is a far smaller city, far less relevant in terms of key economic transactions
and with a very limited criminal underworld. In terms of territorial control, the urban/semi-
urban divide is not as notable as that identified in NDS. Although extortion was part of the
AUC’s financial infrastructure, the magnitude of it was derisory if compared to the scale of
Cúcuta’s forcible contribution system, as explained below. The infiltration of drug tra*cking
in the legal economywas alsomarginal, and as discussed in the correspondent chapters, drugs
hardly flowed into the Sucreño economy. The infiltration of the economy in Sincelejo was fo-
cused on public contracting, which involved the AUC’s access to related information, o*cials
in charge, budget, and payments. As analysed further in this chapter, the public budget in
Cúcuta was also an important spoil of war for the AUC. However, the access to the level of
“white collar” crimes in the latter was obtained through investments in political campaigns
and threats against those who opposed such practices. In Sucre, it was about the creation
of a criminal power structure led by local politicians, from which the AUC co-governed the
department until 2005.
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The coca/cocaine economy
Although the dynamic of the internal conflict in the Catatumbo region generated a dramatic
curbing of the stability of coca cultivation, the coca economy continued to support the AUC’s
war e(ort. The region’s coca economy was the second most productive in the country with
6.2 harvests per year.19 Each harvest provided 700 kilos of coca leaf per hectare, that is a yearly
production 4,200 kilos per hectare (UNODC, 2008b). It is estimated that the Catatumbo’s
coca economy provided the AUCwith approximately US$70million of direct income per year
(Vote Bien, 2007).
According to Jaramillo and Duncan (2006), behind the paramilitary greed there was a
whole new way of organizing the local economy in order to maximize the income flow for
the communities they dominated. Although this argument is correct in the direction of the
paramilitary process of building social support, the organization of the local economymainly
benefited warlords. The case of coca/cocaine in NDS is illustrative. The coca economy cre-
ated a brand new type of colonizer, the illegal rural micro-entrepreneur (García, 2007) who
along with the massive seasonal labour force of harvesters altered the use of the land, mar-
ket exchange, forms of accumulation, price levels, and social stratification. Nevertheless,
coca growers have received the smallest share of the business; coca generates a slightly bet-
ter income for families than that derived from legal crops, but it does not constitute a viable
source of capital accumulation. According to SIMCI (2008), producer units – mainly families
– earned in average USD 1,320 per year in NDS when their activity only involved producing
coca leaves and not transforming them into coca paste. If units also processed coca base
earnings increased to USD 4,073. An important share of the income was used for buying agri-
cultural supplies and for paying the gramaje, a coca-trade tax levied by both guerrilla and
paramilitary groups.
However, contrary to the trends in other coca zones in Colombia, most Catatumbo growers
sold the raw leaves directly to people in charge of processing. It is estimated that throughout
the 2000s only 19% of growers processed coca leaves in NDS (UNODC, 2008b). This reveals
an important division of labour, which is mainly related to the type of arrangements that crys-
tallized between the emerging AUC and pre-existent criminal structures in the department, in
this case with Los Mellizos who controlled the transformation process.
19Guaviare department in southeast Colombia registered the highest productivity with 6.6 harvests per year.
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As for tra*cking, theCB controlled an important share of tra*cking corridors toVenezuela.
According to intelligence reports, over 50%ofColombian cocainewas then tra*cked through
a couple of Cúcuta’s routes: one went to Europe via West African states, and the other one
went to the U.S via Central America. As the paramilitary’s merger with pre-established drug
tra*ckers took place, the AUC became the most prominent wholesaler in the department.
The Autodefensas guaranteed placing orders in Venezuela and Brazil but did not manage any
destination markets (Semana, 2008). By using routes through Venezuelan territory, the AUC
became the main coca paste and cocaine supplier of Los Pepes, and in partnership with them
Salvatore Mancuso became the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta’s main supplier.20 Mancuso revealed
that they produced and sold over 120,000 kilos of cocaine between 1999 and 2004 (each kilo
worth about US$2,000), almost 15% of the drug business in the Catatumbo region, whereas
FARC managed the other 85% of the market (approximately 800,000 kilos).21
Cúcuta: the urban goldmine
“Cúcuta has traditionally experienced a significant criminal linkage. Smuggling mafias have
always existed here and then came drug tra*ckers. After that there were guerrillas benefiting
from oil and coca and after them came the AUC. This situation has created a huge criminal
universe in NDS, which in conjunction with a corrupted political class – in the best of cases
tolerant vis-à-vis the phenomenon – an increasing state of marginality and a corrupted border
with Venezuela, created the most explosive mixture” (Oviedo, 2009). It is in this context that
the FF took over a great share of NDS’s urban economy.
The paramilitary infiltration of the urban economy took place along two dimensions. The
first one is that of pre-existing criminal activities. As in any other Colombian city, there was
a proliferation of individuals and organizations competing for the di(erent segments of crim-
inal activity in Cúcuta. These activities went from pickpocketing and mugging to other more
sophisticated likemoney laundering, contraband, piracy and prostitution. The second dimen-
sion was that of poorly regulated legal businesses linked to some extent to illicit transactions,
all of them cash-intensive, in which the state was discarded as a regulatory agent. Suchwas the
20An investigation led by the Reggio Calabria Court in Italy established how the controversial Italian busi-
nessman Giorgio Sale, connected to the Calabrian mob, generated a massive money laundering operation that
used the AUC’s sophisticated frontmen chain in Colombia. The investigation also established that Mancuso was
strongly connected with Santo Scipione, a ranking member of the ’Ndrangheta, through whom the AUC supplied
cocaine to a drug tra*cking web that operated in Greece, The Netherlands, Bulgaria, Spain and Australia (El
Espectador, 2009b).
21See Verdad Abierta (2009a) and Semana (2007).
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case of sanandresitos that are smuggled goods shopping centres; wholesale foodmarkets char-
acterized in Colombia by price speculation, and gambling, a business prone to tax evasion. It
is worth noting that both dimensions increasingly intertwined, blurring to a significant extent
the divide between licit and illicit activities.
The FF succeeded in controlling Cúcuta’s underworld by coordinating di(erent criminal
actors and activities in a networked fashion. On the one hand, the structure created themuscle
for collecting debts and taxes from households, shops, poorly regulated legal transactions,
and all sorts of illegal businesses, as well as of managing money laundering channels and
activities. On the other hand, it had the armed power to enforce contracts via gangs and hit
men. In this sense the FF had a complex structure, illustrative of the ways in which the urban
conflict connected to the criminal world, not only in Cúcuta but also in other Colombian
major cities, including Bogotá. The success was indisputable: although it is very di*cult
to calculate the FF’s income, the High Court of Bogotá, based on El Iguano’s disclosure,
estimated in US$122.5 million the cost of the Front’s total war e(ort, and calculated a profit
of at least four times the Front’s expenses (HCB-110016000253200680281, 2010).
Smuggling
Until the end of the 1990s, rich smugglers were extorted and kidnapped by ELN and FARC.
During the early stage of paramilitary infiltration in NDS, the AUC’s actions substantially
reduced guerrillas’ activities in urban centres, curbing extortion activities. However, during
a second stage, the AUC recreated protection rackets and systematically extorted contraban-
dists. In a third stage, the Autodefensas fully controlled large-scale contraband, in particular
that of fuel, chemical supplies for cocaine laboratories, arms, ammunition, and stolen vehicles.
By controlling these activities, the AUC not only pursued lucrative goals, but also the military
aim of denying guerrillas access to these strategic goods as well as the use of well-established
contraband routes for drug tra*cking.
The FF seized the black market for fuel not only with the aim of controlling the illegal dis-
tribution networks in NDS and other neighbouring departments but also in order to supply
cocaine processing laboratories in Catatumbo. Regarding small-scale contraband of fuel, the
FF taxed small traders on a monthly basis. As for large-scale smuggling, the AUC monop-
olized the aforementioned fleet of American vintage cars used for transporting fuel as well
as warehouses for wholesale distribution. O*cial numbers indicate that between 2003 and
2004 approximately 30,000 barrels of smuggled fuel, worth US$2.6million, entered Colombia
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through Cúcuta every month, of which almost 12,000were resold in other Colombian depart-
ments and cities at higher prices. However, the FF’s ultimate strategy was venturing through
chains of front men in the licensed fuel collection points authorized by the national govern-
ment where legally imported Venezuelan fuel could be sold at a cheaper price per gallon (El
Tiempo, 2005).
Extortion
As mentioned, the AUC created a complex protection racket that covered a wide spectrum of
people, activities and sectors in Cúcuta’s metropolitan area. Paramilitary levies were created
for “protecting” urban poor and other sectors from the proliferation of competing extortion-
ist agents like guerrillas and other criminal groups. Although it is di*cult to estimate the
total income via extortion, some data from the International Crisis Group – ICG – provides a
rough idea of the magnitude of the protection market. In shanty towns, every shopkeeper and
household was forced to pay a monthly “cleansing and control tax”, which varied depending
on the size of the household or the business. The household tax oscillated between US$0.50
and US$1.50 per week whereas shops were charged according to weekly sales, between US$5
and US$25; in the case of beer sales the Front charged US$1.5 for every 24 bottles sold (ICG,
2007).
Another case is that of small-scale smugglers who had to pay a monthly US$15 “security
tax”. According to NDS’s Secretary of Finance, by the time the AUC was in full operational
capacity inNDS there were approximately 12,000 families who participated in fuel smuggling.
At least as many other families must have been involved in the smuggling of other goods.
Controlling wholesale food markets was always a central AUC goal in urban centres as it
not only secured valuable “countryside to urban” informant networks but also an important
source of income via the extortion of food traders.22 The AUC’s tax base was also composed
of Cúcuta’s downtown shops and bars, taxi companies, and private security firms.
Money laundering
Cúcuta is one of Colombia’s money laundering paradises. Contraband, black market cur-
rency exchange and corruption in border controls facilitated the laundering of repatriated
22There is the case of five fruit traders from Cenabastos, Cucuta’s wholesale food market, assassinated in
December 2002 after refusing to pay AUC’s “Christmas” extortion (SCJ-33301, 2010).
231
the accumulation logic of the auc
flown capital and domestic illegal circulating cash. Between 2002 and 2005, Cúcuta was one
of the three cities with the largest number of suspicious financial operations in the country.23
In 2005 alone, the Ministry of Finance’s Information and Financial Analysis Unit reported
approximately 1,500 transactions worth millions as suspicious.
Paramilitaries created sophisticated networks for laundering money in NDS. Colombian
authorities identified several mechanisms used by the FF for this purpose, among which fuel
and livestock contraband, under-invoicing of imports and the currency exchange market were
used to launder the extraordinary profits of the drugs business in Cúcuta. The FF also laun-
dered money through taxies, motels, private security firms and cable television. The construc-
tion sector experienced impressive growth between 2000 and 2004: some properties reached
unprecedented prices of US$2.5 million, only found in Bogotá’s high end markets. On top
of that, the FF not only used the public sector as a source of accumulation, as examined be-
low, but also as a laundering front. This is the case of the public works firm Retromáquinas,
owned by the family of NDS Senator Carlos Barriga. According to “El Iguano”, the firm was
used in two ways: during the AUC era the firm practically monopolized Cúcuta’s contracting
and was also used for laundering AUC’ money (Vote Bien, 2007).
Although these activities are very di*cult to trace, it was established by the General So-
licitor’s O*ce that the already mentioned criminal group Los Pepes became a FF key node,
and that among other tasks, the gang laundered approximately US$220million for Salvatore
Mancuso (El Colombiano, 2008).
Gambling
The gambling and lotteries system, created to subsidize the healthcare system in Colombia,
has been traditionally a main target for corrupt practices.24 It is well known that the AUC
took over these businesses, especially the chance game25, in conjunction with local politicians.
23None of the Caribbean cities under paramilitary influence, including Sincelejo, was included in the Unit’s
list of suspicious operations. These kinds of operations were only detected in cities with large drug tra*cking
activities’ influence and frontier dynamics (Semana, 2006).
24Besides the national lottery games and those run by the local Red Cross, each Colombian department is
also permitted to operate its own games, leaving over twenty di(erent lotteries competing for prominence in
the Colombian market. However, a number of departmental lotteries have been highly problematic because of
corruption. In many cases the national government has had to intervene departmental lotteries and even shut
down some operations.
25Chance is a locally operated lottery that grows at a rate that outstrips even the national lottery, accounting for
nearly 50% of total gambling expenditure in the country. In accordance with Colombian law, local governments
are only allowed to operateChance games via an operator selected in a public tender process, usually characterized
by irregularities and corruption. It is estimated that in the mid-2000s that the Chance’s 71 concessions operated
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Although the most striking case of appropriation of rents derived from slot machines26 and
lotteries took place in some Caribbean departments (Sucre was not included in this activity),
NDS did not escape this logic, according to the General Solicitor’s O*ce. The case of the
firm J.J. Pita, the largest chance game operator in the department is noteworthy. In August
2004, the owner Juan Jose Pita was assassinated in Táchira (Venezuela) by the AUC. It is said
that Pita had great political influence and was an important financer of political campaigns;
for many Pita was probably an important intermediary between the AUC and some local
politicians. He had quite a shady reputation and he was once implicated in a murder trial.
Although his death has not been solved yet, it is believed that it was related to a settling of
scores with the FF, which was heavily involved in the business (Alianza de Medios, 2005).
The support of legal interests
Paramilitary support to private legal interests in NDS has yet to be exposed. For many the
AUC played a central role in protecting the agro-industrial expansion of palm oil and the
reactivation of the oil industry (Bautista, 2009; Oviedo, 2009). The fact that the AUC cleared
Tibú’s jurisdiction from guerrilla influence and participated in the shifting of illegal crops
towards the Catatumbo intermediate and mountainous areas may constitute a strong signal
of paramilitary protection of private legal interests.
Although there is no evidence of protection of oil companies by the AUC as had been the
case in other Colombian regions, the fact is that the clearing of FARC and of coca crops
from Tibú facilitated the recent reactivation of the oil industry as well as of other large-scale
mining and agro-industrial projects. It has been said that the AUC’s force was used for the
recent alteration of the rural land structure in Catatumbo region where approximately 6,000
hectares were violently or fraudulently expropriated to small farmers for the cultivation of
palm oil.
The rural/urban cleavage in NDS has had di(erent implications for irregular warring ac-
tors in NDS. On the side of guerrillas, this divide generated fragmentation. The Catatumbo
region constituted the economic backbone of both FARC (coca economy) and ELN (oil in-
dustry). Nevertheless, in the urban areas guerrillas never actively participated in the criminal
by almost 500 entrepreneurs generates around $1.3 billion every year, of which 12% subsidizes local healthcare
systems.
26According to theMinistry of Social Protection’s Gambling Supervisory Department (ETESA), it is estimated
that almost 50,000 out of 71,643 slot machines registered in Colombia were controlled by the AUC by 2003. In
other words, US$640million out of US$1,300million annual revenue ended up in AUC hands (Semana, 2009).
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underground. Except for some protection rackets, guerrillas concentrated on building robust
political underground networks and controlling shanty towns through urban militia struc-
tures. In contrast, the rural/urban divide had a strong complementarity for the AUC: the
rural strategy was mainly focused on the coca/cocaine economies, but was also linked to the
agro-industrial expansion of palm oil and the reactivation of the oil industry. The urban strat-
egy strongly complemented the rural one: the AUC managed to build extraordinary money
laundering mechanisms through its control over criminal networks, the informal markets and
poorly regulated legal activities.
This panorama significantly contrasts with that of Sucre. Besides the fact that the conflict
did not follow the urban/rural divide and its consequences remained within the department’s
territorial boundaries, the absence of legal and illegal extractive economies significantly lim-
ited the ELN and FARC financial opportunities. Insurgents therefore secured financial means
via armed clientelist practices, mainly through the extortion of local governments. This situa-
tion in Sucre also had consequences for the AUC. Regardless of the fact that warlords rapidly
monopolized cocaine exports through the Morrosquillo gulf, the absence of a coca economy
and of a pre-existing criminal infrastructure made the HMMB financially reliant on public
budgets and rural land. It was perhaps in this financial handicap that politics acquired its
great significance in Sucre.
the social control strategy: terror, protection and regulation
In Sucre, paramilitary violence brought elites together, in the sense that the needs of maintain-
ing the status quo of rural land and of leading political houses became a shared goal of rural
rich and politicians (Romero, 2004, 2005), and excluded the lower strata. The case of NDS
exhibited a di(erent trend. On the one hand, there did not seem to be a unique shared goal
that gathered subnational elites, as thoroughly examined in the next section, and on the other
hand, the integration of the poorest sectors to the AUC project was very clear. While in Sucre
social control was mainly achieved through mass violence against the agrarian unions, NDS
exhibited a somewhat di(erent model based upon the combination of terror – paramilitaries
also exerted violence against the social movement in NDS – and protection of a far more
di(use and heterogeneous society. This variation compared to Sucre is largely explained by
the predominance of the economic rationale of the AUC in NDS’s massive illegal economic
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platform and therefore the need of integrating the lower strata to the paramilitary economic
networks.
Indeed violence via social and political cleansing was the “natural” instrument of social
control and regulation in NDS, and constituted an essential means for securing territorial
control. However, violence was a necessary yet not su*cient condition for integrating and
shaping lower strata of society according to warlords’ needs. According to Jaramillo and
Duncan (2006), behind the paramilitary drive for accumulation there was a whole new way
of organizing the local economy in many a region in order to maximize the income flow for
the communities they dominated and in this way securing labour force and clienteles. In
the Catatumbo region coca communities constituted the social base for paramilitaries and
FARC. Loyalty was a central asset for securing control over cultivations and guaranteeing the
smooth running of the coca market. In exchange, these communities were protected against
the competitor. The urban poor – criminal labour force and informal workers linked to the
criminal and legal activities mentioned before – also constituted part of the AUC’s clientele
under a similar rationale.
TheAutodefensas intensivemilitary activity not only fed the strategy for generating reliable
labour and recruitment sources and expanding intelligence networks but also for stabilizing
communities. The AUC social stabilization implied the construction of a distinct type of “cit-
izenship” in which rights and duties became exchange objects. All clients – urban and rural
– were expected to be loyal to the AUC in exchange for protection, contract enforcement,
conflict solving, and deterrence of competitors, among other things. Indeed, this type of ex-
change was not governed by democratic values but mediated by regressive norms based upon
the principle of vertical integration, which characterizes the patron-client relations, regulated
through violence and without the political exchange.
In this context, protection rackets were not only a means for extracting money but also
a most e(ective mechanism for social control and regulation. The AUC blocked and con-
fined entire communities through curfews and a tight control of people leaving and entering
counties or urban neighbourhoods. The FF had lists of inhabitants with their correspondent
national ID numbers. In Cúcuta, the pressure over urban poor communities reached the ex-
tent of even controlling youth gatherings, fashion and the use of spare time: “I was forced to
cut my hair, go back home before 10 p.m. every day, stopwearingmy favourite bands’ T-shirts.
We could not go out in groups of more than three people at a time. Tight clothes for young
girls were banned as well as rock concerts. The rock culture became a military objective. We
could not understand what had we done wrong. Just that within this new rule we became a
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problem. Threats were direct; no letters; no messages. Or you disperse and change or you
die” (SCAD-Group Action La Gabarra, 2004).
The e(ects of this mixture of violence, extortion and protection on the social fabric were
pervasive: the paramilitary action allowed the establishment of a regime of terror, progres-
sively undermining local social and political organizations as well as increasing the paramili-
tary recruitment base and youth involvement in criminal activities.
part ii — the capture of the state
impunity and immunity as central assets for the protection of the illegal
conglomerate
Besides the prevalence of the economic rationale over the political one in NDS, the patterns of
parapolitics vary in other ways from those of Sucre. In the latter, the collusion of politicians
and paramilitaries occurred on the top of the subnational political scale and then descended
along it. Alvaro García created, financed and was the actual HMMB commander, along with
his political partners, and sought, by creating a consociational arrangement with the AUC,
to build a distinct political project. In NDS, the predominance of a war economy based upon
hard-core organized crime put collusive arrangements with security and judicial agencies on
top of the AUC’s agenda. The involvement with politicians was dispersed, did not cover the
subnational political spectrum, and seemed to be strictly functional to the economic strategy.
There are only two proven involvements – those of the then Mayor of Cúcuta and a candi-
date to the Governor’s O*ce, a couple of political newcomers – cases that seem to endorse
this argument that such alliances constituted a means for obtaining immunity and impunity
required for securing the paramilitary accumulation strategy, as analyzed below.
The other side of the equation, is that it is very likely that FARC’s strength inNDSprompted
the military and national-level AUC figures to take an initiative that was considered “neces-
sary” in NDS but “unnecessary” in Sucre, where guerrillas were weaker and the territory was
not as strategic as NDS’s, where the weakening of guerrillas attracted new investors linked to
the oil industry as well as to large-scale palm oil and cocoa bean cultivation to the Catatumbo
region. Although it is very di*cult to connect this with the highest levels of government,
the fact is that while the AUC operated with full immunity in Catatumbo, the national gov-
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ernment acknowledged the merit of the Colombian Army’s counterinsurgent e(ort (Semana,
2009).
security and law enforcement agencies
Carlos Castaño acknowledged that the Catatumbo region was central to the organization
as it produced almost 70% of the organization’s revenues (Aranguren, 2001), a matter that
largely explains why the seizure of security and law enforcement agencies made more sense
than the capture of a complex political structure in NDS. Mancuso confessed that the AUC
had a “payroll” through which paramilitaries rewarded state o*cials and politicians through-
out the country. The payroll’s total cost was on average USD500,000 per year; in NDS it cost
USD250,000, half the total, of which over 80%paid for their agents at the District Attorney’s
O*ce, the National Army and Police, and the Secret Service, while Mancuso’s units in Cór-
doba department in the Caribbean region paid a monthly outlay of no more than US$80,000
(La Opinión, 2007a). These numbers are consistent with the hypothesis that the economic
rationale took priority over the political one, and that in this regard, security and law enforce-
ment agencies constituted central assets for the AUC.
Colombian Army
Two main features characterized the collusion between the AUC and the Colombian army
in NDS. The first one was the top-down nature of the penetration. According to the Solici-
tor General’s O*ce “it was not about middle-rank o*cials collaborating with the AUC. The
symbiosis took place at the highest levels” (CNRR, 2010). The second featurewas that the col-
lusion framework was established outside NDS, prior to the creation of the CB. According to
the same report, the overall departmental strategy was agreed between Castaño andMancuso
and four Generals from the National Army in Córdoba department before the AUC reached
NDS’s territory (CNRR, 2010).
According to di(erent judicial versions27, over 200 AUC combatants were transported in
six trucks from Córdoba to NDS in May 1999. As noted by a witness28, the contingent made
27The main witness in this case is Mauricio Llorente, a former National Army o*cer who by then wasHéroes
de Saraguro Battalion commander in Tibú, and his confessions fully coincide with those of Salvatore Mancuso.
28O*cer Llorente mentioned in previous footnote.
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a journey that lasted over fifteen hours and entailed fully crossing northern Colombia in a
west-east direction (five departments) before it reached the final destination without any ob-
stacle. It is noteworthy that given the critical public order situation in Colombia at that time
it was impossible to drive through five departments without finding military or police check-
points along the way, which suggests that the paramilitary deployment required a great deal
of planning and coordination not only from and between the army and the police, but also
clear lines of command involved.
On the 29th of May 1999 the contingent arrived in Tibú where the quest for territorial
control over the Catatumbo region began and was fully supported by the Army. The first
massacre took place on the day of arrival in the Socuavo County where five civilians were
murdered along the road. The second massacre took place in Tibú on the 17th of July. Ac-
cording to a key military witness29, Colonel Víctor Hugo Matamoros, then commander of
the 5th Cavalry Group in Cúcuta, and the then Departmental Police Commander had several
telephone conversations with Mancuso and other AUC commanders. The witness confessed:
“I planned the whole operation with David [the alias of Mancuso’s nephew]. I told him that
I needed to simulate a guerrilla attack on the military garrison in order to justify the fact
that I couldn’t abandon my post. This alibi allowed them [AUC] to get to the centre of Tibú
with an informer who was wearing a balaclava, one block away from the Police station. She
[the informer] pointed at nine alleged guerrilla supporters. All of the identified people were
shot dead in the head; paramilitaries stole all the money from the shops and took four more
civilians with them. Their dead bodies were later found along the road” (Semana, 2009).The
third massacre took place on the 21st of August in La Gabarra County where the AUC as-
sassinated 35 civilians. The military commander of the zone was found guilty for colluding
with paramilitary groups in this event. All three events generated the displacement of 2,229
civilians to Venezuela (Semana, 2009).
The Supreme Chamber for Administrative Disputes issued a resolution in which it con-
cludes that “LaGabarra [paramilitary] operationwas not only foreseeable butwas also known
by the police andmilitary authorities in the region whose abuse of their functions contributed
to the paramilitary action [...] the operation was also avoidable [...] evident lack of interest
in confronting the illegal actor made all the massacres possible in El Catatumbo [...] in spite
of the military controls introduced ex-post, the paramilitary units continued to control the
population, food and medications [...] the 18th of July 1999 the paramilitary group entered
Tibú without any resistance from the Police or military personnel [...] the criminal and dis-
29O*cer Llorente.
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ciplinary investigations established that the paramilitary activity was permitted by the Police
and the National Army” (SCAD-Group Action La Gabarra, 2004).
“The local army unit refuses to combat area paramilitaries,” wrote a U.S o*cial who in-
terviewed Matamoros a few months after the initial massacres. “He is convinced that doing
so [combatting paramilitaries] before the guerrillas are defeated would not make military
sense” (Lindsay-Poland, 2009). “El Iguano” stated: “thanks to Matamoros we could operate
in 1999; he coordinated everything. Wherever we went there was no presence of the public
force. A combat with guerrillas could last two, three hours and no one would show up” (Ver-
dad Abierta, 2009a).
“El Iguano” also claimed that he paid USD 10,000 to a sergeant who had been assigned
to a special programme at the President’s O*ce in which airborne operations against illegal
armed groups were planned. The junior o*cer informed him about specific operations in
Tibú and La Gabarra beforehand.
Mancuso said that “the relations between the AUC and the Public Force were quite fluid”
and that during the taking of the Catatumbo “[paramilitaries] were patrolling on one side of
the road while militaries were doing the same on the other side” [...] after a while the AUC
troops started to make serious joint operations” (Verdad Abierta, 2008b). It is presumed
that at least four other Army Generals and a Colonel were actively involved in the collusion
(Semana, 2009).
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National Police
In general terms, there was a division of labour in which the Army supported the AUC in
the countryside and the Police in the metropolitan area. “El Iguano” said “everybody is talk-
ing about the Army’s collaboration but what about the Police’s? How do you explain the
occurrence of so many assassinations in Cúcuta and so few AUC members arrested?” (El
Espectador, 2009b).
Unlike the case of the Army and according to the available evidence the collusion with the
Police seems to have taken place at the subnational level, and not in a top-down fashion30 – and
with intermediate and low rank o*cers. Nevertheless, the police’s support was central for the
FF infiltration in Cúcuta. According to judicial investigations, Major William Montezuma,
director of the departmental judiciary police, was the o*cer in charge of providing paramili-
taries with valuable information about the state of on-going investigations and warned them
about police operations (El Espectador, 2009b).
Agent Martín Soto, member of the security sta( of Cúcuta’s mayor, was an important
link for paramilitaries. According to “El Iguano”, the fact that Soto was the link between
Mayor Suárez and the FF protected the latter from any direct interaction with the AUC. It was
through Soto that the aforementioned assassinations of Tirso Vélez and Enrique Flórez were
planned and executed (Semana, 2004). The agent was also responsible of releasing smuggled
merchandise confiscated by the Police. A corporal named Ardila participated in the assassina-
tion of two members of the District Attorney’s O*ce in 2001. It was established that Ardila
undertook surveillance of the victims’ movements and routines and provided hit men with
guns to shoot the victims.
Departmental National Secret Service O%ce
Asdiscussed, theNational Secret Service constituted perhaps themost striking case of paramil-
itary institutional seizure in Colombia. The institution was penetrated in a top-down fashion
and in many departments there were strong levels of collusion. NDS was no exception.
Jorge Díaz, former departmental director of the National Secret Service, and deputy direc-
tor Viterbo Galvis actively collaborated with the AUC. According to the General Attorney’s
30In Colombia the Police is a national institution, not departmental or municipal, vertically organized in a
similar fashion to that of the military forces.
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O*ce, Díaz provided theAUCwith information about potential “military targets”, aswas the
case of lawyer Ernesto Obregón, ex-candidate to Cúcuta’s mayoralty Carlos Caicedo, and hu-
man rights activist Carlos Bernal, assassinated in Cúcuta between 2003 and 2004. “El Iguano”
said that Díaz was “more an AUCmember than a DAS o*cial” (Verdad Abierta, 2010b), and
identified several DAS detectives as close collaborators. “El Iguano” also said he had ameeting
with Díaz and a former general of the Colombian Army in which they informed him that one
of FARC’s top commanders was in Venezuela’s Táchira department and that they required an
AUC operation to kill him there (Verdad Abierta, 2010b).
Mancuso revealed during one of his public hearings that Díaz was one of his closest col-
laborators in NDS and that paramilitaries operated in the institution’s vehicles. In a recent
interview “El Iguano” stated that the Secret Service in NDS provided the AUC with intelli-
gence information on alleged guerrilla members, information that made paramilitary actions
more e*cient (El Espectador, 2009b). In 2003, Cúcuta’s La Opinión newspaper reproduced
a telephone conversation between “El Iguano” and one of his lieutenants in which the lat-
ter informed him that he had to sleep in the Secret Service’s installations because a judicial
commission from Bogotá was looking for him.
According to information provided by the Secret Service in Cúcuta31, a rural property be-
longing to the family of aforementioned Senator Barriga was used by the FF for illegal activi-
ties in 2004. The internal information revealed that this situation was reported to the central
headquarters but that the then Director General warned the Barriga family and the AUC that
this situation was about to be investigated. FF’s men assassinated Flórez and Galvis a few
months later, allegedly in revenge.
District Attorney’s O%ce
NDS’s Prosecutor O*ce is perhaps one of the most notable cases of judicial infiltration by
the AUC.32 The subnational judiciary was so penetrated that all the investigations had to
be commissioned from Bogotá. Captured criminals also had to be transferred to prisons in
Bogotá. This was the only way for authorities to partially break up the seizure of the o*ce.
31In 2006, Departmental Secret Service o*cials anonymously sent this information to Left-wing Senator Gus-
tavo Petro, responsible for unveiling the parapolitics phenomenon in Colombia, and other politicians. Senator
Petro disclosed the information a week after.
32The then Deputy Attorney General acknowledged the high level of paramilitary infiltration in NDS. He said
it was the only department where such a collusion had taken place (El Espectador, 2004).
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This was a typical case of infiltration through pressure, unlike the case of other institutions
in NDS in which infiltration took place through mutual agreement. In 2001, paramilitaries
killed local prosecutor María del Rosario Silva – renowned for the e*cacy and soundness
with which she conducted her investigations – in Cúcuta. She was investigating the linkages
between the AUC, businessmen and politicians in NDS, as well as over 80 cases of crimes
perpetrated by paramilitaries. There was also the assassination of David Corzo, a local crim-
inal investigator in September 2001. Prosecutor Carlos Pinto, who replaced Silva, was also
assassinated four months later. “El Iguano” involved the departmental Secret Service direc-
tor and two national police o*cers in this assassination. The paramilitary acknowledged
that the AUC required eliminating all the existing “uncomfortable” investigations against the
organization and to this end penetrating the institution was indispensable (Verdad Abierta,
2010c).
These crimes along with permanent threats to other investigators finally broke the internal
resistance. The SCJ established that theworkwas done by a lawyer namedAlexi Sandovalwho
influenced the institution at the national level in order to declare null and void a local key in
the investigation of the Tibú and La Gabarra massacres without much substance (SCJ-23973,
2007; SCJ-33301, 2010). It was under Ana María Díaz’s direction that the District O*ce was
finally infiltrated by the FF. “El Iguano” said the “the departmental Attorney worked with
us [...] Ana María Flórez provided us with valuable information about investigations and
operations against us. She kept ‘El Gato’ [second FF urban commander] updated about the
location of guerrilla militias andwe operated according to that information” (Verdad Abierta,
2010c). Salvatore Mancuso said he influenced the appointments of Flórez and her assistant
Magaly Moreno (known as alias “Perla”) at the District O*ce. He stated that “she [Moreno]
was El Gato’s girlfriend; she was part of the organization” and testified that Flórez gave his
group the names of colleagues who, in her judgment, supported the guerrillas. “Everyone she
mentioned was assassinated”, he added (Verdad Abierta, 2008a).
After tracing NDS o*cials’ mobile calls, the Solicitor General’s O*ce established that 52
o*cials from the District Attorney’s O*ce regularly communicated with paramilitaries (El
Tiempo, 2004).
“El Iguano” revealed that in 2002 Flórez asked the FF to find a couple of youngmen to arrest
in order to help the District O*ce to register better operational results. “Ana María Flórez
was under a lot of pressure from Bogotá because under her administration the District O*ce
had not produced any single result against us. So [one of ‘El Iguano’s’ lieutenants] asked me
if I would authorize providing her these two guys, and I said yes, I authorize it”. A couple of
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days later, the District O*ce broke into a house where the two paramilitaries were left drunk
and asleep with guns and ammunition, and made the arrest (Caracol Radio, 2010).
Flórez left the country by the time an arrest warrant against her was issued. The SCJ con-
victed her to twelve years of prison for colluding with the AUC (SCJ-23973, 2007), however
she still remains a fugitive. Another twelve District O*ce members are currently in prison,
among them Magaly Moreno.
National Prison’s Authority
The director and deputy director of the departmental Prison’s Authority O*ce, the director
of theModelo prison in Cúcuta, and Secret Service deputy director in NDS were involved in
El Iguano’s spectacular jailbreak in November 2002 from a hospital in Cúcuta where he was
sent for an emergency surgery while under detention. He was rescued by FF men and it is
calculated that the operation cost the AUC US$50,000 (Verdad Abierta, 2010a).
politics
Unlike in Sucre where it has been proven that over thirty politicians and public o*cials col-
luded with paramilitaries, the linkages between the AUC and politicians in NDS were not as
numerous. However, the di(erencewith Sucre not only lies in the intensity of the phenomenon
but also in the nature of the strategy and of the arrangements between the AUC and politi-
cians. Despite the perplexing absence of evidence on the politics-crime linkages in this case,
the indications permit arguing that the economic rationale led the AUC’s strategy in NDS. In
NDS paramilitary groups did not politically embed in the framework of agreements such as
that of Ralito in the Caribbean departments. In this vein, colluding with some politicians –
not seizing political power – seemed to be more in line with the AUC’s strategy in NDS.
It is di*cult to imagine a highly criminalized space such as NDS in which the criminal and
political spheres did not experience any kind of friction. Indeed, politicians and criminals
have traditionally coexisted in NDS in a context of mutual accommodation and shared bene-
fits. As stated during an interview, “it is compulsory to go through the departmental mafias
in order to win elections” (Bautista, 2009). Unlike the case of Sucre, the criminal-political
exchange existed in the department long before the emergence of the AUC, and the exchange
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has been highly instrumental: campaign financing on the side of criminals in exchange for
the reinforcement of immunity and impunity from politicians. The exchange has never sup-
ported a clear political project. Moreover, the collusion has tended to be highly intermediated,
and therefore has been more di(use, as discussed in detail below. During the AUC era, the
paramilitary influence on departmental politics seemed to have followed the same traditional
path with similar characteristics.
Catatumbo: the logic of armed clientelist practices
The AUC did not exhibit a distinct strategy for capturing the state and politics in Catatumbo,
a matter that could be either explained by the fact that the organization could not overcome
guerrillas in the region – particularly FARC, and/or justified by the heavy weight of the coca
economy in the paramilitary strategy.
Although corruption has been a structural feature in the region and some atypical patterns
of electoral competition and public expenditure have been identified in the Ocaña and Tibú
municipalities (Foro Nacional por Colombia, 2008), the capture of public rents by armed
actors is still a di*cult process to trace in this case. The same goes for interference in Cata-
tumbo’s politics. It is worth noting that the Catatumbo municipalities – except for Tibú that
has traditionally received royalties’ transfers – are amongst the poorest in the country and
therefore are insignificant regarding public finances. The available information suggests that
AUC meddling in the region was a typical case of armed clientelism, and in this respect, it
was not too di(erent from ELN or FARC interventions: extorting contractors and putting
pressure on local administrations in order to divert public expenditures. According to FFNC,
GTZ and Rinde report (2008), besides having a bearing on infrastructure contracts and ap-
pointment of teachers in many Catatumbo municipalities – competing with FARC and ELN
– paramilitaries also influenced the contracting of workers for the oil industry as well as the
allocation of local subsidies for palm oil cultivations. “Paramilitaries controlled almost every-
thing [in Catatumbo]. They took over the public administration [...] the health, education
and infrastructure budgets. It is said they obtained a share of every single contract subscribed
by Tibú’s administration. On top of that they controlled bars, local gambling, and even the
funeral parlour. Whatever generated money” (Oviedo, 2009). Under these circumstances,
many local governments in the Catatumbo region had no choice but to share the administra-
tion with FARC, ELN and AUC, as in many places in Colombia, a matter which along with
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the curbing of royalties transfers further worsened the already fragile fiscal and administrative
conditions of the region (FFNC et al., 2008).
Regarding electoral processes, there is no proof of paramilitary electoral protection and/or
manipulation in the region, and much less of arrangements for the creation of “electoral dis-
tricts”, selection of candidates, or influence of appointments, as found in Sucre. On the con-
trary, electoral processes were severely threatened between 2000 and 2004, again a typical out-
come of armed clientelist practices. Both guerrillas and paramilitaries were responsible for
this kind of violence in the Catatumbo region. According to the National Electoral Authority,
El Tarra, Tibú and Convención were the most dangerous places for campaigning purposes;
five Catatumbo mayors were assassinated during that period and over nine had to abandon
their municipalities and govern from “exile” in Cúcuta or Ocaña (Vote Bien, 2007). In the
context of the armed clientelist model, the main di(erence between guerrillas and the AUC
vis-à-vis electoral processes was that the former have been more prone to the sabotage of elec-
tions by forbidding people to go to the polls whereas the latter tended to force communities to
vote (González, Bolívar, & Vásquez, 2003; Losada, 2006). In this context, the 2003 local elec-
tions in the Catatumbo region seem to have beenmore sabotaged by guerrillas than influenced
by the AUC. Not a single case exhibited signs of electoral fraud of the likes of very low levels
of abstention, as observed in Sucre. Elections in El Tarra, El Carmen, Hacarí, San Calixto and
Teorama had to be postponed because of the absence of candidates; the elections took place
months later and the National Electoral Authority registered patterns of high abstention in
each case, a situation very likely attributable to FARC.
Concerning the election of AUC’s frontmen or paramilitary influence on appointments,
the only case identified is that of Carlos Barbarán, a Town Councillor from Tibú elected in
2003who participated in the CB’s demobilization in 2004 under the alias of “Alonso”. Unfor-
tunately, it was impossible to substantiate this case as there is no further o*cial, judicial or
journalistic information on the matter.
The urban machine: the protection of the criminalized economy
According to Duncan (2007) the levels of success of criminals in urban centres can be classified
according to the levels of infiltration of three main activities: criminal transactions, legal ac-
tivities and state institutions. The AUC was highly successful in infiltrating all these spheres
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in NDS, but the infiltration of state institutions was linked to the protection of businesses
rather than driven by political goals.
If the CB proved incapable of establishing a political strategy in Catatumbo or that such
strategy was not a fundamental part of the organizational goals, the outcome in the area of
Cúcuta was di(erent. Unlike in the Catatumbo region, elections took place in every single
municipality in Cúcuta’s metropolitan area and the National Electoral Authority found that
abstention levels were far below the national average, reflecting a typical “electoral paramili-
tary” pattern. The Authority also established that the total number of registered voters was
larger than the number of inhabitants in Villa del Rosario and Los Patios, a typical case of the
so-called “moving of votes” which consists of bringing people who are registered for voting
in a given municipality to vote in another one.
Although this trend is consistent with the AUC’s success in exerting full control over the
urban territory, and despite the fact that all relevant cases of collusion took place in the urban
areas, neither did paramilitaries capture the state nor did they penetrate politics in the way in
which they did in Sucre.
The role of intermediaries
Della Porta and Vanucci (1999) argue that brokers are necessary when relations between cor-
rupters and corrupted are sporadic or fragmentary; or when these are complicated because of
the involvement of larger networks of di(erent actors. InNDS this is the case. As stated before,
politics has had an instrumental relationship with crime in the department: the financing of
campaigns by criminals in exchange for immunity from prosecution and eventually a share of
the public budget. It is in this environment that the complex web of the criminal underworld
flourished long before the emergence of the AUC, and sophisticated ways of connecting the
political and criminal spheres have been implemented, particularly the use of intermediaries
(best known as “apostles”) who played a central role in facilitating the exchange and have
been vital in erasing possible traces of this exchange. Intermediaries have been usually well-
connected entrepreneurs with influence – and in some cases with participation – in the crimi-
nal underworld, which have been usually the main campaign funders but do not belong to the
political elite. This situation sharply contrasts with that of Sucre where brokers were of no
use as power networks were narrower and involved fewer actors: the AUC emerged because




Themost prominent name is that of Luis Enrique Pérez, best known asEl Pulpo, a self-made
businessman of modest background. Pérez became a highly influential person in the local
scenario during the 1990s and a prominent political campaigns funder. “He is the real regional
ruler, and everybody fears him” (Revista Cambio, 2009). An alleged partner of several drug
tra*ckers with strong links to the AUC, Pérez was a car dealer who diversified his business
in restaurants and show business, in which it is said he laundered millions of dollars. He
was thoroughly investigated for money laundering since 1986, and in the mid-2000s he was
arrested on charges of illicit enrichment but he was soon released in the absence of evidence
against him. Nonetheless, his name appeared in intelligence reports as an important partner
of one of the most important cocaine routes that goes through Cúcuta and Central America
to the U.S. (Semana, 2006). Di(erent sources interviewed agree in that Pérez put pressure on
Cúcuta’s Mayor Ramiro Suárez in 2003 to have his nephew appointed inMetroseguridad, a
state enterprise in charge of preventing criminal activities in main Colombian cities through
information systems and fast connections to the National Police, a situation that provided
the FF a great deal of immunity from investigation. Pérez was assassinated in April 2012 in
Cúcuta, apparently motivated by settling of scores. Other killings took place in the city right
after El Pulpo’s death. According to local authorities, these were related to internal struggles
between Pérez’s frontmen.
Another important intermediary was JenseyMiranda, a renowned real estate entrepreneur
and one of NDSmost prominent contractors with contracts worth over USD7.5 between 2003
and 2006. Miranda was also known as “Ernesto” in Cúcuta’s underworld and is held respon-
sible for tra*cking cocaine to Europe through Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. While tracked
by international authorities for his illicit activities for almost six years, Miranda enjoyed a
great deal of protection by local authorities in Cúcuta and in Caracas’ legal business world
and politics. According to an Interpol o*cial “someone protected him for a long time. There
are key recordings of phone conversations with politicians” (El Tiempo, 2009). El Tiempo
newspaper disclosed a meeting with politicians during AUC times that took place in one of
Miranda’s country estates before the 2003 elections in which he o(ered his support to at least
a dozen local politicians among which there was Luis Miguel Morelli, then candidate to the
Governor’s o*ce, and Cúcuta’s Mayor candidate Ramiro Suárez. The latter’s party Colom-
bia Alive got a US$30million contribution fromMiranda’s firm (El Tiempo, 2009). Miranda
was arrested in an operation coordinated from Bogotá, on charges of running cocaine process-
ing laboratories and some tra*cking routes through Venezuela and was extradited to Spain
in 2009. Miranda admitted financing Suárez’s campaign and said that the ex-mayor had im-
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portant links with the AUC. By the time he was captured, Miranda had won contracts worth
about USD1.5 million with Cúcuta’s mayoralty (La Opinión, 2011). Miranda has also been
linked to Senator Juan Manuel Corzo, a matter discussed below.
The aforementioned gambling operator Juan Jose Pita, killed in 2004 by the FF, was also an
important campaign funder and he might have also been an important intermediary between
politicians and criminals (Oviedo, 2009).
The early paramilitary-less politics (1997–2002)
Unlike the case of Sucre where two political houses controlled subnational politics, when the
AUC arrived in NDS political power was significantly dispersed, as has been the tradition in
the department.
On the Liberal side there were five houses and all of them had already split from the party’s
o*cial line for that electoral period. As shown in the figure below, Liberal power in NDS was
significantly distributed among houses and none exclusively dominated the electoral realm.
These houses obtained 20%of mayoralties (8municipalities); 11 out of 17 seats at the Assem-
bly; and majorities in 32% of town councils (13 municipalities). In Congress, they won two
senatorial seats and one in the House of Representatives.
Source: RNEC
The Conservative side, organized in three houses, won 60% of mayoralties and 6 seats at
the Departmental Assembly. It also obtained majorities in 65%of town councils and won the
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Governor’s O*ce. At the congressional level Conservatives won one senatorial seat and two
at the House of Representatives. As in the Liberal side, no Conservative house held political
power exclusively. During this period the balance of power was in equilibrium: Liberals and
Conservatives got almost the same representation in Congress. The former won the Gover-
nor’s O*ce and the latter Cúcuta’s Mayoralty.
Source: RNEC
As in Sucre, NDS’s politics experienced a progressive shift towards the right and most
groups joined the Uribista Coalition later, except for Liberal Renewal, which opposed Uribe’s
administration under the national leadership of NDS’s Cristo house. During this period there
was no AUC interference in politics.
In the 2002–2003 elections the Liberal wing shrank and was reduced to three factions: Lib-
eral Renewal, which joined the Liberal o*cial line for the 2002 elections and won two con-
gressional seats; LiberalOpeningwhich obtained a congressional seat; the other three factions
disappeared and the newUribista party Popular IntegrationMovement (MIPOL), took over33
and gained two congressional seats. On the whole, the Liberal wing won eight mayoralties,
four Assembly seats and majorities in ten Town Councils. None of the factions had over-
whelming results over the others; again, there was no dominant group.
33MIPOL was created in the Caribbean region and was particularly strong in Magdalena department where it




Conservatives maintained three groups, which were divorced from the previous labels and
mainly became linked to each group’s strongmen, a trend that could be observed throughout
the country. The Conservative wing won five congressional seats in 2002; won the Governor’s
O*ce, 18mayoralties, 6 Assembly seats and obtained majorities in 40%of Town Councils in
the 2003 local elections.
Source: RNEC
As noted previously, although Liberal and Conservative power structures did not change
substantially from one election to the next, there were no signs of power accumulation, as
there were in Sucre during the same period. Neither were there signs of collusion with the
AUC.As amatter of fact both the Liberal andConservativewings experienced overall electoral
losses: despite the fact that each wing managed to increase its congressional representation
in 2002 they both lost mayoralties – including Cúcuta’s – and town councils in 2003. As
analysed below, this situation is largely explained by the emergence of another Uribista party,
Colombia Alive, allegedly supported by the AUC.
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The infiltration of local politics in 2003: Cúcuta’s Mayoralty and NDS’s Governor’s O%ce
The fact that for the 2002 elections no “parapolitical” arrangements had taken place in NDS
shows a completely di(erent trajectory from that of Sucre. In the latter great electors created,
financed, and commanded AUC structures and gave paramilitaries access to local adminis-
trations. Politicians strengthened the existing power structures supported by paramilitary
violence and in exchange the AUC obtained congressional support for the demobilization
process.
The paramilitary infiltration of Cúcuta’s mayoralty and attempts to infiltrate theNDSGov-
ernor’s O*ce, both in the 2003 elections, constituted the first events in which politicians col-
luded with the AUC in the department. These cases, unlike in Sucre, are illustrative of the
disconnection with the political realm and the prevalence of the economic rationale.
The SCJ substantiated how the AUC created a commission led by Pacho, the CB’s political
spokesman, in charge of coordinating the 2003 electoral strategy of vetoes, threats, assassina-
tions and displacements for Cúcuta’s metropolitan area (SCJ-33301, 2010). The AUC sought
to secure candidates for the Governor’s O*ce and for the mayoralties of Villa del Rosario,
Puerto Santander, Los Patios, Chinácota and Cúcuta. There is evidence of a meeting that
took place, which candidates attended under pressure. According to Villarraga and Cañiza-
les (2005) the campaigns in Villa del Rosario, Los Patios and Cúcuta were “extravagant” in
terms of invested resources, advertising, logistics, transport, and securing of social leaders.
However, the only proven cases of alliances are those of the Mayoralty of Cúcuta and NDS
Governor’s O*ce.
Cúcuta’s Mayoralty
Cúcuta is a typical case of politicians being subjugated to paramilitaries’ interests and not the
other way round. Gustavo Duncan argues that in a criminal context such as Cúcuta’s, mayors
do not constitute an “exchange” cell in the illegal network but instead an “operative” one
(Duncan, 2007). This seems to have been the case of Ramiro Suárez, elected in 2003.
Suárez, an absolute political newcomer of modest background, represented the emerging
Uribista party Colombia Alive in NDS. Suárez had worked as personal driver of Conservative
leader Said Lamk in the 1990s, who later connected Suárez to the political world. He soon
established a long-lasting friendship and collaboration with Guillermo Mora, another tradi-
tional Liberal politician. He worked for Mora’s campaign for Cúcuta’s mayoralty in 2000
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and became his closest assistant while Mora was in o*ce. For the 2003 elections Suárez used
the recently created Colombia Alive as his platform for Cúcuta’s mayoralty, which he won
with 127,800 votes, the largest vote recorded in the city’s history (El Tiempo, 2007b). The
party also obtained majorities in four Town Councils and three Assembly seats. Guillermo
Mora abandoned Liberal Opening in order to join Suárez’s campaign. Another politician,
Carlos Barriga, who was NDS’s treasurer for the Alvaro Uribe Presidential campaign, became
Suárez’s assistant. Mora and Barriga were later involved in the parapolitics phenomenon in
NDS; however, they were never trialled.
For many, Suárez split NDS’s political life in two, because he became one of the greatest
electoral barons in the department almost overnight. One source pointed out that “he did
not have a penny, yet he managed to get his campaigns financed; organized meetings with
the people that have traditionally financed campaigns here in NDS [...] politically speaking
Suárez is a monster. When Guillermo Mora was Cúcuta’s mayor, Suárez was the ‘shadow’
mayor” (Oviedo, interview, 2009).
The AUC funded Suárez’s campaign in a complex scheme of intermediation (allegedly
through Jensey Miranda) that provided Suárez with an extraordinary amount of votes. The
AUC also used its violent muscle to eliminate opponents. In exchange, Suárez’s administra-
tion protected FF from prosecution in conjunction with the Police and Secret Service and gave
the Front access to public contracting.
SalvatoreMancuso stated that when Suárezwas still a candidate, the AUC reached an agree-
ment to support his political aspirations. As the FF controlled shanty towns in the city, it was
relatively easy for “El Iguano” to secure the urban poor vote for Suárez. In exchange, once
elected, he would give the AUC access to key local o*ces, public budget and contracts. Ac-
cording to Mancuso, Suárez actually did so. “Andrés”, one the FF’s commanders revealed
that “[Suárez] promised [the AUC] Cúcuta’s Secretary of Transit, Metroseguridad, and sev-
eral contracts in exchange for votes in Cúcuta’s shantytowns where I was in control” (La
Opinión, 2007b). The AUC had its frontmen appointed as Secretaries of Transit, Transporta-
tion and Public Works (La Opinión, 2007b). There is the much-discussed case of the firm
Retromáquinas of the aforementioned Barriga family. The public works firm that became
the main contractor in NDS during the time, was allegedly a means for laundering AUC’s
money (Eje 21, 2011). El Tiempo newspaper (2005) pointed out that “many young engineers
have warned that they cannot get business from the mayor or governor’s o*ces because the
contracting process is controlled by paramilitaries”.
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Other types of favours by Suárez included the repeal of a regulation that prohibited the
construction of tall buildings in Cúcuta, at the very moment in which the building of tall
luxury “love hotels”34, one of the top money laundering mechanisms in Colombia, started
to take over the city. There was also the granting of licences for the aforementioned legal
fuel collection points to several AUC frontmen, a situation that further permitted the FF to
monopolize the fuel market in the metropolitan area.
Besides access to public contracting, the infiltration of Cúcutas administration reinforced
the immunity from investigation and prosecution enjoyed by criminals. Clear examples of this
were the FF’s strong grip on the state enterpriseMetroseguridadwhere El Pulpo’s nephewwas
appointed, and the case support by Police agent Martín Soto. In June 2004 Semana weekly
magazine described the relation between Cúcuta’s mayoralty and impunity with the police-
man case:
“Soto was one of former mayor Guillermo Mora’s bodyguards and he had been recently
transferred as part of then candidate Suárez’s security scheme. Ever since Sotowas transferred
to the Mayor’s o*ce he had become a strategic link for paramilitaries. For instance, in July
2003 the police had immobilized a truck loadedwith smuggled food and clothes inCenabastos
[wholesale food market] which was heading to Puerto Santander, a renowned operational
paramilitary hub [...] men from FF contacted Soto and let him know that the confiscated
load belonged to ‘El Gato’ [...] the police agent contacted the uniformed men in charge of the
operation and managed to free the truck. These types of favours made Soto not only a main
man for the Autodefensas but also for some politicians who found in Soto an e(ective bridge
with the AUC” (Semana, 2004).
Despite the abundant signs of Suárez’s linkages with the FF, the judicial investigations only
shed results until very recently. Suárez was first arrested in June 2004while still in o*ce under
charges of receiving paramilitary funds for his campaign and holding several meetings and
telephone conversations with local AUC commanders. In January 2005 Suárez was accused
and put on trial; he spent six months in prison in Bogotá until the investigation was thrown
out by the prosecutor in charge, on the grounds that the evidence was not strong enough (La
Opinión, 2007b). Nonetheless, mass media remained very active in denouncing the Suárez
administration’s corruption and linkages with paramilitaries. As a consequence, journalists
were severely victimized during the mayor’s time in o*ce. In 2005, a journalist was killed by
the FF and another eighteen were threatened and forced to leave the city (Indymedia, 2005).
Suárez allegedly used paramilitary force against the press and also against those within the
34Known asmotels in Colombia, where couples pay per hour.
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o*ce who opposed his corrupted ways (El Tiempo, 2007d). In September 2007 Suárez was
accused of the aforementioned homicides of Pedro Durán and Enrique Flórez. Regarding the
latter, who opposed most of Suárez’ contracting, Mancuso and key witnesses indicated that
Suárez negotiated Flórez’s death with El Gato when he was still in campaign (La Opinión,
2007b). Likewise, “El Iguano” declared that “the current mayor of Cúcuta, Ramiro Suárez,
asked in 2003 the FF under my command to neutralize electoral observer Pedro Durán and
Enrique Flórez. He insisted they belonged to FARC’s 33rd Front” (El Tiempo, 2007a). The
paramilitary added that Flórez’s homicide was actually a personal favour to Suárez because
the victim was about to disclose Suárez’s links with the AUC (El Tiempo, 2007a; Verdad
Abierta, 2009c).
The ex-mayor was in jail for two years but was freed again in 2009. However, in August
2011 the High Tribunal of Bogotá reversed the acquittal and convicted the ex-mayor to 27
years of prison for the assassination of Flórez (Verdad Abierta, 2011). According to the Tri-
bunal’s decision “Suárez let AUC commanders know that he wanted Cúcuta’s mayoralty. The
delinquents supported him in exchange for his help in the ‘legalization’ of several urban AUC
soldiers by incorporating them to a private security firm in the city. ‘El Gato’ was the man in
charge of helping Suárez with the murder [...] The AUC had not planned to kill Flórez. The
commanders decided to do so when Suárez asked for it” (El Espectador, 2011)
Governor’s O%ce
Besides the capture of Cúcuta’s mayoralty, the AUC attempted a similar move on the NDS’s
Governor’s O*ce in the same year. Ricardo Elcure, a “mediocre politician” (López, 2010)
with little political background, became the CB’s candidate. Elcure launched his gubernato-
rial campaign for the 2003 elections with the UribistaDemocratic Colombia party. Although
he received an extraordinary high voting for a newcomer, 109,181 votes, his Conservative
competitor Miguel Morelli won the O*ce with 191,552 votes. The AUC’s muscle in Elcure’s
campaign did not guarantee electoral victory. According to “El Iguano” the o*ce was lost
because communities did not respond to paramilitary “indoctrination” of votes in favour of
its candidate and the insu*cient financial injection into the campaign (SCJ-29640, 2009).
It was established that the AUC financed Elcure’s campaign in exchange for 5% of all de-
partmental contracting (SCJ-29640, 2009). According to “El Iguano”, Elcurewas the keyAUC
politician in NDS for the 2003 elections and the organization and the politician connected
through the already mentioned former Secret Service director Jorge Díaz (Verdad Abierta,
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2009b). The paramilitary assured that “[he] met el ‘Chico’ [Elcure’s nickname] thrice in
Puerto Santander. [Alias] Camilo mentioned that he had requested money for his campaign.
We agreed to give him 80million [USD40,000] out of the 200 [USD100,000] he had requested.
Alias ‘Mauro’ delivered it through Jorge Díaz. I cannot remember very well how he did influ-
ence Díaz’s appointment, but it was Díaz who introduced ‘Chico’ Elcure to the AUC” (SCJ-
29640, 2009). This AUC funding was collected through the so-called “stamp” (estampilla), a
public works contract “tax” levied by paramilitaries in Cúcuta, and the resort to the stamp
was Elcure’s idea (SCJ-29640, 2009).
The intermediation of Díaz was confirmed later by former National Secret Service Gen-
eral Director – convicted to 25 years of prison for colluding with the AUC – who accepted
that Elcure influenced the appointment of Díaz in NDS (SCJ-29640, 2009). The SCJ estab-
lished that Díaz, “a sinister character who was appointed thanks to Elcure’s influence”, was
a fundamental source of support for Elcure (SCJ-29640, 2009).
The Supreme Court’s investigation concluded that “there is absolute certainty that Elcure
formed an alliance with the AUC, clearly linked to the 2003 electoral process [...] the handing
over of the money is not the only element that accounts for the illegal collusion between
Elcure and the illegal armed group; nevertheless it constitutes the emblematic evidence of the
financing of his political work by paramilitaries (SCJ-29640, 2009). Although there are some
signs of paramilitary pressure on some local candidates to mayoralties and town councils to
support Elcure’s campaign35, there is no evidence of anomalous voting patterns in any NDS
municipality for Elcure. Abstention levels varied depending on whether zones were controlled
by guerrillas or paramilitaries, as discussed above.
Elcure’s case took time to investigate. He ran for Congress in 2006 again with Democratic
Colombia, the same party through which Sucreño parapoliticians Alvaro García and Eric
Morris were elected in the same year, but did notwin a seat. However, replaced a congressman
convicted for linkages with the AUC in October 200736 where he remained until 2009, when
the SCJ sentenced him to six years of prison for colludingwith the AUC. The abovementioned
assassination of Left-wing candidate for theO*ce Tirso Vélez seemed to have been part of the
strategy to win the Governor’s O*ce. According to El Iguano, “Mancuso ordered his [Vélez]
death. We had information that linked him with FARC’s 33rd Front”. He added that “it was a
35The SCJ accounts for the case of Tibú’s Town Council candidate Ovidio Navarro, whose campaign was
partly funded by the AUC in exchange for support to Elcure and the threats against one candidate for Pamplona’s
mayoralty (SCJ-29640, 2009).
36Elcure replaced Mario Uribe, president’s Uribe cousin who had to resign to his seat for being prosecuted by
links with paramilitaries in Antioquia department.
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political favour” (Verdad Abierta, 2010d). However the paramilitary commander said later to
Vélez’s widow during a Justice and Peace public hearing that they really did not knowwhether
they assassinated the politician because of his ideology or because it was necessary to remove
him from the electoral scene. He said it was Mancuso who ordered the crime and that he
simply followed his orders (Verdad Abierta, 2010d).
There are unproven accounts of FF also supporting Miguel Morelli’s candidacy, not with
money as in the case of Elcure, but with votes (La Opinión, 2011). “El Iguano’s” support for
Morelli was supposedly requested by Jensey Miranda (La Opinión, 2011), who funded both
Morelli and Suárez campaigns. True or not, it seems that intermediaries and criminals inNDS
had no preferences when it came to supporting campaigns. They were indi(erent to labels
or political projects as long as candidates delivered. In this case, both the AUC and Miranda
supported the best options, amatter that rea*rms Losada’s typology of predominancewithin
restricted competition typology (Losada, 2006) in NDS, in which paramilitaries supported
candidates within a restricted competition field kindred to the organization’s interests.
The late congressional penetration attempt: the unreadable ‘para-congressional’ map in NDS
The first signs of paramilitary collusion with NDS congressmen emerged during the 2006
elections, unlike in Sucre where alliances were forged as early as the 2002 elections. The mi-
gration of politicians to Uribista coalition parties increased electoral competition, and in this
context, elections were more vulnerable to paramilitary influence. For the 2006 election the
Liberal wing experienced further shrinking to two houses and a significant electoral loss: only





As for the Conservative wing, the three factions remained but that of Juan Manuel Corso
realigned with the o*cial Conservative party; William Villamizar was in charge of Celis’ fac-
tion (who had died in an accident) and Chávez kept control over his group.
Source: RNEC
Although the Conservative wing won the highest number of votes in 2006 elections and its
loss in 2007 local elections was not as dramatic as that of the Liberal wing, Conservatives were
unable to benefit from the losses of Liberals. Other Uribista coalition parties such as Citizen
Convergence, Democratic Colombia, and the recently created Radical Change and U Party
mainly filled the Liberal gap. Many Liberal politicians migrated to the newest parties. Besides
the case of Suárez and Elcure, all other NDS’s politicians but one with alleged linkages with
the AUC belonged to these new parties.
Between the 2002 and 2006 congressional elections the votes of Citizen Convergence in
NDS increased by 1,633%.37 Carlos Barriga, a politician of Conservative backgroundwithout
electoral history, won a seat in Senate with 38,344 votes, Villa del Rosario’s mayoralty and an
Assembly seat. Voting for Barriga was very high, considering the fact that he was somewhat
of a newcomer and that it was the first time he ran for election, and at that time rumours of
paramilitary infiltration in his campaign were strong but no evidence has ever been found (El
Tiempo, 2007c).
Senator Barriga was investigated, along with NDS’s political bosses Jorge García-Herreros,
Eduardo Benítez, Augusto Celis, and Guillermo Mora, in the aforementioned case of violent
land expropriation of about 6,000 hectares (25% of peasant property in the region) in the
Catatumbo region with paramilitary support, aimed at growing palm oil.
But what actually first connected Barriga to the parapolitics scandal was the alleged links
between his brothers – owners of the aforementioned public works firmRetromáquinas – and
theAUCand other criminals of the likes of theMejíaMúnera twins andLosMexicanos. It has
37Similar trends could be observed in other departments. Except for two cases, all Citizen Convergence seats
have been or are being currently investigated for parapolitics.
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been claimed that the Barriga brothers laundered money through their firm and coordinated
cocaine tra*c activities with “El Pulpo” (Semana, 2006). It has also been said that the AUC
established a command and training centre in La Isla rural estate, a Barriga brothers property
in the Catatumbo region, which was also used as an interrogation, torture and execution
centre (Revista Cambio, 2007b). Nevertheless, the investigations against senator Barriga and
his brothers did not succeed. A writ of prohibition was issued in the case of the Senator and
the judicial investigation ceased as the evidence was considered weak. Barriga was re-elected
to Senate in 2010.
The U Party was electorally strong in NDS with 82,413 votes in 2006 with which it gained
two senatorial seats, two on theHouse of Representatives, fivemayoralties and three Assembly
seats. Manuel Guillermo Mora, former Cúcuta mayor, who had left Liberal Opening in 2003
in order to joinColombia Alive (Suárez’s party), joined theU Party for the 2006 elections and
won a senate seat with 49,708 votes. Mora allegedly met several times with FF’s men while
in mayoral o*ce in order to negotiate appointments at Comfaoriente, a departmental family
benefit fund (Revista Cambio, 2007b). However, there is no evidence that formally involves
the politician. The investigation at the SCJ has remained in preliminary stage. Mora was
re-elected to Congress in 2010.
Senator Juan Manuel Corzo from the Conservative Party is the only alleged parapolitician
with long-term experience in politics. He has been in Congress since 1998. The first investiga-
tion against Corzo for alleged collusion with the AUC was closed in September 2008 because
the evidencewasweak. However, “El Iguano” implicated the politician during one of his Peace
and Justice public hearings (Verdad Abierta, 2009b), a situation that led to the re-opening of
the investigation, which is still in preliminary stage. Despite the fact that Corzo was subject
to another three criminal investigations for alleged corruption, he was re-elected for Congress
in 2010. Ramiro Suárez stated that Jensey Miranda also financed Corzo’s campaigns.
Di(erent sources, including former AUC combatants, have provided a long list of at least
another eighteen politicians apparently involved with paramilitaries. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence to support the linkages.
Besides all the variations pointed above, there are additional di(erences between the AUC
intervention in NDS politics and that in Sucre. First, there was a significant discontinuity be-
tween politics in Catatumbo region and Cúcuta area, contrary to Sucre, where the linkages
from town councils to Congress and everything in between, and from rural to urban could be
easily drawn along the line of parapolitics. In Catatumbo, in the absence of evidence of collu-
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sion of politics, it is possible to argue that the action of the AUC was a typical case of armed
clientelism, not distant from the relationships established by guerrillas with local administra-
tions in that region. All the proven and alleged cases of collusion inNDS are specifically urban
and involve the FF under “El Iguano’s” direction. However, it is not possible to establish a
clear arrangement between the AUC and a specific power structure in NDS. None of the tra-
ditional electoral barons of the likes of the Cristo or García-Herreros have been involved in
the parapolitics to date. All of the implicated were newcomers to politics.
Second, there are no signs that allow linking the influence of the 2002 congressional elec-
tions with the 2003 local elections as in Sucre. Not only there is no evidence of the creation
of paramilitary “electoral districts” for the 2002 and 2003 local elections but also there are no
signs of any political house accumulating power and o*ce from 2002 to 2003 via paramilitary
influence as clearly observed in Sucre. Elcure’s case is illustrative, as the connection neither
took place via the political establishment nor via traditional intermediaries. Instead it was
the local director of the Secret Service who connected Elcure with the AUC. As for the case of
Ramiro Suárez, despite his connection with Manuel GuillermoMora, it is not possible to ob-
serve a clear incremental political capital. Third, not a singleNDS elected congress member in
2002 has been involved in parapolitics which means that the AUC did not seek NDS congres-
sional vote for the Justice and Peace Law approval and enactment. Although the purported
support to 2006 congressional candidates might have been connected to the AUC’s needs to
enlarge its already robust congressional voting block, the purpose of colluding with Senators
and Representatives in NDS it is not clear at all: the Justice and Peace Lawwas already passed
before the 2006 elections, and there are no signs of a paramilitary political project of the likes
of what “Jorge 40” sought to implant in the Caribbean region through the Social Front for
Peace, discussed in Chapter 5.
Fourth, capturing the state in NDS implied transforming institutions into operative cells
of the criminal network rather than a means to enter the realm of politics. In this context,
politicians involved were practically subordinated to AUC commanders, and were considered
as nodes of the network, just as security and law enforcement agencies, intermediaries, and
contractors’ firms. Moreover, there was a significant level of interconnection between cells. In
Sucre, the AUC integration to local politics was vertical as paramilitaries were subordinated
to the García house, and not all actors had the same weight within the structure.
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the judicial black spot of nds
Unlike the case of Sucre, the incidence or paramilitarism within the subnational state in NDS
has not been subjected to serious investigation or prosecution. As seen above, the deep infiltra-
tion of key security and law enforcement agencies as well as of local executive o*ces provided
the AUC an invaluable veil of impunity that has hindered judicial action to a significant extent.
Notwithstanding gaps in the available evidence, it does not seem possible to assert that col-
lusion was a marginal phenomenon under the AUC’s time in NDS. Moreover, such an asser-
tion would be questionable given the traditional weight of organized crime in the subnational
economy and the already discussed role of politicians in this field. The complicity between
politicians and criminals seems instead to have been characterized as a long-term process of
accommodation and of mutual benefit from one another. It is very likely that intermediaries
have contributed to make these linkages very sophisticated and di*cult to trace. Therefore,
the judicial investigation seems to have become increasingly di*cult.
What did exactly happened in NDS? Why is it that there are no successful judicial results?
As discussed above, the Colombian judicial system has shown on the whole extraordinary re-
sults vis-à-vis parapolitics – as the case of Sucre illustrates – in a country where impunity is a
structural and endemic issue. In this respect, impunity in NDS is puzzling. To date, there are
only two convictions, those of Suárez and Elcure; one writ of prohibition and investigation
being closed (Barriga); and two preliminary investigations (Mora and Corzo). “It is not clear
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at all why in NDS the investigation and prosecution of parapolitics has not prospered. It is
probable that there are too many interests at stake; too many businesses; too much money
involved. There must be extremely powerful intermediaries [...] there is so much at stake
here and many of the compromised actors are active and that is why nothing has been clar-
ified as it has happened in other parts of the country” (Bautista, 2009). There are, however,
more assertive opinions: “parapolitics has not been properly dealt with in NDS because our
politicians were very careful in protecting themselves against the judicial action. We have an
extremely clever political establishment, and politicians knew they had to deal with the AUC
as they had dealt with other criminals in the past. Arrangements were always done through
others of the likes of El Pulpo. That is why there were no meetings of the Ralito type here in
NDS. Our politicians have a rather low profile in Congress; they are not too visible. It seems
as if they delegated the exchange to [Ramiro] Suárez [...] economically speaking, and except
for Elcure, politicians were very careful not to be involved with AUC’s dirty money. But mark
my words: all their hands are dirty!” (Oviedo, 2009).
The case of security and law enforcement agencies is uneven, and although in this situation
it is very likely that many of the “ingredients” mentioned above by Oviedo in his interview
are at play, it has also to do with the performance of military justice in Colombia, which as
stated, has structural issues of judicial independence. In the case of the National Army and
Police, the o*cers with the higher ranks went unpunished: military courts acquitted Colonel
Matamoros; and the investigations against Major Montezuma did not yield results and he
ascended to the rank of Colonel. The only exceptions are the cases of Major Llorente who
was convicted in 2007 for La Gabarra massacre and of lower ranked agent Martín Soto and
Corporal Ardila. The case of the Secret Service was left unpunished because former director
and deputy director were assassinated. The only case in which there has been exemplary
twelve-year sentence to District Prosecutor Ana María Díaz, still in absentia, as well as seven
years sentences to a further twelve o*cials from the O*ce, including Magaly Moreno who
was captured in Venezuela in 2010.
Regarding Justice and Peace, the High Court of Bogotá found “El Iguano” guilty of the
commission of 170 homicides, two kidnappings, and 16 forcible displacements of civilians.
The paramilitary was sentenced to forty years of prison, however once JPL conditions were
applied, the sentence was reduced to eight years in prison, the maximum punishment deter-
mined by the law (HCB-110016000253200680281, 2010). “El Iguano” is the third paramilitary
commander to be sentenced in the framework of the JPL, after “Diego Vecino” and “Juancho
Dique” from Sucres HMMB. In the judicial review, the SCJ requested the High Court in 2009
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to exclude “El Iguano” from the Justice and Peace system, in which case “El Iguano” would
have lost all benefits from the JPL (SCJ-33301, 2010). However, the High Court refused, argu-
ing that the paramilitary had contributed to the system by confessing all the abovementioned
crimes (HCB-110016000253200680281, 2010).38 No other convictions have taken place in the
framework of the law. “Visaje”, another AUC urban commander was convicted to 26 years
of prison for the murder of Ernesto Obregón, but this sentence took place outside the Justice
and Peace system.
The situation of the victims is critical. As discussed, the investigation of crimes committed
by the AUC has had very poor results. In this context, the case of forcible disappearances is
particularly dramatic: skeletal remains of only 69 missing people have been found and iden-
tified out of the over 600 cases reported between 2000 and 2004 (El Espectador, 2009a). The
process of land restitution for displaced people has been very arduous as claimants have been
systematically threatened by re-emerging paramilitary groups; Sara Rodríguez and Rigoberto
Ramírez – leaders of the land restitution process in NDS -were murdered in Cúcuta in 2010.
And finally, the reparation process has been very slow and hardly any paramilitaries’ assets
have been used for compensating victims. It is calculated that only the compensation to vic-
tims for “El Iguano’s” confessed crimes (which do not constitute the whole universe of FF’s
victims) would amount to USD 3.2 million (HCB-110016000253200680281, 2010), of which
not even one per cent was declared by the paramilitary in the context of the JPL.
the post-auc era
Re-emerging paramilitary structures
Soon after the demobilization of the CB in 2004 FARC and ELN guerrillas have been trying
to take control over the cleared areas, which used to be their areas of influence. However,
as in Sucre, new paramilitary structures also emerged. In this context, coca crops and drug
tra*cking routes constitute the targets of a new cycle of contestation over territorial control.
According to the OAS, 1,425 combatants of the Catatumbo Bloc were demobilized in 2004
but only 1,115 guns were handed to the government during the process (MAPP-OEA, 2006).
Taking into account that the CB was one of the most important AUC structures, this 0.78
38In the sentence the High Court acknowledges nonetheless that these crimes do not constitute the whole
universe of o(ences which El Iguano can be held accountable for. According to the Prosecutor General’s O*ce,
paramilitary crimes reported to the Justice and Peace system in FF’s jurisdiction amount to 2,978.
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man/gun ratio does not coincide with the estimated firepower of the CB, and suggests that the
demobilization process was only partial. One of Mancuso’s partners in the drug tra*cking
business said that “[Mancuso] has only handed obsolete arms and demobilized useless people.
By doing so he was weighing the Government’s compromise to the demobilization process
while keeping the best he had” (Semana, 2008).
The neo-paramilitary structureÁguilas Negras (Black Eagles) emerged in Ocaña, El Tarra,
Tibú and Cúcuta at the end of 2004 and several of AUC’s former mid-ranking members were
identified as the main commanders. In 2008 it was estimated that Águilas Negras was ac-
tive in 11 municipalities with over 400 combatants, an army composed by BC’s demobilized
members, non-demobilized paramilitaries and ex-guerrilla combatants (MAPP-OEA, 2007).
In 2009 Águilas Negras were violently absorbed by another re-emerging structures called
Los Urabeños arrived in NDS from the Urabá region in Antioquia department – the same
route followed by the AUC in 1999. Then came Los Rastrojos, another re-emerging structure
from Valle department in southwestern Colombia. These groups have been at war for the
control of the illegal markets in NDS ever since.39
As in the case of Sucre, there are di(erent interpretations of these new structures. A promi-
nent regional journalist argued: “the AUC did not actually demobilize. They handed the
government old rifles and demobilized some men but not all of them. The only thing that
changed was the commandership. AUC’s former mid-ranking men are now in charge of these
structures” (Romero, 2009). However, others di(er in their assessment: “I do not think it is
exactly the same phenomenon. There is a great dispersion mostly due to the proliferation of
debt-colleting o*ces. The new paramilitary generation is disorganized, highly violent and
irrelevant in political terms [...] these emerging bands not only control debt-collecting o*ces
but also cocaine processing laboratories in [Cúcuta’s jurisdiction] and the roads’ network
where they extort transporters. All these activities demand territorial control, so in this re-
gard these groups can still be considered as paramilitaries but they are no longer the AUC”
(Bautista, 2009).
If compared to the post-AUC era in Sucre, the situation regarding the re-emerging struc-
tures in NDS has been even more complicated as not only all possible forms of organized
crime converge in NDS but also the size of the illicit economy is far larger than that of Sucre.
39“Los Rastrojos” operates in nine Colombian departments and “Los Urabeños” in four. They are ferociously
disputing[fighting over] coca crops areas and tra*cking routes trough the Pacific, Caribbean, and Venezuela. The
groups’ enmity can be traced back in the 1990s and their leaders are well-known drug barons who have been at
war over two decades.
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Consequently, violence associated with the criminal markets, which is somehow structural in
the department, particularly in Cúcuta, has been further intensified with these new groups.
It is therefore possible to claim that in NDS there is an enormous potential for a continuous
flow of criminalized economic activities in the hands of these bands or any other criminal
structures.
Since 2010mass media have been reporting the paradoxical alliance between guerrillas and
re-emerging bands for drug tra*cking purposes. According to reports, FARC and ELN are
in charge of coca production; EPL transforms coca paste into cocaine and new paramilitary
structures transport and collect money (El Tiempo, 2011). The alliance has been nonethe-
less very unstable and violent because of regular breaches of contract and losses of money
and drugs, a situation that has further destabilized the region, particularly in Hacarí and El
Tarra. In urban areas, re-emerging gangs operate in the same fashion as the FF, under the
model of debt-collecting o*ces; that is as criminal networks that provide the financial and vi-
olent enforcement of illegal markets. Given the control over extortion, money laundering and
contract killers, re-emerging gangs have keep a dominant position in Cúcuta’s metropolitan
area.
International E"ects
President Santos re-established the diplomatic relations with Venezuela in 2010 under a new
cooperative approach. These relations have become increasingly important in the context of
the peace talk with FARC that started in October 2012, in which the Venezuelan government
plays a key role. However, because the border continued to be a hot spot, criminal actions
have continued on both the Colombian and Venezuelan sides.
According to a report from the Colombian government, in 2010 FARC had expanded to-
wards the states of Apure and Zulia in Venezuela with 1,500 combatants, as well as some ELN
groups, allegedly connected to the Governor’s O*ce and some mayoralties through which in-
surgents have access to public contracting (El Espectador, 2010). Likewise the report claims
that members of ETA and Iranian citizens established in Venezuela are providing training
to Colombian guerrillas as well as creating and training local commandos. The report dis-
closes the linkages between some FARC commanders and Venezuelan power structures, en-
trepreneurs, social and educational organizations.
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Colombian think-tank Nuevo Arco Iris and a New York Times report claim that Los Ras-
trojos control Zulia state and its capital Maracaibo. The criminal gang, jointly withMexican
criminal group Los Zetas have been using Maracaibo’s port and clandestine airstrips for co-
caine tra*cking with the alleged protection of Zulia’s Police (Nuevo Arco Iris, 2012; TNYT,
2012). The report also notes that the war between Los Rastrojos and Los Urabeños has also
crossed the border, and the killing of four people in January 2012 is apparently connected to
this war.
Further propagation and contagion of the conflict has taken place. There are two groups
clearly identified in Venezuela. On the one hand, there is a paramilitary command of former
AUC combatants, under the command of renowned drug tra*cker and former “Jorge 40”
lieutenant Miguel Villarreal El Salmón. It is said that Villarreal controls almost all 25 tra*ck-
ing existing routes in Venezuela. On the other hand, there is a left-wing armed group known
as Los Boliches that sympathizes with the Bolivarian revolution and is presumably trained
by ELN guerrillas. This group is allegedly responsible for the infamous massacre of eleven
Colombian street vendors in Fernández Feo, Táchira department, in October 2009.
Economy
Despite the governmental anti-narcotics’ e(orts, coca cultivation has not declined inNDS, un-
like in other Colombian regions. Although between 1999 and 2004 illicit crops were reduced
by over 30% (UNODC, 2011) the coca economy experienced a substantial increase after the
AUC demobilized. In 2005 coca crops were reduced to 844 hectares but in 2009 they had aug-
mented to 3,307. In 2010 the total area decreased to 1,889 hectares and in 2011 it reached 3,490
(UNODC, 2011). In 2012 – last available estimate – shows a new increase of 29%with 4,516
hectares. Thus, cocaine exports have grown and the routes via Venezuela are still amongst the
most strategic.
Catatumbo is entering a new cycle of extraction, this time in the framework of legal mar-
kets, but under poorly regulated conditions and in the absence of the state. In 2010 started
the implementation of four great projects in the energy, mining and agro-industrial sectors
in the region. Multinationals of the likes of Harkem Energy, Solana Resources and Petro-
bras were undertaking seismic studies in an area of about 260,000 hectares. These firms are
also seeking to participate in the operation of a huge coal complex, which would become the
second largest open-pit mining complex in the country (Revista Cambio, 2007a). There has
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been a rapid expansion of palm oil plantations since the mid-2000; at the end of 2011 there
were 14,000 hectares in the region and according to the Governor’s O*ce the mid-term goal
is to reach 22,000 hectares and build an oil processing plant. This new extractive cycle has
an enormous potential for further conflict: the fact that over 20%of the Catatumbo territory
is still open for colonization entails a risk of large-scale plantation expansion, pushing small
informal landowners towards the mountains to a situation of greater marginalization. This
situation would not only generate new chaotic colonization waves – associated with the fur-
ther expansion of licit and illicit crops into the Motilón-Barí territory – but also guerrillas
seeking to extort the new multinational companies and re-emerging paramilitary structures
ready to protect the emerging businesses.
As for the metropolitan area, Venezuelan flows of consumers have stopped shopping in
Colombia. Since the 2010 rainy season provoked an unprecedented road blockage that fur-
ther aggravated the bilateral trade to the extent to which the departmental government had to
declare the state of economic and social emergency in NDS. In 2012 and 2013 the devaluation
of Bolivar has deepened the critical situation along the border. The local trade guild indi-
cated a drop of 80% in sales (Dinero, 2013). Unemployment has kept on rising in Cúcuta to
the extent of becoming the city with the highest unemployment rate in Colombia: 19.1%was
reported between July and September 2013, 7.1% above the national average (DANE, 2013).
Consequently, informality has also risen; at 71.2%it is the highest in the country. But drug traf-
ficking activities go on; so do contraband and other illicit activities. Re-emerging structures
have maintained a strong grip over all illicit businesses, including fuel contraband. In 2006
the national government “formalized” the black market in Cúcuta, a policy that consisted
legalizing the fuel that entered irregularly into Colombia. For that purpose the government
created authorized retail points. Despite the formalization policy, the amount of illegal fuel
that enters Colombian territory exceeds the fuel sold at the legal collection points. According
to NDS’s Mining and Energy Planning Unit, 672,000 gallons of Venezuelan fuel have reached
the Cúcuta’s market in average over the last eight years, and the supply exceeds the local de-
mand. The excess-supply fuel goes to the so-called escurrideros (illegal wholesale points from
where the fuel is distributed to other Colombian departments) and to cocaine processing lab-
oratories. It is calculated that this situation causes a national revenue loss of approximately
USD 200 million (Semana, 2010). Besides fuel, these groups control protection rackets and
gambling from which they collect approximately USD 15million per month.
Local authorities rhetorically condemn these practices but there are no e(ective actions
against them, a reality that suggests that nothing has changed in this regard, and that illicit
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markets continue to enjoy a great deal of protection. The thriving of illegal activities along
with informality keeps the city afloat.
State capture and politics
Although there have been no further developments registered regarding the infiltration of the
state, the fact that illegal economies continue to flourish permits arguing that criminals con-
tinue to receive protection on the part of state agents at the local level.
Unlike the AUC, re-emerging paramilitaries do not seem to have any political strength. The
last two elections have been the least violent of the last two decades, as in Sucre. Except for
Suárez and Elcure, those allegedly involved in parapolitics were all re-elected to Congress in
2010. In the overall, there is little political renewal. Nevertheless, unlike Sucre, the Liberal
Cristo house is still strong and in spite of being part of traditional politics, has been immune
to the paramilitary capture and has promoted progressive policies from Congress, such as the
Victims and Land Restitution Law, which was enacted in June 2011.40 As for the Left, the
systematic paramilitary o(ensive largely explains its meagre participation in the 2007 and
2010 elections.
40The law constitutes a fundamental advance vis-à-vis the internal armed conflict victims’ right to reparation
and restitution of land, amatter that was almost completely ignored under the Uribe administration. Senator Juan
FernandoCristo, one of the strongest opponents of theUribe administration, was one of themost active promoters
of the law and was the law’s sponsor in Congress. After successive failures during the Uribe administration, the
project finally found its way under president Santos’s government.
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CONCLUS IONS
an overview of the main original contributions
Despite the magnitude of parapolitics and its impact on the Colombian institutional life,the academic debate has been insu*cient. Notwithstanding the significant contri-
bution of the existing literature to shedding light on the phenomenon, the topic demanded
further empirical analysis and a more comprehensive theoretical approach in order to move
beyond the transactional sphere of parapolitics and to tackle its territorial and temporary
dissimilarities.
I therefore addressed a series of research questions, which along with the conduction of
empirical research that compares the cases of Sucre and NDS in subnational perspective, con-
tributed to providing more accurate answers to these questions. Regarding the first question,
what is parapolitics, I found that the phenomenon was built in a bottom-up fashion, namely
at the subnational level; it occurred in the interaction of distinct forms of political power, eco-
nomic accumulation, war economies and collective violence; and in turn it either contributed
to the maintenance of existing spheres and interactions or significantly transformed them.
These findings made me approach the phenomenon as a series of subnational processes of po-
litical economy, with significant spatial and temporal variations, and built within the existing
institutional framework and not outside the prevailing arrangements.
Regarding the second research question,what andwhowere the AUC, I indeed confirmed it
was confederation ofwarlordswith varying private agendas, but therewas a complex blending
of these personal agendas with the organizational master counter-insurgent discourse. In all
cases AUC structures delivered according to the counterinsurgent “mandate” but the blending
of agendas was significantly shaped tomatch the characteristics and seize the opportunities of
the territory theAutodefensas embedded in. In this vein, AUCwarlords specialized in crossing
the strategic boundaries that each territory o(ered. In Sucre, “Diego Vecino” and “Cadena”
were mainly at the service of the García house political strategy, but were at the same time
drug tra*ckers, and obeyed the counterinsurgent dictate, all under Northern Bloc’s Jorge
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40’s command. In this context, warlords became crossers of political boundaries, both at the
local and national level, co-governing the department and being represented in Congress.
Inversely, in NDS Mancuso and “El Iguano” mainly served economic agendas but did not
serve any political interest beyond colluding in order to guarantee protection to the paramil-
itary war economy. CB and FF commanders were experts in crossing complex economic
boundaries as well as the rural/urban divide. They went from controlling a significant share
of the coca and cocaine economies – and connecting them, controlling informal and scarcely
regulated formal transactions, to dominating the underworld. Warlords did not deliver across
political boundaries as in Sucre but connected with key state areas such as the judiciary, and
allied with Mayor Ramiro Suárez, a great protector, and with candidate “Chico” Elcure.
I addressed a third question: why, how and to what purpose did parapolitics take place?
Concerning the why, I incorporated a series of key variables to the analysis (state formation
processes, democratization, collective violence and crime, forms of accumulation, and trans-
formation of political parties), and made them interact in historical perspective in each case.
This allowed explaining not only why parapolitics occurred but also the particular forms of
parapolitics that took place in each case.
In Sucre I found that the large-scale phenomenon of parapolitics and state capture was
mainly politically driven and was projected to influence the national political sphere. The fact
that in Sucre politics was first and crime came second explains why the legal/illegal intersec-
tion was a long-term empty space that only started being filled in the context of parapolitics,
but not before.
Sucre is perhaps the most extraordinary case of criminalization of politics in Colombia. Be-
fore the emergence of the AUC in Sucre, the local state and society were systematically threat-
ened and victimized by guerrillas; the latifundium structure was progressively jeopardized by
agrarian unions; and the political establishment was at risk of losing influence because of the
proliferation of new power brokers, the rise of independent forces, and the fragmentation of
political parties. All these factors constituted important triggers of paramilitary formation
in Sucre: local elites privileged the privatization of security and protection – via the creation
of local AUC structures – over its public provision. Politicians, rural rich, security agents
and paramilitaries allied in order to preserve the subnational status quo, generating an anti-
subversive and anti-agrarian consociational reform arrangement.
This specific configuration, to a significant extent generalizable to the Caribbean region,
was made possible by the historical interaction of subnational closed political boundaries;
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the vertical integration of society into the state via clientelist ties; the predominance of the
Liberal party with its narrow spectrum and competition margins, as well as a strong fragmen-
tation, atomization and shift towards the Right end of the political continuum; pre-modern
forms of accumulation based upon rentier latifundia – intimately related to politics – and
weak integration to markets; the social contentiousness over the rural landholding structure;
a frail endogenous connection of the internal conflict to drug tra*cking due to the feeble pre-
existing forms of organized crime and limitation of criminal activities to cocaine exports. This
interaction generated a process of paramilitary formation connected to the establishment’s
needs of preserving the status quo of land and of the García house, rather to the incentives
of warlords and drug tra*ckers for taking over the pre-existing criminal underworld. This
explains why AUC structures were created within Sucreño territory and was led – and even
commanded – by the subnational establishment. It also clarifies that despite the accumula-
tion of wealth via drug tra*cking and the diversion of public finances, the principal asset
for the AUC in Sucre was politics. The AUC supported the García house for reproducing
its power in Congress and for unprecedentedly expanding its influence in departmental and
municipal politics. Warlords also protected the rural landholding status quo by undermin-
ing the agrarian movement through massacres, homicides and displacements. In exchange,
the MMHB joined a consociational political arrangement based upon violence, crime and
corruption from which it not only influenced local appointments but most importantly the
enactment of the Justice and Peace Law.
The case of NDS exhibits a di(erent configuration. I found a mainly economically driven
phenomenon of parapolitics, which exhibited a magnitude of intermediate scale and a more
restricted scope of state capture. Unlike Sucre, in NDS illegality and politics historically co-
evolved and therefore the intersection was filled before the AUC emerged. I found no evidence
that supports the importance of politics either via participation or representation in the de-
partment, or of scaling up the influence to the national level, contrary to Sucre’s case. NDS’s
distinct configuration of parapolitics was significantly shaped by the historical interaction of
political boundaries that have been more permeable to the central state’s influence; a society
that was more horizontally integrated to the state despite the existence of clientelist practices;
the absence of a political party in a hegemonic position, wider political competition, less
fragmentation and atomization of parties despite the shift towards the Right, and a stronger
political competition and less atomization of political parties; modern forms of accumula-
tion – detached from politics – based on international trade but weakly regulated in many
areas; the social contentiousness over a wider spectrum of claims; and a strong endogenous
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connection of the internal conflict with drug tra*c and other forms of organized crime ex-
plained by the traditionally robust urban underworld and coca economy in rural peripheries.
The interaction of these variables created a causal path in which paramilitary structures were
introduced in NDS as outcome of the demands of already established drug tra*ckers and sec-
tors of the National Army. There is no evidence that demonstrates that the emergence of the
CB and FF were connected to the subnational establishment’s needs and that politics repre-
sented the most valuable asset for warlords. Although there are two proven cases of collusion
of politicians with AUC warlords, the connection was mainly instrumental to the logic of the
market in the sense that paramilitaries sought protection for their venture in illegal, informal
and legal businesses. Paramilitaries did not form alliances for co-governing NDS or seeking
Congressional representation as in Sucre.
Regarding the how, I analysed three mechanisms for parapolitics: electoral strategies, state
capture and violence. As far as electoral strategies are concerned, I discussed that warlords’
attitudes vis-à-vis political enterprises varied not only according to their personal preferences
and objectives but also to the available territorial possibilities, shaped by the dynamics of
the internal armed conflict, the existing types of rule, and levels of integration to markets at
the subnational level. Following Losada’s types (2006) the hegemonic strategy was prevalent
in Sucre. In the framework of the “foundational” Ralito agreement, the strategy was aimed
at narrowing the scope of political groups or candidates – to the extent of having only the
García andMerlano houses and at times single candidates as the case of San Onofre’s Mayor
candidate – through violence, electoral fraud, and buying of votes. In the process warlords
imposed congressional and presidential candidates in 2002, governor, mayors, departmental
deputies and town councillors in 2003. They also backed the creation and strengthening of
new political parties, a move that significantly increased the success of the houses in the 2006
elections. In terms of state capture, this scheme permitted MMHB’s warlords to determine
appointments and divert public finances. As for violence, paramilitary terror articulated the
establishment, in the sense that the needs of maintaining the status quo of rural land and
of political houses became a shared goal (Romero, 2004, 2005), and was also the instrument
for exclusion of the lower strata. Social and political control in Sucre was mainly achieved
through mass violence against the agrarian unions, political competitors of and opponents
to the dominant houses.
In NDS the electoral strategy corresponded to Losada’s predominance within restricted
competition type, in which warlords supported a wider spectrum of candidates and were rela-
tively tolerant vis-à-vis competitors as long as they all delivered within the framework of their
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interests, namely the protection of the paramilitary economy. There were fewer politicians
that allied with the AUC in these departments as well as fewer cases of threats over elections
or fraud, if compared to the departments of the hegemonic model. It is noteworthy that all
these departments exhibit wider ranges of political actors in permanent competition, a feature
that could have made political alliances more complex and di*cult to establish than in the
Caribbean region where politics have beenmore compact and far less competitive. There is no
evidence of paramilitaries supporting politicians that reached Congress or a strong influence
in appointments at the departmental and municipal levels. In terms of state capture, although
warlords managed to influence a few appointments and get a great share of public contract-
ing, the most penetrated areas of the state were the judiciary, public security agencies and
secret service, which is coherent with the needs of impunity and immunity from investigation
and prosecution. As discussed, Cúcuta Mayor and a candidate to NDS’s Governor’s O*ce
were also central to the protection system and constituted nodes in the criminal networks of
paramilitaries. They did not seem to have any political value. NDS exhibited a somewhat dif-
ferent model concerning violence, which was intimately linked to the coca/cocaine economic
processes and the needs of controlling poorly regulated activities and other pre-existing illegal
operations. In this context, and although the AUC significantly hit the social movement and
Left wing politicians, the terror campaigns were more aimed at combining the control and
regulation of the war economy, and the protection of a far more di(use and heterogeneous so-
ciety. Paramilitary violence neither articulated the establishment nor did it necessarily exclude
the poorest sectors. This variation vis-à-vis Sucre is largely explained by the predominance of
the economic rationale of the AUC in NDS’s massive illegal economic platform and therefore
the need of articulating the lower strata to the paramilitary economic networks.
The fourth question relates to the purpose of parapolitics. There were two levels of pur-
poses; those of politicians and those of warlords, who counter intuitively, did not share identi-
cal goals and interests. On the side of politicians the purposes went from point alliances with
paramilitaries for the violent control of electoral results, to less instrumental engagements
that entailed the foundation and reproduction of authoritarian political regimes at the sub-
national level. In the case of paramilitaries I found that the logic of the market complexly
interacted with the logic of politics in the case of parapolitics. But insofar as parapolitics was
subnationally specific, I not only found distinct blending of economic and political rationales
in each studied case but also the prevalence of one over the other, depending on the subnational
historical configuration. In Sucre the findings respond to the purposes of a lenient demobi-
lization framework especially made for AUC warlords in Congress and the strengthening of
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a subnational authoritarian regime in defence of the status quo of the landholding structure
and of political houses. In NDS I found that the dominant purpose was the safeguard of a
hyper-criminalized economy and in this vein parapolitics took place in a more instrumental
sphere, namely protecting elections and maximizing votes.
limitations
I consider the value of this PhD thesis, beyond its extraordinary learning exercise, is its con-
tribution to the expansion of the current body of knowledge on parapolitics. However, this
line of enquiry has two main limitations that should by all means be tackled and overcome by
future examinations on the subject. The first one is methodological and relates to the scope
for generalization. Although I believe that in my case assuming a small-N research in order to
gain richness of in-depth comparative analysis was absolutely worth the risk, it still consider
the questions addressed and main analytical keys for building causal paths require further
analytical and empirical testing, not only in similar cases to those of Sucre and NDS, but in
cases of Losada’s type of apparent electoral indi"erence, and of parapolitics-free territories.
If my research questions and causal paths stand up to further testing, this thesis will have
contributed to the possibility of expanding its scope by “building blocks”, namely progres-
sively incorporating cases in order to have a larger-N study, with a wider and more compre-
hensive map of parapolitics, thus having enough external validity.
The second limitation is related to the restricted access to fine grained data and primary
sources. As observed, mass media and criminal investigation have provided an impressive
amount of evidence that permitted tracing the process of criminalization of politics and the
politicization of criminals substantiated in many a case, including that of Sucre. That is not
the case of NDS. The best primary source for this kind of research is semi-structured inter-
views. I was very lucky to find so many enthusiastic people willing to talk about parapolitics
in Sucre, in a quasi-cathartic exercise. In NDS it was close to impossible. Not only there were
far less judicial and mass media information. I found the department was still a landscape of
fear by the time of my visit, and exploring for further information entailed a security issue for
both interviewees and the researcher. Filling the gaps on NDS was very di*cult, and as seen
in the comparative analysis there is far less certainty in my NDS conclusions – what evidence
permitted – than in those on Sucre.
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I also found institutional barriers for collecting further information insofar as by the time
I undertook my fieldwork, the national government had banned interviewing AUC comman-
ders in jail. Insofar as talking to warlords was central I overcame many restrictions and man-
aged to make in an almost clandestine fashion a couple of enlightening and rich interviews –
the one with Ramón* lasted 8 hours!
challenges and recommendations
In the case of this research, the challenges and recommendations go beyond the academic
sphere and are centred in the policy and decision-making realms. I could not recommend
enough to the National Government to take into account the risks pointed below. It is note-
worthy underlining the current peace talks that are taking place between the Santos adminis-
tration and FARC in Cuba, which have unprecedentedly advanced in the context of the gov-
ernment’s strategic agenda related to a new model of rural development, the participation
of ex-combatants in politics, the rights of victims, and strategies for overcoming the coca
and cocaine economies. According to experts, the odds of reaching a peace agreement with
FARC, with ELN following suit, are very high. For the very first time after almost fifty years
Colombia would reach a final post conflict situation. In this context, Colombia demands not
only investing huge amounts of economic resources but also establishing strong guarantees
for reincorporating combatants into civilian and productive life, and political participation.
Democratizing and modernizing reforms are more urgent that ever before: the success of an
eventual FARC and ELN demobilization significantly depends upon these.
The historically contentious issues of land; political competition; justice and victims’ right
to reparation; and drug tra*c are on the table, and the structural factors that facilitated the
processes of parapolitics are very much alive. As mentioned in the case of Sucre, the matter
of landholding has not been overcome. On the one hand, an emerging wave of unknown en-
trepreneurs are buying peasant land plots far below market price in Montes de María. On
the other hand, a situation also observed in NDS, there are di*culties for land restitution
processes. According to the Land Restitution Unit, displaced peasants have claimed six mil-
lion hectares of dispossessed land, In August 2013, the GAO indicated it was investigating
56 homicide cases of land restitution leaders and claimants committed by the so-called “anti-
restitution armies” over the last decade, a trend that goes against the serious and committed
e(orts of the Santos administration in this regard.
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The widening of the political participation spectrum is also at stake. Colombia is deeply
polarized vis-à-vis this issue. An important share of the public opinion is reactive to have
ex-guerrilla members running for Congress, mayoralties and governor’s o*ces after having
committed endless crimes against humanity and incurred in drug tra*c activities. It is note-
worthy that this opinion was not shared when the AUC demobilized under the JPL mainly
because the Autodefensas were not granted the right of political participation.
The aforementioned UP extermination experience is recent. The party has just recovered its
legal representation and it is very likely to become the political platform of demobilized FARC
members. However, all conditions for a new wave of violence against this type of politics are
met: resilient corrupted political elites obsessed with maintaining the status quo and privi-
leges and available violent muscle willing to contribute to the annihilation of these political
newcomers.
In a wider social perspective, the criminal political project severely undermined collective
action. Society was further impoverished and deconstructed by paramilitary terror. Father
Rafael Castillo discussed the social impact in Sucre, but his words can perfectly fit NDS or
any other case: “on the one hand, the society has been trapped by fear and with feelings
of betrayal and abandonment from the state. People were unable to collectively react against
terror. On the other hand, criminal values deeply permeated society and it is possible to stress
that to a significant extent the Sucreño society shares a collective “paramilitary ethos”; there
is a generalized obsession with violence. How to transform the imaginaries? Is it possible for
Sucreño society to conceive the world otherwise?” (Castillo, 2009)
I pointed out that the judicial system, backed by a national and international mobilized
public opinion, has been fiercely engaged in uncovering the linkages between politicians and
paramilitaries, demonstrating that a quantum of institutional counter-weight and a modern
de jure performance can unveil an extremely sophisticated and harmful criminal apparatus.
However the overall balance of the benefits obtained by paramilitaries constitutes the triumph
of criminals over justice. The JPL ended up legitimating the paramilitary strategy and political
power, rehabilitating a great share of warlords’ wealth and land holdings, and legalizing to a
significant extent committed crimes at the expense of truth, reparation and conciliation.
Moreover, the elimination of political status as a sine qua non condition for negotiating
peace agreements not only benefited the Autodefensas but also left the door open for any
criminal organization seeking to gain advantages in the future. Paramilitarism is not over yet.
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conclusions
On the side of politicians, the situation has been less favourable insofar as they face longer
convictions than those of paramilitaries that accepted the JPL jurisdiction. In this sense the
spirit of the law failed to embrace the magnitude of the phenomenon by leaving politicians
at the margin; the fact that none of them has collaborated by admitting the existence of al-
liances and providing information makes this possibility even more elusive. Nevertheless, as
discussed, parapoliticians have managed to maintain power by launching relatives or close
friends as political frontmen, and the strategies have been successful in the sense they have
kept congressional seats and o*ce.
In the aftermath of the AUC demobilization process, the inertia of drug tra*cking proved
so strong that it rapidly facilitated the emergence of a new generation of paramilitary gangs.
Although rearmament tends to be a common feature in post-disarmament situations, the rise
of a new generation of paramilitarism under the shelter of a powerful illegal economy seems
very unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon. The AUC ended its demobilization in 2006 and
in 2013 these gangs are still around. The paramilitary recycling through re-emerging struc-
tures have further armoured the illegal economies. The coca and cocaine economies are still
strong in many regions – backed indeed by FARC guerrilla – and other criminal opportuni-
ties are still available. The more recent is that of illegal mining, which is rapidly spreading
throughout the Colombian territory.
Although these re-emerging paramilitary structures have not been involved in politics, as
long as organized crime exists and subnational authoritarian regimes prove resilient to democ-
ratizing trends, the politicians’ needs of political survival will keep on meeting the criminals’
needs of political representation. Although it is too soon to jump into definite predictions, it
would not be misconceived to foresee the history repeating itself. All the conditions are met.
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CHAPTER 1 — THE ENG INEER ING OF PARAPOL ITCS
list of parapoliticians investigated, prosecuted and convicted by the
colombian judicial system (2005-2013)
Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status






Amazonas Victor Hugo Moreno Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Jorge Ignacio Morales Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Mauricio Parody Liberal Party AGO Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Pompilio Avendaño Liberal Party SCJ Acquitted
Antioquia Cesar Pérez Radical Change AGO Trial in process
Antioquia Estanislao Ortiz Radical Change AGO Trial in process
Antioquia César Augusto Andrade Radical Change AGO Convicted
Antioquia Jesús Doval Radical Change AGO Convicted
Antioquia Manuel Darío Avila Radical Change AGO Convicted
Antioquia Rocío Arias Civic and Popular Con-
vergence
AGO Convicted
Antioquia William Velez Mesa U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Antonio Valencia Wings – Colombia
Team
SCJ Convicted
Antioquia Carlos Arturo Clavijo Civic and Popular Con-
vergence
AGO Convicted
Antioquia Ernesto Garcés Soto Conservative Party AGO Case closed
Antioquia Guillermo Gaviria Zap-
ata
Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Humberto de Jesús
Builes
Radical Change AGO Convicted




Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Mario Uribe Escobar Democratic Colombia AGO Convicted
Antioquia Oscar Suarez Mira Wings – Colombia
Team
SCJ Trial in process
Antioquia Rubén Dario Quintero Radical Change AGO Convicted
(Continued)
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Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status
Antioquia Gabriel Zapata Conservative Party SCJ Writ of
prohibition
Antioquia Jhon Jairo Roldán Aven-
daño
Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia José Ignacio Mesa Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage




Antioquia William Ortega Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia Olga suárez Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Antioquia César Pérez García Conservative Party SCJ Trial in process
Atlántico Álvaro Antonio Ashton Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Armando Benedetti U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico David Char Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Dieb Maloof Colombia Alive AGO Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Vicente Blel Colombia Alive AGO Convicted
Atlántico Jorge Castro Colombia Alive SCJ Convicted




Atlántico Alonso Acosta Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Tarquino Pacheco Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Mario Enrique Varón Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Eduardo Crissien U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Jaime Cervantes Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico José Name Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Atlántico Luis Eduardo Díaz-
Granados
Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Bolívar Fernando Tafur Liberal Opening SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Bolívar Héctor Julio Alfonso
López
Liberal Opening AGO Investigation in
Process
Bolívar Miguel Angel Rangel U Party AGO Convicted
Bolívar Daira Galvis Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
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Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status
Bolívar José María Imbett Conservative Party SCJ Convicted
Bolívar Pepe Gnecco Liberal Party AGO Case closed
Bolívar William Montes Conservative Party AGO Convicted
Bolívar Javier Cáceres Radical Change SCJ Convicted
Bolívar Lidio García Turbay Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Bolívar Piedad Zuccardi U Party AGO Preliminary
Stage
Boyacá Ciro Ramírez Conservative Party AGO Convicted
Boyacá Humprey Roa Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Caldas Mauricio Lizcano U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Caldas Emilio Enrique Angel Liberal Party AGO Convicted
Caldas Dixon Tapasco Liberal Party AGO Convicted
Caldas Jairo Alberto Llanos Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Caldas Juan Pablo Sánchez Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Caldas Adriana Gutiérrez U Party AGO Case closed
Caldas Carlos Clavijo Civic and Popular Con-
vergence
AGO Convicted
Caldas Víctor Renán Barco Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Caldas Jaime Zuloaga U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage




Caquetá Alvaro Pacheco Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Casanare Javier Enrique Vargas Radical Change SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Casanare Oscar Wilches Radical Change AGO Investigation in
process
Cauca Gloria Montilla Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Cauca Luis Fernando Velasco Liberal Party SCJ Acquitted
Cesar Alvaro Morón Wings – Colombia
Team
AGO Convicted
Cesar Jorge Enrique Ramírez Liberal Party AGO Convicted
Cesar Miguel Ángel Duran Regional Integration
Movement
SCJ Convicted
Cesar Alvaro Araujo Wings – Colombia
Team
AGO Convicted
Cesar Mauricio Pimiento U Party SCJ Convicted
Cesar Juan Manuel Campo Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
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Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status
Cesar Carmen Gutiérrez U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Cesar Alfonso Mattos Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Cesar Pedro Muvdi Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Cesar Alfredo Ape Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Chocó Odín Sánchez U Party SCJ Convicted
Chocó Edgar Ulises Torres Radical Change SCJ Convicted
Chocó Carlos Escobar Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Chocó Cristóbal Rufino Cór-
doba
Democratic Colombia SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba José de los Santos Ne-
grete
Conservative Party AGO Acquitted
Córdoba Remberto Montes Liberal Party AGO Investigation in
Process
Córdoba Luis José Alvarez Liberal Party AGO Case Closed
Córdoba Eleonora Pineda Popular United Move-
ment
AGO Convicted
Córdoba Freddy Sánchez Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Córdoba Mussa Besaile Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba Arleth Casado Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba Bernardo Elías U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba Juan Manuel López Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Córdoba Julio Manzur Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba Luis Carlos Ordosgoitia Conservative Party AGO Acquitted
Córdoba Salomón Nader Liberal Party SCJ Trial in process
Córdoba Reginaldo Montes Radical Change SCJ Convicted
Córdoba Rodrigo Burgos Conservative Party AGO Convicted
Córdoba Zulema Jattin U Party AGO Investigation in
Process
Córdoba Miguel de la Espriella Democratic Colombia AGO Trial in process
Córdoba Matín Emilio Morales U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Córdoba Nora García Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Guainia Sandra Aravella Radical Change SCJ Revoked
sentence
Guajira Miguel Pinedo Radical Change AGO Convicted
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Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status






Magdalena Rodrigo Roncallo Liberal Opening AGO Preliminary
Stage
Magdalena Jorge Luis Caballero Liberal Opening SCJ Convicted
Magdalena Karelly Lara Radical Change SCJ Convicted
Magdalena Alonso de Jesús Ramírez Moral AGO Trial in process
Magdalena Afonso Campo Escobar Conservative Party SCJ Convicted
Magdalena Luis Fernando Vanegas Liberal Opening AGO Preliminary
Stage
Magdalena José Gamarra Radical Change SCJ Investigation in
Process
Magdalena Eduardo Diazgranados U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Magdalena Fuad Rapag U Party SCJ Trial in process
Magdalena Enrique Caballero Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Magdalena Luis Eduardo Vives Citizen Convergence SCJ Convicted
Magdalena Joaquin José Pérez Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Magdalena Roberto Herrera Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Meta Fabiola Olaya Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Meta Luis Carlos Torres Radical Change AGO Preliminary
Stage
Nariño Myriam Paredes Conservative Party SCJ Writ of
prohibition
Nariño Eduardo Maya Conservative Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage








Ricardo Elcure Democratic Colombia SCJ Convicted
N de
Santander






U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Putumayo Guillermo Rivera Liberal Party AGO Writ of
prohibition
Risaralda Habib Merheg Colombia Alive AGO Preliminary
Stage
Santander José Manuel Herrera Citizen Convergence SCJ Investigation in
Process
Santander Alfonso Riaño Citizen Convergence SCJ Convicted
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Department Name Political Party JurisdictionJudicial Status
Santander Iván Díaz Conservative Party SCJ Convicted
Santander Luis Alberto Gil Citizen Convergence AGO Convicted
Santander Marco Alirio Cortes U Party SCJ Investigation in
Process
Santander Oscar Reyes Citizen Convergence SCJ Convicted
Santander Rafael Castillo Sanchez Citizen Convergence AGO Investigation in
Process
Santander José Eristides Andrade Liberal Party SCJ Trial in process
Santander Nelson Naranjo Citizen Convergence SCJ Convicted
Sucre José María Conde Democratic Colombia SCJ Convicted
Sucre Erick Morris Democratic Colombia SCJ Convicted
Sucre Jairo Fernando Quessep Social Action Party SCJ Acquitted
Sucre Antonio Guerra de la Es-
priella
Radical Change AGO Case Closed
Sucre Muriel Benito Rebollo Conservative Party AGO Convicted
Sucre Jorge Luis Feris Liberal Party AGO Convicted
Sucre Alvaro García Democratic Colombia SCJ Convicted
Sucre Jairo Merlano U Party AGO Convicted
Sucre Eduardo Merlano U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Sucre Jorge Visbal U Party AGO Preliminary
Stage
Tolima Emilio Martínez Liberal Party SCJ Investigation in
Process
Tolima Pedro Pablo Trujillo Conservative Party SCJ Writ of
prohibition
Tolima Javier Ramiro Devia Conservative Party AGO Writ of
prohibition
Tolima Gonzálo García Conservative Party SCJ Convicted
Tolima Jaime Yepes U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Tolima Pompilio Avendaño Liberal Party SCJ Acquitted
Tolima Carlos García U Party SCJ Acquitted
Tolima Luis Humberto Gomez
Gallo
Conservative Party AGO Convicted
Tolima Mauricio Jaramillo Liberal Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Valle Carlos Herney Abadía Liberal Party SCJ Convicted
Valle Luis Carlos Restrepo U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Valle Dilian Francisca Toro U Party SCJ Preliminary
Stage
Valle Juan Carlos Martinez Citizen Convergence SCJ Convicted
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Mapped by the author.
sucre’s auc commandership line
This photo has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
transcripts from the conversations recorded in ‘jorge 40’ laptop
1
1“Las pruebas de la parapolítica en Sucre”, in Semana, November 11th 2006
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‘Gonzalo’, ‘Don Antonio’; departmental deputies Angel Villarreal, Johnny Villa, Nelson Stamp and Walberto
Estrada, and Zenú indigenous leaders Pedro Pestaña and Antonio Martínez2; Willer Cobo and Conservative
candidate to the House of Representatives Antonio Martínez discuss the distribution of electoral support, the
taxing of public contracting, and again, the nature of the political project.
On the political project:
Willer Cobo: “we need to unite in order to guarantee governance in Sucre and promote social work [...] we have to
promote a single candidate who runs for departmental governor and create a political structure in every single
municipality depending on the governor’s political movement”
Gonzalo: “we need to consolidate a political team and have a paramilitary leader in charge; one that hasn’t
demobilized yet [...] working in a di(erent line to that of ‘Cadena’ [...] we cannot a(ord to lose the political
workwe’ve done here. We are creating a political and social front in Sucre for peace time [...] no guns but bearing
in mind that the Northern Bloc still has a threatening muscle in case we need it [...] the aim is to crystallize all
the electoral work we’ve done and the success in influencing the Legislative [...] a centre-right position; we’re
no enemies of the Left but of all those subversives that hide behind the Left flags [...] basing their discourse in
this Marxist-Communist thing [...] we’ll keep on fighting those who use that discourse to gain people’s hearts
and then deceive them”
Antonio Martínez: “We need to have the best possible relations with the Legislative as well as targeting the Exec-
utive in the middle run [...] if we do that we’ll have the ground floor of our building; that will be our base, so
let’s put our first own governor.”
On the distribution of electoral support:
‘Gonzalo’ [referring to the need of negotiating with Alvaro García]: “I will speak to ‘El Gordo’ [‘the Fat’, García’s
nickname] and convince him. He is still looking for a party to launch his campaign”
‘Willer Cobo: “Alvaro García will give some money here. With that money we can finance House of Representa-
tives”.
‘Gonzalo’: “So when I start the [campaign] process you all go with Alvaro [García], but you can’t negotiate on
your own, you have to wait until we say something because maybe we could change our minds. We can decide
supporting someone else. We still don’t know. If you go with García it’s with our organization’s support. If
70% of the Senate voting goes to Alvaro García then we’ll negotiate with García”.
‘Fredy’: “Don Gonzalo, when you talk to Alvaro García let him know that we’ll give him 20,000, 15,000, 30,000
votes, whatever; just a reference point to start a negotiation [...] howmuch are these 20,000, 30,000 votes worth?
Let’s say $1.000million [US$830,000], 500, 800... that’s something you’ll have to work on...”
’Gonzalo’: “the thing with Muriel [Benito] is very complicated right now and I don’t think people will follow
her; I’m really worried about it because my people [Merlano] are with her...[...] We had no choice but thinking
about the future: it was [Jorge] Merlano or Muriel or [Alvaro] García. García gave us the subsidized health
system; he gave us $3.200million [US$2.6million] from the department [...] Merlano has contributed with say
$10,000 or $15.000 million [US$8.3 or US$12.5 million], and this is a problem because Muriel spoke with him
and is aspiring to the House of Representatives again [...] Antonio Martínez, who’s here with us today, is our
candidate for the House of Representatives. Not Muriel. We know him and when he was Los Palmitos mayor
he helped us a lot”.
[...]
‘Fredy’: “Excellent! Coveñas and Toluviejo go with [Eric] Morris [candidate to House of Representatives]”
‘Gonzalo’: “Well, let’s continue...San Antonio de Palmito goes with Morris as well...”
‘Fredy’: “Toluviejo and Sucre are hundred per cent with Morris [...] A quick calculation gives us something like
10,000 votes for Morris [...] this is important because he’ll get to know better his organization’s brothers”
‘Gonzalo’: “with at least 4,000 votes in Toluviejo”
2Pedro Pestaña was the manager of Manexca, an indigenous co-operative that provided subsidized health
system services in the department. Pestaña and Martínez were later prosecuted and convicted under the Zenú
special judicial jurisdiction for deviatingManexca’s resources to the AUC.
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On public contracting:
‘Gonzalo’: “I had a meeting with commander ‘Jorge 40’ last week and we agreed on the need to collect 10 percent
of all the departmental contracting for maintaining our military and political structure [...] I mean, ‘Cadena’
was collecting almost 50 percent, so I guess we are making a huge di(erence here [...] This is the way we are
working now in other departments and to tell the truth we are all working in a quite pleasant way”
The recording also accounts for the politicians’ loyalty to the AUC:
Antonio Martínez: “I’ve had the organization’s support and I can never forget that and that’s why I owe loyalty
and gratitude to the organization. So today I say I’m grateful as a person, as a politician”.
Gonzalo’: Nelson Stanp, a very good friend of missing commander ‘Cadena’, is here with us today. He has done a
very important work for the organization. I think that ‘doctor’ Stanp is one of the closest departmental deputies
to the organization”
Nelson Stanp: “Because of commander Cadena’s loyalty I’m one of your closest men. I was one of the first people
to have met him in San Onofre. I want to say I’m a loyal person and that during the time I was with ‘Cadena’ I
considered myself one of his closest men [...] Now you can expect from me all the loyalty in the world and I’ll
do whatever it takes for you”
Angel Villarreal: “I think this is a great opportunity for Sucre and I’d like to say we fully agree on what you want
to do for our department...”
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sucreño politicians prosecuted/convicted for parapolitics
sucreño parapoliticians
These photos have been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
the victims
Detail of a “memory quilt” sewn by massacre victims (San Onofre)
This photo has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
Mortal remains found in El Palmar rural estate (San Onofre)
This photo has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
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Sucreño Ghost Towns
These photos have been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
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norte de santander orthographic map
This map has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation.
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norte de santander subregions
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Mapped by the author.
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L I ST OF INTERV IEWS
national
RAFAEL PARDO RUEDA, Liberal presidential candidate, Bogotá, November 3rd 2009
CLAUDIA LÓPEZ – Journalist and member of the electoral watchdogMisión de Observación Electoral -MOE
(Electoral Observation Mission), Bogotá, March 26th 2010
sucre
JORGE RESTREPO – Sucre University Lecturer and Director of theCentro de Convivencia y Familia -CECAR,
Sincelejo, November 9th 2009
DABOBERTO VILLADIEGO – ANUC Leader – Sincelejo, November 9th 2009
UDALDO LARA – ANUC Leader – San Onofre, November 10th 2009
JUAN ALVAREZ, ANUC leader, San Onofre, November 10th 2009
EDUARDO PORRAS, Director of the Provincial Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (Comisión Na-
cional de Reparación y Reconciliación -CNRR), Sincelejo, November 11th 2009
FREDY GARCIA – Montes de María Peace and Development Foundation, Sincelejo, November 11th 2009
LUIS ALBERTO HERNANDEZ – Director of transparency watchdog Nueva Sabana Foundation, Sincelejo,
November 11th 2009
PABLO VASQUEZ- FUNDEPAZ – San Onofre, November 10th 2009
FATHER RAFAEL CASTILLO – Priest and Executive Director of the Montes de María Peace and Development
Foundation, Macayepo, November 13th 2009
DAIRO (*) – University Of Sucre’s Student Leader, Sincelejo, November 11th 2009
MAGNOLIA (*), Chengue massacre survivor, Ovejas, November 12th 2009
AMBROSIO (*), Chengue massacre survivor, Ovejas, November 12th 2009
PAOLA (*), San Onofre, November 10th 2009
DANIEL (*), public o*cial, Sincelejo, November 9th 2009
Alias RAMON (*), AUC Commander, Bogotá: November 6th 2009
nds
Jairo Oviedo, PARCOMUN Executive Director, Cúcuta, December 3rd 2009
Víctor Bautista, ORDICOP Executive Director, Cúcuta, December 2nd 2009
Angel Romero, La Opinión newspaper journalist, Cúcuta, December 2nd 2009
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